diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_sriov.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_sriov.c | 2191 |
1 files changed, 1777 insertions, 414 deletions
diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_sriov.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_sriov.c index aa11d07793d4..3ba1408c56a9 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_sriov.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_sriov.c @@ -1,532 +1,1895 @@ // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 /* Copyright (c) 2018, Intel Corporation. */ -#include "ice_common.h" -#include "ice_sriov.h" +#include "ice.h" +#include "ice_vf_lib_private.h" +#include "ice_base.h" +#include "ice_lib.h" +#include "ice_fltr.h" +#include "ice_dcb_lib.h" +#include "ice_flow.h" +#include "ice_eswitch.h" +#include "ice_virtchnl_allowlist.h" +#include "ice_flex_pipe.h" +#include "ice_vf_vsi_vlan_ops.h" +#include "ice_vlan.h" /** - * ice_aq_send_msg_to_vf - * @hw: pointer to the hardware structure - * @vfid: VF ID to send msg - * @v_opcode: opcodes for VF-PF communication - * @v_retval: return error code - * @msg: pointer to the msg buffer - * @msglen: msg length - * @cd: pointer to command details + * ice_free_vf_entries - Free all VF entries from the hash table + * @pf: pointer to the PF structure * - * Send message to VF driver (0x0802) using mailbox - * queue and asynchronously sending message via - * ice_sq_send_cmd() function + * Iterate over the VF hash table, removing and releasing all VF entries. + * Called during VF teardown or as cleanup during failed VF initialization. */ -enum ice_status -ice_aq_send_msg_to_vf(struct ice_hw *hw, u16 vfid, u32 v_opcode, u32 v_retval, - u8 *msg, u16 msglen, struct ice_sq_cd *cd) +static void ice_free_vf_entries(struct ice_pf *pf) { - struct ice_aqc_pf_vf_msg *cmd; - struct ice_aq_desc desc; + struct ice_vfs *vfs = &pf->vfs; + struct hlist_node *tmp; + struct ice_vf *vf; + unsigned int bkt; - ice_fill_dflt_direct_cmd_desc(&desc, ice_mbx_opc_send_msg_to_vf); + /* Remove all VFs from the hash table and release their main + * reference. Once all references to the VF are dropped, ice_put_vf() + * will call ice_release_vf which will remove the VF memory. + */ + lockdep_assert_held(&vfs->table_lock); + + hash_for_each_safe(vfs->table, bkt, tmp, vf, entry) { + hash_del_rcu(&vf->entry); + ice_put_vf(vf); + } +} + +/** + * ice_vf_vsi_release - invalidate the VF's VSI after freeing it + * @vf: invalidate this VF's VSI after freeing it + */ +static void ice_vf_vsi_release(struct ice_vf *vf) +{ + struct ice_vsi *vsi = ice_get_vf_vsi(vf); + + if (WARN_ON(!vsi)) + return; + + ice_vsi_release(vsi); + ice_vf_invalidate_vsi(vf); +} + +/** + * ice_free_vf_res - Free a VF's resources + * @vf: pointer to the VF info + */ +static void ice_free_vf_res(struct ice_vf *vf) +{ + struct ice_pf *pf = vf->pf; + int i, last_vector_idx; + + /* First, disable VF's configuration API to prevent OS from + * accessing the VF's VSI after it's freed or invalidated. + */ + clear_bit(ICE_VF_STATE_INIT, vf->vf_states); + ice_vf_fdir_exit(vf); + /* free VF control VSI */ + if (vf->ctrl_vsi_idx != ICE_NO_VSI) + ice_vf_ctrl_vsi_release(vf); - cmd = &desc.params.virt; - cmd->id = cpu_to_le32(vfid); + /* free VSI and disconnect it from the parent uplink */ + if (vf->lan_vsi_idx != ICE_NO_VSI) { + ice_vf_vsi_release(vf); + vf->num_mac = 0; + } + + last_vector_idx = vf->first_vector_idx + pf->vfs.num_msix_per - 1; + + /* clear VF MDD event information */ + memset(&vf->mdd_tx_events, 0, sizeof(vf->mdd_tx_events)); + memset(&vf->mdd_rx_events, 0, sizeof(vf->mdd_rx_events)); + + /* Disable interrupts so that VF starts in a known state */ + for (i = vf->first_vector_idx; i <= last_vector_idx; i++) { + wr32(&pf->hw, GLINT_DYN_CTL(i), GLINT_DYN_CTL_CLEARPBA_M); + ice_flush(&pf->hw); + } + /* reset some of the state variables keeping track of the resources */ + clear_bit(ICE_VF_STATE_MC_PROMISC, vf->vf_states); + clear_bit(ICE_VF_STATE_UC_PROMISC, vf->vf_states); +} + +/** + * ice_dis_vf_mappings + * @vf: pointer to the VF structure + */ +static void ice_dis_vf_mappings(struct ice_vf *vf) +{ + struct ice_pf *pf = vf->pf; + struct ice_vsi *vsi; + struct device *dev; + int first, last, v; + struct ice_hw *hw; + + hw = &pf->hw; + vsi = ice_get_vf_vsi(vf); + if (WARN_ON(!vsi)) + return; - desc.cookie_high = cpu_to_le32(v_opcode); - desc.cookie_low = cpu_to_le32(v_retval); + dev = ice_pf_to_dev(pf); + wr32(hw, VPINT_ALLOC(vf->vf_id), 0); + wr32(hw, VPINT_ALLOC_PCI(vf->vf_id), 0); - if (msglen) - desc.flags |= cpu_to_le16(ICE_AQ_FLAG_RD); + first = vf->first_vector_idx; + last = first + pf->vfs.num_msix_per - 1; + for (v = first; v <= last; v++) { + u32 reg; + + reg = (((1 << GLINT_VECT2FUNC_IS_PF_S) & + GLINT_VECT2FUNC_IS_PF_M) | + ((hw->pf_id << GLINT_VECT2FUNC_PF_NUM_S) & + GLINT_VECT2FUNC_PF_NUM_M)); + wr32(hw, GLINT_VECT2FUNC(v), reg); + } - return ice_sq_send_cmd(hw, &hw->mailboxq, &desc, msg, msglen, cd); + if (vsi->tx_mapping_mode == ICE_VSI_MAP_CONTIG) + wr32(hw, VPLAN_TX_QBASE(vf->vf_id), 0); + else + dev_err(dev, "Scattered mode for VF Tx queues is not yet implemented\n"); + + if (vsi->rx_mapping_mode == ICE_VSI_MAP_CONTIG) + wr32(hw, VPLAN_RX_QBASE(vf->vf_id), 0); + else + dev_err(dev, "Scattered mode for VF Rx queues is not yet implemented\n"); } /** - * ice_conv_link_speed_to_virtchnl - * @adv_link_support: determines the format of the returned link speed - * @link_speed: variable containing the link_speed to be converted + * ice_sriov_free_msix_res - Reset/free any used MSIX resources + * @pf: pointer to the PF structure + * + * Since no MSIX entries are taken from the pf->irq_tracker then just clear + * the pf->sriov_base_vector. * - * Convert link speed supported by HW to link speed supported by virtchnl. - * If adv_link_support is true, then return link speed in Mbps. Else return - * link speed as a VIRTCHNL_LINK_SPEED_* casted to a u32. Note that the caller - * needs to cast back to an enum virtchnl_link_speed in the case where - * adv_link_support is false, but when adv_link_support is true the caller can - * expect the speed in Mbps. + * Returns 0 on success, and -EINVAL on error. */ -u32 ice_conv_link_speed_to_virtchnl(bool adv_link_support, u16 link_speed) +static int ice_sriov_free_msix_res(struct ice_pf *pf) { - u32 speed; + struct ice_res_tracker *res; - if (adv_link_support) - switch (link_speed) { - case ICE_AQ_LINK_SPEED_10MB: - speed = ICE_LINK_SPEED_10MBPS; - break; - case ICE_AQ_LINK_SPEED_100MB: - speed = ICE_LINK_SPEED_100MBPS; - break; - case ICE_AQ_LINK_SPEED_1000MB: - speed = ICE_LINK_SPEED_1000MBPS; - break; - case ICE_AQ_LINK_SPEED_2500MB: - speed = ICE_LINK_SPEED_2500MBPS; - break; - case ICE_AQ_LINK_SPEED_5GB: - speed = ICE_LINK_SPEED_5000MBPS; - break; - case ICE_AQ_LINK_SPEED_10GB: - speed = ICE_LINK_SPEED_10000MBPS; - break; - case ICE_AQ_LINK_SPEED_20GB: - speed = ICE_LINK_SPEED_20000MBPS; - break; - case ICE_AQ_LINK_SPEED_25GB: - speed = ICE_LINK_SPEED_25000MBPS; - break; - case ICE_AQ_LINK_SPEED_40GB: - speed = ICE_LINK_SPEED_40000MBPS; - break; - case ICE_AQ_LINK_SPEED_50GB: - speed = ICE_LINK_SPEED_50000MBPS; - break; - case ICE_AQ_LINK_SPEED_100GB: - speed = ICE_LINK_SPEED_100000MBPS; - break; - default: - speed = ICE_LINK_SPEED_UNKNOWN; - break; - } + if (!pf) + return -EINVAL; + + res = pf->irq_tracker; + if (!res) + return -EINVAL; + + /* give back irq_tracker resources used */ + WARN_ON(pf->sriov_base_vector < res->num_entries); + + pf->sriov_base_vector = 0; + + return 0; +} + +/** + * ice_free_vfs - Free all VFs + * @pf: pointer to the PF structure + */ +void ice_free_vfs(struct ice_pf *pf) +{ + struct device *dev = ice_pf_to_dev(pf); + struct ice_vfs *vfs = &pf->vfs; + struct ice_hw *hw = &pf->hw; + struct ice_vf *vf; + unsigned int bkt; + + if (!ice_has_vfs(pf)) + return; + + while (test_and_set_bit(ICE_VF_DIS, pf->state)) + usleep_range(1000, 2000); + + /* Disable IOV before freeing resources. This lets any VF drivers + * running in the host get themselves cleaned up before we yank + * the carpet out from underneath their feet. + */ + if (!pci_vfs_assigned(pf->pdev)) + pci_disable_sriov(pf->pdev); else - /* Virtchnl speeds are not defined for every speed supported in - * the hardware. To maintain compatibility with older AVF - * drivers, while reporting the speed the new speed values are - * resolved to the closest known virtchnl speeds - */ - switch (link_speed) { - case ICE_AQ_LINK_SPEED_10MB: - case ICE_AQ_LINK_SPEED_100MB: - speed = (u32)VIRTCHNL_LINK_SPEED_100MB; - break; - case ICE_AQ_LINK_SPEED_1000MB: - case ICE_AQ_LINK_SPEED_2500MB: - case