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Diffstat (limited to 'arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c')
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c641
1 files changed, 598 insertions, 43 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c
index 83df20e3e633..ebe79d60619f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@
#include "encl.h"
#include "encls.h"
-static struct sgx_va_page *sgx_encl_grow(struct sgx_encl *encl)
+struct sgx_va_page *sgx_encl_grow(struct sgx_encl *encl, bool reclaim)
{
struct sgx_va_page *va_page = NULL;
void *err;
@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ static struct sgx_va_page *sgx_encl_grow(struct sgx_encl *encl)
if (!va_page)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
- va_page->epc_page = sgx_alloc_va_page();
+ va_page->epc_page = sgx_alloc_va_page(reclaim);
if (IS_ERR(va_page->epc_page)) {
err = ERR_CAST(va_page->epc_page);
kfree(va_page);
@@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ static struct sgx_va_page *sgx_encl_grow(struct sgx_encl *encl)
return va_page;
}
-static void sgx_encl_shrink(struct sgx_encl *encl, struct sgx_va_page *va_page)
+void sgx_encl_shrink(struct sgx_encl *encl, struct sgx_va_page *va_page)
{
encl->page_cnt--;
@@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ static int sgx_encl_create(struct sgx_encl *encl, struct sgx_secs *secs)
struct file *backing;
long ret;
- va_page = sgx_encl_grow(encl);
+ va_page = sgx_encl_grow(encl, true);
if (IS_ERR(va_page))
return PTR_ERR(va_page);
else if (va_page)
@@ -107,6 +107,7 @@ static int sgx_encl_create(struct sgx_encl *encl, struct sgx_secs *secs)
set_bit(SGX_ENCL_DEBUG, &encl->flags);
encl->secs.encl = encl;
+ encl->secs.type = SGX_PAGE_TYPE_SECS;
encl->base = secs->base;
encl->size = secs->size;
encl->attributes = secs->attributes;
@@ -168,38 +169,6 @@ static long sgx_ioc_enclave_create(struct sgx_encl *encl, void __user *arg)
return ret;
}
-static struct sgx_encl_page *sgx_encl_page_alloc(struct sgx_encl *encl,
- unsigned long offset,
- u64 secinfo_flags)
-{
- struct sgx_encl_page *encl_page;
- unsigned long prot;
-
- encl_page = kzalloc(sizeof(*encl_page), GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!encl_page)
- return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
-
- encl_page->desc = encl->base + offset;
- encl_page->encl = encl;
-
- prot = _calc_vm_trans(secinfo_flags, SGX_SECINFO_R, PROT_READ) |
- _calc_vm_trans(secinfo_flags, SGX_SECINFO_W, PROT_WRITE) |
- _calc_vm_trans(secinfo_flags, SGX_SECINFO_X, PROT_EXEC);
-
- /*
- * TCS pages must always RW set for CPU access while the SECINFO
- * permissions are *always* zero - the CPU ignores the user provided
- * values and silently overwrites them with zero permissions.
- */
- if ((secinfo_flags & SGX_SECINFO_PAGE_TYPE_MASK) == SGX_SECINFO_TCS)
- prot |= PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE;
-
- /* Calculate maximum of the VM flags for the page. */
- encl_page->vm_max_prot_bits = calc_vm_prot_bits(prot, 0);
-
- return encl_page;
-}
-
static int sgx_validate_secinfo(struct sgx_secinfo *secinfo)
{
u64 perm = secinfo->flags & SGX_SECINFO_PERMISSION_MASK;
@@ -306,7 +275,7 @@ static int sgx_encl_add_page(struct sgx_encl *encl, unsigned long src,
return PTR_ERR(epc_page);
}
- va_page = sgx_encl_grow(encl);
+ va_page = sgx_encl_grow(encl, true);
if (IS_ERR(va_page)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(va_page);
goto err_out_free;
@@ -344,6 +313,7 @@ static int sgx_encl_add_page(struct sgx_encl *encl, unsigned long src,
*/
encl_page->encl = encl;
encl_page->epc_page = epc_page;
+ encl_page->type = (secinfo->flags & SGX_SECINFO_PAGE_TYPE_MASK) >> 8;
encl->secs_child_cnt++;
if (flags & SGX_PAGE_MEASURE) {
@@ -372,6 +342,26 @@ err_out_free:
return ret;
}
+/*
+ * Ensure user provided offset and length values are valid for
+ * an enclave.
