diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'fs/proc/base.c')
-rw-r--r-- | fs/proc/base.c | 449 |
1 files changed, 278 insertions, 171 deletions
diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c index c7c64272b0fa..9e479d7d202b 100644 --- a/fs/proc/base.c +++ b/fs/proc/base.c @@ -74,7 +74,6 @@ #include <linux/mount.h> #include <linux/security.h> #include <linux/ptrace.h> -#include <linux/tracehook.h> #include <linux/printk.h> #include <linux/cache.h> #include <linux/cgroup.h> @@ -96,6 +95,7 @@ #include <linux/posix-timers.h> #include <linux/time_namespace.h> #include <linux/resctrl.h> +#include <linux/cn_proc.h> #include <trace/events/oom.h> #include "internal.h" #include "fd.h" @@ -405,11 +405,11 @@ print0: static int lock_trace(struct task_struct *task) { - int err = mutex_lock_killable(&task->signal->cred_guard_mutex); + int err = down_read_killable(&task->signal->exec_update_lock); if (err) return err; if (!ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH_FSCREDS)) { - mutex_unlock(&task->signal->cred_guard_mutex); + up_read(&task->signal->exec_update_lock); return -EPERM; } return 0; @@ -417,7 +417,7 @@ static int lock_trace(struct task_struct *task) static void unlock_trace(struct task_struct *task) { - mutex_unlock(&task->signal->cred_guard_mutex); + up_read(&task->signal->exec_update_lock); } #ifdef CONFIG_STACKTRACE @@ -551,8 +551,17 @@ static int proc_oom_score(struct seq_file *m, struct pid_namespace *ns, { unsigned long totalpages = totalram_pages() + total_swap_pages; unsigned long points = 0; + long badness; + + badness = oom_badness(task, totalpages); + /* + * Special case OOM_SCORE_ADJ_MIN for all others scale the + * badness value into [0, 2000] range which we have been + * exporting for a long time so userspace might depend on it. + */ + if (badness != LONG_MIN) + points = (1000 + badness * 1000 / (long)totalpages) * 2 / 3; - points = oom_badness(task, totalpages) * 1000 / totalpages; seq_printf(m, "%lu\n", points); return 0; @@ -660,10 +669,10 @@ static int proc_pid_syscall(struct seq_file *m, struct pid_namespace *ns, /************************************************************************/ /* permission checks */ -static int proc_fd_access_allowed(struct inode *inode) +static bool proc_fd_access_allowed(struct inode *inode) { struct task_struct *task; - int allowed = 0; + bool allowed = false; /* Allow access to a task's file descriptors if it is us or we * may use ptrace attach to the process and find out that * information. @@ -676,7 +685,8 @@ static int proc_fd_access_allowed(struct inode *inode) return allowed; } -int proc_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr) +int proc_setattr(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct dentry *dentry, + struct iattr *attr) { int error; struct inode *inode = d_inode(dentry); @@ -684,11 +694,11 @@ int proc_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr) if (attr->ia_valid & ATTR_MODE) return -EPERM; - error = setattr_prepare(dentry, attr); + error = setattr_prepare(&init_user_ns, dentry, attr); if (error) return error; - setattr_copy(inode, attr); + setattr_copy(&init_user_ns, inode, attr); mark_inode_dirty(inode); return 0; } @@ -697,32 +707,41 @@ int proc_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr) * May current process learn task's sched/cmdline info (for hide_pid_min=1) * or euid/egid (for hide_pid_min=2)? */ -static bool has_pid_permissions(struct pid_namespace *pid, +static bool has_pid_permissions(struct proc_fs_info *fs_info, struct task_struct *task, - int hide_pid_min) + enum proc_hidepid hide_pid_min) { - if (pid->hide_pid < hide_pid_min) + /* + * If 'hidpid' mount option is set force a ptrace check, + * we indicate that we are using a filesystem syscall + * by passing PTRACE_MODE_READ_FSCREDS + */ + if (fs_info->hide_pid == HIDEPID_NOT_PTRACEABLE) + return ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ_FSCREDS); + + if (fs_info->hide_pid < hide_pid_min) return true; - if (in_group_p(pid->pid_gid)) + if (in_group_p(fs_info->pid_gid)) return true; return ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ_FSCREDS); } -static int proc_pid_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask) +static int proc_pid_permission(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, + struct inode *inode, int mask) { - struct pid_namespace *pid = proc_pid_ns(inode); + struct proc_fs_info *fs_info = proc_sb_info(inode->i_sb); struct task_struct *task; bool has_perms; task = get_proc_task(inode); if (!task) return -ESRCH; - has_perms = has_pid_permissions(pid, task, HIDEPID_NO_ACCESS); + has_perms = has_pid_permissions(fs_info, task, HIDEPID_NO_ACCESS); put_task_struct(task); if (!has_perms) { - if (pid->hide_pid == HIDEPID_INVISIBLE) { + if (fs_info->hide_pid == HIDEPID_INVISIBLE) { /* * Let's make getdents(), stat(), and open() * consistent with each other. If a process @@ -734,7 +753,7 @@ static int proc_pid_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask) return -EPERM; } - return generic_permission(inode, mask); + return generic_permission(&init_user_ns, inode, mask); } @@ -746,7 +765,7 @@ static const struct inode_operations proc_def_inode_operations = { static int proc_single_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v) { struct inode *inode = m->private; - struct pid_namespace *ns = proc_pid_ns(inode); + struct pid_namespace *ns = proc_pid_ns(inode->i_sb); struct pid *pid = proc_pid(inode); struct task_struct *task; int ret; @@ -838,7 +857,7 @@ static ssize_t mem_rw(struct file *file, char __user *buf, flags = FOLL_FORCE | (write ? FOLL_WRITE : 0); while (count > 0) { - int this_len = min_t(int, count, PAGE_SIZE); + size_t this_len = min_t(size_t, count, PAGE_SIZE); if (write && copy_from_user(page, buf, this_len)) { copied = -EFAULT; @@ -1032,13 +1051,14 @@ static ssize_t oom_adj_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t count, oom_adj = (task->signal->oom_score_adj * -OOM_DISABLE) / OOM_SCORE_ADJ_MAX; put_task_struct(task); + if (oom_adj > OOM_ADJUST_MAX) + oom_adj = OOM_ADJUST_MAX; len = snprintf(buffer, sizeof(buffer), "%d\n", oom_adj); return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, buffer, len); } static int __set_oom_adj(struct file *file, int oom_adj, bool legacy) { - static DEFINE_MUTEX(oom_adj_mutex); struct mm_struct *mm = NULL; struct task_struct *task; int err = 0; @@ -1078,7 +1098,7 @@ static int __set_oom_adj(struct file *file, int oom_adj, bool legacy) struct task_struct *p = find_lock_task_mm(task); if (p) { - if (atomic_read(&p->mm->mm_users) > 1) { + if (test_bit(MMF_MULTIPROCESS, &p->mm->flags)) { mm = p->mm; mmgrab(mm); } @@ -1252,6 +1272,10 @@ static ssize_t proc_loginuid_write(struct file * file, const char __user * buf, kuid_t kloginuid; int rv; + /* Don't let kthreads write their own loginuid */ + if (current->flags & PF_KTHREAD) + return -EPERM; + rcu_read_lock(); if (current != pid_task(proc_pid(inode), PIDTYPE_PID)) { rcu_read_unlock(); @@ -1415,7 +1439,7 @@ static const struct file_operations proc_fail_nth_operations = { static int sched_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v) { struct inode *inode = m->private; - struct pid_namespace *ns = proc_pid_ns(inode); + struct pid_namespace *ns = proc_pid_ns(inode->i_sb); struct task_struct *p; p = get_proc_task(inode); @@ -1573,6 +1597,7 @@ static ssize_t timens_offsets_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, noffsets = 0; for (pos = kbuf; pos; pos = next_line) { struct proc_timens_offset *off = &offsets[noffsets]; + char clock[10]; int err; /* Find the end of line and ensure we don't look past it */ @@ -1584,10 +1609,21 @@ static ssize_t timens_offsets_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, next_line = NULL; } - err = sscanf(pos, "%u %lld %lu", &off->clockid, + err = sscanf(pos, "%9s %lld %lu", clock, &off->val.tv_sec, &off->val.tv_nsec); if (err != 3 || off->val.tv_nsec >= NSEC_PER_SEC) goto out; + + clock[sizeof(clock) - 1] = 0; + if (strcmp(clock, "monotonic") == 0 || + strcmp(clock, __stringify(CLOCK_MONOTONIC)) == 0) + off->clockid = CLOCK_MONOTONIC; + else if (strcmp(clock, "boottime") == 0 || + strcmp(clock, __stringify(CLOCK_BOOTTIME)) == 0) + off->clockid = CLOCK_BOOTTIME; + else + goto out; + noffsets++; if (noffsets == ARRAY_SIZE(offsets)) { if (next_line) @@ -1641,8 +1677,10 @@ static ssize_t comm_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, if (!p) return -ESRCH; - if (same_thread_group(current, p)) + if (same_thread_group(current, p)) { set_task_comm(p, buffer); + proc_comm_connector(p); + } else count = -EINVAL; @@ -1723,27 +1761,27 @@ out: return ERR_PTR(error); } -static int do_proc_readlink(struct path *path, char __user *buffer, int buflen) +static int do_proc_readlink(const struct path *path, char __user *buffer, int buflen) { - char *tmp = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL); + char *tmp = kmalloc(PATH_MAX, GFP_KERNEL); char *pathname; int len; if (!tmp) return -ENOMEM; - pathname = d_path(path, tmp, PAGE_SIZE); + pathname = d_path(path, tmp, PATH_MAX); len = PTR_ERR(pathname); if (IS_ERR(pathname)) goto out; - len = tmp + PAGE_SIZE - 1 - pathname; + len = tmp + PATH_MAX - 1 - pathname; if (len > buflen) len = buflen; if (copy_to_user(buffer, pathname, len)) len = -EFAULT; out: - free_page((unsigned long)tmp); + kfree(tmp); return len; } @@ -1834,11 +1872,25 @@ void task_dump_owner(struct task_struct *task, umode_t mode, *rgid = gid; } -struct inode *proc_pid_make_inode(struct super_block * sb, +void proc_pid_evict_inode(struct proc_inode *ei) +{ + struct pid *pid = ei->pid; + + if (S_ISDIR(ei->vfs_inode.i_mode)) { + spin_lock(&pid->lock); + hlist_del_init_rcu(&ei->sibling_inodes); + spin_unlock(&pid->lock); + } + + put_pid(pid); +} + +struct inode *proc_pid_make_inode(struct super_block *sb, struct task_struct *task, umode_t mode) { struct inode * inode; struct proc_inode *ei; + struct pid *pid; /* We need a new inode */ @@ -1856,10 +1908,13 @@ struct inode *proc_pid_make_inode(struct super_block * sb, /* * grab the reference to task. */ - ei->pid = get_task_pid(task, PIDTYPE_PID); - if (!ei->pid) + pid = get_task_pid(task, PIDTYPE_PID); + if (!pid) goto out_unlock; + /* Let the pid remember us for quick removal */ + ei->pid = pid; + task_dump_owner(task, 0, &inode->i_uid, &inode->i_gid); security_task_to_inode(task, inode); @@ -1871,21 +1926,54 @@ out_unlock: return NULL; } -int pid_getattr(const struct path *path, struct kstat *stat, - u32 request_mask, unsigned int query_flags) +/* + * Generating an inode and adding it into @pid->inodes, so that task will + * invalidate inode's dentry before being released. + * + * This helper is used for creating dir-type entries under '/proc' and + * '/proc/<tgid>/task'. Other entries(eg. fd, stat) under '/proc/<tgid>' + * can