ICE_AQ_LINK_SPEED_5GB: - speed = (u32)VIRTCHNL_LINK_SPEED_1GB; - break; - case ICE_AQ_LINK_SPEED_10GB: - speed = (u32)VIRTCHNL_LINK_SPEED_10GB; - break; - case ICE_AQ_LINK_SPEED_20GB: - speed = (u32)VIRTCHNL_LINK_SPEED_20GB; - break; - case ICE_AQ_LINK_SPEED_25GB: - speed = (u32)VIRTCHNL_LINK_SPEED_25GB; - break; - case ICE_AQ_LINK_SPEED_40GB: - case ICE_AQ_LINK_SPEED_50GB: - case ICE_AQ_LINK_SPEED_100GB: - speed = (u32)VIRTCHNL_LINK_SPEED_40GB; - break; - default: - speed = (u32)VIRTCHNL_LINK_SPEED_UNKNOWN; - break; + dev_warn(dev, "VFs are assigned - not disabling SR-IOV\n"); + + mutex_lock(&vfs->table_lock); + + ice_eswitch_release(pf); + + ice_for_each_vf(pf, bkt, vf) { + mutex_lock(&vf->cfg_lock); + + ice_dis_vf_qs(vf); + + if (test_bit(ICE_VF_STATE_INIT, vf->vf_states)) { + /* disable VF qp mappings and set VF disable state */ + ice_dis_vf_mappings(vf); + set_bit(ICE_VF_STATE_DIS, vf->vf_states); + ice_free_vf_res(vf); + } + + if (!pci_vfs_assigned(pf->pdev)) { + u32 reg_idx, bit_idx; + + reg_idx = (hw->func_caps.vf_base_id + vf->vf_id) / 32; + bit_idx = (hw->func_caps.vf_base_id + vf->vf_id) % 32; + wr32(hw, GLGEN_VFLRSTAT(reg_idx), BIT(bit_idx)); } - return speed; + /* clear malicious info since the VF is getting released */ + if (ice_mbx_clear_malvf(&hw->mbx_snapshot, pf->vfs.malvfs, + ICE_MAX_SRIOV_VFS, vf->vf_id)) + dev_dbg(dev, "failed to clear malicious VF state for VF %u\n", + vf->vf_id); + + mutex_unlock(&vf->cfg_lock); + } + + if (ice_sriov_free_msix_res(pf)) + dev_err(dev, "Failed to free MSIX resources used by SR-IOV\n"); + + vfs->num_qps_per = 0; + ice_free_vf_entries(pf); + + mutex_unlock(&vfs->table_lock); + + clear_bit(ICE_VF_DIS, pf->state); + clear_bit(ICE_FLAG_SRIOV_ENA, pf->flags); } -/* The mailbox overflow detection algorithm helps to check if there - * is a possibility of a malicious VF transmitting too many MBX messages to the - * PF. - * 1. The mailbox snapshot structure, ice_mbx_snapshot, is initialized during - * driver initialization in ice_init_hw() using ice_mbx_init_snapshot(). - * The struct ice_mbx_snapshot helps to track and traverse a static window of - * messages within the mailbox queue while looking for a malicious VF. +/** + * ice_vf_vsi_setup - Set up a VF VSI + * @vf: VF to setup VSI for * - * 2. When the caller starts processing its mailbox queue in response to an - * interrupt, the structure ice_mbx_snapshot is expected to be cleared before - * the algorithm can be run for the first time for that interrupt. This can be - * done via ice_mbx_reset_snapshot(). + * Returns pointer to the successfully allocated VSI struct on success, + * otherwise returns NULL on failure. + */ +static struct ice_vsi *ice_vf_vsi_setup(struct ice_vf *vf) +{ + struct ice_port_info *pi = ice_vf_get_port_info(vf); + struct ice_pf *pf = vf->pf; + struct ice_vsi *vsi; + + vsi = ice_vsi_setup(pf, pi, ICE_VSI_VF, vf, NULL); + + if (!vsi) { + dev_err(ice_pf_to_dev(pf), "Failed to create VF VSI\n"); + ice_vf_invalidate_vsi(vf); + return NULL; + } + + vf->lan_vsi_idx = vsi->idx; + vf->lan_vsi_num = vsi->vsi_num; + + return vsi; +} + +/** + * ice_calc_vf_first_vector_idx - Calculate MSIX vector index in the PF space + * @pf: pointer to PF structure + * @vf: pointer to VF that the first MSIX vector index is being calculated for * - * 3. For every message read by the caller from the MBX Queue, the caller must - * call the detection algorithm's entry function ice_mbx_vf_state_handler(). - * Before every call to ice_mbx_vf_state_handler() the struct ice_mbx_data is - * filled as it is required to be passed to the algorithm. + * This returns the first MSIX vector index in PF space that is used by this VF. + * This index is used when accessing PF relative registers such as + * GLINT_VECT2FUNC and GLINT_DYN_CTL. + * This will always be the OICR index in the AVF driver so any functionality + * using vf->first_vector_idx for queue configuration will have to increment by + * 1 to avoid meddling with the OICR index. + */ +static int ice_calc_vf_first_vector_idx(struct ice_pf *pf, struct ice_vf *vf) +{ + return pf->sriov_base_vector + vf->vf_id * pf->vfs.num_msix_per; +} + +/** + * ice_ena_vf_msix_mappings - enable VF MSIX mappings in hardware + * @vf: VF to enable MSIX mappings for * - * 4. Every time a message is read from the MBX queue, a VFId is received which - * is passed to the state handler. The boolean output is_malvf of the state - * handler ice_mbx_vf_state_handler() serves as an indicator to the caller - * whether this VF is malicious or not. + * Some of the registers need to be indexed/configured using hardware global + * device values and other registers need 0-based values, which represent PF + * based values. + */ +static void ice_ena_vf_msix_mappings(struct ice_vf *vf) +{ + int device_based_first_msix, device_based_last_msix; + int pf_based_first_msix, pf_based_last_msix, v; + struct ice_pf *pf = vf->pf; + int device_based_vf_id; + struct ice_hw *hw; + u32 reg; + + hw = &pf->hw; + pf_based_first_msix = vf->first_vector_idx; + pf_based_last_msix = (pf_based_first_msix + pf->vfs.num_msix_per) - 1; + + device_based_first_msix = pf_based_first_msix + + pf->hw.func_caps.common_cap.msix_vector_first_id; + device_based_last_msix = + (device_based_first_msix + pf->vfs.num_msix_per) - 1; + device_based_vf_id = vf->vf_id + hw->func_caps.vf_base_id; + + reg = (((device_based_first_msix << VPINT_ALLOC_FIRST_S) & + VPINT_ALLOC_FIRST_M) | + ((device_based_last_msix << VPINT_ALLOC_LAST_S) & + VPINT_ALLOC_LAST_M) | VPINT_ALLOC_VALID_M); + wr32(hw, VPINT_ALLOC(vf->vf_id), reg); + + reg = (((device_based_first_msix << VPINT_ALLOC_PCI_FIRST_S) + & VPINT_ALLOC_PCI_FIRST_M) | + ((device_based_last_msix << VPINT_ALLOC_PCI_LAST_S) & + VPINT_ALLOC_PCI_LAST_M) | VPINT_ALLOC_PCI_VALID_M); + wr32(hw, VPINT_ALLOC_PCI(vf->vf_id), reg); + + /* map the interrupts to its functions */ + for (v = pf_based_first_msix; v <= pf_based_last_msix; v++) { + reg = (((device_based_vf_id << GLINT_VECT2FUNC_VF_NUM_S) & + GLINT_VECT2FUNC_VF_NUM_M) | + ((hw->pf_id << GLINT_VECT2FUNC_PF_NUM_S) & + GLINT_VECT2FUNC_PF_NUM_M)); + wr32(hw, GLINT_VECT2FUNC(v), reg); + } + + /* Map mailbox interrupt to VF MSI-X vector 0 */ + wr32(hw, VPINT_MBX_CTL(device_based_vf_id), VPINT_MBX_CTL_CAUSE_ENA_M); +} + +/** + * ice_ena_vf_q_mappings - enable Rx/Tx queue mappings for a VF + * @vf: VF to enable the mappings for + * @max_txq: max Tx queues allowed on the VF's VSI + * @max_rxq: max Rx queues allowed on the VF's VSI + */ +static void ice_ena_vf_q_mappings(struct ice_vf *vf, u16 max_txq, u16 max_rxq) +{ + struct device *dev = ice_pf_to_dev(vf->pf); + struct ice_vsi *vsi = ice_get_vf_vsi(vf); + struct ice_hw *hw = &vf->pf->hw; + u32 reg; + + if (WARN_ON(!vsi)) + return; + + /* set regardless of mapping mode */ + wr32(hw, VPLAN_TXQ_MAPENA(vf->vf_id), VPLAN_TXQ_MAPENA_TX_ENA_M); + + /* VF Tx queues allocation */ + if (vsi->tx_mapping_mode == ICE_VSI_MAP_CONTIG) { + /* set the VF PF Tx queue range + * VFNUMQ value should be set to (number of queues - 1). A value + * of 0 means 1 queue and a value of 255 means 256 queues + */ + reg = (((vsi->txq_map[0] << VPLAN_TX_QBASE_VFFIRSTQ_S) & + VPLAN_TX_QBASE_VFFIRSTQ_M) | + (((max_txq - 1) << VPLAN_TX_QBASE_VFNUMQ_S) & + VPLAN_TX_QBASE_VFNUMQ_M)); + wr32(hw, VPLAN_TX_QBASE(vf->vf_id), reg); + } else { + dev_err(dev, "Scattered mode for VF Tx queues is not yet implemented\n"); + } + + /* set regardless of mapping mode */ + wr32(hw, VPLAN_RXQ_MAPENA(vf->vf_id), VPLAN_RXQ_MAPENA_RX_ENA_M); + + /* VF Rx queues allocation */ + if (vsi->rx_mapping_mode == ICE_VSI_MAP_CONTIG) { + /* set the VF PF Rx queue range + * VFNUMQ value should be set to (number of queues - 1). A value + * of 0 means 1 queue and a value of 255 means 256 queues + */ + reg = (((vsi->rxq_map[0] << VPLAN_RX_QBASE_VFFIRSTQ_S) & + VPLAN_RX_QBASE_VFFIRSTQ_M) | + (((max_rxq - 1) << VPLAN_RX_QBASE_VFNUMQ_S) & + VPLAN_RX_QBASE_VFNUMQ_M)); + wr32(hw, VPLAN_RX_QBASE(vf->vf_id), reg); + } else { + dev_err(dev, "Scattered mode for VF Rx queues is not yet implemented\n"); + } +} + +/** + * ice_ena_vf_mappings - enable VF MSIX and queue mapping + * @vf: pointer to the VF structure + */ +static void ice_ena_vf_mappings(struct ice_vf *vf) +{ + struct ice_vsi *vsi = ice_get_vf_vsi(vf); + + if (WARN_ON(!vsi)) + return; + + ice_ena_vf_msix_mappings(vf); + ice_ena_vf_q_mappings(vf, vsi->alloc_txq, vsi->alloc_rxq); +} + +/** + * ice_calc_vf_reg_idx - Calculate the VF's register index in the PF space + * @vf: VF to calculate the register index for + * @q_vector: a q_vector associated to the VF + */ +int ice_calc_vf_reg_idx(struct ice_vf *vf, struct ice_q_vector *q_vector) +{ + struct ice_pf *pf; + + if (!vf || !q_vector) + return -EINVAL; + + pf = vf->pf; + + /* always add one to account for the OICR being the first MSIX */ + return pf->sriov_base_vector + pf->vfs.num_msix_per * vf->vf_id + + q_vector->v_idx + 1; +} + +/** + * ice_get_max_valid_res_idx - Get the max valid resource index + * @res: pointer to the resource to find the max valid index for * - * 5. When a VF is identified to be malicious, the caller can send a message - * to the system administrator. The caller can invoke ice_mbx_report_malvf() - * to help determine if a malicious VF is to be reported or not. This function - * requires the caller to maintain a global bitmap to track all malicious VFs - * and pass that to ice_mbx_report_malvf() along with the VFID which was identified - * to be malicious by ice_mbx_vf_state_handler(). + * Start from the end of the ice_res_tracker and return right when we find the + * first res->list entry with the ICE_RES_VALID_BIT set. This function is only + * valid for SR-IOV because it is the only consumer that manipulates the + * res->end and this is always called when res->end is set to res->num_entries. + */ +static int ice_get_max_valid_res_idx(struct ice_res_tracker *res) +{ + int i; + + if (!res) + return -EINVAL; + + for (i = res->num_entries - 1; i >= 0; i--) + if (res->list[i] & ICE_RES_VALID_BIT) + return i; + + return 0; +} + +/** + * ice_sriov_set_msix_res - Set any used MSIX resources + * @pf: pointer to PF structure + * @num_msix_needed: number of MSIX vectors needed for all SR-IOV VFs * - * 6. The global bitmap maintained by PF can be cleared completely if PF is in - * reset or the bit corresponding to a VF can be cleared if that VF is in reset. - * When a VF is shut down and brought back up, we assume that the new VF - * brought up is not malicious and hence report it if found malicious. + * This function allows SR-IOV resources to be taken from the end of the PF's + * allowed HW MSIX vectors so that the irq_tracker will not be affected. We + * just set the pf->sriov_base_vector and return success. * - * 7. The function ice_mbx_reset_snapshot() is called to reset the information - * in ice_mbx_snapshot for every new mailbox interrupt handled. + * If there are not enough resources available, return an error. This should + * always be caught by ice_set_per_vf_res(). * - * 8. The memory allocated for variables in ice_mbx_snapshot is de-allocated - * when driver is unloaded. - */ -#define ICE_RQ_DATA_MASK(rq_data) ((rq_data) & PF_MBX_ARQH_ARQH_M) -/* Using the highest value for an unsigned 16-bit value 0xFFFF to indicate that - * the max messages check must be ignored in the algorithm + * Return 0 on success, and -EINVAL when there are not enough MSIX vectors + * in the PF's space available for SR-IOV. */ -#define ICE_IGNORE_MAX_MSG_CNT 0xFFFF +static int ice_sriov_set_msix_res(struct ice_pf *pf, u16 num_msix_needed) +{ + u16 total_vectors = pf->hw.func_caps.common_cap.num_msix_vectors; + int vectors_used = pf->irq_tracker->num_entries; + int sriov_base_vector; + + sriov_base_vector = total_vectors - num_msix_needed; + + /* make sure we only grab irq_tracker entries from the list end and + * that we have enough available MSIX vectors + */ + if (sriov_base_vector < vectors_used) + return -EINVAL; + + pf->sriov_base_vector = sriov_base_vector; + + return 0; +} /** - * ice_mbx_traverse - Pass through mailbox snapshot - * @hw: pointer to the HW struct - * @new_state: new algorithm state + * ice_set_per_vf_res - check if vectors and queues are available + * @pf: pointer to the PF structure + * @num_vfs: the number of SR-IOV VFs being configured + * + * First, determine HW interrupts from common pool. If we allocate fewer VFs, we + * get more vectors and can enable more queues per VF. Note that this does not + * grab any vectors from the SW pool already allocated. Also note, that all + * vector counts include one for each VF's miscellaneous interrupt vector + * (i.e. OICR). * - * Traversing the mailbox static snapshot without checking - * for malicious VFs. + * Minimum VFs - 2 vectors, 1 queue pair + * Small VFs - 5 vectors, 4 queue pairs + * Medium VFs - 17 vectors, 16 queue pairs + * + * Second, determine number of queue pairs per VF by starting with a pre-defined + * maximum each VF supports. If this is not possible, then we adjust based on + * queue pairs available on the device. + * + * Lastly, set queue and MSI-X VF variables tracked by the PF so it can be used + * by each VF during VF initialization and reset. */ -static void -ice_mbx_traverse(struct ice_hw *hw, - enum ice_mbx_snapshot_state *new_state) +static int ice_set_per_vf_res(struct ice_pf *pf, u16 num_vfs) { - struct ice_mbx_snap_buffer_data *snap_buf; - u32 num_iterations; + int max_valid_res_idx = ice_get_max_valid_res_idx(pf->irq_tracker); + u16 num_msix_per_vf, num_txq, num_rxq, avail_qs; + int msix_avail_per_vf, msix_avail_for_sriov; + struct device *dev = ice_pf_to_dev(pf); + int err; - snap_buf = &hw->mbx_snapshot.mbx_buf; + lockdep_assert_held(&pf->vfs.table_lock); - /* As mailbox buffer is circular, applying a mask - * on the incremented iteration count. - */ - num_iterations = ICE_RQ_DATA_MASK(++snap_buf->num_iterations); - - /* Checking either of the below conditions to exit snapshot traversal: - * Condition-1: If the number of iterations in the mailbox is equal to - * the mailbox head which would indicate that we have reached the end - * of the static snapshot. - * Condition-2: If the maximum messages serviced in the mailbox for a - * given interrupt is the highest possible value then there is no need - * to check if the number of messages processed is equal to it. If not - * check if the number of messages processed is greater than or equal - * to the maximum number of mailbox entries serviced in current work item. - */ - if (num_iterations == snap_buf->head || - (snap_buf->max_num_msgs_mbx < ICE_IGNORE_MAX_MSG_CNT && - ++snap_buf->num_msg_proc >= snap_buf->max_num_msgs_mbx)) - *new_state = ICE_MAL_VF_DETECT_STATE_NEW_SNAPSHOT; + if (!num_vfs) + return -EINVAL; + + if (max_valid_res_idx < 0) + return -ENOSPC; + + /* determine MSI-X resources per VF */ + msix_avail_for_sriov = pf->hw.func_caps.common_cap.num_msix_vectors - + pf->irq_tracker->num_entries; + msix_avail_per_vf = msix_avail_for_sriov / num_vfs; + if (msix_avail_per_vf >= ICE_NUM_VF_MSIX_MED) { + num_msix_per_vf = ICE_NUM_VF_MSIX_MED; + } else if (msix_avail_per_vf >= ICE_NUM_VF_MSIX_SMALL) { + num_msix_per_vf = ICE_NUM_VF_MSIX_SMALL; + } else if (msix_avail_per_vf >= ICE_NUM_VF_MSIX_MULTIQ_MIN) { + num_msix_per_vf = ICE_NUM_VF_MSIX_MULTIQ_MIN; + } else if (msix_avail_per_vf >= ICE_MIN_INTR_PER_VF) { + num_msix_per_vf = ICE_MIN_INTR_PER_VF; + } else { + dev_err(dev, "Only %d MSI-X interrupts available for SR-IOV. Not enough to support minimum of %d MSI-X interrupts per VF for %d VFs\n", + msix_avail_for_sriov, ICE_MIN_INTR_PER_VF, + num_vfs); + return -ENOSPC; + } + + num_txq = min_t(u16, num_msix_per_vf - ICE_NONQ_VECS_VF, + ICE_MAX_RSS_QS_PER_VF); + avail_qs = ice_get_avail_txq_count(pf) / num_vfs; + if (!avail_qs) + num_txq = 0; + else if (num_txq > avail_qs) + num_txq = rounddown_pow_of_two(avail_qs); + + num_rxq = min_t(u16, num_msix_per_vf - ICE_NONQ_VECS_VF, + ICE_MAX_RSS_QS_PER_VF); + avail_qs = ice_get_avail_rxq_count(pf) / num_vfs; + if (!avail_qs) + num_rxq = 0; + else if (num_rxq > avail_qs) + num_rxq = rounddown_pow_of_two(avail_qs); + + if (num_txq < ICE_MIN_QS_PER_VF || num_rxq < ICE_MIN_QS_PER_VF) { + dev_err(dev, "Not enough queues to support minimum of %d queue pairs per VF for %d VFs\n", + ICE_MIN_QS_PER_VF, num_vfs); + return -ENOSPC; + } + + err = ice_sriov_set_msix_res(pf, num_msix_per_vf * num_vfs); + if (err) { + dev_err(dev, "Unable to set MSI-X resources for %d VFs, err %d\n", + num_vfs, err); + return err; + } + + /* only allow equal Tx/Rx queue count (i.e. queue pairs) */ + pf->vfs.num_qps_per = min_t(int, num_txq, num_rxq); + pf->vfs.num_msix_per = num_msix_per_vf; + dev_info(dev, "Enabling %d VFs with %d vectors and %d queues per VF\n", + num_vfs, pf->vfs.num_msix_per, pf->vfs.num_qps_per); + + return 0; } /** - * ice_mbx_detect_malvf - Detect malicious VF in snapshot - * @hw: pointer to the HW struct - * @vf_id: relative virtual function ID - * @new_state: new algorithm state - * @is_malvf: boolean output to indicate if VF is malicious + * ice_init_vf_vsi_res - initialize/setup VF VSI resources + * @vf: VF to initialize/setup the VSI for * - * This function tracks the number of asynchronous messages - * sent per VF and marks the VF as malicious if it exceeds - * the permissible number of messages