+ */
+static int sgx_validate_offset_length(struct sgx_encl *encl,
+ unsigned long offset,
+ unsigned long length)
+{
+ if (!IS_ALIGNED(offset, PAGE_SIZE))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (!length || !IS_ALIGNED(length, PAGE_SIZE))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (offset + length - PAGE_SIZE >= encl->size)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
/**
* sgx_ioc_enclave_add_pages() - The handler for %SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGES
* @encl: an enclave pointer
@@ -425,14 +415,10 @@ static long sgx_ioc_enclave_add_pages(struct sgx_encl *encl, void __user *arg)
if (copy_from_user(&add_arg, arg, sizeof(add_arg)))
return -EFAULT;
- if (!IS_ALIGNED(add_arg.offset, PAGE_SIZE) ||
- !IS_ALIGNED(add_arg.src, PAGE_SIZE))
- return -EINVAL;
-
- if (!add_arg.length || add_arg.length & (PAGE_SIZE - 1))
+ if (!IS_ALIGNED(add_arg.src, PAGE_SIZE))
return -EINVAL;
- if (add_arg.offset + add_arg.length - PAGE_SIZE >= encl->size)
+ if (sgx_validate_offset_length(encl, add_arg.offset, add_arg.length))
return -EINVAL;
if (copy_from_user(&secinfo, (void __user *)add_arg.secinfo,
@@ -674,6 +660,565 @@ static long sgx_ioc_enclave_provision(struct sgx_encl *encl, void __user *arg)
return sgx_set_attribute(&encl->attributes_mask, params.fd);
}
+/*
+ * Ensure enclave is ready for SGX2 functions. Readiness is checked
+ * by ensuring the hardware supports SGX2 and the enclave is initialized
+ * and thus able to handle requests to modify pages within it.
+ */
+static int sgx_ioc_sgx2_ready(struct sgx_encl *encl)
+{
+ if (!(cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SGX2)))
+ return -ENODEV;
+
+ if (!test_bit(SGX_ENCL_INITIALIZED, &encl->flags))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Some SGX functions require that no cached linear-to-physical address
+ * mappings are present before they can succeed. Collaborate with
+ * hardware via ENCLS[ETRACK] to ensure that all cached
+ * linear-to-physical address mappings belonging to all threads of
+ * the enclave are cleared. See sgx_encl_cpumask() for details.
+ *
+ * Must be called with enclave's mutex held from the time the
+ * SGX function requiring that no cached linear-to-physical mappings
+ * are present is executed until this ETRACK flow is complete.
+ */
+static int sgx_enclave_etrack(struct sgx_encl *encl)
+{
+ void *epc_virt;
+ int ret;
+
+ epc_virt = sgx_get_epc_virt_addr(encl->secs.epc_page);
+ ret = __etrack(epc_virt);
+ if (ret) {
+ /*
+ * ETRACK only fails when there is an OS issue. For
+ * example, two consecutive ETRACK was sent without
+ * completed IPI between.
+ */
+ pr_err_once("ETRACK returned %d (0x%x)", ret, ret);
+ /*
+ * Send IPIs to kick CPUs out of the enclave and
+ * try ETRACK again.
+ */
+ on_each_cpu_mask(sgx_encl_cpumask(encl), sgx_ipi_cb, NULL, 1);
+ ret = __etrack(epc_virt);
+ if (ret) {
+ pr_err_once("ETRACK repeat returned %d (0x%x)",
+ ret, ret);
+ return -EFAULT;
+ }
+ }
+ on_each_cpu_mask(sgx_encl_cpumask(encl), sgx_ipi_cb, NULL, 1);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * sgx_enclave_restrict_permissions() - Restrict EPCM permissions
+ * @encl: Enclave to which the pages belong.
+ * @modp: Checked parameters from user on which pages need modifying and
+ * their new permissions.
+ *
+ * Return:
+ * - 0: Success.
+ * - -errno: Otherwise.
