diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'crypto/asymmetric_keys')
| -rw-r--r-- | crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig | 31 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile | 14 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | crypto/asymmetric_keys/asym_tpm.c | 957 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c | 65 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.c | 26 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.h | 5 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_trust.c | 8 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c | 22 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c | 196 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c | 55 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | crypto/asymmetric_keys/selftest.c | 224 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | crypto/asymmetric_keys/signature.c | 4 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | crypto/asymmetric_keys/tpm.asn1 | 5 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | crypto/asymmetric_keys/tpm_parser.c | 102 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | crypto/asymmetric_keys/verify_pefile.c | 4 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509.asn1 | 2 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c | 115 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_loader.c | 57 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h | 12 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c | 44 |
20 files changed, 706 insertions, 1242 deletions
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig index 1f1f004dc757..3df3fe4ed95f 100644 --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig @@ -22,18 +22,6 @@ config ASYMMETRIC_PUBLIC_KEY_SUBTYPE appropriate hash algorithms (such as SHA-1) must be available. ENOPKG will be reported if the requisite algorithm is unavailable. -config ASYMMETRIC_TPM_KEY_SUBTYPE - tristate "Asymmetric TPM backed private key subtype" - depends on TCG_TPM - depends on TRUSTED_KEYS - select CRYPTO_HMAC - select CRYPTO_SHA1 - select CRYPTO_HASH_INFO - help - This option provides support for TPM backed private key type handling. - Operations such as sign, verify, encrypt, decrypt are performed by - the TPM after the private key is loaded. - config X509_CERTIFICATE_PARSER tristate "X.509 certificate parser" depends on ASYMMETRIC_PUBLIC_KEY_SUBTYPE @@ -54,15 +42,6 @@ config PKCS8_PRIVATE_KEY_PARSER private key data and provides the ability to instantiate a crypto key from that data. -config TPM_KEY_PARSER - tristate "TPM private key parser" - depends on ASYMMETRIC_TPM_KEY_SUBTYPE - select ASN1 - help - This option provides support for parsing TPM format blobs for - private key data and provides the ability to instantiate a crypto key - from that data. - config PKCS7_MESSAGE_PARSER tristate "PKCS#7 message parser" depends on X509_CERTIFICATE_PARSER @@ -96,4 +75,14 @@ config SIGNED_PE_FILE_VERIFICATION This option provides support for verifying the signature(s) on a signed PE binary. +config FIPS_SIGNATURE_SELFTEST + bool "Run FIPS selftests on the X.509+PKCS7 signature verification" + help + This option causes some selftests to be run on the signature + verification code, using some built in data. This is required + for FIPS. + depends on KEYS + depends on ASYMMETRIC_KEY_TYPE + depends on PKCS7_MESSAGE_PARSER + endif # ASYMMETRIC_KEY_TYPE diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile index 28b91adba2ae..0d1fa1b692c6 100644 --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile @@ -11,7 +11,6 @@ asymmetric_keys-y := \ signature.o obj-$(CONFIG_ASYMMETRIC_PUBLIC_KEY_SUBTYPE) += public_key.o -obj-$(CONFIG_ASYMMETRIC_TPM_KEY_SUBTYPE) += asym_tpm.o # # X.509 Certificate handling @@ -21,7 +20,9 @@ x509_key_parser-y := \ x509.asn1.o \ x509_akid.asn1.o \ x509_cert_parser.o \ + x509_loader.o \ x509_public_key.o +x509_key_parser-$(CONFIG_FIPS_SIGNATURE_SELFTEST) += selftest.o $(obj)/x509_cert_parser.o: \ $(obj)/x509.asn1.h \ @@ -75,14 +76,3 @@ verify_signed_pefile-y := \ $(obj)/mscode_parser.o: $(obj)/mscode.asn1.h $(obj)/mscode.asn1.h $(obj)/mscode.asn1.o: $(obj)/mscode.asn1.c $(obj)/mscode.asn1.h - -# -# TPM private key parsing -# -obj-$(CONFIG_TPM_KEY_PARSER) += tpm_key_parser.o -tpm_key_parser-y := \ - tpm.asn1.o \ - tpm_parser.o - -$(obj)/tpm_parser.o: $(obj)/tpm.asn1.h -$(obj)/tpm.asn1.o: $(obj)/tpm.asn1.c $(obj)/tpm.asn1.h diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asym_tpm.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asym_tpm.c deleted file mode 100644 index 378b18b9bc34..000000000000 --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asym_tpm.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,957 +0,0 @@ -// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 -#define pr_fmt(fmt) "ASYM-TPM: "fmt -#include <linux/slab.h> -#include <linux/module.h> -#include <linux/export.h> -#include <linux/kernel.h> -#include <linux/seq_file.h> -#include <linux/scatterlist.h> -#include <linux/tpm.h> -#include <linux/tpm_command.h> -#include <crypto/akcipher.h> -#include <crypto/hash.h> -#include <crypto/sha.h> -#include <asm/unaligned.h> -#include <keys/asymmetric-subtype.h> -#include <keys/trusted_tpm.h> -#include <crypto/asym_tpm_subtype.h> -#include <crypto/public_key.h> - -#define TPM_ORD_FLUSHSPECIFIC 186 -#define TPM_ORD_LOADKEY2 65 -#define TPM_ORD_UNBIND 30 -#define TPM_ORD_SIGN 60 - -#define TPM_RT_KEY 0x00000001 - -/* - * Load a TPM key from the blob provided by userspace - */ -static int tpm_loadkey2(struct tpm_buf *tb, - uint32_t keyhandle, unsigned char *keyauth, - const unsigned char *keyblob, int keybloblen, - uint32_t *newhandle) -{ - unsigned char nonceodd[TPM_NONCE_SIZE]; - unsigned char enonce[TPM_NONCE_SIZE]; - unsigned char authdata[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE]; - uint32_t authhandle = 0; - unsigned char cont = 0; - uint32_t ordinal; - int ret; - - ordinal = htonl(TPM_ORD_LOADKEY2); - - /* session for loading the key */ - ret = oiap(tb, &authhandle, enonce); - if (ret < 0) { - pr_info("oiap failed (%d)\n", ret); - return ret; - } - - /* generate odd nonce */ - ret = tpm_get_random(NULL, nonceodd, TPM_NONCE_SIZE); - if (ret < 0) { - pr_info("tpm_get_random failed (%d)\n", ret); - return ret; - } - - /* calculate authorization HMAC value */ - ret = TSS_authhmac(authdata, keyauth, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, enonce, - nonceodd, cont, sizeof(uint32_t), &ordinal, - keybloblen, keyblob, 0, 0); - if (ret < 0) - return ret; - - /* build the request buffer */ - tpm_buf_reset(tb, TPM_TAG_RQU_AUTH1_COMMAND, TPM_ORD_LOADKEY2); - tpm_buf_append_u32(tb, keyhandle); - tpm_buf_append(tb, keyblob, keybloblen); - tpm_buf_append_u32(tb, authhandle); - tpm_buf_append(tb, nonceodd, TPM_NONCE_SIZE); - tpm_buf_append_u8(tb, cont); - tpm_buf_append(tb, authdata, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE); - - ret = trusted_tpm_send(tb->data, MAX_BUF_SIZE); - if (ret < 0) { - pr_info("authhmac failed (%d)\n", ret); - return ret; - } - - ret = TSS_checkhmac1(tb->data, ordinal, nonceodd, keyauth, - SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, 0, 0); - if (ret < 0) { - pr_info("TSS_checkhmac1 failed (%d)\n", ret); - return ret; - } - - *newhandle = LOAD32(tb->data, TPM_DATA_OFFSET); - return 0; -} - -/* - * Execute the FlushSpecific TPM command - */ -static int tpm_flushspecific(struct tpm_buf *tb, uint32_t handle) -{ - tpm_buf_reset(tb, TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND, TPM_ORD_FLUSHSPECIFIC); - tpm_buf_append_u32(tb, handle); - tpm_buf_append_u32(tb, TPM_RT_KEY); - - return trusted_tpm_send(tb->data, MAX_BUF_SIZE); -} - -/* - * Decrypt a blob provided by userspace using a specific key handle. - * The handle is a well known handle or previously loaded by e.g. LoadKey2 - */ -static int tpm_unbind(struct tpm_buf *tb, - uint32_t keyhandle, unsigned char *keyauth, - const unsigned char *blob, uint32_t bloblen, - void *out, uint32_t outlen) -{ - unsigned char nonceodd[TPM_NONCE_SIZE]; - unsigned char enonce[TPM_NONCE_SIZE]; - unsigned char authdata[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE]; - uint32_t authhandle = 0; - unsigned char cont = 0; - uint32_t ordinal; - uint32_t datalen; - int ret; - - ordinal = htonl(TPM_ORD_UNBIND); - datalen = htonl(bloblen); - - /* session for loading the key */ - ret = oiap(tb, &authhandle, enonce); - if (ret < 0) { - pr_info("oiap failed (%d)\n", ret); - return ret; - } - - /* generate odd nonce */ - ret = tpm_get_random(NULL, nonceodd, TPM_NONCE_SIZE); - if (ret < 0) { - pr_info("tpm_get_random failed (%d)\n", ret); - return ret; - } - - /* calculate authorization HMAC value */ - ret = TSS_authhmac(authdata, keyauth, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, enonce, - nonceodd, cont, sizeof(uint32_t), &ordinal, - sizeof(uint32_t), &datalen, - bloblen, blob, 0, 0); - if (ret < 0) - return ret; - - /* build the request buffer */ - tpm_buf_reset(tb, TPM_TAG_RQU_AUTH1_COMMAND, TPM_ORD_UNBIND); - tpm_buf_append_u32(tb, keyhandle); - tpm_buf_append_u32(tb, bloblen); - tpm_buf_append(tb, blob, bloblen); - tpm_buf_append_u32(tb, authhandle); - tpm_buf_append(tb, nonceodd, TPM_NONCE_SIZE); - tpm_buf_append_u8(tb, cont); - tpm_buf_append(tb, authdata, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE); - - ret = trusted_tpm_send(tb->data, MAX_BUF_SIZE); - if (ret < 0) { - pr_info("authhmac failed (%d)\n", ret); - return ret; - } - - datalen = LOAD32(tb->data, TPM_DATA_OFFSET); - - ret = TSS_checkhmac1(tb->data, ordinal, nonceodd, - keyauth, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, - sizeof(uint32_t), TPM_DATA_OFFSET, - datalen, TPM_DATA_OFFSET + sizeof(uint32_t), - 0, 0); - if (ret < 0) { - pr_info("TSS_checkhmac1 failed (%d)\n", ret); - return ret; - } - - memcpy(out, tb->data + TPM_DATA_OFFSET + sizeof(uint32_t), - min(outlen, datalen)); - - return datalen; -} - -/* - * Sign a blob provided by userspace (that has had the hash function applied) - * using a specific key handle. The handle is assumed to have been previously - * loaded by e.g. LoadKey2. - * - * Note that the key signature scheme of the used key should be set to - * TPM_SS_RSASSAPKCS1v15_DER. This allows the hashed input to be of any size - * up to key_length_in_bytes - 11 and not be limited to size 20 like the - * TPM_SS_RSASSAPKCS1v15_SHA1 