to send. + * This function creates a VSI for the VF, adds a VLAN 0 filter, and sets up the + * VF VSI's broadcast filter and is only used during initial VF creation. */ -static enum ice_status -ice_mbx_detect_malvf(struct ice_hw *hw, u16 vf_id, - enum ice_mbx_snapshot_state *new_state, - bool *is_malvf) +static int ice_init_vf_vsi_res(struct ice_vf *vf) { - struct ice_mbx_snapshot *snap = &hw->mbx_snapshot; + struct ice_vsi_vlan_ops *vlan_ops; + struct ice_pf *pf = vf->pf; + u8 broadcast[ETH_ALEN]; + struct ice_vsi *vsi; + struct device *dev; + int err; + + vf->first_vector_idx = ice_calc_vf_first_vector_idx(pf, vf); - if (vf_id >= snap->mbx_vf.vfcntr_len) - return ICE_ERR_OUT_OF_RANGE; + dev = ice_pf_to_dev(pf); + vsi = ice_vf_vsi_setup(vf); + if (!vsi) + return -ENOMEM; + + err = ice_vsi_add_vlan_zero(vsi); + if (err) { + dev_warn(dev, "Failed to add VLAN 0 filter for VF %d\n", + vf->vf_id); + goto release_vsi; + } + + vlan_ops = ice_get_compat_vsi_vlan_ops(vsi); + err = vlan_ops->ena_rx_filtering(vsi); + if (err) { + dev_warn(dev, "Failed to enable Rx VLAN filtering for VF %d\n", + vf->vf_id); + goto release_vsi; + } - /* increment the message count in the VF array */ - snap->mbx_vf.vf_cntr[vf_id]++; + eth_broadcast_addr(broadcast); + err = ice_fltr_add_mac(vsi, broadcast, ICE_FWD_TO_VSI); + if (err) { + dev_err(dev, "Failed to add broadcast MAC filter for VF %d, error %d\n", + vf->vf_id, err); + goto release_vsi; + } - if (snap->mbx_vf.vf_cntr[vf_id] >= ICE_ASYNC_VF_MSG_THRESHOLD) - *is_malvf = true; + err = ice_vsi_apply_spoofchk(vsi, vf->spoofchk); + if (err) { + dev_warn(dev, "Failed to initialize spoofchk setting for VF %d\n", + vf->vf_id); + goto release_vsi; + } - /* continue to iterate through the mailbox snapshot */ - ice_mbx_traverse(hw, new_state); + vf->num_mac = 1; return 0; + +release_vsi: + ice_vf_vsi_release(vf); + return err; } /** - * ice_mbx_reset_snapshot - Reset mailbox snapshot structure - * @snap: pointer to mailbox snapshot structure in the ice_hw struct + * ice_start_vfs - start VFs so they are ready to be used by SR-IOV + * @pf: PF the VFs are associated with + */ +static int ice_start_vfs(struct ice_pf *pf) +{ + struct ice_hw *hw = &pf->hw; + unsigned int bkt, it_cnt; + struct ice_vf *vf; + int retval; + + lockdep_assert_held(&pf->vfs.table_lock); + + it_cnt = 0; + ice_for_each_vf(pf, bkt, vf) { + vf->vf_ops->clear_reset_trigger(vf); + + retval = ice_init_vf_vsi_res(vf); + if (retval) { + dev_err(ice_pf_to_dev(pf), "Failed to initialize VSI resources for VF %d, error %d\n", + vf->vf_id, retval); + goto teardown; + } + + set_bit(ICE_VF_STATE_INIT, vf->vf_states); + ice_ena_vf_mappings(vf); + wr32(hw, VFGEN_RSTAT(vf->vf_id), VIRTCHNL_VFR_VFACTIVE); + it_cnt++; + } + + ice_flush(hw); + return 0; + +teardown: + ice_for_each_vf(pf, bkt, vf) { + if (it_cnt == 0) + break; + + ice_dis_vf_mappings(vf); + ice_vf_vsi_release(vf); + it_cnt--; + } + + return retval; +} + +/** + * ice_sriov_free_vf - Free VF memory after all references are dropped + * @vf: pointer to VF to free * - * Reset the mailbox snapshot structure and clear VF counter array. + * Called by ice_put_vf through ice_release_vf once the last reference to a VF + * structure has been dropped. */ -static void ice_mbx_reset_snapshot(struct ice_mbx_snapshot *snap) +static void ice_sriov_free_vf(struct ice_vf *vf) { - u32 vfcntr_len; + mutex_destroy(&vf->cfg_lock); - if (!snap || !snap->mbx_vf.vf_cntr) - return; + kfree_rcu(vf, rcu); +} - /* Clear VF counters. */ - vfcntr_len = snap->mbx_vf.vfcntr_len; - if (vfcntr_len) - memset(snap->mbx_vf.vf_cntr, 0, - (vfcntr_len * sizeof(*snap->mbx_vf.vf_cntr))); - - /* Reset mailbox snapshot for a new capture. */ - memset(&snap->mbx_buf, 0, sizeof(snap->mbx_buf)); - snap->mbx_buf.state = ICE_MAL_VF_DETECT_STATE_NEW_SNAPSHOT; -} - -/** - * ice_mbx_vf_state_handler - Handle states of the overflow algorithm - * @hw: pointer to the HW struct - * @mbx_data: pointer to structure containing mailbox data - * @vf_id: relative virtual function (VF) ID - * @is_malvf: boolean output to indicate if VF is malicious - * - * The function serves as an entry point for the malicious VF - * detection algorithm by handling the different states and state - * transitions of the algorithm: - * New snapshot: This state is entered when creating a new static - * snapshot. The data from any previous mailbox snapshot is - * cleared and a new capture of the mailbox head and tail is - * logged. This will be the new static snapshot to detect - * asynchronous messages sent by VFs. On capturing the snapshot - * and depending on whether the number of pending messages in that - * snapshot exceed the watermark value, the state machine enters - * traverse or detect states. - * Traverse: If pending message count is below watermark then iterate - * through the snapshot without any action on VF. - * Detect: If pending message count exceeds watermark traverse - * the static snapshot and look for a malicious VF. - */ -enum ice_status -ice_mbx_vf_state_handler(struct ice_hw *hw, - struct ice_mbx_data *mbx_data, u16 vf_id, - bool *is_malvf) -{ - struct ice_mbx_snapshot *snap = &hw->mbx_snapshot; - struct ice_mbx_snap_buffer_data *snap_buf; - struct ice_ctl_q_info *cq = &hw->mailboxq; - enum ice_mbx_snapshot_state new_state; - enum ice_status status = 0; - - if (!is_malvf || !mbx_data) - return ICE_ERR_BAD_PTR; - - /* When entering the mailbox state machine assume that the VF - * is not malicious until detected. - */ - *is_malvf = false; - - /* Checking if max messages allowed to be processed while servicing current - * interrupt is not less than the defined AVF message threshold. - */ - if (mbx_data->max_num_msgs_mbx <= ICE_ASYNC_VF_MSG_THRESHOLD) - return ICE_ERR_INVAL_SIZE; - - /* The watermark value should not be lesser than the threshold limit - * set for the number of asynchronous messages a VF can send to mailbox - * nor should it be greater than the maximum number of messages in the - * mailbox serviced in current interrupt. +/** + * ice_sriov_clear_mbx_register - clears SRIOV VF's mailbox registers + * @vf: the vf to configure + */ +static void ice_sriov_clear_mbx_register(struct ice_vf *vf) +{ + struct ice_pf *pf = vf->pf; + + wr32(&pf->hw, VF_MBX_ARQLEN(vf->vf_id), 0); + wr32(&pf->hw, VF_MBX_ATQLEN(vf->vf_id), 0); +} + +/** + * ice_sriov_trigger_reset_register - trigger VF reset for SRIOV VF + * @vf: pointer to VF structure + * @is_vflr: true if reset occurred due to VFLR + * + * Trigger and cleanup after a VF reset for a SR-IOV VF. + */ +static void ice_sriov_trigger_reset_register(struct ice_vf *vf, bool is_vflr) +{ + struct ice_pf *pf = vf->pf; + u32 reg, reg_idx, bit_idx; + unsigned int vf_abs_id, i; + struct device *dev; + struct ice_hw *hw; + + dev = ice_pf_to_dev(pf); + hw = &pf->hw; + vf_abs_id = vf->vf_id + hw->func_caps.vf_base_id; + + /* In the case of a VFLR, HW has already reset the VF and we just need + * to clean up. Otherwise we must first trigger the reset using the + * VFRTRIG register. */ - if (mbx_data->async_watermark_val < ICE_ASYNC_VF_MSG_THRESHOLD || - mbx_data->async_watermark_val > mbx_data->max_num_msgs_mbx) - return ICE_ERR_PARAM; + if (!is_vflr) { + reg = rd32(hw, VPGEN_VFRTRIG(vf->vf_id)); + reg |= VPGEN_VFRTRIG_VFSWR_M; + wr32(hw, VPGEN_VFRTRIG(vf->vf_id), reg); + } - new_state = ICE_MAL_VF_DETECT_STATE_INVALID; - snap_buf = &snap->mbx_buf; + /* clear the VFLR bit in GLGEN_VFLRSTAT */ + reg_idx = (vf_abs_id) / 32; + bit_idx = (vf_abs_id) % 32; + wr32(hw, GLGEN_VFLRSTAT(reg_idx), BIT(bit_idx)); + ice_flush(hw); - switch (snap_buf->state) { - case ICE_MAL_VF_DETECT_STATE_NEW_SNAPSHOT: - /* Clear any previously held data in mailbox snapshot structure. */ - ice_mbx_reset_snapshot(snap); + wr32(hw, PF_PCI_CIAA, + VF_DEVICE_STATUS | (vf_abs_id << PF_PCI_CIAA_VF_NUM_S)); + for (i = 0; i < ICE_PCI_CIAD_WAIT_COUNT; i++) { + reg = rd32(hw, PF_PCI_CIAD); + /* no transactions pending so stop polling */ + if ((reg & VF_TRANS_PENDING_M) == 0) + break; - /* Collect the pending ARQ count, number of messages processed and - * the maximum number of messages allowed to be processed from the - * Mailbox for current interrupt. - */ - snap_buf->num_pending_arq = mbx_data->num_pending_arq; - snap_buf->num_msg_proc = mbx_data->num_msg_proc; - snap_buf->max_num_msgs_mbx = mbx_data->max_num_msgs_mbx; + dev_err(dev, "VF %u PCI transactions stuck\n", vf->vf_id); + udelay(ICE_PCI_CIAD_WAIT_DELAY_US); + } +} - /* Capture a new static snapshot of the mailbox by logging the - * head and tail of snapshot and set num_iterations to the tail - * value to mark the start of the iteration through the snapshot. - */ - snap_buf->head = ICE_RQ_DATA_MASK(cq->rq.next_to_clean + - mbx_data->num_pending_arq); - snap_buf->tail = ICE_RQ_DATA_MASK(cq->rq.next_to_clean - 1); - snap_buf->num_iterations = snap_buf->tail; - - /* Pending ARQ messages returned by ice_clean_rq_elem - * is the difference between the head and tail of the - * mailbox queue. Comparing this value against the watermark - * helps to check if we potentially have malicious VFs. +/** + * ice_sriov_poll_reset_status - poll SRIOV VF reset status + * @vf: pointer to VF structure + * + * Returns true when reset is successful, else returns false + */ +static bool ice_sriov_poll_reset_status(struct ice_vf *vf) +{ + struct ice_pf *pf = vf->pf; + unsigned int i; + u32 reg; + + for (i = 0; i < 10; i++) { + /* VF reset requires driver to first reset the VF and then + * poll the status register to make sure that the reset + * completed successfully. */ - if (snap_buf->num_pending_arq >= - mbx_data->async_watermark_val) { - new_state = ICE_MAL_VF_DETECT_STATE_DETECT; - status = ice_mbx_detect_malvf(hw, vf_id, &new_state, is_malvf); - } else { - new_state = ICE_MAL_VF_DETECT_STATE_TRAVERSE; - ice_mbx_traverse(hw, &new_state); - } - break; + reg = rd32(&pf->hw, VPGEN_VFRSTAT(vf->vf_id)); + if (reg & VPGEN_VFRSTAT_VFRD_M) + return true; - case ICE_MAL_VF_DETECT_STATE_TRAVERSE: - new_state = ICE_MAL_VF_DETECT_STATE_TRAVERSE; - ice_mbx_traverse(hw, &new_state); - break; + /* only sleep if the reset is not done */ + usleep_range(10, 20); + } + return false; +} - case ICE_MAL_VF_DETECT_STATE_DETECT: - new_state = ICE_MAL_VF_DETECT_STATE_DETECT; - status = ice_mbx_detect_malvf(hw, vf_id, &new_state, is_malvf); - break; +/** + * ice_sriov_clear_reset_trigger - enable VF to access hardware + * @vf: VF to enabled hardware access for + */ +static void ice_sriov_clear_reset_trigger(struct ice_vf *vf) +{ + struct ice_hw *hw = &vf->pf->hw; + u32 reg; - default: - new_state = ICE_MAL_VF_DETECT_STATE_INVALID; - status = ICE_ERR_CFG; + reg = rd32(hw, VPGEN_VFRTRIG(vf->vf_id)); + reg &= ~VPGEN_VFRTRIG_VFSWR_M; + wr32(hw, VPGEN_VFRTRIG(vf->vf_id), reg); + ice_flush(hw); +} + +/** + * ice_sriov_vsi_rebuild - release and rebuild VF's VSI + * @vf: VF to release and setup the VSI for + * + * This is only called when a single VF is being reset (i.e. VFR, VFLR, host VF + * configuration change, etc.). + */ +static int ice_sriov_vsi_rebuild(struct ice_vf *vf) +{ + struct ice_pf *pf = vf->pf; + + ice_vf_vsi_release(vf); + if (!ice_vf_vsi_setup(vf)) { + dev_err(ice_pf_to_dev(pf), + "Failed to release and setup the VF%u's VSI\n", + vf->vf_id); + return -ENOMEM; } - snap_buf->state = new_state; + return 0; +} - return status; +/** + * ice_sriov_post_vsi_rebuild - tasks to do after the VF's VSI have been rebuilt + * @vf: VF to perform tasks on + */ +static void ice_sriov_post_vsi_rebuild(struct ice_vf *vf) +{ + ice_vf_rebuild_host_cfg(vf); + ice_vf_set_initialized(vf); + ice_ena_vf_mappings(vf); + wr32(&vf->pf->hw, VFGEN_RSTAT(vf->vf_id), VIRTCHNL_VFR_VFACTIVE); } +static const struct ice_vf_ops ice_sriov_vf_ops = { + .reset_type = ICE_VF_RESET, + .free = ice_sriov_free_vf, + .clear_mbx_register = ice_sriov_clear_mbx_register, + .trigger_reset_register = ice_sriov_trigger_reset_register, + .poll_reset_status = ice_sriov_poll_reset_status, + .clear_reset_trigger = ice_sriov_clear_reset_trigger, + .vsi_rebuild = ice_sriov_vsi_rebuild, + .post_vsi_rebuild = ice_sriov_post_vsi_rebuild, +}; + /** - * ice_mbx_report_malvf - Track and note malicious VF - * @hw: pointer to the HW struct - * @all_malvfs: all malicious VFs tracked by PF - * @bitmap_len: length of bitmap in bits - * @vf_id: relative virtual function ID of the malicious VF - * @report_malvf: boolean to indicate if malicious VF must be reported + * ice_create_vf_entries - Allocate and insert VF entries + * @pf: pointer to the PF structure + * @num_vfs: the number of VFs to allocate * - * This function will update a bitmap that keeps track of the malicious - * VFs attached to the PF. A malicious VF must be reported only once if - * discovered between VF resets or loading so the function checks - * the input vf_id against the bitmap to verify if the VF has been - * detected in any previous mailbox iterations. + * Allocate new VF entries and insert them into the hash table. Set some + * basic default fields for initializing the new VFs. + * + * After this function exits, the hash table will have num_vfs entries + * inserted. + * + * Returns 0 on success or an integer error code on failure. */ -enum ice_status -ice_mbx_report_malvf(struct ice_hw *hw, unsigned long *all_malvfs, - u16 bitmap_len, u16 vf_id, bool *report_malvf) +static int ice_create_vf_entries(struct ice_pf *pf, u16 num_vfs) { - if (!all_malvfs || !report_malvf) - return ICE_ERR_PARAM; + struct ice_vfs *vfs = &pf->vfs; + struct ice_vf *vf; + u16 vf_id; + int err; - *report_malvf = false; + lockdep_assert_held(&vfs->table_lock); - if (bitmap_len < hw->mbx_snapshot.mbx_vf.vfcntr_len) - return ICE_ERR_INVAL_SIZE; + for (vf_id = 0; vf_id < num_vfs; vf_id++) { + vf = kzalloc(sizeof(*vf), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!vf) { + err = -ENOMEM; + goto err_free_entries; + } + kref_init(&vf->refcnt); - if (vf_id >= bitmap_len) - return ICE_ERR_OUT_OF_RANGE; + vf->pf = pf; + vf->vf_id = vf_id; - /* If the vf_id is found in the bitmap set bit and boolean to true */ - if (!test_and_set_bit(vf_id, all_malvfs)) - *report_malvf = true; + /* set sriov vf ops for VFs created during SRIOV flow */ + vf->vf_ops = &ice_sriov_vf_ops; + + vf->vf_sw_id = pf->first_sw; + /* assign default capabilities */ + vf->spoofchk = true; + vf->num_vf_qs = pf->vfs.num_qps_per; + ice_vc_set_default_allowlist(vf); + + /* ctrl_vsi_idx will be set to a valid value only when VF + * creates its first fdir rule. + */ + ice_vf_ctrl_invalidate_vsi(vf); + ice_vf_fdir_init(vf); + + ice_virtchnl_set_dflt_ops(vf); + + mutex_init(&vf->cfg_lock); + + hash_add_rcu(vfs->table, &vf->entry, vf_id); + } return 0; + +err_free_entries: + ice_free_vf_entries(pf); + return err; } /** - * ice_mbx_clear_malvf - Clear VF bitmap and counter for VF ID - * @snap: pointer to the mailbox snapshot structure - * @all_malvfs: all malicious VFs tracked by PF - * @bitmap_len: length of bitmap in bits - * @vf_id: relative virtual function ID of the malicious VF + * ice_ena_vfs - enable VFs so they are ready to be used + * @pf: pointer to the PF structure + * @num_vfs: number of VFs to enable + */ +static int ice_ena_vfs(struct ice_pf *pf, u16 num_vfs) +{ + struct device *dev = ice_pf_to_dev(pf); + struct ice_hw *hw = &pf->hw; + int ret; + + /* Disable global interrupt 0 so we don't try to handle the VFLR. */ + wr32(hw, GLINT_DYN_CTL(pf->oicr_idx), + ICE_ITR_NONE << GLINT_DYN_CTL_ITR_INDX_S); + set_bit(ICE_OICR_INTR_DIS, pf->state); + ice_flush(hw); + + ret = pci_enable_sriov(pf->pdev, num_vfs); + if (ret) + goto err_unroll_intr; + + mutex_lock(&pf->vfs.table_lock); + + ret = ice_set_per_vf_res(pf, num_vfs); + if (ret) { + dev_err(dev, "Not enough resources for %d VFs, err %d. Try with fewer number of VFs\n", + num_vfs, ret); + goto err_unroll_sriov; + } + + ret = ice_create_vf_entries(pf, num_vfs); + if (ret) { + dev_err(dev, "Failed to allocate VF entries for %d VFs\n", + num_vfs); + goto err_unroll_sriov; + } + + ret = ice_start_vfs(pf); + if (ret) { + dev_err(dev, "Failed to start %d VFs, err %d\n", num_vfs, ret); + ret = -EAGAIN; + goto err_unroll_vf_entries; + } + + clear_bit(ICE_VF_DIS, pf->state); + + ret = ice_eswitch_configure(pf); + if (ret) { + dev_err(dev, "Failed to configure eswitch, err %d\n", ret); + goto err_unroll_sriov; + } + + /* rearm global interrupts */ + if (test_and_clear_bit(ICE_OICR_INTR_DIS, pf->state)) + ice_irq_dynamic_ena(hw, NULL, NULL); + + mutex_unlock(&pf->vfs.table_lock); + + return 0; + +err_unroll_vf_entries: + ice_free_vf_entries(pf); +err_unroll_sriov: + mutex_unlock(&pf->vfs.table_lock); + pci_disable_sriov(pf->pdev); +err_unroll_intr: + /* rearm interrupts here */ + ice_irq_dynamic_ena(hw, NULL, NULL); + clear_bit(ICE_OICR_INTR_DIS, pf->state); + return ret; +} + +/** + * ice_pci_sriov_ena - Enable or change number of VFs + * @pf: pointer to the PF structure + * @num_vfs: number of VFs to allocate * - * In case of a VF reset, this function can be called to clear - * the bit corresponding to the VF ID in the bitmap tracking all - * malicious VFs attached to the PF. The function also clears the - * VF counter array at the index of the VF ID. This is to ensure - * that the new VF loaded is not considered malicious before going - * through the overflow detection algorithm. + * Returns 0 on success and negative on