+ */
+static long
+sgx_enclave_restrict_permissions(struct sgx_encl *encl,
+ struct sgx_enclave_restrict_permissions *modp)
+{
+ struct sgx_encl_page *entry;
+ struct sgx_secinfo secinfo;
+ unsigned long addr;
+ unsigned long c;
+ void *epc_virt;
+ int ret;
+
+ memset(&secinfo, 0, sizeof(secinfo));
+ secinfo.flags = modp->permissions & SGX_SECINFO_PERMISSION_MASK;
+
+ for (c = 0 ; c < modp->length; c += PAGE_SIZE) {
+ addr = encl->base + modp->offset + c;
+
+ sgx_reclaim_direct();
+
+ mutex_lock(&encl->lock);
+
+ entry = sgx_encl_load_page(encl, addr);
+ if (IS_ERR(entry)) {
+ ret = PTR_ERR(entry) == -EBUSY ? -EAGAIN : -EFAULT;
+ goto out_unlock;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Changing EPCM permissions is only supported on regular
+ * SGX pages. Attempting this change on other pages will
+ * result in #PF.
+ */
+ if (entry->type != SGX_PAGE_TYPE_REG) {
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ goto out_unlock;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Apart from ensuring that read-access remains, do not verify
+ * the permission bits requested. Kernel has no control over
+ * how EPCM permissions can be relaxed from within the enclave.
+ * ENCLS[EMODPR] can only remove existing EPCM permissions,
+ * attempting to set new permissions will be ignored by the
+ * hardware.
+ */
+
+ /* Change EPCM permissions. */
+ epc_virt = sgx_get_epc_virt_addr(entry->epc_page);
+ ret = __emodpr(&secinfo, epc_virt);
+ if (encls_faulted(ret)) {
+ /*
+ * All possible faults should be avoidable:
+ * parameters have been checked, will only change
+ * permissions of a regular page, and no concurrent
+ * SGX1/SGX2 ENCLS instructions since these
+ * are protected with mutex.
+ */
+ pr_err_once("EMODPR encountered exception %d\n",
+ ENCLS_TRAPNR(ret));
+ ret = -EFAULT;
+ goto out_unlock;
+ }
+ if (encls_failed(ret)) {
+ modp->result = ret;
+ ret = -EFAULT;
+ goto out_unlock;
+ }
+
+ ret = sgx_enclave_etrack(encl);
+ if (ret) {
+ ret = -EFAULT;
+ goto out_unlock;
+ }
+
+ mutex_unlock(&encl->lock);
+ }
+
+ ret = 0;
+ goto out;
+
+out_unlock:
+ mutex_unlock(&encl->lock);
+out:
+ modp->count = c;
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/**
+ * sgx_ioc_enclave_restrict_permissions() - handler for
+ * %SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RESTRICT_PERMISSIONS
+ * @encl: an enclave pointer
+ * @arg: userspace pointer to a &struct sgx_enclave_restrict_permissions
+ * instance
+ *
+ * SGX2 distinguishes between relaxing and restricting the enclave page
+ * permissions maintained by the hardware (EPCM permissions) of pages
+ * belonging to an initialized enclave (after SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_INIT).
+ *
+ * EPCM permissions cannot be restricted from within the enclave, the enclave
+ * requires the kernel to run the privileged level 0 instructions ENCLS[EMODPR]
+ * and ENCLS[ETRACK]. An attempt to relax EPCM permissions with this call
+ * will be ignored by the hardware.
+ *
+ * Return:
+ * - 0: Success
+ * - -errno: Otherwise
+ */
+static long sgx_ioc_enclave_restrict_permissions(struct sgx_encl *encl,
+ void __user *arg)
+{
+ struct sgx_enclave_restrict_permissions params;
+ long ret;
+
+ ret = sgx_ioc_sgx2_ready(encl);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+
+ if (copy_from_user(&params, arg, sizeof(params)))
+ return -EFAULT;
+
+ if (sgx_validate_offset_length(encl, params.offset, params.length))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (params.permissions & ~SGX_SECINFO_PERMISSION_MASK)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ /*
+ * Fail early if invalid permissions requested to prevent ENCLS[EMODPR]
+ * from faulting later when the CPU does the same check.