signature scheme. - */ -static int tpm_sign(struct tpm_buf *tb, - uint32_t keyhandle, unsigned char *keyauth, - const unsigned char *blob, uint32_t bloblen, - void *out, uint32_t outlen) -{ - unsigned char nonceodd[TPM_NONCE_SIZE]; - unsigned char enonce[TPM_NONCE_SIZE]; - unsigned char authdata[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE]; - uint32_t authhandle = 0; - unsigned char cont = 0; - uint32_t ordinal; - uint32_t datalen; - int ret; - - ordinal = htonl(TPM_ORD_SIGN); - datalen = htonl(bloblen); - - /* session for loading the key */ - ret = oiap(tb, &authhandle, enonce); - if (ret < 0) { - pr_info("oiap failed (%d)\n", ret); - return ret; - } - - /* generate odd nonce */ - ret = tpm_get_random(NULL, nonceodd, TPM_NONCE_SIZE); - if (ret < 0) { - pr_info("tpm_get_random failed (%d)\n", ret); - return ret; - } - - /* calculate authorization HMAC value */ - ret = TSS_authhmac(authdata, keyauth, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, enonce, - nonceodd, cont, sizeof(uint32_t), &ordinal, - sizeof(uint32_t), &datalen, - bloblen, blob, 0, 0); - if (ret < 0) - return ret; - - /* build the request buffer */ - tpm_buf_reset(tb, TPM_TAG_RQU_AUTH1_COMMAND, TPM_ORD_SIGN); - tpm_buf_append_u32(tb, keyhandle); - tpm_buf_append_u32(tb, bloblen); - tpm_buf_append(tb, blob, bloblen); - tpm_buf_append_u32(tb, authhandle); - tpm_buf_append(tb, nonceodd, TPM_NONCE_SIZE); - tpm_buf_append_u8(tb, cont); - tpm_buf_append(tb, authdata, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE); - - ret = trusted_tpm_send(tb->data, MAX_BUF_SIZE); - if (ret < 0) { - pr_info("authhmac failed (%d)\n", ret); - return ret; - } - - datalen = LOAD32(tb->data, TPM_DATA_OFFSET); - - ret = TSS_checkhmac1(tb->data, ordinal, nonceodd, - keyauth, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, - sizeof(uint32_t), TPM_DATA_OFFSET, - datalen, TPM_DATA_OFFSET + sizeof(uint32_t), - 0, 0); - if (ret < 0) { - pr_info("TSS_checkhmac1 failed (%d)\n", ret); - return ret; - } - - memcpy(out, tb->data + TPM_DATA_OFFSET + sizeof(uint32_t), - min(datalen, outlen)); - - return datalen; -} - -/* Room to fit two u32 zeros for algo id and parameters length. */ -#define SETKEY_PARAMS_SIZE (sizeof(u32) * 2) - -/* - * Maximum buffer size for the BER/DER encoded public key. The public key - * is of the form SEQUENCE { INTEGER n, INTEGER e } where n is a maximum 2048 - * bit key and e is usually 65537 - * The encoding overhead is: - * - max 4 bytes for SEQUENCE - * - max 4 bytes for INTEGER n type/length - * - 257 bytes of n - * - max 2 bytes for INTEGER e type/length - * - 3 bytes of e - * - 4+4 of zeros for set_pub_key parameters (SETKEY_PARAMS_SIZE) - */ -#define PUB_KEY_BUF_SIZE (4 + 4 + 257 + 2 + 3 + SETKEY_PARAMS_SIZE) - -/* - * Provide a part of a description of the key for /proc/keys. - */ -static void asym_tpm_describe(const struct key *asymmetric_key, - struct seq_file *m) -{ - struct tpm_key *tk = asymmetric_key->payload.data[asym_crypto]; - - if (!tk) - return; - - seq_printf(m, "TPM1.2/Blob"); -} - -static void asym_tpm_destroy(void *payload0, void *payload3) -{ - struct tpm_key *tk = payload0; - - if (!tk) - return; - - kfree(tk->blob); - tk->blob_len = 0; - - kfree(tk); -} - -/* How many bytes will it take to encode the length */ -static inline uint32_t definite_length(uint32_t len) -{ - if (len <= 127) - return 1; - if (len <= 255) - return 2; - return 3; -} - -static inline uint8_t *encode_tag_length(uint8_t *buf, uint8_t tag, - uint32_t len) -{ - *buf++ = tag; - - if (len <= 127) { - buf[0] = len; - return buf + 1; - } - - if (len <= 255) { - buf[0] = 0x81; - buf[1] = len; - return buf + 2; - } - - buf[0] = 0x82; - put_unaligned_be16(len, buf + 1); - return buf + 3; -} - -static uint32_t derive_pub_key(const void *pub_key, uint32_t len, uint8_t *buf) -{ - uint8_t *cur = buf; - uint32_t n_len = definite_length(len) + 1 + len + 1; - uint32_t e_len = definite_length(3) + 1 + 3; - uint8_t e[3] = { 0x01, 0x00, 0x01 }; - - /* SEQUENCE */ - cur = encode_tag_length(cur, 0x30, n_len + e_len); - /* INTEGER n */ - cur = encode_tag_length(cur, 0x02, len + 1); - cur[0] = 0x00; - memcpy(cur + 1, pub_key, len); - cur += len + 1; - cur = encode_tag_length(cur, 0x02, sizeof(e)); - memcpy(cur, e, sizeof(e)); - cur += sizeof(e); - /* Zero parameters to satisfy set_pub_key ABI. */ - memset(cur, 0, SETKEY_PARAMS_SIZE); - - return cur - buf; -} - -/* - * Determine the crypto algorithm name. - */ -static int determine_akcipher(const char *encoding, const char *hash_algo, - char alg_name[CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME]) -{ - if (strcmp(encoding, "pkcs1") == 0) { - if (!hash_algo) { - strcpy(alg_name, "pkcs1pad(rsa)"); - return 0; - } - - if (snprintf(alg_name, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME, "pkcs1pad(rsa,%s)", - hash_algo) >= CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME) - return -EINVAL; - - return 0; - } - - if (strcmp(encoding, "raw") == 0) { - strcpy(alg_name, "rsa"); - return 0; - } - - return -ENOPKG; -} - -/* - * Query information about a key. - */ -static int tpm_key_query(const struct kernel_pkey_params *params, - struct kernel_pkey_query *info) -{ - struct tpm_key *tk = params->key->payload.data[asym_crypto]; - int ret; - char alg_name[CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME]; - struct crypto_akcipher *tfm; - uint8_t der_pub_key[PUB_KEY_BUF_SIZE]; - uint32_t der_pub_key_len; - int len; - - /* TPM only works on private keys, public keys still done in software */ - ret = determine_akcipher(params->encoding, params->hash_algo, alg_name); - if (ret < 0) - return ret; - - tfm = crypto_alloc_akcipher(alg_name, 0, 0); - if (IS_ERR(tfm)) - return PTR_ERR(tfm); - - der_pub_key_len = derive_pub_key(tk->pub_key, tk->pub_key_len, - der_pub_key); - - ret = crypto_akcipher_set_pub_key(tfm, der_pub_key, der_pub_key_len); - if (ret < 0) - goto error_free_tfm; - - len = crypto_akcipher_maxsize(tfm); - - info->key_size = tk->key_len; - info->max_data_size = tk->key_len / 8; - info->max_sig_size = len; - info->max_enc_size = len; - info->max_dec_size = tk->key_len / 8; - - info->supported_ops = KEYCTL_SUPPORTS_ENCRYPT | - KEYCTL_SUPPORTS_DECRYPT | - KEYCTL_SUPPORTS_VERIFY | - KEYCTL_SUPPORTS_SIGN; - - ret = 0; -error_free_tfm: - crypto_free_akcipher(tfm); - pr_devel("<==%s() = %d\n", __func__, ret); - return ret; -} - -/* - * Encryption operation is performed with the public key. Hence it is done - * in software - */ -static int tpm_key_encrypt(struct tpm_key *tk, - struct kernel_pkey_params *params, - const void *in, void *out) -{ - char alg_name[CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME]; - struct crypto_akcipher *tfm; - struct akcipher_request *req; - struct crypto_wait cwait; - struct scatterlist in_sg, out_sg; - uint8_t der_pub_key[PUB_KEY_BUF_SIZE]; - uint32_t der_pub_key_len; - int ret; - - pr_devel("==>%s()\n", __func__); - - ret = determine_akcipher(params->encoding, params->hash_algo, alg_name); - if (ret < 0) - return ret; - - tfm = crypto_alloc_akcipher(alg_name, 0, 0); - if (IS_ERR(tfm)) - return PTR_ERR(tfm); - - der_pub_key_len = derive_pub_key(tk->pub_key, tk->pub_key_len, - der_pub_key); - - ret = crypto_akcipher_set_pub_key(tfm, der_pub_key, der_pub_key_len); - if (ret < 0) - goto error_free_tfm; - - ret = -ENOMEM; - req = akcipher_request_alloc(tfm, GFP_KERNEL); - if (!req) - goto error_free_tfm; - - sg_init_one(&in_sg, in, params->in_len); - sg_init_one(&out_sg, out, params->out_len); - akcipher_request_set_crypt(req, &in_sg, &out_sg, params->in_len, - params->out_len); - crypto_init_wait(&cwait); - akcipher_request_set_callback(req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG | - CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP, - crypto_req_done, &cwait); - - ret = crypto_akcipher_encrypt(req); - ret = crypto_wait_req(ret, &cwait); - - if (ret == 0) - ret = req->dst_len; - - akcipher_request_free(req); -error_free_tfm: - crypto_free_akcipher(tfm); - pr_devel("<==%s() = %d\n", __func__, ret); - return ret; -} - -/* - * Decryption operation is performed with the private key in the TPM. - */ -static int tpm_key_decrypt(struct tpm_key *tk, - struct kernel_pkey_params *params, - const void *in, void *out) -{ - struct tpm_buf tb; - uint32_t keyhandle; - uint8_t srkauth[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE]; - uint8_t keyauth[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE]; - int r; - - pr_devel("==>%s()\n", __func__); - - if (params->hash_algo) - return -ENOPKG; - - if (strcmp(params->encoding, "pkcs1")) - return -ENOPKG; - - r = tpm_buf_init(&tb, 0, 0); - if (r) - return r; - - /* TODO: Handle a non-all zero SRK authorization */ - memset(srkauth, 0, sizeof(srkauth)); - - r = tpm_loadkey2(&tb, SRKHANDLE, srkauth, - tk->blob, tk->blob_len, &keyhandle); - if (r < 0) { - pr_devel("loadkey2 failed (%d)\n", r); - goto error; - } - - /* TODO: Handle a non-all zero key authorization */ - memset(keyauth, 0, sizeof(keyauth)); - - r = tpm_unbind(&tb, keyhandle, keyauth, - in, params->in_len, out, params->out_len); - if (r < 0) - pr_devel("tpm_unbind failed (%d)\n", r); - - if (tpm_flushspecific(&tb, keyhandle) < 0) - pr_devel("flushspecific failed (%d)\n", r); - -error: - tpm_buf_destroy(&tb); - pr_devel("<==%s() = %d\n", __func__, r); - return r; -} - -/* - * Hash algorithm OIDs plus ASN.1 DER wrappings [RFC4880 sec 5.2.2]. - */ -static const u8 digest_info_md5[] = { - 0x30, 0x20, 0x30, 0x0c, 0x06, 0x08, - 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x02, 0x05, /* OID */ - 0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x10 -}; - -static const u8 digest_info_sha1[] = { - 0x30, 0x21, 0x30, 0x09, 0x06, 0x05, - 0x2b, 0x0e, 0x03, 0x02, 0x1a, - 0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x14 -}; - -static const u8 digest_info_rmd160[] = { - 0x30, 0x21, 0x30, 0x09, 0x06, 0x05, - 0x2b, 0x24, 0x03, 0x02, 0x01, - 0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x14 -}; - -static const u8 digest_info_sha224[] = { - 0x30, 0x2d, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, - 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x04, - 0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x1c -}; - -static const u8 digest_info_sha256[] = { - 0x30, 0x31, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, - 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x01, - 