failure */ -enum ice_status -ice_mbx_clear_malvf(struct ice_mbx_snapshot *snap, unsigned long *all_malvfs, - u16 bitmap_len, u16 vf_id) +static int ice_pci_sriov_ena(struct ice_pf *pf, int num_vfs) { - if (!snap || !all_malvfs) - return ICE_ERR_PARAM; + int pre_existing_vfs = pci_num_vf(pf->pdev); + struct device *dev = ice_pf_to_dev(pf); + int err; + + if (pre_existing_vfs && pre_existing_vfs != num_vfs) + ice_free_vfs(pf); + else if (pre_existing_vfs && pre_existing_vfs == num_vfs) + return 0; + + if (num_vfs > pf->vfs.num_supported) { + dev_err(dev, "Can't enable %d VFs, max VFs supported is %d\n", + num_vfs, pf->vfs.num_supported); + return -EOPNOTSUPP; + } - if (bitmap_len < snap->mbx_vf.vfcntr_len) - return ICE_ERR_INVAL_SIZE; + dev_info(dev, "Enabling %d VFs\n", num_vfs); + err = ice_ena_vfs(pf, num_vfs); + if (err) { + dev_err(dev, "Failed to enable SR-IOV: %d\n", err); + return err; + } - /* Ensure VF ID value is not larger than bitmap or VF counter length */ - if (vf_id >= bitmap_len || vf_id >= snap->mbx_vf.vfcntr_len) - return ICE_ERR_OUT_OF_RANGE; + set_bit(ICE_FLAG_SRIOV_ENA, pf->flags); + return 0; +} - /* Clear VF ID bit in the bitmap tracking malicious VFs attached to PF */ - clear_bit(vf_id, all_malvfs); +/** + * ice_check_sriov_allowed - check if SR-IOV is allowed based on various checks + * @pf: PF to enabled SR-IOV on + */ +static int ice_check_sriov_allowed(struct ice_pf *pf) +{ + struct device *dev = ice_pf_to_dev(pf); - /* Clear the VF counter in the mailbox snapshot structure for that VF ID. - * This is to ensure that if a VF is unloaded and a new one brought back - * up with the same VF ID for a snapshot currently in traversal or detect - * state the counter for that VF ID does not increment on top of existing - * values in the mailbox overflow detection algorithm. - */ - snap->mbx_vf.vf_cntr[vf_id] = 0; + if (!test_bit(ICE_FLAG_SRIOV_CAPABLE, pf->flags)) { + dev_err(dev, "This device is not capable of SR-IOV\n"); + return -EOPNOTSUPP; + } + + if (ice_is_safe_mode(pf)) { + dev_err(dev, "SR-IOV cannot be configured - Device is in Safe Mode\n"); + return -EOPNOTSUPP; + } + + if (!ice_pf_state_is_nominal(pf)) { + dev_err(dev, "Cannot enable SR-IOV, device not ready\n"); + return -EBUSY; + } return 0; } /** - * ice_mbx_init_snapshot - Initialize mailbox snapshot structure - * @hw: pointer to the hardware structure - * @vf_count: number of VFs allocated on a PF + * ice_sriov_configure - Enable or change number of VFs via sysfs + * @pdev: pointer to a pci_dev structure + * @num_vfs: number of VFs to allocate or 0 to free VFs + * + * This function is called when the user updates the number of VFs in sysfs. On + * success return whatever num_vfs was set to by the caller. Return negative on + * failure. + */ +int ice_sriov_configure(struct pci_dev *pdev, int num_vfs) +{ + struct ice_pf *pf = pci_get_drvdata(pdev); + struct device *dev = ice_pf_to_dev(pf); + int err; + + err = ice_check_sriov_allowed(pf); + if (err) + return err; + + if (!num_vfs) { + if (!pci_vfs_assigned(pdev)) { + ice_free_vfs(pf); + ice_mbx_deinit_snapshot(&pf->hw); + if (pf->lag) + ice_enable_lag(pf->lag); + return 0; + } + + dev_err(dev, "can't free VFs because some are assigned to VMs.\n"); + return -EBUSY; + } + + err = ice_mbx_init_snapshot(&pf->hw, num_vfs); + if (err) + return err; + + err = ice_pci_sriov_ena(pf, num_vfs); + if (err) { + ice_mbx_deinit_snapshot(&pf->hw); + return err; + } + + if (pf->lag) + ice_disable_lag(pf->lag); + return num_vfs; +} + +/** + * ice_process_vflr_event - Free VF resources via IRQ calls + * @pf: pointer to the PF structure + * + * called from the VFLR IRQ handler to + * free up VF resources and state variables + */ +void ice_process_vflr_event(struct ice_pf *pf) +{ + struct ice_hw *hw = &pf->hw; + struct ice_vf *vf; + unsigned int bkt; + u32 reg; + + if (!test_and_clear_bit(ICE_VFLR_EVENT_PENDING, pf->state) || + !ice_has_vfs(pf)) + return; + + mutex_lock(&pf->vfs.table_lock); + ice_for_each_vf(pf, bkt, vf) { + u32 reg_idx, bit_idx; + + reg_idx = (hw->func_caps.vf_base_id + vf->vf_id) / 32; + bit_idx = (hw->func_caps.vf_base_id + vf->vf_id) % 32; + /* read GLGEN_VFLRSTAT register to find out the flr VFs */ + reg = rd32(hw, GLGEN_VFLRSTAT(reg_idx)); + if (reg & BIT(bit_idx)) + /* GLGEN_VFLRSTAT bit will be cleared in ice_reset_vf */ + ice_reset_vf(vf, ICE_VF_RESET_VFLR | ICE_VF_RESET_LOCK); + } + mutex_unlock(&pf->vfs.table_lock); +} + +/** + * ice_get_vf_from_pfq - get the VF who owns the PF space queue passed in + * @pf: PF used to index all VFs + * @pfq: queue index relative to the PF's function space * - * Clear the mailbox snapshot structure and allocate memory - * for the VF counter array based on the number of VFs allocated - * on that PF. + * If no VF is found who owns the pfq then return NULL, otherwise return a + * pointer to the VF who owns the pfq * - * Assumption: This function will assume ice_get_caps() has already been - * called to ensure that the vf_count can be compared against the number - * of VFs supported as defined in the functional capabilities of the device. + * If this function returns non-NULL, it acquires a reference count of the VF + * structure. The caller is responsible for calling ice_put_vf() to drop this + * reference. */ -enum ice_status ice_mbx_init_snapshot(struct ice_hw *hw, u16 vf_count) +static struct ice_vf *ice_get_vf_from_pfq(struct ice_pf *pf, u16 pfq) { - struct ice_mbx_snapshot *snap = &hw->mbx_snapshot; + struct ice_vf *vf; + unsigned int bkt; - /* Ensure that the number of VFs allocated is non-zero and - * is not greater than the number of supported VFs defined in - * the functional capabilities of the PF. - */ - if (!vf_count || vf_count > hw->func_caps.num_allocd_vfs) - return ICE_ERR_INVAL_SIZE; + rcu_read_lock(); + ice_for_each_vf_rcu(pf, bkt, vf) { + struct ice_vsi *vsi; + u16 rxq_idx; - snap->mbx_vf.vf_cntr = devm_kcalloc(ice_hw_to_dev(hw), vf_count, - sizeof(*snap->mbx_vf.vf_cntr), - GFP_KERNEL); - if (!snap->mbx_vf.vf_cntr) - return ICE_ERR_NO_MEMORY; + vsi = ice_get_vf_vsi(vf); + if (!vsi) + continue; - /* Setting the VF counter length to the number of allocated - * VFs for given PF's functional capabilities. - */ - snap->mbx_vf.vfcntr_len = vf_count; + ice_for_each_rxq(vsi, rxq_idx) + if (vsi->rxq_map[rxq_idx] == pfq) { + struct ice_vf *found; + + if (kref_get_unless_zero(&vf->refcnt)) + found = vf; + else + found = NULL; + rcu_read_unlock(); + return found; + } + } + rcu_read_unlock(); + + return NULL; +} + +/** + * ice_globalq_to_pfq - convert from global queue index to PF space queue index + * @pf: PF used for conversion + * @globalq: global queue index used to convert to PF space queue index + */ +static u32 ice_globalq_to_pfq(struct ice_pf *pf, u32 globalq) +{ + return globalq - pf->hw.func_caps.common_cap.rxq_first_id; +} + +/** + * ice_vf_lan_overflow_event - handle LAN overflow event for a VF + * @pf: PF that the LAN overflow event happened on + * @event: structure holding the event information for the LAN overflow event + * + * Determine if the LAN overflow event was caused by a VF queue. If it was not + * caused by a VF, do nothing. If a VF caused this LAN overflow event trigger a + * reset on the offending VF. + */ +void +ice_vf_lan_overflow_event(struct ice_pf *pf, struct ice_rq_event_info *event) +{ + u32 gldcb_rtctq, queue; + struct ice_vf *vf; + + gldcb_rtctq = le32_to_cpu(event->desc.params.lan_overflow.prtdcb_ruptq); + dev_dbg(ice_pf_to_dev(pf), "GLDCB_RTCTQ: 0x%08x\n", gldcb_rtctq); + + /* event returns device global Rx queue number */ + queue = (gldcb_rtctq & GLDCB_RTCTQ_RXQNUM_M) >> + GLDCB_RTCTQ_RXQNUM_S; + + vf = ice_get_vf_from_pfq(pf, ice_globalq_to_pfq(pf, queue)); + if (!vf) + return; + + ice_reset_vf(vf, ICE_VF_RESET_NOTIFY | ICE_VF_RESET_LOCK); + ice_put_vf(vf); +} - /* Clear mbx_buf in the mailbox snaphot structure and setting the - * mailbox snapshot state to a new capture. +/** + * ice_set_vf_spoofchk + * @netdev: network interface device structure + * @vf_id: VF identifier + * @ena: flag to enable or disable feature + * + * Enable or disable VF spoof checking + */ +int ice_set_vf_spoofchk(struct net_device *netdev, int vf_id, bool ena) +{ + struct ice_netdev_priv *np = netdev_priv(netdev); + struct ice_pf *pf = np->vsi->back; + struct ice_vsi *vf_vsi; + struct device *dev; + struct ice_vf *vf; + int ret; + + dev = ice_pf_to_dev(pf); + + vf = ice_get_vf_by_id(pf, vf_id); + if (!vf) + return -EINVAL; + + ret = ice_check_vf_ready_for_cfg(vf); + if (ret) + goto out_put_vf; + + vf_vsi = ice_get_vf_vsi(vf); + if (!vf_vsi) { + netdev_err(netdev, "VSI %d for VF %d is null\n", + vf->lan_vsi_idx, vf->vf_id); + ret = -EINVAL; + goto out_put_vf; + } + + if (vf_vsi->type != ICE_VSI_VF) { + netdev_err(netdev, "Type %d of VSI %d for VF %d is no ICE_VSI_VF\n", + vf_vsi->type, vf_vsi->vsi_num, vf->vf_id); + ret = -ENODEV; + goto out_put_vf; + } + + if (ena == vf->spoofchk) { + dev_dbg(dev, "VF spoofchk already %s\n", ena ? "ON" : "OFF"); + ret = 0; + goto out_put_vf; + } + + ret = ice_vsi_apply_spoofchk(vf_vsi, ena); + if (ret) + dev_err(dev, "Failed to set spoofchk %s for VF %d VSI %d\n error %d\n", + ena ? "ON" : "OFF", vf->vf_id, vf_vsi->vsi_num, ret); + else + vf->spoofchk = ena; + +out_put_vf: + ice_put_vf(vf); + return ret; +} + +/** + * ice_get_vf_cfg + * @netdev: network interface device structure + * @vf_id: VF identifier + * @ivi: VF configuration structure + * + * return VF configuration + */ +int +ice_get_vf_cfg(struct net_device *netdev, int vf_id, struct ifla_vf_info *ivi) +{ + struct ice_pf *pf = ice_netdev_to_pf(netdev); + struct ice_vf *vf; + int ret; + + vf = ice_get_vf_by_id(pf, vf_id); + if (!vf) + return -EINVAL; + + ret = ice_check_vf_ready_for_cfg(vf); + if (ret) + goto out_put_vf; + + ivi->vf = vf_id; + ether_addr_copy(ivi->mac, vf->hw_lan_addr.addr); + + /* VF configuration for VLAN and applicable QoS */ + ivi->vlan = ice_vf_get_port_vlan_id(vf); + ivi->qos = ice_vf_get_port_vlan_prio(vf); + if (ice_vf_is_port_vlan_ena(vf)) + ivi->vlan_proto = cpu_to_be16(ice_vf_get_port_vlan_tpid(vf)); + + ivi->trusted = vf->trusted; + ivi->spoofchk = vf->spoofchk; + if (!vf->link_forced) + ivi->linkstate = IFLA_VF_LINK_STATE_AUTO; + else if (vf->link_up) + ivi->linkstate = IFLA_VF_LINK_STATE_ENABLE; + else + ivi->linkstate = IFLA_VF_LINK_STATE_DISABLE; + ivi->max_tx_rate = vf->max_tx_rate; + ivi->min_tx_rate = vf->min_tx_rate; + +out_put_vf: + ice_put_vf(vf); + return ret; +} + +/** + * ice_set_vf_mac + * @netdev: network interface device structure + * @vf_id: VF identifier + * @mac: MAC address + * + * program VF MAC address + */ +int ice_set_vf_mac(struct net_device *netdev, int vf_id, u8 *mac) +{ + struct ice_pf *pf = ice_netdev_to_pf(netdev); + struct ice_vf *vf; + int ret; + + if (is_multicast_ether_addr(mac)) { + netdev_err(netdev, "%pM not a valid unicast address\n", mac); + return -EINVAL; + } + + vf = ice_get_vf_by_id(pf, vf_id); + if (!vf) + return -EINVAL; + + /* nothing left to do, unicast MAC already set */ + if (ether_addr_equal(vf->dev_lan_addr.addr, mac) && + ether_addr_equal(vf->hw_lan_addr.addr, mac)) { + ret = 0; + goto out_put_vf; + } + + ret = ice_check_vf_ready_for_cfg(vf); + if (ret) + goto out_put_vf; + + mutex_lock(&vf->cfg_lock); + + /* VF is notified of its new MAC via the PF's response to the + * VIRTCHNL_OP_GET_VF_RESOURCES message after the VF has been reset */ - memset(&snap->mbx_buf, 0, sizeof(snap->mbx_buf)); - snap->mbx_buf.state = ICE_MAL_VF_DETECT_STATE_NEW_SNAPSHOT; + ether_addr_copy(vf->dev_lan_addr.addr, mac); + ether_addr_copy(vf->hw_lan_addr.addr, mac); + if (is_zero_ether_addr(mac)) { + /* VF will send VIRTCHNL_OP_ADD_ETH_ADDR message with its MAC */ + vf->pf_set_mac = false; + netdev_info(netdev, "Removing MAC on VF %d. VF driver will be reinitialized\n", + vf->vf_id); + } else { + /* PF will add MAC rule for the VF */ + vf->pf_set_mac = true; + netdev_info(netdev, "Setting MAC %pM on VF %d. VF driver will be reinitialized\n", + mac, vf_id); + } - return 0; + ice_reset_vf(vf, ICE_VF_RESET_NOTIFY); + mutex_unlock(&vf->cfg_lock); + +out_put_vf: + ice_put_vf(vf); + return ret; +} + +/** + * ice_set_vf_trust + * @netdev: network interface device structure + * @vf_id: VF identifier + * @trusted: Boolean value to enable/disable trusted VF + * + * Enable or disable a given VF as trusted + */ +int ice_set_vf_trust(struct net_device *netdev, int vf_id, bool trusted) +{ + struct ice_pf *pf = ice_netdev_to_pf(netdev); + struct ice_vf *vf; + int ret; + + if (ice_is_eswitch_mode_switchdev(pf)) { + dev_info(ice_pf_to_dev(pf), "Trusted VF is forbidden in switchdev mode\n"); + return -EOPNOTSUPP; + } + + vf = ice_get_vf_by_id(pf, vf_id); + if (!vf) + return -EINVAL; + + ret = ice_check_vf_ready_for_cfg(vf); + if (ret) + goto out_put_vf; + + /* Check if already trusted */ + if (trusted == vf->trusted) { + ret = 0; + goto out_put_vf; + } + + mutex_lock(&vf->cfg_lock); + + vf->trusted = trusted; + ice_reset_vf(vf, ICE_VF_RESET_NOTIFY); + dev_info(ice_pf_to_dev(pf), "VF %u is now %strusted\n", + vf_id, trusted ? "" : "un"); + + mutex_unlock(&vf->cfg_lock); + +out_put_vf: + ice_put_vf(vf); + return ret; +} + +/** + * ice_set_vf_link_state + * @netdev: network interface device structure + * @vf_id: VF identifier + * @link_state: required link state + * + * Set VF's link state, irrespective of physical link state status + */ +int ice_set_vf_link_state(struct net_device *netdev, int vf_id, int link_state) +{ + struct ice_pf *pf = ice_netdev_to_pf(netdev); + struct ice_vf *vf; + int ret; + + vf = ice_get_vf_by_id(pf, vf_id); + if (!vf) + return -EINVAL; + + ret = ice_check_vf_ready_for_cfg(vf); + if (ret) + goto out_put_vf; + + switch (link_state) { + case IFLA_VF_LINK_STATE_AUTO: + vf->link_forced = false; + break; + case IFLA_VF_LINK_STATE_ENABLE: + vf->link_forced = true; + vf->link_up = true; + break; + case IFLA_VF_LINK_STATE_DISABLE: + vf->link_forced = true; + vf->link_up = false; + break; + default: + ret = -EINVAL; + goto out_put_vf; + } + + ice_vc_notify_vf_link_state(vf); + +out_put_vf: + ice_put_vf(vf); + return ret; +} + +/** + * ice_calc_all_vfs_min_tx_rate - calculate cumulative min Tx rate on all VFs + * @pf: PF associated with VFs + */ +static int ice_calc_all_vfs_min_tx_rate(struct ice_pf *pf) +{ + struct ice_vf *vf; + unsigned int bkt; + int rate = 0; + + rcu_read_lock(); + ice_for_each_vf_rcu(pf, bkt, vf) + rate += vf->min_tx_rate; + rcu_read_unlock(); + + return rate; +} + +/** + * ice_min_tx_rate_oversubscribed - check if min Tx rate causes oversubscription + * @vf: VF trying to configure min_tx_rate + * @min_tx_rate: min Tx rate in Mbps + * + * Check if the min_tx_rate being passed in will cause oversubscription of total + * min_tx_rate based on the current link speed and all other VFs configured + * min_tx_rate + * + * Return true if the passed min_tx_rate would cause oversubscription, else + * return false + */ +static bool +ice_min_tx_rate_oversubscribed(struct ice_vf *vf, int min_tx_rate) +{ + struct ice_vsi *vsi = ice_get_vf_vsi(vf); + int all_vfs_min_tx_rate; + int link_speed_mbps; + + if (WARN_ON(!vsi)) + return false; + + link_speed_mbps = ice_get_link_speed_mbps(vsi); + all_vfs_min_tx_rate = ice_calc_all_vfs_min_tx_rate(vf->pf); + + /* this VF's previous rate is being overwritten */ + all_vfs_min_tx_rate -= vf->min_tx_rate; + + if (all_vfs_min_tx_rate + min_tx_rate > link_speed_mbps) { + dev_err(ice_pf_to_dev(vf->pf), "min_tx_rate of %d Mbps on VF %u would cause oversubscription of %d Mbps based on the current link speed %d Mbps\n", + min_tx_rate, vf->vf_id, + all_vfs_min_tx_rate + min_tx_rate - link_speed_mbps, + link_speed_mbps); + return true; + } + + return false; +} + +/** + * ice_set_vf_bw - set min/max VF bandwidth + * @netdev: network interface device structure + * @vf_id: VF identifier + * @min_tx_rate: Minimum Tx rate in Mbps + * @max_tx_rate: Maximum Tx rate in Mbps + */ +int +ice_set_vf_bw(struct net_device *netdev, int vf_id, int min_tx_rate, + int max_tx_rate) +{ + struct ice_pf *pf = ice_netdev_to_pf(netdev); + struct ice_vsi *vsi; + struct device *dev; + struct ice_vf *vf; + int ret; + + dev = ice_pf_to_dev(pf); + + vf = ice_get_vf_by_id(pf, vf_id); + if (!vf) + return -EINVAL; + + ret = ice_check_vf_ready_for_cfg(vf); + if (ret) + goto out_put_vf; + + vsi = ice_get_vf_vsi(vf); + if (!vsi) { + ret = -EINVAL; + goto out_put_vf; + } + + if (min_tx_rate && ice_is_dcb_active(pf)) { + dev_err(dev, "DCB on PF is currently enabled. VF min Tx rate limiting not allowed on this PF.