+ */
+ if ((params.permissions & SGX_SECINFO_W) &&
+ !(params.permissions & SGX_SECINFO_R))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (params.result || params.count)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ ret = sgx_enclave_restrict_permissions(encl, &params);
+
+ if (copy_to_user(arg, &params, sizeof(params)))
+ return -EFAULT;
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/**
+ * sgx_enclave_modify_types() - Modify type of SGX enclave pages
+ * @encl: Enclave to which the pages belong.
+ * @modt: Checked parameters from user about which pages need modifying
+ * and their new page type.
+ *
+ * Return:
+ * - 0: Success
+ * - -errno: Otherwise
+ */
+static long sgx_enclave_modify_types(struct sgx_encl *encl,
+ struct sgx_enclave_modify_types *modt)
+{
+ unsigned long max_prot_restore;
+ enum sgx_page_type page_type;
+ struct sgx_encl_page *entry;
+ struct sgx_secinfo secinfo;
+ unsigned long prot;
+ unsigned long addr;
+ unsigned long c;
+ void *epc_virt;
+ int ret;
+
+ page_type = modt->page_type & SGX_PAGE_TYPE_MASK;
+
+ /*
+ * The only new page types allowed by hardware are PT_TCS and PT_TRIM.
+ */
+ if (page_type != SGX_PAGE_TYPE_TCS && page_type != SGX_PAGE_TYPE_TRIM)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ memset(&secinfo, 0, sizeof(secinfo));
+
+ secinfo.flags = page_type << 8;
+
+ for (c = 0 ; c < modt->length; c += PAGE_SIZE) {
+ addr = encl->base + modt->offset + c;
+
+ sgx_reclaim_direct();
+
+ mutex_lock(&encl->lock);
+
+ entry = sgx_encl_load_page(encl, addr);
+ if (IS_ERR(entry)) {
+ ret = PTR_ERR(entry) == -EBUSY ? -EAGAIN : -EFAULT;
+ goto out_unlock;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Borrow the logic from the Intel SDM. Regular pages
+ * (SGX_PAGE_TYPE_REG) can change type to SGX_PAGE_TYPE_TCS
+ * or SGX_PAGE_TYPE_TRIM but TCS pages can only be trimmed.
+ * CET pages not supported yet.
+ */
+ if (!(entry->type == SGX_PAGE_TYPE_REG ||
+ (entry->type == SGX_PAGE_TYPE_TCS &&
+ page_type == SGX_PAGE_TYPE_TRIM))) {
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ goto out_unlock;
+ }
+
+ max_prot_restore = entry->vm_max_prot_bits;
+
+ /*
+ * Once a regular page becomes a TCS page it cannot be
+ * changed back. So the maximum allowed protection reflects
+ * the TCS page that is always RW from kernel perspective but
+ * will be inaccessible from within enclave. Before doing
+ * so, do make sure that the new page type continues to
+ * respect the originally vetted page permissions.
+ */
+ if (entry->type == SGX_PAGE_TYPE_REG &&
+ page_type == SGX_PAGE_TYPE_TCS) {
+ if (~entry->vm_max_prot_bits & (VM_READ | VM_WRITE)) {
+ ret = -EPERM;
+ goto out_unlock;
+ }
+ prot = PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE;
+ entry->vm_max_prot_bits = calc_vm_prot_bits(prot, 0);
+
+ /*
+ * Prevent page from being reclaimed while mutex
+ * is released.
+ */
+ if (sgx_unmark_page_reclaimable(entry->epc_page)) {
+ ret = -EAGAIN;
+ goto out_entry_changed;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Do not keep encl->lock because of dependency on
+ * mmap_lock acquired in sgx_zap_enclave_ptes().
+ */
+ mutex_unlock(&encl->lock);
+
+ sgx_zap_enclave_ptes(encl, addr);
+
+ mutex_lock(&encl->lock);
+
+ sgx_mark_page_reclaimable(entry->epc_page);
+ }
+
+ /* Change EPC type */
+ epc_virt = sgx_get_epc_virt_addr(entry->epc_page);
+ ret = __emodt(&secinfo, epc_virt);
+ if (encls_faulted(ret)) {
+ /*
+ * All possible faults should be avoidable:
+ * parameters have been checked, will only change
+ * valid page types, and no concurrent
+ * SGX1/SGX2 ENCLS instructions since these are
+ * protected with mutex.