0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x20 -}; - -static const u8 digest_info_sha384[] = { - 0x30, 0x41, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, - 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x02, - 0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x30 -}; - -static const u8 digest_info_sha512[] = { - 0x30, 0x51, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, - 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x03, - 0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x40 -}; - -static const struct asn1_template { - const char *name; - const u8 *data; - size_t size; -} asn1_templates[] = { -#define _(X) { #X, digest_info_##X, sizeof(digest_info_##X) } - _(md5), - _(sha1), - _(rmd160), - _(sha256), - _(sha384), - _(sha512), - _(sha224), - { NULL } -#undef _ -}; - -static const struct asn1_template *lookup_asn1(const char *name) -{ - const struct asn1_template *p; - - for (p = asn1_templates; p->name; p++) - if (strcmp(name, p->name) == 0) - return p; - return NULL; -} - -/* - * Sign operation is performed with the private key in the TPM. - */ -static int tpm_key_sign(struct tpm_key *tk, - struct kernel_pkey_params *params, - const void *in, void *out) -{ - struct tpm_buf tb; - uint32_t keyhandle; - uint8_t srkauth[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE]; - uint8_t keyauth[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE]; - void *asn1_wrapped = NULL; - uint32_t in_len = params->in_len; - int r; - - pr_devel("==>%s()\n", __func__); - - if (strcmp(params->encoding, "pkcs1")) - return -ENOPKG; - - if (params->hash_algo) { - const struct asn1_template *asn1 = - lookup_asn1(params->hash_algo); - - if (!asn1) - return -ENOPKG; - - /* request enough space for the ASN.1 template + input hash */ - asn1_wrapped = kzalloc(in_len + asn1->size, GFP_KERNEL); - if (!asn1_wrapped) - return -ENOMEM; - - /* Copy ASN.1 template, then the input */ - memcpy(asn1_wrapped, asn1->data, asn1->size); - memcpy(asn1_wrapped + asn1->size, in, in_len); - - in = asn1_wrapped; - in_len += asn1->size; - } - - if (in_len > tk->key_len / 8 - 11) { - r = -EOVERFLOW; - goto error_free_asn1_wrapped; - } - - r = tpm_buf_init(&tb, 0, 0); - if (r) - goto error_free_asn1_wrapped; - - /* TODO: Handle a non-all zero SRK authorization */ - memset(srkauth, 0, sizeof(srkauth)); - - r = tpm_loadkey2(&tb, SRKHANDLE, srkauth, - tk->blob, tk->blob_len, &keyhandle); - if (r < 0) { - pr_devel("loadkey2 failed (%d)\n", r); - goto error_free_tb; - } - - /* TODO: Handle a non-all zero key authorization */ - memset(keyauth, 0, sizeof(keyauth)); - - r = tpm_sign(&tb, keyhandle, keyauth, in, in_len, out, params->out_len); - if (r < 0) - pr_devel("tpm_sign failed (%d)\n", r); - - if (tpm_flushspecific(&tb, keyhandle) < 0) - pr_devel("flushspecific failed (%d)\n", r); - -error_free_tb: - tpm_buf_destroy(&tb); -error_free_asn1_wrapped: - kfree(asn1_wrapped); - pr_devel("<==%s() = %d\n", __func__, r); - return r; -} - -/* - * Do encryption, decryption and signing ops. - */ -static int tpm_key_eds_op(struct kernel_pkey_params *params, - const void *in, void *out) -{ - struct tpm_key *tk = params->key->payload.data[asym_crypto]; - int ret = -EOPNOTSUPP; - - /* Perform the encryption calculation. */ - switch (params->op) { - case kernel_pkey_encrypt: - ret = tpm_key_encrypt(tk, params, in, out); - break; - case kernel_pkey_decrypt: - ret = tpm_key_decrypt(tk, params, in, out); - break; - case kernel_pkey_sign: - ret = tpm_key_sign(tk, params, in, out); - break; - default: - BUG(); - } - - return ret; -} - -/* - * Verify a signature using a public key. - */ -static int tpm_key_verify_signature(const struct key *key, - const struct public_key_signature *sig) -{ - const struct tpm_key *tk = key->payload.data[asym_crypto]; - struct crypto_wait cwait; - struct crypto_akcipher *tfm; - struct akcipher_request *req; - struct scatterlist src_sg[2]; - char alg_name[CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME]; - uint8_t der_pub_key[PUB_KEY_BUF_SIZE]; - uint32_t der_pub_key_len; - int ret; - - pr_devel("==>%s()\n", __func__); - - BUG_ON(!tk); - BUG_ON(!sig); - BUG_ON(!sig->s); - - if (!sig->digest) - return -ENOPKG; - - ret = determine_akcipher(sig->encoding, sig->hash_algo, alg_name); - if (ret < 0) - return ret; - - tfm = crypto_alloc_akcipher(alg_name, 0, 0); - if (IS_ERR(tfm)) - return PTR_ERR(tfm); - - der_pub_key_len = derive_pub_key(tk->pub_key, tk->pub_key_len, - der_pub_key); - - ret = crypto_akcipher_set_pub_key(tfm, der_pub_key, der_pub_key_len); - if (ret < 0) - goto error_free_tfm; - - ret = -ENOMEM; - req = akcipher_request_alloc(tfm, GFP_KERNEL); - if (!req) - goto error_free_tfm; - - sg_init_table(src_sg, 2); - sg_set_buf(&src_sg[0], sig->s, sig->s_size); - sg_set_buf(&src_sg[1], sig->digest, sig->digest_size); - akcipher_request_set_crypt(req, src_sg, NULL, sig->s_size, - sig->digest_size); - crypto_init_wait(&cwait); - akcipher_request_set_callback(req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG | - CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP, - crypto_req_done, &cwait); - ret = crypto_wait_req(crypto_akcipher_verify(req), &cwait); - - akcipher_request_free(req); -error_free_tfm: - crypto_free_akcipher(tfm); - pr_devel("<==%s() = %d\n", __func__, ret); - if (WARN_ON_ONCE(ret > 0)) - ret = -EINVAL; - return ret; -} - -/* - * Parse enough information out of TPM_KEY structure: - * TPM_STRUCT_VER -> 4 bytes - * TPM_KEY_USAGE -> 2 bytes - * TPM_KEY_FLAGS -> 4 bytes - * TPM_AUTH_DATA_USAGE -> 1 byte - * TPM_KEY_PARMS -> variable - * UINT32 PCRInfoSize -> 4 bytes - * BYTE* -> PCRInfoSize bytes - * TPM_STORE_PUBKEY - * UINT32 encDataSize; - * BYTE* -> encDataSize; - * - * TPM_KEY_PARMS: - * TPM_ALGORITHM_ID -> 4 bytes - * TPM_ENC_SCHEME -> 2 bytes - * TPM_SIG_SCHEME -> 2 bytes - * UINT32 parmSize -> 4 bytes - * BYTE* -> variable - */ -static int extract_key_parameters(struct tpm_key *tk) -{ - const void *cur = tk->blob; - uint32_t len = tk->blob_len; - const void *pub_key; - uint32_t sz; - uint32_t key_len; - - if (len < 11) - return -EBADMSG; - - /* Ensure this is a legacy key */ - if (get_unaligned_be16(cur + 4) != 0x0015) - return -EBADMSG; - - /* Skip to TPM_KEY_PARMS */ - cur += 11; - len -= 11; - - if (len < 12) - return -EBADMSG; - - /* Make sure this is an RSA key */ - if (get_unaligned_be32(cur) != 0x00000001) - return -EBADMSG; - - /* Make sure this is TPM_ES_RSAESPKCSv15 encoding scheme */ - if (get_unaligned_be16(cur + 4) != 0x0002) - return -EBADMSG; - - /* Make sure this is TPM_SS_RSASSAPKCS1v15_DER signature scheme */ - if (get_unaligned_be16(cur + 6) != 0x0003) - return -EBADMSG; - - sz = get_unaligned_be32(cur + 8); - if (len < sz + 12) - return -EBADMSG; - - /* Move to TPM_RSA_KEY_PARMS */ - len -= 12; - cur += 12; - - /* Grab the RSA key length */ - key_len = get_unaligned_be32(cur); - - switch (key_len) { - case 512: - case 1024: - case 1536: - case 2048: - break; - default: - return -EINVAL; - } - - /* Move just past TPM_KEY_PARMS */ - cur += sz; - len -= sz; - - if (len < 4) - return -EBADMSG; - - sz = get_unaligned_be32(cur); - if (len < 4 + sz) - return -EBADMSG; - - /* Move to TPM_STORE_PUBKEY */ - cur += 4 + sz; - len -= 4 + sz; - - /* Grab the size of the public key, it should jive with the key size */ - sz = get_unaligned_be32(cur); - if (sz > 256) - return -EINVAL; - - pub_key = cur + 4; - - tk->key_len = key_len; - tk->pub_key = pub_key; - tk->pub_key_len = sz; - - return 0; -} - -/* Given the blob, parse it and load it into the TPM */ -struct tpm_key *tpm_key_create(const void *blob, uint32_t blob_len) -{ - int r; - struct tpm_key *tk; - - r = tpm_is_tpm2(NULL); - if (r < 0) - goto error; - - /* We don't support TPM2 yet */ - if (r > 0) { - r = -ENODEV; - goto error; - } - - r = -ENOMEM; - tk = kzalloc(sizeof(struct tpm_key), GFP_KERNEL); - if (!tk) - goto error; - - tk->blob = kmemdup(blob, blob_len, GFP_KERNEL); - if (!tk->blob) - goto error_memdup; - - tk->blob_len = blob_len; - - r = extract_key_parameters(tk); - if (r < 0) - goto error_extract; - - return tk; - -error_extract: - kfree(tk->blob); - tk->blob_len = 0; -error_memdup: - kfree(tk); -error: - return ERR_PTR(r); -} -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_key_create); - -/* - * TPM-based asymmetric key subtype - */ -struct asymmetric_key_subtype asym_tpm_subtype = { - .owner = THIS_MODULE, - .name = "asym_tpm", - .name_len = sizeof("asym_tpm") - 1, - .describe = asym_tpm_describe, - .destroy = asym_tpm_destroy, - .query = tpm_key_query, - .eds_op = tpm_key_eds_op, - .verify_signature = tpm_key_verify_signature, -}; -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(asym_tpm_subtype); - -MODULE_DESCRIPTION("TPM based asymmetric key subtype"); -MODULE_AUTHOR("Intel Corporation"); -MODULE_LICENSE("GPL v2"); diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c index 6e5fc8e31f01..41a2f0eb4ce4 100644 --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later /* Asymmetric public-key cryptography key type * - * See Documentation/crypto/asymmetric-keys.txt + * See Documentation/crypto/asymmetric-keys.rst * * Copyright (C) 2012 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved. * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com) @@ -36,16 +36,23 @@ static DECLARE_RWSEM(asymmetric_key_parsers_sem); * find_asymmetric_key - Find a key by ID. * @keyring: The keys to search. * @id_0: The first ID to look for or NULL. - * @id_1: The second ID to look for or NULL. - * @partial: Use partial match if true, exact if false. + * @id_1: The second ID to look for or NULL, matched together with @id_0 + * against @keyring keys' id[0] and id[1]. + * @id_2: The fallback ID to match against @keyring keys' id[2] if both of the + * other IDs are NULL. + * @partial: Use partial match for @id_0 and @id_1 if true, exact if false. * * Find a key in the given keyring by identifier. The preferred identifier is * the id_0 and the fallback identifier is the id_1. If both are given, the - * lookup is by the former, but the latter must also match. + * former is matched (exactly or partially) against either of the sought key's + * identifiers and the latter must match the found key's second identifier + * exactly. If both are missing, id_2 must match the sought key's third + * identifier exactly. */ struct key *find_asymmetric_key(struct key *keyring, const struct asymmetric_key_id *id_0, const struct