\n"); + ret = -EOPNOTSUPP; + goto out_put_vf; + } + + if (ice_min_tx_rate_oversubscribed(vf, min_tx_rate)) { + ret = -EINVAL; + goto out_put_vf; + } + + if (vf->min_tx_rate != (unsigned int)min_tx_rate) { + ret = ice_set_min_bw_limit(vsi, (u64)min_tx_rate * 1000); + if (ret) { + dev_err(dev, "Unable to set min-tx-rate for VF %d\n", + vf->vf_id); + goto out_put_vf; + } + + vf->min_tx_rate = min_tx_rate; + } + + if (vf->max_tx_rate != (unsigned int)max_tx_rate) { + ret = ice_set_max_bw_limit(vsi, (u64)max_tx_rate * 1000); + if (ret) { + dev_err(dev, "Unable to set max-tx-rate for VF %d\n", + vf->vf_id); + goto out_put_vf; + } + + vf->max_tx_rate = max_tx_rate; + } + +out_put_vf: + ice_put_vf(vf); + return ret; +} + +/** + * ice_get_vf_stats - populate some stats for the VF + * @netdev: the netdev of the PF + * @vf_id: the host OS identifier (0-255) + * @vf_stats: pointer to the OS memory to be initialized + */ +int ice_get_vf_stats(struct net_device *netdev, int vf_id, + struct ifla_vf_stats *vf_stats) +{ + struct ice_pf *pf = ice_netdev_to_pf(netdev); + struct ice_eth_stats *stats; + struct ice_vsi *vsi; + struct ice_vf *vf; + int ret; + + vf = ice_get_vf_by_id(pf, vf_id); + if (!vf) + return -EINVAL; + + ret = ice_check_vf_ready_for_cfg(vf); + if (ret) + goto out_put_vf; + + vsi = ice_get_vf_vsi(vf); + if (!vsi) { + ret = -EINVAL; + goto out_put_vf; + } + + ice_update_eth_stats(vsi); + stats = &vsi->eth_stats; + + memset(vf_stats, 0, sizeof(*vf_stats)); + + vf_stats->rx_packets = stats->rx_unicast + stats->rx_broadcast + + stats->rx_multicast; + vf_stats->tx_packets = stats->tx_unicast + stats->tx_broadcast + + stats->tx_multicast; + vf_stats->rx_bytes = stats->rx_bytes; + vf_stats->tx_bytes = stats->tx_bytes; + vf_stats->broadcast = stats->rx_broadcast; + vf_stats->multicast = stats->rx_multicast; + vf_stats->rx_dropped = stats->rx_discards; + vf_stats->tx_dropped = stats->tx_discards; + +out_put_vf: + ice_put_vf(vf); + return ret; +} + +/** + * ice_is_supported_port_vlan_proto - make sure the vlan_proto is supported + * @hw: hardware structure used to check the VLAN mode + * @vlan_proto: VLAN TPID being checked + * + * If the device is configured in Double VLAN Mode (DVM), then both ETH_P_8021Q + * and ETH_P_8021AD are supported. If the device is configured in Single VLAN + * Mode (SVM), then only ETH_P_8021Q is supported. + */ +static bool +ice_is_supported_port_vlan_proto(struct ice_hw *hw, u16 vlan_proto) +{ + bool is_supported = false; + + switch (vlan_proto) { + case ETH_P_8021Q: + is_supported = true; + break; + case ETH_P_8021AD: + if (ice_is_dvm_ena(hw)) + is_supported = true; + break; + } + + return is_supported; +} + +/** + * ice_set_vf_port_vlan + * @netdev: network interface device structure + * @vf_id: VF identifier + * @vlan_id: VLAN ID being set + * @qos: priority setting + * @vlan_proto: VLAN protocol + * + * program VF Port VLAN ID and/or QoS + */ +int +ice_set_vf_port_vlan(struct net_device *netdev, int vf_id, u16 vlan_id, u8 qos, + __be16 vlan_proto) +{ + struct ice_pf *pf = ice_netdev_to_pf(netdev); + u16 local_vlan_proto = ntohs(vlan_proto); + struct device *dev; + struct ice_vf *vf; + int ret; + + dev = ice_pf_to_dev(pf); + + if (vlan_id >= VLAN_N_VID || qos > 7) { + dev_err(dev, "Invalid Port VLAN parameters for VF %d, ID %d, QoS %d\n", + vf_id, vlan_id, qos); + return -EINVAL; + } + + if (!ice_is_supported_port_vlan_proto(&pf->hw, local_vlan_proto)) { + dev_err(dev, "VF VLAN protocol 0x%04x is not supported\n", + local_vlan_proto); + return -EPROTONOSUPPORT; + } + + vf = ice_get_vf_by_id(pf, vf_id); + if (!vf) + return -EINVAL; + + ret = ice_check_vf_ready_for_cfg(vf); + if (ret) + goto out_put_vf; + + if (ice_vf_get_port_vlan_prio(vf) == qos && + ice_vf_get_port_vlan_tpid(vf) == local_vlan_proto && + ice_vf_get_port_vlan_id(vf) == vlan_id) { + /* duplicate request, so just return success */ + dev_dbg(dev, "Duplicate port VLAN %u, QoS %u, TPID 0x%04x request\n", + vlan_id, qos, local_vlan_proto); + ret = 0; + goto out_put_vf; + } + + mutex_lock(&vf->cfg_lock); + + vf->port_vlan_info = ICE_VLAN(local_vlan_proto, vlan_id, qos); + if (ice_vf_is_port_vlan_ena(vf)) + dev_info(dev, "Setting VLAN %u, QoS %u, TPID 0x%04x on VF %d\n", + vlan_id, qos, local_vlan_proto, vf_id); + else + dev_info(dev, "Clearing port VLAN on VF %d\n", vf_id); + + ice_reset_vf(vf, ICE_VF_RESET_NOTIFY); + mutex_unlock(&vf->cfg_lock); + +out_put_vf: + ice_put_vf(vf); + return ret; +} + +/** + * ice_print_vf_rx_mdd_event - print VF Rx malicious driver detect event + * @vf: pointer to the VF structure + */ +void ice_print_vf_rx_mdd_event(struct ice_vf *vf) +{ + struct ice_pf *pf = vf->pf; + struct device *dev; + + dev = ice_pf_to_dev(pf); + + dev_info(dev, "%d Rx Malicious Driver Detection events detected on PF %d VF %d MAC %pM. mdd-auto-reset-vfs=%s\n", + vf->mdd_rx_events.count, pf->hw.pf_id, vf->vf_id, + vf->dev_lan_addr.addr, + test_bit(ICE_FLAG_MDD_AUTO_RESET_VF, pf->flags) + ? "on" : "off"); +} + +/** + * ice_print_vfs_mdd_events - print VFs malicious driver detect event + * @pf: pointer to the PF structure + * + * Called from ice_handle_mdd_event to rate limit and print VFs MDD events. + */ +void ice_print_vfs_mdd_events(struct ice_pf *pf) +{ + struct device *dev = ice_pf_to_dev(pf); + struct ice_hw *hw = &pf->hw; + struct ice_vf *vf; + unsigned int bkt; + + /* check that there are pending MDD events to print */ + if (!test_and_clear_bit(ICE_MDD_VF_PRINT_PENDING, pf->state)) + return; + + /* VF MDD event logs are rate limited to one second intervals */ + if (time_is_after_jiffies(pf->vfs.last_printed_mdd_jiffies + HZ * 1)) + return; + + pf->vfs.last_printed_mdd_jiffies = jiffies; + + mutex_lock(&pf->vfs.table_lock); + ice_for_each_vf(pf, bkt, vf) { + /* only print Rx MDD event message if there are new events */ + if (vf->mdd_rx_events.count != vf->mdd_rx_events.last_printed) { + vf->mdd_rx_events.last_printed = + vf->mdd_rx_events.count; + ice_print_vf_rx_mdd_event(vf); + } + + /* only print Tx MDD event message if there are new events */ + if (vf->mdd_tx_events.count != vf->mdd_tx_events.last_printed) { + vf->mdd_tx_events.last_printed = + vf->mdd_tx_events.count; + + dev_info(dev, "%d Tx Malicious Driver Detection events detected on PF %d VF %d MAC %pM.\n", + vf->mdd_tx_events.count, hw->pf_id, vf->vf_id, + vf->dev_lan_addr.addr); + } + } + mutex_unlock(&pf->vfs.table_lock); } /** - * ice_mbx_deinit_snapshot - Free mailbox snapshot structure - * @hw: pointer to the hardware structure + * ice_restore_all_vfs_msi_state - restore VF MSI state after PF FLR + * @pdev: pointer to a pci_dev structure * - * Clear the mailbox snapshot structure and free the VF counter array. + * Called when recovering from a PF FLR to restore interrupt capability to + * the VFs. */ -void ice_mbx_deinit_snapshot(struct ice_hw *hw) +void ice_restore_all_vfs_msi_state(struct pci_dev *pdev) { - struct ice_mbx_snapshot *snap = &hw->mbx_snapshot; + u16 vf_id; + int pos; - /* Free VF counter array and reset VF counter length */ - devm_kfree(ice_hw_to_dev(hw), snap->mbx_vf.vf_cntr); - snap->mbx_vf.vfcntr_len = 0; + if (!pci_num_vf(pdev)) + return; + + pos = pci_find_ext_capability(pdev, PCI_EXT_CAP_ID_SRIOV); + if (pos) { + struct pci_dev *vfdev; + + pci_read_config_word(pdev, pos + PCI_SRIOV_VF_DID, + &vf_id); + vfdev = pci_get_device(pdev->vendor, vf_id, NULL); + while (vfdev) { + if (vfdev->is_virtfn && vfdev->physfn == pdev) + pci_restore_msi_state(vfdev); + vfdev = pci_get_device(pdev->vendor, vf_id, + vfdev); + } + } +} + +/** + * ice_is_malicious_vf - helper function to detect a malicious VF + * @pf: ptr to struct ice_pf + * @event: pointer to the AQ event + * @num_msg_proc: the number of messages processed so far + * @num_msg_pending: the number of messages peinding in admin queue + */ +bool +ice_is_malicious_vf(struct ice_pf *pf, struct ice_rq_event_info *event, + u16 num_msg_proc, u16 num_msg_pending) +{ + s16 vf_id = le16_to_cpu(event->desc.retval); + struct device *dev = ice_pf_to_dev(pf); + struct ice_mbx_data mbxdata; + bool malvf = false; + struct ice_vf *vf; + int status; + + vf = ice_get_vf_by_id(pf, vf_id); + if (!vf) + return false; + + if (test_bit(ICE_VF_STATE_DIS, vf->vf_states)) + goto out_put_vf; + + mbxdata.num_msg_proc = num_msg_proc; + mbxdata.num_pending_arq = num_msg_pending; + mbxdata.max_num_msgs_mbx = pf->hw.mailboxq.num_rq_entries; +#define ICE_MBX_OVERFLOW_WATERMARK 64 + mbxdata.async_watermark_val = ICE_MBX_OVERFLOW_WATERMARK; + + /* check to see if we have a malicious VF */ + status = ice_mbx_vf_state_handler(&pf->hw, &mbxdata, vf_id, &malvf); + if (status) + goto out_put_vf; + + if (malvf) { + bool report_vf = false; + + /* if the VF is malicious and we haven't let the user + * know about it, then let them know now + */ + status = ice_mbx_report_malvf(&pf->hw, pf->vfs.malvfs, + ICE_MAX_SRIOV_VFS, vf_id, + &report_vf); + if (status) + dev_dbg(dev, "Error reporting malicious VF\n"); + + if (report_vf) { + struct ice_vsi *pf_vsi = ice_get_main_vsi(pf); + + if (pf_vsi) + dev_warn(dev, "VF MAC %pM on PF MAC %pM is generating asynchronous messages and may be overflowing the PF message queue. Please see the Adapter User Guide for more information\n", + &vf->dev_lan_addr.addr[0], + pf_vsi->netdev->dev_addr); + } + } - /* Clear mbx_buf in the mailbox snaphot structure */ - memset(&snap->mbx_buf, 0, sizeof(snap->mbx_buf)); +out_put_vf: + ice_put_vf(vf); + return malvf; } |