+ */
+ pr_err_once("EMODT encountered exception %d\n",
+ ENCLS_TRAPNR(ret));
+ ret = -EFAULT;
+ goto out_entry_changed;
+ }
+ if (encls_failed(ret)) {
+ modt->result = ret;
+ ret = -EFAULT;
+ goto out_entry_changed;
+ }
+
+ ret = sgx_enclave_etrack(encl);
+ if (ret) {
+ ret = -EFAULT;
+ goto out_unlock;
+ }
+
+ entry->type = page_type;
+
+ mutex_unlock(&encl->lock);
+ }
+
+ ret = 0;
+ goto out;
+
+out_entry_changed:
+ entry->vm_max_prot_bits = max_prot_restore;
+out_unlock:
+ mutex_unlock(&encl->lock);
+out:
+ modt->count = c;
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/**
+ * sgx_ioc_enclave_modify_types() - handler for %SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_MODIFY_TYPES
+ * @encl: an enclave pointer
+ * @arg: userspace pointer to a &struct sgx_enclave_modify_types instance
+ *
+ * Ability to change the enclave page type supports the following use cases:
+ *
+ * * It is possible to add TCS pages to an enclave by changing the type of
+ * regular pages (%SGX_PAGE_TYPE_REG) to TCS (%SGX_PAGE_TYPE_TCS) pages.
+ * With this support the number of threads supported by an initialized
+ * enclave can be increased dynamically.
+ *
+ * * Regular or TCS pages can dynamically be removed from an initialized
+ * enclave by changing the page type to %SGX_PAGE_TYPE_TRIM. Changing the
+ * page type to %SGX_PAGE_TYPE_TRIM marks the page for removal with actual
+ * removal done by handler of %SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_REMOVE_PAGES ioctl() called
+ * after ENCLU[EACCEPT] is run on %SGX_PAGE_TYPE_TRIM page from within the
+ * enclave.
+ *
+ * Return:
+ * - 0: Success
+ * - -errno: Otherwise
+ */
+static long sgx_ioc_enclave_modify_types(struct sgx_encl *encl,
+ void __user *arg)
+{
+ struct sgx_enclave_modify_types params;
+ long ret;
+
+ ret = sgx_ioc_sgx2_ready(encl);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+
+ if (copy_from_user(&params, arg, sizeof(params)))
+ return -EFAULT;
+
+ if (sgx_validate_offset_length(encl, params.offset, params.length))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (params.page_type & ~SGX_PAGE_TYPE_MASK)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (params.result || params.count)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ ret = sgx_enclave_modify_types(encl, &params);
+
+ if (copy_to_user(arg, &params, sizeof(params)))
+ return -EFAULT;
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/**
+ * sgx_encl_remove_pages() - Remove trimmed pages from SGX enclave
+ * @encl: Enclave to which the pages belong
+ * @params: Checked parameters from user on which pages need to be removed
+ *
+ * Return:
+ * - 0: Success.
+ * - -errno: Otherwise.
+ */
+static long sgx_encl_remove_pages(struct sgx_encl *encl,
+ struct sgx_enclave_remove_pages *params)
+{
+ struct sgx_encl_page *entry;
+ struct sgx_secinfo secinfo;
+ unsigned long addr;
+ unsigned long c;
+ void *epc_virt;
+ int ret;
+
+ memset(&secinfo, 0, sizeof(secinfo));
+ secinfo.flags = SGX_SECINFO_R | SGX_SECINFO_W | SGX_SECINFO_X;
+
+ for (c = 0 ; c < params->length; c += PAGE_SIZE) {
+ addr = encl->base + params->offset + c;
+
+ sgx_reclaim_direct();
+
+ mutex_lock(&encl->lock);
+
+ entry = sgx_encl_load_page(encl, addr);
+ if (IS_ERR(entry)) {
+ ret = PTR_ERR(entry) == -EBUSY ? -EAGAIN : -EFAULT;
+ goto out_unlock;
+ }
+
+ if (entry->type != SGX_PAGE_TYPE_TRIM) {
+ ret = -EPERM;
+ goto out_unlock;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * ENCLS[EMODPR] is a no-op instruction used to inform if
+ * ENCLU[EACCEPT] was run from within the enclave. If
+ * ENCLS[EMODPR] is run with RWX on a trimmed page that is
+ * not yet accepted then it will return
+ * %SGX_PAGE_NOT_MODIFIABLE, after the trimmed page is
+ * accepted the instruction will encounter a page fault.