asymmetric_key_id *id_1, + const struct asymmetric_key_id *id_2, bool partial) { struct key *key; @@ -54,14 +61,17 @@ struct key *find_asymmetric_key(struct key *keyring, char *req, *p; int len; - BUG_ON(!id_0 && !id_1); + WARN_ON(!id_0 && !id_1 && !id_2); if (id_0) { lookup = id_0->data; len = id_0->len; - } else { + } else if (id_1) { lookup = id_1->data; len = id_1->len; + } else { + lookup = id_2->data; + len = id_2->len; } /* Construct an identifier "id:<keyid>". */ @@ -69,7 +79,10 @@ struct key *find_asymmetric_key(struct key *keyring, if (!req) return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); - if (partial) { + if (!id_0 && !id_1) { + *p++ = 'd'; + *p++ = 'n'; + } else if (partial) { *p++ = 'i'; *p++ = 'd'; } else { @@ -152,7 +165,8 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(asymmetric_key_generate_id); /** * asymmetric_key_id_same - Return true if two asymmetric keys IDs are the same. - * @kid_1, @kid_2: The key IDs to compare + * @kid1: The key ID to compare + * @kid2: The key ID to compare */ bool asymmetric_key_id_same(const struct asymmetric_key_id *kid1, const struct asymmetric_key_id *kid2) @@ -168,7 +182,8 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(asymmetric_key_id_same); /** * asymmetric_key_id_partial - Return true if two asymmetric keys IDs * partially match - * @kid_1, @kid_2: The key IDs to compare + * @kid1: The key ID to compare + * @kid2: The key ID to compare */ bool asymmetric_key_id_partial(const struct asymmetric_key_id *kid1, const struct asymmetric_key_id *kid2) @@ -183,8 +198,8 @@ bool asymmetric_key_id_partial(const struct asymmetric_key_id *kid1, EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(asymmetric_key_id_partial); /** - * asymmetric_match_key_ids - Search asymmetric key IDs - * @kids: The list of key IDs to check + * asymmetric_match_key_ids - Search asymmetric key IDs 1 & 2 + * @kids: The pair of key IDs to check * @match_id: The key ID we're looking for * @match: The match function to use */ @@ -198,7 +213,7 @@ static bool asymmetric_match_key_ids( if (!kids || !match_id) return false; - for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(kids->id); i++) + for (i = 0; i < 2; i++) if (match(kids->id[i], match_id)) return true; return false; @@ -242,7 +257,7 @@ struct asymmetric_key_id *asymmetric_key_hex_to_key_id(const char *id) } /* - * Match asymmetric keys by an exact match on an ID. + * Match asymmetric keys by an exact match on one of the first two IDs. */ static bool asymmetric_key_cmp(const struct key *key, const struct key_match_data *match_data) @@ -255,7 +270,7 @@ static bool asymmetric_key_cmp(const struct key *key, } /* - * Match asymmetric keys by a partial match on an IDs. + * Match asymmetric keys by a partial match on one of the first two IDs. */ static bool asymmetric_key_cmp_partial(const struct key *key, const struct key_match_data *match_data) @@ -268,14 +283,27 @@ static bool asymmetric_key_cmp_partial(const struct key *key, } /* + * Match asymmetric keys by an exact match on the third IDs. + */ +static bool asymmetric_key_cmp_name(const struct key *key, + const struct key_match_data *match_data) +{ + const struct asymmetric_key_ids *kids = asymmetric_key_ids(key); + const struct asymmetric_key_id *match_id = match_data->preparsed; + + return kids && asymmetric_key_id_same(kids->id[2], match_id); +} + +/* * Preparse the match criterion. If we don't set lookup_type and cmp, * the default will be an exact match on the key description. * * There are some specifiers for matching key IDs rather than by the key * description: * - * "id:<id>" - find a key by partial match on any available ID - * "ex:<id>" - find a key by exact match on any available ID + * "id:<id>" - find a key by partial match on one of the first two IDs + * "ex:<id>" - find a key by exact match on one of the first two IDs + * "dn:<id>" - find a key by exact match on the third ID * * These have to be searched by iteration rather than by direct lookup because * the key is hashed according to its description. @@ -299,6 +327,11 @@ static int asymmetric_key_match_preparse(struct key_match_data *match_data) spec[1] == 'x' && spec[2] == ':') { id = spec + 3; + } else if (spec[0] == 'd' && + spec[1] == 'n' && + spec[2] == ':') { + id = spec + 3; + cmp = asymmetric_key_cmp_name; } else { goto default_match; } diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.c index 967329e0a07b..277482bb1777 100644 --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.c +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.c @@ -248,6 +248,15 @@ int pkcs7_sig_note_digest_algo(void *context, size_t hdrlen, case OID_sha224: ctx->sinfo->sig->hash_algo = "sha224"; break; + case OID_sm3: + ctx->sinfo->sig->hash_algo = "sm3"; + break; + case OID_gost2012Digest256: + ctx->sinfo->sig->hash_algo = "streebog256"; + break; + case OID_gost2012Digest512: + ctx->sinfo->sig->hash_algo = "streebog512"; + break; default: printk("Unsupported digest algo: %u\n", ctx->last_oid); return -ENOPKG; @@ -269,6 +278,23 @@ int pkcs7_sig_note_pkey_algo(void *context, size_t hdrlen, ctx->sinfo->sig->pkey_algo = "rsa"; ctx->sinfo->sig->encoding = "pkcs1"; break; + case OID_id_ecdsa_with_sha1: + case OID_id_ecdsa_with_sha224: + case OID_id_ecdsa_with_sha256: + case OID_id_ecdsa_with_sha384: + case OID_id_ecdsa_with_sha512: + ctx->sinfo->sig->pkey_algo = "ecdsa"; + ctx->sinfo->sig->encoding = "x962"; + break; + case OID_SM2_with_SM3: + ctx->sinfo->sig->pkey_algo = "sm2"; + ctx->sinfo->sig->encoding = "raw"; + break; + case OID_gost2012PKey256: + case OID_gost2012PKey512: + ctx->sinfo->sig->pkey_algo = "ecrdsa"; + ctx->sinfo->sig->encoding = "raw"; + break; default: printk("Unsupported pkey algo: %u\n", ctx->last_oid); return -ENOPKG; diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.h b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.h index 6565fdc2d4ca..e17f7ce4fb43 100644 --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.h +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.h @@ -41,10 +41,9 @@ struct pkcs7_signed_info { * * This contains the generated digest of _either_ the Content Data or * the Authenticated Attributes [RFC2315 9.3]. If the latter, one of - * the attributes contains the digest of the the Content Data within - * it. + * the attributes contains the digest of the Content Data within it. * - * THis also contains the issuing cert serial number and issuer's name + * This also contains the issuing cert serial number and issuer's name * [PKCS#7 or CMS ver 1] or issuing cert's SKID [CMS ver 3]. */ struct public_key_signature *sig; diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_trust.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_trust.c index 61af3c4d82cc..9a87c34ed173 100644 --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_trust.c +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_trust.c @@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ #include <crypto/public_key.h> #include "pkcs7_parser.h" -/** +/* * Check the trust on one PKCS#7 SignedInfo block. */ static int pkcs7_validate_trust_one(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7, @@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ static int pkcs7_validate_trust_one(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7, * keys. */ key = find_asymmetric_key(trust_keyring, - x509->id, x509->skid, false); + x509->id, x509->skid, NULL, false); if (!IS_ERR(key)) { /* One of the X.509 certificates in the PKCS#7 message * is apparently the same as one we already trust. @@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ static int pkcs7_validate_trust_one(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7, key = find_asymmetric_key(trust_keyring, last->sig->auth_ids[0], last->sig->auth_ids[1], - false); + NULL, false); if (!IS_ERR(key)) { x509 = last; pr_devel("sinfo %u: Root cert %u signer is key %x\n", @@ -97,7 +97,7 @@ static int pkcs7_validate_trust_one(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7, * the signed info directly. */ key = find_asymmetric_key(trust_keyring, - sinfo->sig->auth_ids[0], NULL, false); + sinfo->sig->auth_ids[0], NULL, NULL, false); if (!IS_ERR(key)) { pr_devel("sinfo %u: Direct signer is key %x\n", sinfo->index, key_serial(key)); diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c index ce49820caa97..f6321c785714 100644 --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c @@ -141,11 +141,10 @@ int pkcs7_get_digest(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7, const u8 **buf, u32 *len, *buf = sinfo->sig->digest; *len = sinfo->sig->digest_size; - for (i = 0; i < HASH_ALGO__LAST; i++) - if (!strcmp(hash_algo_name[i], sinfo->sig->hash_algo)) { - *hash_algo = i; - break; - } + i = match_string(hash_algo_name, HASH_ALGO__LAST, + sinfo->sig->hash_algo); + if (i >= 0) + *hash_algo = i; return 0; } @@ -175,12 +174,6 @@ static int pkcs7_find_key(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7, pr_devel("Sig %u: Found cert serial match X.509[%u]\n", sinfo->index, certix); - if (strcmp(x509->pub->pkey_algo, sinfo->sig->pkey_algo) != 0) { - pr_warn("Sig %u: X.509 algo and PKCS#7 sig algo don't match\n", - sinfo->index); - continue; - } - sinfo->signer = x509; return 0; } @@ -227,9 +220,6 @@ static int pkcs7_verify_sig_chain(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7, return 0; } - if (x509->unsupported_key) - goto unsupported_crypto_in_x509; - pr_debug("- issuer %s\n", x509->issuer); sig = x509->sig; if (sig->auth_ids[0]) @@ -246,7 +236,7 @@ static int pkcs7_verify_sig_chain(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7, * authority. */ if (x509->unsupported_sig) - goto unsupported_crypto_in_x509; + goto unsupported_sig_in_x509; x509->signer = x509; pr_debug("- self-signed\n"); return 0; @@ -310,7 +300,7 @@ static int pkcs7_verify_sig_chain(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7, might_sleep(); } -unsupported_crypto_in_x509: +unsupported_sig_in_x509: /* Just prune the certificate chain at this point if we lack some * crypto module to go further. Note, however, we don't want to set * sinfo->unsupported_crypto as the signed info block may still be diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c index d7f43d4ea925..2f8352e88860 100644 --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later /* In-software asymmetric public-key crypto subtype * - * See