be released by invalidating '/proc/<tgid>' dentry. + * In theory, dentries under '/proc/<tgid>/task' can also be released by + * invalidating '/proc/<tgid>' dentry, we reserve it to handle single + * thread exiting situation: Any one of threads should invalidate its + * '/proc/<tgid>/task/<pid>' dentry before released. + */ +static struct inode *proc_pid_make_base_inode(struct super_block *sb, + struct task_struct *task, umode_t mode) +{ + struct inode *inode; + struct proc_inode *ei; + struct pid *pid; + + inode = proc_pid_make_inode(sb, task, mode); + if (!inode) + return NULL; + + /* Let proc_flush_pid find this directory inode */ + ei = PROC_I(inode); + pid = ei->pid; + spin_lock(&pid->lock); + hlist_add_head_rcu(&ei->sibling_inodes, &pid->inodes); + spin_unlock(&pid->lock); + + return inode; +} + +int pid_getattr(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, const struct path *path, + struct kstat *stat, u32 request_mask, unsigned int query_flags) { struct inode *inode = d_inode(path->dentry); - struct pid_namespace *pid = proc_pid_ns(inode); + struct proc_fs_info *fs_info = proc_sb_info(inode->i_sb); struct task_struct *task; - generic_fillattr(inode, stat); + generic_fillattr(&init_user_ns, inode, stat); stat->uid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID; stat->gid = GLOBAL_ROOT_GID; rcu_read_lock(); task = pid_task(proc_pid(inode), PIDTYPE_PID); if (task) { - if (!has_pid_permissions(pid, task, HIDEPID_INVISIBLE)) { + if (!has_pid_permissions(fs_info, task, HIDEPID_INVISIBLE)) { rcu_read_unlock(); /* * This doesn't prevent learning whether PID exists, @@ -1921,19 +2009,21 @@ static int pid_revalidate(struct dentry *dentry, unsigned int flags) { struct inode *inode; struct task_struct *task; + int ret = 0; - if (flags & LOOKUP_RCU) - return -ECHILD; - - inode = d_inode(dentry); - task = get_proc_task(inode); + rcu_read_lock(); + inode = d_inode_rcu(dentry); + if (!inode) + goto out; + task = pid_task(proc_pid(inode), PIDTYPE_PID); if (task) { pid_update_inode(task, inode); - put_task_struct(task); - return 1; + ret = 1; } - return 0; +out: + rcu_read_unlock(); + return ret; } static inline bool proc_inode_is_dead(struct inode *inode) @@ -1965,7 +2055,7 @@ const struct dentry_operations pid_dentry_operations = * file type from dcache entry. * * Since all of the proc inode numbers are dynamically generated, the inode - * numbers do not exist until the inode is cache. This means creating the + * numbers do not exist until the inode is cache. This means creating * the dcache entry in readdir is necessary to keep the inode numbers * reported by readdir in sync with the inode numbers reported * by stat. @@ -2070,11 +2160,11 @@ static int map_files_d_revalidate(struct dentry *dentry, unsigned int flags) goto out; if (!dname_to_vma_addr(dentry, &vm_start, &vm_end)) { - status = down_read_killable(&mm->mmap_sem); + status = mmap_read_lock_killable(mm); if (!status) { exact_vma_exists = !!find_exact_vma(mm, vm_start, vm_end); - up_read(&mm->mmap_sem); + mmap_read_unlock(mm); } } @@ -2121,7 +2211,7 @@ static int map_files_get_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct path *path) if (rc) goto out_mmput; - rc = down_read_killable(&mm->mmap_sem); + rc = mmap_read_lock_killable(mm); if (rc) goto out_mmput; @@ -2132,7 +2222,7 @@ static int map_files_get_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct path *path) path_get(path); rc = 0; } - up_read(&mm->mmap_sem); + mmap_read_unlock(mm); out_mmput: mmput(mm); @@ -2147,16 +2237,16 @@ struct map_files_info { }; /* - * Only allow CAP_SYS_ADMIN to follow