+ */
+ epc_virt = sgx_get_epc_virt_addr(entry->epc_page);
+ ret = __emodpr(&secinfo, epc_virt);
+ if (!encls_faulted(ret) || ENCLS_TRAPNR(ret) != X86_TRAP_PF) {
+ ret = -EPERM;
+ goto out_unlock;
+ }
+
+ if (sgx_unmark_page_reclaimable(entry->epc_page)) {
+ ret = -EBUSY;
+ goto out_unlock;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Do not keep encl->lock because of dependency on
+ * mmap_lock acquired in sgx_zap_enclave_ptes().
+ */
+ mutex_unlock(&encl->lock);
+
+ sgx_zap_enclave_ptes(encl, addr);
+
+ mutex_lock(&encl->lock);
+
+ sgx_encl_free_epc_page(entry->epc_page);
+ encl->secs_child_cnt--;
+ entry->epc_page = NULL;
+ xa_erase(&encl->page_array, PFN_DOWN(entry->desc));
+ sgx_encl_shrink(encl, NULL);
+ kfree(entry);
+
+ mutex_unlock(&encl->lock);
+ }
+
+ ret = 0;
+ goto out;
+
+out_unlock:
+ mutex_unlock(&encl->lock);
+out:
+ params->count = c;
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/**
+ * sgx_ioc_enclave_remove_pages() - handler for %SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_REMOVE_PAGES
+ * @encl: an enclave pointer
+ * @arg: userspace pointer to &struct sgx_enclave_remove_pages instance
+ *
+ * Final step of the flow removing pages from an initialized enclave. The
+ * complete flow is:
+ *
+ * 1) User changes the type of the pages to be removed to %SGX_PAGE_TYPE_TRIM
+ * using the %SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_MODIFY_TYPES ioctl().
+ * 2) User approves the page removal by running ENCLU[EACCEPT] from within
+ * the enclave.
+ * 3) User initiates actual page removal using the
+ * %SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_REMOVE_PAGES ioctl() that is handled here.
+ *
+ * First remove any page table entries pointing to the page and then proceed
+ * with the actual removal of the enclave page and data in support of it.
+ *
+ * VA pages are not affected by this removal. It is thus possible that the
+ * enclave may end up with more VA pages than needed to support all its
+ * pages.
+ *
+ * Return:
+ * - 0: Success
+ * - -errno: Otherwise
+ */
+static long sgx_ioc_enclave_remove_pages(struct sgx_encl *encl,
+ void __user *arg)
+{
+ struct sgx_enclave_remove_pages params;
+ long ret;
+
+ ret = sgx_ioc_sgx2_ready(encl);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+
+ if (copy_from_user(&params, arg, sizeof(params)))
+ return -EFAULT;
+
+ if (sgx_validate_offset_length(encl, params.offset, params.length))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (params.count)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ ret = sgx_encl_remove_pages(encl, &params);
+
+ if (copy_to_user(arg, &params, sizeof(params)))
+ return -EFAULT;
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
long sgx_ioctl(struct file *filep, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
{
struct sgx_encl *encl = filep->private_data;
@@ -695,6 +1240,16 @@ long sgx_ioctl(struct file *filep, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
case SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_PROVISION:
ret = sgx_ioc_enclave_provision(encl, (void __user *)arg);
break;
+ case SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RESTRICT_PERMISSIONS:
+ ret = sgx_ioc_enclave_restrict_permissions(encl,
+ (void __user *)arg);
+ break;
+ case SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_MODIFY_TYPES:
+ ret = sgx_ioc_enclave_modify_types(encl, (void __user *)arg);
+ break;
+ case SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_REMOVE_PAGES:
+ ret = sgx_ioc_enclave_remove_pages(encl, (void __user *)arg);
+ break;
default:
ret = -ENOIOCTLCMD;
break;