Documentation/crypto/asymmetric-keys.txt + * See Documentation/crypto/asymmetric-keys.rst * * Copyright (C) 2012 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved. * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com) @@ -14,9 +14,12 @@ #include <linux/slab.h> #include <linux/seq_file.h> #include <linux/scatterlist.h> +#include <linux/asn1.h> #include <keys/asymmetric-subtype.h> #include <crypto/public_key.h> #include <crypto/akcipher.h> +#include <crypto/sm2.h> +#include <crypto/sm3_base.h> MODULE_DESCRIPTION("In-software asymmetric public-key subtype"); MODULE_AUTHOR("Red Hat, Inc."); @@ -57,38 +60,83 @@ static void public_key_destroy(void *payload0, void *payload3) } /* - * Determine the crypto algorithm name. + * Given a public_key, and an encoding and hash_algo to be used for signing + * and/or verification with that key, determine the name of the corresponding + * akcipher algorithm. Also check that encoding and hash_algo are allowed. */ -static -int software_key_determine_akcipher(const char *encoding, - const char *hash_algo, - const struct public_key *pkey, - char alg_name[CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME]) +static int +software_key_determine_akcipher(const struct public_key *pkey, + const char *encoding, const char *hash_algo, + char alg_name[CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME]) { int n; - if (strcmp(encoding, "pkcs1") == 0) { - /* The data wangled by the RSA algorithm is typically padded - * and encoded in some manner, such as EMSA-PKCS1-1_5 [RFC3447 - * sec 8.2]. + if (!encoding) + return -EINVAL; + + if (strcmp(pkey->pkey_algo, "rsa") == 0) { + /* + * RSA signatures usually use EMSA-PKCS1-1_5 [RFC3447 sec 8.2]. + */ + if (strcmp(encoding, "pkcs1") == 0) { + if (!hash_algo) + n = snprintf(alg_name, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME, + "pkcs1pad(%s)", + pkey->pkey_algo); + else + n = snprintf(alg_name, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME, + "pkcs1pad(%s,%s)", + pkey->pkey_algo, hash_algo); + return n >= CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME ? -EINVAL : 0; + } + if (strcmp(encoding, "raw") != 0) + return -EINVAL; + /* + * Raw RSA cannot differentiate between different hash + * algorithms. + */ + if (hash_algo) + return -EINVAL; + } else if (strncmp(pkey->pkey_algo, "ecdsa", 5) == 0) { + if (strcmp(encoding, "x962") != 0) + return -EINVAL; + /* + * ECDSA signatures are taken over a raw hash, so they don't + * differentiate between different hash algorithms. That means + * that the verifier should hard-code a specific hash algorithm. + * Unfortunately, in practice ECDSA is used with multiple SHAs, + * so we have to allow all of them and not just one. */ if (!hash_algo) - n = snprintf(alg_name, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME, - "pkcs1pad(%s)", - pkey->pkey_algo); - else - n = snprintf(alg_name, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME, - "pkcs1pad(%s,%s)", - pkey->pkey_algo, hash_algo); - return n >= CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME ? -EINVAL : 0; - } - - if (strcmp(encoding, "raw") == 0) { - strcpy(alg_name, pkey->pkey_algo); - return 0; + return -EINVAL; + if (strcmp(hash_algo, "sha1") != 0 && + strcmp(hash_algo, "sha224") != 0 && + strcmp(hash_algo, "sha256") != 0 && + strcmp(hash_algo, "sha384") != 0 && + strcmp(hash_algo, "sha512") != 0) + return -EINVAL; + } else if (strcmp(pkey->pkey_algo, "sm2") == 0) { + if (strcmp(encoding, "raw") != 0) + return -EINVAL; + if (!hash_algo) + return -EINVAL; + if (strcmp(hash_algo, "sm3") != 0) + return -EINVAL; + } else if (strcmp(pkey->pkey_algo, "ecrdsa") == 0) { + if (strcmp(encoding, "raw") != 0) + return -EINVAL; + if (!hash_algo) + return -EINVAL; + if (strcmp(hash_algo, "streebog256") != 0 && + strcmp(hash_algo, "streebog512") != 0) + return -EINVAL; + } else { + /* Unknown public key algorithm */ + return -ENOPKG; } - - return -ENOPKG; + if (strscpy(alg_name, pkey->pkey_algo, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME) < 0) + return -EINVAL; + return 0; } static u8 *pkey_pack_u32(u8 *dst, u32 val) @@ -109,9 +157,8 @@ static int software_key_query(const struct kernel_pkey_params *params, u8 *key, *ptr; int ret, len; - ret = software_key_determine_akcipher(params->encoding, - params->hash_algo, - pkey, alg_name); + ret = software_key_determine_akcipher(pkey, params->encoding, + params->hash_algo, alg_name); if (ret < 0) return ret; @@ -119,6 +166,7 @@ static int software_key_query(const struct kernel_pkey_params *params, if (IS_ERR(tfm)) return PTR_ERR(tfm); + ret = -ENOMEM; key = kmalloc(pkey->keylen + sizeof(u32) * 2 + pkey->paramlen, GFP_KERNEL); if (!key) @@ -174,9 +222,8 @@ static int software_key_eds_op(struct kernel_pkey_params *params, pr_devel("==>%s()\n", __func__); - ret = software_key_determine_akcipher(params->encoding, - params->hash_algo, - pkey, alg_name); + ret = software_key_determine_akcipher(pkey, params->encoding, + params->hash_algo, alg_name); if (ret < 0) return ret; @@ -245,6 +292,65 @@ error_free_tfm: return ret; } +#if IS_REACHABLE(CONFIG_CRYPTO_SM2) +static int cert_sig_digest_update(const struct public_key_signature *sig, + struct crypto_akcipher *tfm_pkey) +{ + struct crypto_shash *tfm; + struct shash_desc *desc; + size_t desc_size; + unsigned char dgst[SM3_DIGEST_SIZE]; + int ret; + + BUG_ON(!sig->data); + + /* SM2 signatures always use the SM3 hash algorithm */ + if (!sig->hash_algo || strcmp(sig->hash_algo, "sm3") != 0) + return -EINVAL; + + ret = sm2_compute_z_digest(tfm_pkey, SM2_DEFAULT_USERID, + SM2_DEFAULT_USERID_LEN, dgst); + if (ret) + return ret; + + tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(sig->hash_algo, 0, 0); + if (IS_ERR(tfm)) + return PTR_ERR(tfm); + + desc_size = crypto_shash_descsize(tfm) + sizeof(*desc); + desc = kzalloc(desc_size, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!desc) { + ret = -ENOMEM; + goto error_free_tfm; + } + + desc->tfm = tfm; + + ret = crypto_shash_init(desc); + if (ret < 0) + goto error_free_desc; + + ret = crypto_shash_update(desc, dgst, SM3_DIGEST_SIZE); + if (ret < 0) + goto error_free_desc; + + ret = crypto_shash_finup(desc, sig->data, sig->data_size, sig->digest); + +error_free_desc: + kfree(desc); +error_free_tfm: + crypto_free_shash(tfm); + return ret; +} +#else +static inline int cert_sig_digest_update( + const struct public_key_signature *sig, + struct crypto_akcipher *tfm_pkey) +{ + return -ENOTSUPP; +} +#endif /* ! IS_REACHABLE(CONFIG_CRYPTO_SM2) */ + /* * Verify a signature using a public key. */ @@ -265,9 +371,23 @@ int public_key_verify_signature(const struct public_key *pkey, BUG_ON(!sig); BUG_ON(!sig->s); - ret = software_key_determine_akcipher(sig->encoding, - sig->hash_algo, - pkey, alg_name); + /* + * If the signature specifies a public key algorithm, it *must* match + * the key's actual public key algorithm. + * + * Small exception: ECDSA signatures don't specify the curve, but ECDSA + * keys do. So the strings can mismatch slightly in that case: + * "ecdsa-nist-*" for the key, but "ecdsa" for the signature. + */ + if (sig->pkey_algo) { + if (strcmp(pkey->pkey_algo, sig->pkey_algo) != 0 && + (strncmp(pkey->pkey_algo, "ecdsa-", 6) != 0 || + strcmp(sig->pkey_algo, "ecdsa") != 0)) + return -EKEYREJECTED; + } + + ret = software_key_determine_akcipher(pkey, sig->encoding, + sig->hash_algo, alg_name); if (ret < 0) return ret; @@ -298,6 +418,12 @@ int public_key_verify_signature(const struct public_key *pkey, if (ret) goto error_free_key; + if (strcmp(pkey->pkey_algo, "sm2") == 0 && sig->data_size) { + ret = cert_sig_digest_update(sig, tfm); + if (ret) + goto error_free_key; + } + sg_init_table(src_sg, 2); sg_set_buf(&src_sg[0], sig->s, sig->s_size); sg_set_buf(&src_sg[1], sig->digest, sig->digest_size); diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c index 77ebebada29c..6b1ac5f5896a 100644 --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c @@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ int restrict_link_by_signature(struct key *dest_keyring, sig = payload->data[asym_auth]; if (!sig) return -ENOPKG; - if (!sig->auth_ids[0] && !sig->auth_ids[1]) + if (!sig->auth_ids[0] && !sig->auth_ids[1] && !sig->auth_ids[2]) return -ENOKEY; if (ca_keyid && !asymmetric_key_id_partial(sig->auth_ids[1], ca_keyid)) @@ -96,7 +96,7 @@ int restrict_link_by_signature(struct key *dest_keyring, /* See if we have a key that signed this one. */ key = find_asymmetric_key(trust_keyring, sig->auth_ids[0], sig->auth_ids[1], - false); + sig->auth_ids[2], false); if (IS_ERR(key)) return -ENOKEY; @@ -108,11 +108,11 @@ int restrict_link_by_signature(struct key *dest_keyring, return ret; } -static bool match_either_id(const struct asymmetric_key_ids *pair, +static bool match_either_id(const struct asymmetric_key_id **pair, const struct asymmetric_key_id *single) { - return (asymmetric_key_id_same(pair->id[0], single) || - asymmetric_key_id_same(pair->id[1], single)); + return (asymmetric_key_id_same(pair[0], single) || + asymmetric_key_id_same(pair[1], single)); } static int key_or_keyring_common(struct key *dest_keyring, @@ -140,20 +140,22 @@ static int key_or_keyring_common(struct key *dest_keyring, sig = payload->data[asym_auth]; if (!sig) return -ENOPKG; - if (!sig->auth_ids[0] && !sig->auth_ids[1]) + if (!sig->auth_ids[0] && !sig->auth_ids[1] && !sig->auth_ids[2]) return -ENOKEY; if (trusted) { if (trusted->type == &key_type_keyring) { /* See if we have a key that signed this one. */ key = find_asymmetric_key(trusted, sig->auth_ids[0], - sig->auth_ids[1], false); + sig->auth_ids[1], + sig->auth_ids[2], false); if (IS_ERR(key)) key = NULL; } else if (trusted->type == &key_type_asymmetric) { - const struct asymmetric_key_ids *signer_ids; + const struct asymmetric_key_id **signer_ids; - signer_ids = asymmetric_key_ids(trusted); + signer_ids = (const struct asymmetric_key_id **) + asymmetric_key_ids(trusted)->id; /* * The auth_ids come from the candidate key (the @@ -164,22 +166,29 @@ static int key_or_keyring_common(struct key *dest_keyring, * The signer_ids are identifiers for the * signing key specified for dest_keyring. * - * The first auth_id is the preferred id, and - * the second is the fallback. If only one - * auth_id is present, it may match against - * either signer_id. If two auth_ids are - * present, the first auth_id must match one - * signer_id and the second auth_id must match - * the second signer_id. + * The first auth_id is the preferred id, 2nd and + * 3rd are the fallbacks. If exactly one of + * auth_ids[0] and auth_ids[1] is present, it may + * match either signer_ids[0] or signed_ids[1]. + * If both are present the first one may match + * either signed_id but the second one must match + * the second signer_id. If neither of them is + * available, auth_ids[2] is matched against + * signer_ids[2] as a fallback. */ - if (!sig->auth_ids[0] || !sig->auth_ids[1]) { + if (!sig->auth_ids[0] && !sig->auth_ids[1]) { + if (asymmetric_key_id_same(signer_ids[2], + sig->auth_ids[2])) + key = __key_get(trusted); + + } else if (!sig->auth_ids[0] || !sig->auth_ids[1]) { const struct asymmetric_key_id *auth_id; auth_id = sig->auth_ids[0] ?: sig->auth_ids[1]; if (match_either_id(signer_ids, auth_id)) key = __key_get(trusted); - } else if (asymmetric_key_id_same(signer_ids->id[1], + } else if (asymmetric_key_id_same(signer_ids[1], sig->auth_ids[1]) && match_either_id(signer_ids, sig->auth_ids[0])) { @@ -193,7 +202,8 @@ static int key_or_keyring_common(struct key *dest_keyring, if (check_dest && !key) { /* See if the destination has a key that signed this one. */ key = find_asymmetric_key(dest_keyring, sig->auth_ids[0], - sig->auth_ids[1], false); + sig->auth_ids[1], sig->auth_ids[2], + false); if (IS_ERR(key)) key = NULL; } @@ -244,9 +254,10 @@ int restrict_link_by_key_or_keyring(struct key *dest_keyring, * @payload: The payload of the new key. * @trusted: A key or ring of keys that can be used to vouch for the new cert. * - * Check the new certificate only against the key or keys passed in the data - * parameter. If one of those is the signing key and validates the new - * certificate, then mark the new certificate as being ok to link. + * Check the new certificate against the key or keys passed in the data + * parameter and against the keys already linked to the destination keyring. If + * one of those is the signing key and validates the new certificate, then mark + * the new certificate as being ok to link. * * Returns 0 if the new certificate was accepted, -ENOKEY if we * couldn't find a matching parent certificate in the trusted list, diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/selftest.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/selftest.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..fa0bf7f24284 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/selftest.c @@ -0,0 +1,224 @@ +/* Self-testing for signature checking. + * + * Copyright (C) 2022 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved. + * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com) + */ + +#include <linux/kernel.h> +#include <linux/cred.h> +#include <linux/key.h> +#include <crypto/pkcs7.h> +#include "x509_parser.h" + +struct certs_test { + const u8 *data; + size_t data_len; + const u8 *pkcs7; + size_t pkcs7_len; +}; + +/* + * Set of X.509 certificates to provide public keys for the tests. These will + * be loaded into a temporary keyring for the duration of the testing. + */ +static const __initconst u8 certs_selftest_keys[] = { + "\x30\x82\x05\x55\x30\x82\x03\x3d\xa0\x03\x02\x01\x02\x02\x14\x73" + "\x98\xea\x98\x2d\xd0\x2e\xa8\xb1\xcf\x57\xc7\xf2\x97\xb3\xe6\x1a" + "\xfc\x8c\x0a\x30\x0d\x06\x09\x2a\x86\x48\x86\xf7\x0d\x01\x01\x0b" + "\x05\x00\x30\x34\x31\x32\x30\x30\x06\x03\x55\x04\x03\x0c\x29\x43" + "\x65\x72\x74\x69\x66\x69\x63\x61\x74\x65\x20\x76\x65\x72\x69\x66" + "\x69\x63\x61\x74\x69\x6f\x6e\x20\x73\x65\x6c\x66\x2d\x74\x65\x73" + "\x74\x69\x6e\x67\x20\x6b\x65\x79\x30\x20\x17\x0d\x32\x32\x30\x35" + "\x31\x38\x32\x32\x33\x32\x34\x31\x5a\x18\x0f\x32\x31\x32\x32\x30" + "\x34\x32\x34\x32\x32\x33\x32\x34\x31\x5a\x30\x34\x31\x32\x30\x30" + "\x06\x03\x55\x04\x03\x0c\x29\x43\x65\x72\x74\x69\x66\x69\x63\x61" + "\x74\x65\x20\x76\x65\x72\x69\x66\x69\x63\x61\x74\x69\x6f\x6e\x20" + "\x73\x65\x6c\x66\x2d\x74\x65\x73\x74\x69\x6e\x67\x20\x6b\x65\x79" + "\x30\x82\x02\x22\x30\x0d\x06\x09\x2a\x86\x48\x86\xf7\x0d\x01\x01" + "\x01\x05\x00\x03\x82\x02\x0f\x00\x30\x82\x02\x0a\x02\x82\x02\x01" + "\x00\xcc\xac\x49\xdd\x3b\xca\xb0\x15\x7e\x84\x6a\xb2\x0a\x69\x5f" + "\x1c\x0a\x61\x82\x3b\x4f\x2c\xa3\x95\x2c\x08\x58\x4b\xb1\x5d\x99" + "\xe0\xc3\xc1\x79\xc2\xb3\xeb\xc0\x1e\x6d\x3e\x54\x1d\xbd\xb7\x92" + "\x7b\x4d\xb5\x95\x58\xb2\x52\x2e\xc6\x24\x4b\x71\x63\x80\x32\x77" + "\xa7\x38\x5e\xdb\x72\xae\x6e\x0d\xec\xfb\xb6\x6d\x01\x7f\xe9\x55" + "\x66\xdf\xbf\x1d\x76\x78\x02\x31\xe8\xe5\x07\xf8\xb7\x82\x5c\x0d" + "\xd4\xbb\xfb\xa2\x59\x0d\x2e\x3a\x78\x95\x3a\x8b\x46\x06\x47\x44" + "\x46\xd7\xcd\x06\x6a\x41\x13\xe3\x19\xf6\xbb\x6e\x38\xf4\x83\x01" + "\xa3\xbf\x4a\x39\x4f\xd7\x0a\xe9\x38\xb3\xf5\x94\x14\x4e\xdd\xf7" + "\x43\xfd\x24\xb2\x49\x3c\xa5\xf7\x7a\x7c\xd4\x45\x3d\x97\x75\x68" + "\xf1\xed\x4c\x42\x0b\x70\xca\x85\xf3\xde\xe5\x88\x2c\xc5\xbe\xb6" + "\x97\x34\xba\x24\x02\xcd\x8b\x86\x9f\xa9\x73\xca\x73\xcf\x92\x81" + "\xee\x75\x55\xbb\x18\x67\x5c\xff\x3f\xb5\xdd\x33\x1b\x0c\xe9\x78" + "\xdb\x5c\xcf\xaa\x5c\x43\x42\xdf\x5e\xa9\x6d\xec\xd7\xd7\xff\xe6" + "\xa1\x3a\x92\x1a\xda\xae\xf6\x8c\x6f\x7b\xd5\xb4\x6e\x06\xe9\x8f" + "\xe8\xde\x09\x31\x89\xed\x0e\x11\xa1\xfa\x8a\xe9\xe9\x64\x59\x62" + "\x53\xda\xd1\x70\xbe\x11\xd4\x99\x97\x11\xcf\x99\xde\x0b\x9d\x94" + "\x7e\xaa\xb8\x52\xea\x37\xdb\x90\x7e\x35\xbd\xd9\xfe\x6d\x0a\x48" + "\x70\x28\xdd\xd5\x0d\x7f\x03\x80\x93\x14\x23\x8f\xb9\x22\xcd\x7c" + "\x29\xfe\xf1\x72\xb5\x5c\x0b\x12\xcf\x9c\x15\xf6\x11\x4c\x7a\x45" + "\x25\x8c\x45\x0a\x34\xac\x2d\x9a\x81\xca\x0b\x13\x22\xcd\xeb\x1a" + "\x38\x88\x18\x97\x96\x08\x81\xaa\xcc\x8f\x0f\x8a\x32\x7b\x76\x68" + "\x03\x68\x43\xbf\x11\xba\x55\x60\xfd\x80\x1c\x0d\x9b\x69\xb6\x09" + "\x72\xbc\x0f\x41\x2f\x07\x82\xc6\xe3\xb2\x13\x91\xc4\x6d\x14\x95" + "\x31\xbe\x19\xbd\xbc\xed\xe1\x4c\x74\xa2\xe0\x78\x0b\xbb\x94\xec" + "\x4c\x53\x3a\xa2\xb5\x84\x1d\x4b\x65\x7e\xdc\xf7\xdb\x36\x7d\xbe" + "\x9e\x3b\x36\x66\x42\x66\x76\x35\xbf\xbe\xf0\xc1\x3c\x7c\xe9\x42" + "\x5c\x24\x53\x03\x05\xa8\x67\x24\x50\x02\x75\xff\x24\x46\x3b\x35" + "\x89\x76\xe6\x70\xda\xc5\x51\x8c\x9a\xe5\x05\xb0\x0b\xd0\x2d\xd4" + "\x7d\x57\x75\x94\x6b\xf9\x0a\xad\x0e\x41\x00\x15\xd0\x4f\xc0\x7f" + "\x90\x2d\x18\x48\x8f\x28\xfe\x5d\xa7\xcd\x99\x9e\xbd\x02\x6c\x8a" + "\x31\xf3\x1c\xc7\x4b\xe6\x93\xcd\x42\xa2\xe4\x68\x10\x47\x9d\xfc" + "\x21\x02\x03\x01\x00\x01\xa3\x5d\x30\x5b\x30\x0c\x06\x03\x55\x1d" + "\x13\x01\x01\xff\x04\x02\x30\x00\x30\x0b\x06\x03\x55\x1d\x0f\x04" + "\x04\x03\x02\x07\x80\x30\x1d\x06\x03\x55\x1d\x0e\x04\x16\x04\x14" + "\xf5\x87\x03\xbb\x33\xce\x1b\x73\xee\x02\xec\xcd\xee\x5b\x88\x17" + "\x51\x8f\xe3\xdb\x30\x1f\x06\x03\x55\x1d\x23\x04\x18\x30\x16\x80" + "\x14\xf5\x87\x03\xbb\x33\xce\x1b\x73\xee\x02\xec\xcd\xee\x5b\x88" + "\x17\x51\x8f\xe3\xdb\x30\x0d\x06\x09\x2a\x86\x48\x86\xf7\x0d\x01" + "\x01\x0b\x05\x00\x03\x82\x02\x01\x00\xc0\x2e\x12\x41\x7b\x73\x85" + "\x16\xc8\xdb\x86\x79\xe8\xf5\xcd\x44\xf4\xc6\xe2\x81\x23\x5e\x47" + "\xcb\xab\x25\xf1\x1e\x58\x3e\x31\x7f\x78\xad\x85\xeb\xfe\x14\x88" + "\x60\xf7\x7f\xd2\x26\xa2\xf4\x98\x2a\xfd\xba\x05\x0c\x20\x33\x12" + "\xcc\x4d\x14\x61\x64\x81\x93\xd3\x33\xed\xc8\xff\xf1\x78\xcc\x5f" + "\x51\x9f\x09\xd7\xbe\x0d\x5c\x74\xfd\x9b\xdf\x52\x4a\xc9\xa8\x71" + "\x25\x33\x04\x10\x67\x36\xd0\xb3\x0b\xc9\xa1\x40\x72\xae\x41\x7b" + "\x68\xe6\xe4\x7b\xd0\x28\xf7\x6d\xe7\x3f\x50\xfc\x91\x7c\x91\x56" + "\xd4\xdf\xa6\xbb\xe8\x4d\x1b\x58\xaa\x28\xfa\xc1\x19\xeb\x11\x2f" + "\x24\x8b\x7c\xc5\xa9\x86\x26\xaa\x6e\xb7\x9b\xd5\xf8\x06\xfb\x02" + "\x52\x7b\x9c\x9e\xa1\xe0\x07\x8b\x5e\xe4\xb8\x55\x29\xf6\x48\x52" + "\x1c\x1b\x54\x2d\x46\xd8\xe5\x71\xb9\x60\xd1\x45\xb5\x92\x89\x8a" + "\x63\x58\x2a\xb3\xc6\xb2\x76\xe2\x3c\x82\x59\x04\xae\x5a\xc4\x99" + "\x7b\x2e\x4b\x46\x57\xb8\x29\x24\xb2\xfd\xee\x2c\x0d\xa4\x83\xfa" + "\x65\x2a\x07\x35\x8b\x97\xcf\xbd\x96\x2e\xd1\x7e\x6c\xc2\x1e\x87" + "\xb6\x6c\x76\x65\xb5\xb2\x62\xda\x8b\xe9\x73\xe3\xdb\x33\xdd\x13" + "\x3a\x17\x63\x6a\x76\xde\x8d\x8f\xe0\x47\x61\x28\x3a\x83\xff\x8f" + "\xe7\xc7\xe0\x4a\xa3\xe5\x07\xcf\xe9\x8c\x35\x35\x2e\xe7\x80\x66" + "\x31\xbf\x91\x58\x0a\xe1\x25\x3d\x38\xd3\xa4\xf0\x59\x34\x47\x07" + "\x62\x0f\xbe\x30\xdd\x81\x88\x58\xf0\x28\xb0\x96\xe5\x82\xf8\x05" + "\xb7\x13\x01\xbc\xfa\xc6\x1f\x86\x72\xcc\xf9\xee\x8e\xd9\xd6\x04" + "\x8c\x24\x6c\xbf\x0f\x5d\x37\x39\xcf\x45\xc1\x93\x3a\xd2\xed\x5c" + "\x58\x79\x74\x86\x62\x30\x7e\x8e\xbb\xdd\x7a\xa9\xed\xca\x40\xcb" + "\x62\x47\xf4\xb4\x9f\x52\x7f\x72\x63\xa8\xf0\x2b\xaf\x45\x2a\x48" + "\x19\x6d\xe3\xfb\xf9\x19\x66\x69\xc8\xcc\x62\x87\x6c\x53\x2b\x2d" + "\x6e\x90\x6c\x54\x3a\x82\x25\x41\xcb\x18\x6a\xa4\x22\xa8\xa1\xc4" + "\x47\xd7\x81\x00\x1c\x15\x51\x0f\x1a\xaf\xef\x9f\xa6\x61\x8c\xbd" + "\x6b\x8b\xed\xe6\xac\x0e\xb6\x3a\x4c\x92\xe6\x0f\x91\x0a\x0f\x71" + "\xc7\xa0\xb9\x0d\x3a\x17\x5a\x6f\x35\xc8\xe7\x50\x4f\x46\xe8\x70" + "\x60\x48\x06\x82\x8b\x66\x58\xe6\x73\x91\x9c\x12\x3d\x35\x8e\x46" + "\xad\x5a\xf5\xb3\xdb\x69\x21\x04\xfd\xd3\x1c\xdf\x94\x9d\x56\xb0" + "\x0a\xd1\x95\x76\x8d\xec\x9e\xdd\x0b\x15\x97\x64\xad\xe5\xf2\x62" + "\x02\xfc\x9e\x5f\x56\x42\x39\x05\xb3" +}; + +/* + * Signed data and detached signature blobs that form the verification tests. + */ +static const __initconst u8 certs_selftest_1_data[] = { + "\x54\x68\x69\x73\x20\x69\x73\x20\x73\x6f\x6d\x65\x20\x74\x65\x73" + "\x74\x20\x64\x61\x74\x61\x20\x75\x73\x65\x64\x20\x66\x6f\x72\x20" + "\x73\x65\x6c\x66\x2d\x74\x65\x73\x74\x69\x6e\x67\x20\x63\x65\x72" + "\x74\x69\x66\x69\x63\x61\x74\x65\x20\x76\x65\x72\x69\x66\x69\x63" + "\x61\x74\x69\x6f\x6e\x2e\x0a" +}; + +static const __initconst u8 certs_selftest_1_pkcs7[] = { + "\x30\x82\x02\xab\x06\x09\x2a\x86\x48\x86\xf7\x0d\x01\x07\x02\xa0" + "\x82\x02\x9c\x30\x82\x02\x98\x02\x01\x01\x31\x0d\x30\x0b\x06\x09" + "\x60\x86\x48\x01\x65\x03\x04\x02\x01\x30\x0b\x06\x09\x2a\x86\x48" + "\x86\xf7\x0d\x01\x07\x01\x31\x82\x02\x75\x30\x82\x02\x71\x02\x01" + "\x01\x30\x4c\x30\x34\x31\x32\x30\x30\x06\x03\x55\x04\x03\x0c\x29" + "\x43\x65\x72\x74\x69\x66\x69\x63\x61\x74\x65\x20\x76\x65\x72\x69" + "\x66\x69\x63\x61\x74\x69\x6f\x6e\x20\x73\x65\x6c\x66\x2d\x74\x65" + "\x73\x74\x69\x6e\x67\x20\x6b\x65\x79\x02\x14\x73\x98\xea\x98\x2d" + "\xd0\x2e\xa8\xb1\xcf\x57\xc7\xf2\x97\xb3\xe6\x1a\xfc\x8c\x0a\x30" + "\x0b\x06\x09\x60\x86\x48\x01\x65\x03\x04\x02\x01\x30\x0d\x06\x09" + "\x2a\x86\x48\x86\xf7\x0d\x01\x01\x01\x05\x00\x04\x82\x02\x00\xac" + "\xb0\xf2\x07\xd6\x99\x6d\xc0\xc0\xd9\x8d\x31\x0d\x7e\x04\xeb\xc3" + "\x88\x90\xc4\x58\x46\xd4\xe2\xa0\xa3\x25\xe3\x04\x50\x37\x85\x8c" + "\x91\xc6\xfc\xc5\xd4\x92\xfd\x05\xd8\xb8\xa3\xb8\xba\x89\x13\x00" + "\x88\x79\x99\x51\x6b\x5b\x28\x31\xc0\xb3\x1b\x7a\x68\x2c\x00\xdb" + "\x4b\x46\x11\xf3\xfa\x50\x8e\x19\x89\xa2\x4c\xda\x4c\x89\x01\x11" + "\x89\xee\xd3\xc8\xc1\xe7\xa7\xf6\xb2\xa2\xf8\x65\xb8\x35\x20\x33" + "\xba\x12\x62\xd5\xbd\xaa\x71\xe5\x5b\xc0\x6a\x32\xff\x6a\x2e\x23" + "\xef\x2b\xb6\x58\xb1\xfb\x5f\x82\x34\x40\x6d\x9f\xbc\x27\xac\x37" + "\x23\x99\xcf\x7d\x20\xb2\x39\x01\xc0\x12\xce\xd7\x5d\x2f\xb6\xab" + "\xb5\x56\x4f\xef\xf4\x72\x07\x58\x65\xa9\xeb\x1f\x75\x1c\x5f\x0c" + "\x88\xe0\xa4\xe2\xcd\x73\x2b\x9e\xb2\x05\x7e\x12\xf8\xd0\x66\x41" + "\xcc\x12\x63\xd4\xd6\xac\x9b\x1d\x14\x77\x8d\x1c\x57\xd5\x27\xc6" + "\x49\xa2\x41\x43\xf3\x59\x29\xe5\xcb\xd1\x75\xbc\x3a\x97\x2a\x72" + "\x22\x66\xc5\x3b\xc1\xba\xfc\x53\x18\x98\xe2\x21\x64\xc6\x52\x87" + "\x13\xd5\x7c\x42\xe8\xfb\x9c\x9a\x45\x32\xd5\xa5\x22\x62\x9d\xd4" + "\xcb\xa4\xfa\x77\xbb\x50\x24\x0b\x8b\x88\x99\x15\x56\xa9\x1e\x92" + "\xbf\x5d\x94\x77\xb6\xf1\x67\x01\x60\x06\x58\x5c\xdf\x18\x52\x79" + "\x37\x30\x93\x7d\x87\x04\xf1\xe0\x55\x59\x52\xf3\xc2\xb1\x1c\x5b" + "\x12\x7c\x49\x87\xfb\xf7\xed\xdd\x95\x71\xec\x4b\x1a\x85\x08\xb0" + "\xa0\x36\xc4\x7b\xab\x40\xe0\xf1\x98\xcc\xaf\x19\x40\x8f\x47\x6f" + "\xf0\x6c\x84\x29\x7f\x7f\x04\x46\xcb\x08\x0f\xe0\xc1\xc9\x70\x6e" + "\x95\x3b\xa4\xbc\x29\x2b\x53\x67\x45\x1b\x0d\xbc\x13\xa5\x76\x31" + "\xaf\xb9\xd0\xe0\x60\x12\xd2\xf4\xb7\x7c\x58\x7e\xf6\x2d\xbb\x24" + "\x14\x5a\x20\x24\xa8\x12\xdf\x25\xbd\x42\xce\x96\x7c\x2e\xba\x14" + "\x1b\x81\x9f\x18\x45\xa4\xc6\x70\x3e\x0e\xf0\xd3\x7b\x9c\x10\xbe" + "\xb8\x7a\x89\xc5\x9e\xd9\x97\xdf\xd7\xe7\xc6\x1d\xc0\x20\x6c\xb8" + "\x1e\x3a\x63\xb8\x39\x8e\x8e\x62\xd5\xd2\xb4\xcd\xff\x46\xfc\x8e" + "\xec\x07\x35\x0c\xff\xb0\x05\xe6\xf4\xe5\xfe\xa2\xe3\x0a\xe6\x36" + "\xa7\x4a\x7e\x62\x1d\xc4\x50\x39\x35\x4e\x28\xcb\x4a\xfb\x9d\xdb" + "\xdd\x23\xd6\x53\xb1\x74\x77\x12\xf7\x9c\xf0\x9a\x6b\xf7\xa9\x64" + "\x2d\x86\x21\x2a\xcf\xc6\x54\xf5\xc9\xad\xfa\xb5\x12\xb4\xf3\x51" + "\x77\x55\x3c\x6f\x0c\x32\xd3\x8c\x44\x39\x71\x25\xfe\x96\xd2" +}; + +/* + * List of tests to be run. + */ +#define TEST(data, pkcs7) { data, sizeof(data) - 1, pkcs7, sizeof(pkcs7) - 1 } +static const struct certs_test certs_tests[] __initconst = { + TEST(certs_selftest_1_data, certs_selftest_1_pkcs7), +}; + +int __init fips_signature_selftest(void) +{ + struct key *keyring; + int ret, i; + + pr_notice("Running certificate verification selftests\n"); + + keyring = keyring_alloc(".certs_selftest", + GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, GLOBAL_ROOT_GID, current_cred(), + (KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) | + KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ | + KEY_USR_SEARCH, + KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA, + NULL, NULL); + if (IS_ERR(keyring)) + panic("Can't allocate certs selftest keyring: %ld\n", + PTR_ERR(keyring)); + + ret = x509_load_certificate_list(certs_selftest_keys, + sizeof(certs_selftest_keys) - 1, keyring); + if (ret < 0) + panic("Can't allocate certs selftest keyring: %d\n", ret); + + for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(certs_tests); i++) { + const struct certs_test *test = &certs_tests[i]; + struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7; + + pkcs7 = pkcs7_parse_message(test->pkcs7, test->pkcs7_len); + if (IS_ERR(pkcs7)) + panic("Certs selftest %d: pkcs7_parse_message() = %d\n", i, ret); + + pkcs7_supply_detached_data(pkcs7, test->data, test->data_len); + + ret = pkcs7_verify(pkcs7, VERIFYING_MODULE_SIGNATURE); + if (ret < 0) + panic("Certs selftest %d: pkcs7_verify() = %d\n", i, ret); + + ret = pkcs7_validate_trust(pkcs7, keyring); + if (ret < 0) + panic("Certs selftest %d: pkcs7_validate_trust() = %d\n", i, ret); + + pkcs7_free_message(pkcs7); + } + + key_put(keyring); + return 0; +} diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/signature.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/signature.c index e24a031db1e4..2deff81f8af5 100644 --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/signature.c +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/signature.c @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later /* Signature verification with an asymmetric key * - * See Documentation/crypto/asymmetric-keys.txt + * See Documentation/crypto/asymmetric-keys.rst * * Copyright (C) 2012 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved. * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com) @@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ void public_key_signature_free(struct public_key_signature *sig) EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(public_key_signature_free); /** - * query_asymmetric_key - Get information about an aymmetric key. + * query_asymmetric_key - Get information about an asymmetric key. * @params: Various parameters. * @info: Where to put the information. */ diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/tpm.asn1 b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/tpm.asn1 deleted file mode 100644 index d7f194232f30..000000000000 --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/tpm.asn1 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,5 +0,0 @@ --- --- Unencryted TPM Blob. For details of the format, see: --- http://david.woodhou.se/draft-woodhouse-cert-best-practice.html#I-D.mavrogiannopoulos-tpmuri --- -PrivateKeyInfo ::= OCTET STRING ({ tpm_note_key }) diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/tpm_parser.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/tpm_parser.c deleted file mode 100644 index 96405d8dcd98..000000000000 --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/tpm_parser.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,102 +0,0 @@ -// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 -#define pr_fmt(fmt) "TPM-PARSER: "fmt -#include <linux/module.h> -#include <linux/kernel.h> -#include <linux/export.h> -#include <linux/slab.h> -#include <linux/err.h> -#include <keys/asymmetric-subtype.h> -#include <keys/asymmetric-parser.h> -#include <crypto/asym_tpm_subtype.h> -#include "tpm.asn1.h" - -struct tpm_parse_context { - const void *blob; - u32 blob_len; -}; - -/* - * Note the key data of the ASN.1 blob. - */ -int tpm_note_key(void *context, size_t hdrlen, - unsigned char tag, - const void *value, size_t vlen) -{ - struct tpm_parse_context *ctx = context; - - ctx->blob = value; - ctx->blob_len = vlen; - - return 0; -} - -/* - * Parse a TPM-encrypted private key blob. - */ -static struct tpm_key *tpm_parse(const void *data, size_t datalen) -{ - struct tpm_parse_context ctx; - long ret; - - memset(&ctx, 0, sizeof(ctx)); - - /* Attempt to decode the private key */ - ret = asn1_ber_decoder(&tpm_decoder, &ctx, data, datalen); - if (ret < 0) - goto error; - - return tpm_key_create(ctx.blob, ctx.blob_len); - -error: - return ERR_PTR(ret); -} -/* - * Attempt to parse a data blob for a key as a TPM private key blob. - */ -static int tpm_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) -{ - struct tpm_key *tk; - - /* - * TPM 1.2 keys are max 2048 bits long, so assume the blob is no - * more than 4x that - */ - if (prep->datalen > 256 * 4) - return -EMSGSIZE; - - tk = tpm_parse(prep->data, prep->datalen); - - if (IS_ERR(tk)) - return PTR_ERR(tk); - - /* We're pinning the module by being linked against it */ - __module_get(asym_tpm_subtype.owner); - prep->payload.data[asym_subtype] = &asym_tpm_subtype; - prep->payload.data[asym_key_ids] = NULL; - prep->payload.data[asym_crypto] = tk; - prep->payload.data[asym_auth] = NULL; - prep->quotalen = 100; - return 0; -} - -static struct asymmetric_key_parser tpm_key_parser = { - .owner = THIS_MODULE, - .name = "tpm_parser", - .parse = tpm_key_preparse, -}; - -static int __init tpm_key_init(void) -{ - return register_asymmetric_key_parser(&tpm_key_parser); -} - -static void __exit tpm_key_exit(void) -{ - unregister_asymmetric_key_parser(&tpm_key_parser); -} - -module_init(tpm_key_init); -module_exit(tpm_key_exit); - -MODULE_DESCRIPTION("TPM private key-blob parser"); -MODULE_LICENSE("GPL v2"); diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/verify_pefile.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/verify_pefile.c index cc9dbcecaaca..7553ab18db89 100644 --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/verify_pefile.c +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/verify_pefile.c @@ -376,7 +376,7 @@ static int pefile_digest_pe(const void *pebuf, unsigned int pelen, } error: - kzfree(desc); + kfree_sensitive(desc); error_no_desc: crypto_free_shash(tfm); kleave(" = %d", ret); @@ -447,6 +447,6 @@ int verify_pefile_signature(const void *pebuf, unsigned pelen, ret = pefile_digest_pe(pebuf, pelen, &ctx); error: - kzfree(ctx.digest); + kfree_sensitive(ctx.digest); return ret; } diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509.asn1 b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509.asn1 index 5c9f4e4a5231..92d59c32f96a 100644 --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509.asn1 +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509.asn1 @@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ Certificate ::= SEQUENCE { TBSCertificate ::= SEQUENCE { version [ 0 ] Version DEFAULT, serialNumber CertificateSerialNumber ({ x509_note_serial }), - signature AlgorithmIdentifier ({ x509_note_pkey_algo }), + signature AlgorithmIdentifier ({ x509_note_sig_algo }), issuer Name ({ x509_note_issuer }), validity Validity, subject Name ({ x509_note_subject }), diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c index 26ec20ef4899..7a9b084e2043 100644 --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c @@ -19,15 +19,13 @@ struct x509_parse_context { struct x509_certificate *cert; /* Certificate being constructed */ unsigned long data; /* Start of data */ - const void *cert_start; /* Start of cert content */ const void *key; /* Key data */ size_t key_size; /* Size of key data */ const void *params; /* Key parameters */ size_t params_size; /* Size of key parameters */ - enum OID key_algo; /* Public key algorithm */ + enum OID key_algo; /* Algorithm used by the cert's key */ enum OID last_oid; /* Last OID encountered */ - enum OID algo_oid; /* Algorithm OID */ - unsigned char nr_mpi; /* Number of MPIs stored */ + enum OID sig_algo; /* Algorithm used to sign the cert */ u8 o_size; /* Size of organizationName (O) */ u8 cn_size; /* Size of commonName (CN) */ u8 email_size; /* Size of emailAddress */ @@ -187,11 +185,10 @@ int x509_note_tbs_certificate(void *context, size_t hdrlen, } /* - * Record the public key algorithm + * Record the algorithm that was used to sign this certificate. */ -int x509_note_pkey_algo(void *context, size_t hdrlen, - unsigned char tag, - const void *value, size_t vlen) +int x509_note_sig_algo(void *context, size_t hdrlen, unsigned char tag, + const void *value, size_t vlen) { struct x509_parse_context *ctx = context; @@ -227,6 +224,26 @@ int x509_note_pkey_algo(void *context, size_t hdrlen, ctx->cert->sig->hash_algo = "sha224"; goto rsa_pkcs1; + case OID_id_ecdsa_with_sha1: + ctx->cert->sig->hash_algo = "sha1"; + goto ecdsa; + + case OID_id_ecdsa_with_sha224: + ctx->cert->sig->hash_algo = "sha224"; + goto ecdsa; + + case OID_id_ecdsa_with_sha256: + ctx->cert->sig->hash_algo = "sha256"; + goto ecdsa; + + case OID_id_ecdsa_with_sha384: + ctx->cert->sig->hash_algo = "sha384"; + goto ecdsa; + + case OID_id_ecdsa_with_sha512: + ctx->cert->sig->hash_algo = "sha512"; + goto ecdsa; + case OID_gost2012Signature256: ctx->cert->sig->hash_algo = "streebog256"; goto ecrdsa; @@ -234,17 +251,31 @@ int x509_note_pkey_algo(void *context, size_t hdrlen, case OID_gost2012Signature512: ctx->cert->sig->hash_algo = "streebog512"; goto ecrdsa; + + case OID_SM2_with_SM3: + ctx->cert->sig->hash_algo = "sm3"; + goto sm2; } rsa_pkcs1: ctx->cert->sig->pkey_algo = "rsa"; ctx->cert->sig->encoding = "pkcs1"; - ctx->algo_oid = ctx->last_oid; + ctx->sig_algo = ctx->last_oid; return 0; ecrdsa: ctx->cert->sig->pkey_algo = "ecrdsa"; ctx->cert->sig->encoding = "raw"; - ctx->algo_oid = ctx->last_oid; + ctx->sig_algo = ctx->last_oid; + return 0; +sm2: + ctx->cert->sig->pkey_algo = "sm2"; + ctx->cert->sig->encoding = "raw"; + ctx->sig_algo = ctx->last_oid; + return 0; +ecdsa: + ctx->cert->sig->pkey_algo = "ecdsa"; + ctx->cert->sig->encoding = "x962"; + ctx->sig_algo = ctx->last_oid; return 0; } @@ -257,16 +288,23 @@ int x509_note_signature(void *context, size_t hdrlen, { struct x509_parse_context *ctx = context; - pr_debug("Signature type: %u size %zu\n", ctx->last_oid, vlen); + pr_debug("Signature: alg=%u, size=%zu\n", ctx->last_oid, vlen); - if (ctx->last_oid != ctx->algo_oid) { - pr_warn("Got cert with pkey (%u) and sig (%u) algorithm OIDs\n", - ctx->algo_oid, ctx->last_oid); + /* + * In X.509 certificates, the signature's algorithm is stored in two + * places: inside the TBSCertificate (the data that is signed), and + * alongside the signature. These *must* match. + */ + if (ctx->last_oid != ctx->sig_algo) { + pr_warn("signatureAlgorithm (%u) differs from tbsCertificate.signature (%u)\n", + ctx->last_oid, ctx->sig_algo); return -EINVAL; } if (strcmp(ctx->cert->sig->pkey_algo, "rsa") == 0 || - strcmp(ctx->cert->sig->pkey_algo, "ecrdsa") == 0) { + strcmp(ctx->cert->sig->pkey_algo, "ecrdsa") == 0 || + strcmp(ctx->cert->sig->pkey_algo, "sm2") == 0 || + strcmp(ctx->cert->sig->pkey_algo, "ecdsa") == 0) { /* Discard the BIT STRING metadata */ if (vlen < 1 || *(const u8 *)value != 0) return -EBADMSG; @@ -405,8 +443,18 @@ int x509_note_issuer(void *context, size_t hdrlen, const void *value, size_t vlen) { struct x509_parse_context *ctx = context; + struct asymmetric_key_id *kid; + ctx->cert->raw_issuer = value; ctx->cert->raw_issuer_size = vlen; + + if (!ctx->cert->sig->auth_ids[2]) { + kid = asymmetric_key_generate_id(value, vlen, "", 0); + if (IS_ERR(kid)) + return PTR_ERR(kid); + ctx->cert->sig->auth_ids[2] = kid; + } + return x509_fabricate_name(ctx, hdrlen, tag, &ctx->cert->issuer, vlen); } @@ -449,15 +497,44 @@ int x509_extract_key_data(void *context, size_t hdrlen, const void *value, size_t vlen) { struct x509_parse_context *ctx = context; + enum OID oid; ctx->key_algo = ctx->last_oid; - if (ctx->last_oid == OID_rsaEncryption) + switch (ctx->last_oid) { + case OID_rsaEncryption: ctx->cert->pub->pkey_algo = "rsa"; - else if (ctx->last_oid == OID_gost2012PKey256 || - ctx->last_oid == OID_gost2012PKey512) + break; + case OID_gost2012PKey256: + case OID_gost2012PKey512: ctx->cert->pub->pkey_algo = "ecrdsa"; - else + break; + case OID_sm2: + ctx->cert->pub->pkey_algo = "sm2"; + break; + case OID_id_ecPublicKey: + if (parse_OID(ctx->params, ctx->params_size, &oid) != 0) + return -EBADMSG; + + switch (oid) { + case OID_sm2: + ctx->cert->pub->pkey_algo = "sm2"; + break; + case OID_id_prime192v1: + ctx->cert->pub->pkey_algo = "ecdsa-nist-p192"; + break; + case OID_id_prime256v1: + ctx->cert->pub->pkey_algo = "ecdsa-nist-p256"; + break; + case OID_id_ansip384r1: + ctx->cert->pub->pkey_algo = "ecdsa-nist-p384"; + break; + default: + return -ENOPKG; + } + break; + default: return -ENOPKG; + } /* Discard the BIT STRING metadata */ if (vlen < 1 || *(const u8 *)value != 0) diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_loader.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_loader.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..1bc169dee22e --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_loader.c @@ -0,0 +1,57 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later + +#include <linux/kernel.h> +#include <linux/key.h> +#include <keys/asymmetric-type.h> + +int x509_load_certificate_list(const u8 cert_list[], + const unsigned long list_size, + const struct key *keyring) +{ + key_ref_t key; + const u8 *p, *end; + size_t plen; + + p = cert_list; + end = p + list_size; + while (p < end) { + /* Each cert begins with an ASN.1 SEQUENCE tag and must be more + * than 256 bytes in size. + */ + if (end - p < 4) + goto dodgy_cert; + if (p[0] != 0x30 && + p[1] != 0x82) + goto dodgy_cert; + plen = (p[2] << 8) | p[3]; + plen += 4; + if (plen > end - p) + goto dodgy_cert; + + key = key_create_or_update(make_key_ref(keyring, 1), + "asymmetric", + NULL, + p, + plen, + ((KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) | + KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ), + KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA | + KEY_ALLOC_BUILT_IN | + KEY_ALLOC_BYPASS_RESTRICTION); + if (IS_ERR(key)) { + pr_err("Problem loading in-kernel X.509 certificate (%ld)\n", + PTR_ERR(key)); + } else { + pr_notice("Loaded X.509 cert '%s'\n", + key_ref_to_ptr(key)->description); + key_ref_put(key); + } + p += plen; + } + + return 0; + +dodgy_cert: + pr_err("Problem parsing in-kernel X.509 certificate list\n"); + return 0; +} diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h index c233f136fb35..a299c9c56f40 100644 --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h @@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ struct x509_certificate { time64_t valid_to; const void *tbs; /* Signed data */ unsigned tbs_size; /* Size of signed data */ - unsigned raw_sig_size; /* Size of sigature */ + unsigned raw_sig_size; /* Size of signature */ const void *raw_sig; /* Signature data */ const void *raw_serial; /* Raw serial number in ASN.1 */ unsigned raw_serial_size; @@ -36,12 +36,20 @@ struct x509_certificate { bool seen; /* Infinite recursion prevention */ bool verified; bool self_signed; /* T if self-signed (check unsupported_sig too) */ - bool unsupported_key; /* T if key uses unsupported crypto */ bool unsupported_sig; /* T if signature uses unsupported crypto */ bool blacklisted; }; /* + * selftest.c + */ +#ifdef CONFIG_FIPS_SIGNATURE_SELFTEST +extern int __init fips_signature_selftest(void); +#else +static inline int fips_signature_selftest(void) { return 0; } +#endif + +/* * x509_cert_parser.c */ extern void x509_free_certificate(struct x509_certificate *cert); diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c index d964cc82b69c..0b4943a4592b 100644 --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c @@ -30,17 +30,8 @@ int x509_get_sig_params(struct x509_certificate *cert) pr_devel("==>%s()\n", __func__); - if (!cert->pub->pkey_algo) - cert->unsupported_key = true; - - if (!sig->pkey_algo) - cert->unsupported_sig = true; - - /* We check the hash if we can - even if we can't then verify it */ - if (!sig->hash_algo) { - cert->unsupported_sig = true; - return 0; - } + sig->data = cert->tbs; + sig->data_size = cert->tbs_size; sig->s = kmemdup(cert->raw_sig, cert->raw_sig_size, GFP_KERNEL); if (!sig->s) @@ -78,7 +69,8 @@ int x509_get_sig_params(struct x509_certificate *cert) if (ret < 0) goto error_2; - ret = is_hash_blacklisted(sig->digest, sig->digest_size, "tbs"); + ret = is_hash_blacklisted(sig->digest, sig->digest_size, + BLACKLIST_HASH_X509_TBS); if (ret == -EKEYREJECTED) { pr_err("Cert %*phN is blacklisted\n", sig->digest_size, sig->digest); @@ -125,10 +117,6 @@ int x509_check_for_self_signed(struct x509_certificate *cert) goto out; } - ret = -EKEYREJECTED; - if (strcmp(cert->pub->pkey_algo, cert->sig->pkey_algo) != 0) - goto out; - ret = public_key_verify_signature(cert->pub, cert->sig); if (ret < 0) { if (ret == -ENOPKG) { @@ -168,12 +156,6 @@ static int x509_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) pr_devel("Cert Issuer: %s\n", cert->issuer); pr_devel("Cert Subject: %s\n", cert->subject); - - if (cert->unsupported_key) { - ret = -ENOPKG; - goto error_free_cert; - } - pr_devel("Cert Key Algo: %s\n", cert->pub->pkey_algo); pr_devel("Cert Valid period: %lld-%lld\n", cert->valid_from, cert->valid_to); @@ -218,6 +200,13 @@ static int x509_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) goto error_free_desc; kids->id[0] = cert->id; kids->id[1] = cert->skid; + kids->id[2] = asymmetric_key_generate_id(cert->raw_subject, + cert->raw_subject_size, + "", 0); + if (IS_ERR(kids->id[2])) { + ret = PTR_ERR(kids->id[2]); + goto error_free_kids; + } /* We're pinning the module by being linked against it */ __module_get(public_key_subtype.owner); @@ -234,8 +223,11 @@ static int x509_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) cert->skid = NULL; cert->sig = NULL; desc = NULL; + kids = NULL; ret = 0; +error_free_kids: + kfree(kids); error_free_desc: kfree(desc); error_free_cert: @@ -252,9 +244,15 @@ static struct asymmetric_key_parser x509_key_parser = { /* * Module stuff */ +extern int __init certs_selftest(void); static int __init x509_key_init(void) { - return register_asymmetric_key_parser(&x509_key_parser); + int ret; + + ret = register_asymmetric_key_parser(&x509_key_parser); + if (ret < 0) + return ret; + return fips_signature_selftest(); } static void __exit x509_key_exit(void) |