the links, due to concerns about how the - * symlinks may be used to bypass permissions on ancestor directories in the - * path to the file in question. + * Only allow CAP_SYS_ADMIN and CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE to follow the links, due + * to concerns about how the symlinks may be used to bypass permissions on + * ancestor directories in the path to the file in question. */ static const char * proc_map_files_get_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode, struct delayed_call *done) { - if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) + if (!checkpoint_restore_ns_capable(&init_user_ns)) return ERR_PTR(-EPERM); return proc_pid_get_link(dentry, inode, done); @@ -2222,7 +2312,7 @@ static struct dentry *proc_map_files_lookup(struct inode *dir, goto out_put_task; result = ERR_PTR(-EINTR); - if (down_read_killable(&mm->mmap_sem)) + if (mmap_read_lock_killable(mm)) goto out_put_mm; result = ERR_PTR(-ENOENT); @@ -2235,7 +2325,7 @@ static struct dentry *proc_map_files_lookup(struct inode *dir, (void *)(unsigned long)vma->vm_file->f_mode); out_no_vma: - up_read(&mm->mmap_sem); + mmap_read_unlock(mm); out_put_mm: mmput(mm); out_put_task: @@ -2260,6 +2350,7 @@ proc_map_files_readdir(struct file *file, struct dir_context *ctx) GENRADIX(struct map_files_info) fa; struct map_files_info *p; int ret; + struct vma_iterator vmi; genradix_init(&fa); @@ -2280,7 +2371,7 @@ proc_map_files_readdir(struct file *file, struct dir_context *ctx) if (!mm) goto out_put_task; - ret = down_read_killable(&mm->mmap_sem); + ret = mmap_read_lock_killable(mm); if (ret) { mmput(mm); goto out_put_task; @@ -2291,14 +2382,16 @@ proc_map_files_readdir(struct file *file, struct dir_context *ctx) /* * We need two passes here: * - * 1) Collect vmas of mapped files with mmap_sem taken - * 2) Release mmap_sem and instantiate entries + * 1) Collect vmas of mapped files with mmap_lock taken + * 2) Release mmap_lock and instantiate entries * * otherwise we get lockdep complained, since filldir() - * routine might require mmap_sem taken in might_fault(). + * routine might require mmap_lock taken in might_fault(). */ - for (vma = mm->mmap, pos = 2; vma; vma = vma->vm_next) { + pos = 2; + vma_iter_init(&vmi, mm, 0); + for_each_vma(vmi, vma) { if (!vma->vm_file) continue; if (++pos <= ctx->pos) @@ -2307,7 +2400,7 @@ proc_map_files_readdir(struct file *file, struct dir_context *ctx) p = genradix_ptr_alloc(&fa, nr_files++, GFP_KERNEL); if (!p) { ret = -ENOMEM; - up_read(&mm->mmap_sem); + mmap_read_unlock(mm); mmput(mm); goto out_put_task; } @@ -2316,7 +2409,7 @@ proc_map_files_readdir(struct file *file, struct dir_context *ctx) p->end = vma->vm_end; p->mode = vma->vm_file->f_mode; } - up_read(&mm->mmap_sem); + mmap_read_unlock(mm); mmput(mm); for (i = 0; i < nr_files; i++) { @@ -2436,7 +2529,7 @@ static int proc_timers_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) return -ENOMEM; tp->pid = proc_pid(inode); - tp->ns = proc_pid_ns(inode); + tp->ns = proc_pid_ns(inode->i_sb); return 0; } @@ -2619,6 +2712,13 @@ out: } #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY +static int proc_pid_attr_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) +{ + file->private_data = NULL; + __mem_open(inode, file, PTRACE_MODE_READ_FSCREDS); + return 0; +} + static ssize_t proc_pid_attr_read(struct file * file, char __user * buf, size_t count, loff_t *ppos) { @@ -2631,7 +2731,7 @@ static ssize_t proc_pid_attr_read(struct file * file, char __user * buf, return -ESRCH; length = security_getprocattr(task, PROC_I(inode)->op.lsm, - (char*)file->f_path.dentry->d_name.name, + file->f_path.dentry->d_name.name, &p); put_task_struct(task); if (length > 0) @@ -2648,6 +2748,10 @@ static ssize_t proc_pid_attr_write(struct file * file, const char __user * buf, void *page; int rv; + /* A task may only write when it was the opener. */ + if (file->private_data != current->mm) + return -EPERM; + rcu_read_lock(); task = pid_task(proc_pid(inode), PIDTYPE_PID); if (!task) { @@ -2695,9 +2799,11 @@ out: } static const struct file_operations proc_pid_attr_operations = { + .open = proc_pid_attr_open, .read = proc_pid_attr_read, .write = proc_pid_attr_write, .llseek = generic_file_llseek, + .release = mem_release, }; #define LSM_DIR_OPS(LSM) \ @@ -2736,6 +2842,15 @@ static const struct pid_entry smack_attr_dir_stuff[] = { LSM_DIR_OPS(smack); #endif +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR +static const struct pid_entry apparmor_attr_dir_stuff[] = { + ATTR("apparmor", "current", 0666), + ATTR("apparmor", "prev", 0444), + ATTR("apparmor", "exec", 0666), +}; +LSM_DIR_OPS(apparmor); +#endif + static const struct pid_entry attr_dir_stuff[] = { ATTR(NULL, "current", 0666), ATTR(NULL, "prev", 0444), @@ -2747,6 +2862,10 @@ static const struct pid_entry attr_dir_stuff[] = { DIR("smack", 0555, proc_smack_attr_dir_inode_ops, proc_smack_attr_dir_ops), #endif +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR + DIR("apparmor", 0555, + proc_apparmor_attr_dir_inode_ops, proc_apparmor_attr_dir_ops), +#endif }; static int proc_attr_dir_readdir(struct file *file, struct dir_context *ctx) @@ -2861,7 +2980,7 @@ static int do_io_accounting(struct task_struct *task, struct seq_file *m, int wh unsigned long flags; int result; - result = mutex_lock_killable(&task->signal->cred_guard_mutex); + result = down_read_killable(&task->signal->exec_update_lock); if (result) return result; @@ -2897,7 +3016,7 @@ static int do_io_accounting(struct task_struct *task, struct seq_file *m, int wh result = 0; out_unlock: - mutex_unlock(&task->signal->cred_guard_mutex); + up_read(&task->signal->exec_update_lock); return result; } @@ -3066,6 +3185,35 @@ static int proc_pid_patch_state(struct seq_file *m, struct pid_namespace *ns, } #endif /* CONFIG_LIVEPATCH */ +#ifdef CONFIG_KSM +static int proc_pid_ksm_merging_pages(struct seq_file *m, struct pid_namespace *ns, + struct pid *pid, struct task_struct *task) +{ + struct mm_struct *mm; + + mm = get_task_mm(task); + if (mm) { + seq_printf(m, "%lu\n", mm->ksm_merging_pages); + mmput(mm); + } + + return 0; +} +static int proc_pid_ksm_stat(struct seq_file *m, struct pid_namespace *ns, + struct pid *pid, struct task_struct *task) +{ + struct mm_struct *mm; + + mm = get_task_mm(task); + if (mm) { + seq_printf(m, "ksm_rmap_items %lu\n", mm->ksm_rmap_items); + mmput(mm); + } + + return 0; +} +#endif /* CONFIG_KSM */ + #ifdef CONFIG_STACKLEAK_METRICS static int proc_stack_depth(struct seq_file *m, struct pid_namespace *ns, struct pid *pid, struct task_struct *task) @@ -3091,7 +3239,7 @@ static const struct pid_entry tgid_base_stuff[] = { DIR("task", S_IRUGO|S_IXUGO, proc_task_inode_operations, proc_task_operations), DIR("fd", S_IRUSR|S_IXUSR, proc_fd_inode_operations, proc_fd_operations), DIR("map_files", S_IRUSR|S_IXUSR, proc_map_files_inode_operations, proc_map_files_operations), - DIR("fdinfo", S_IRUSR|S_IXUSR, proc_fdinfo_inode_operations, proc_fdinfo_operations), + DIR("fdinfo", S_IRUGO|S_IXUGO, proc_fdinfo_inode_operations, proc_fdinfo_operations), DIR("ns", S_IRUSR|S_IXUGO, proc_ns_dir_inode_operations, proc_ns_dir_operations), #ifdef CONFIG_NET DIR("net", S_IRUGO|S_IXUGO, proc_net_inode_operations, proc_net_operations), @@ -3194,6 +3342,13 @@ static const struct pid_entry tgid_base_stuff[] = { #ifdef CONFIG_PROC_PID_ARCH_STATUS ONE("arch_status", S_IRUGO, proc_pid_arch_status), #endif +#ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP_CACHE_DEBUG + ONE("seccomp_cache", S_IRUSR, proc_pid_seccomp_cache), +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_KSM + ONE("ksm_merging_pages", S_IRUSR, proc_pid_ksm_merging_pages), + ONE("ksm_stat", S_IRUSR, proc_pid_ksm_stat), +#endif }; static int proc_tgid_base_readdir(struct file *file, struct dir_context *ctx) @@ -3230,90 +3385,28 @@ static const struct inode_operations proc_tgid_base_inode_operations = { .permission = proc_pid_permission, }; -static void proc_flush_task_mnt(struct vfsmount *mnt, pid_t pid, pid_t tgid) -{ - struct dentry *dentry, *leader, *dir; - char buf[10 + 1]; - struct qstr name; - - name.name = buf; - name.len = snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%u", pid); - /* no ->d_hash() rejects on procfs */ - dentry = d_hash_and_lookup(mnt->mnt_root, &name); - if (dentry) { - d_invalidate(dentry); - dput(dentry); - } - - if (pid == tgid) - return; - - name.name = buf; - name.len = snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%u", tgid); - leader = d_hash_and_lookup(mnt->mnt_root, &name); - if (!leader) - goto out; - - name.name = "task"; - name.len = strlen(name.name); - dir = d_hash_and_lookup(leader, &name); - if (!dir) - goto out_put_leader; - - name.name = buf; - name.len = snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%u", pid); - dentry = d_hash_and_lookup(dir, &name); - if (dentry) { - d_invalidate(dentry); - dput(dentry); - } - - dput(dir); -out_put_leader: - dput(leader); -out: - return; -} - /** - * proc_flush_task - Remove dcache entries for @task from the /proc dcache. - * @task: task that should be flushed. - * - * When flushing dentries from proc, one needs to flush them from global - * proc (proc_mnt) and from all the namespaces' procs this task was seen - * in. This call is supposed to do all of this job. + * proc_flush_pid - Remove dcache entries for @pid from the /proc dcache. + * @pid: pid that should be flushed. * - * Looks in the dcache for - * /proc/@pid - * /proc/@tgid/task/@pid - * if either directory is present flushes it and all of it'ts children - * from the dcache. + * This function walks a list of inodes (that belong to any proc + * filesystem) that are attached to the pid and flushes them from + * the dentry cache. * * It is safe and reasonable to cache /proc entries for a task until * that task exits. After that they just clog up the dcache with * useless entries, possibly causing useful dcache entries to be - * flushed instead. This routine is proved to flush those useless - * dcache entries at process exit time. + * flushed instead. This routine is provided to flush those useless + * dcache entries when a process is reaped. * * NOTE: This routine is just an optimization so it does not guarantee - * that no dcache entries will exist at process exit time it - * just makes it very unlikely that any will persist. + * that no dcache entries will exist after a process is reaped + * it just makes it very unlikely that any will persist. */ -void proc_flush_task(struct task_struct *task) +void proc_flush_pid(struct pid *pid) { - int i; - struct pid *pid, *tgid; - struct upid *upid; - - pid = task_pid(task); - tgid = task_tgid(task); - - for (i = 0; i <= pid->level; i++) { - upid = &pid->numbers[i]; - proc_flush_task_mnt(upid->ns->proc_mnt, upid->nr, - tgid->numbers[i].nr); - } + proc_invalidate_siblings_dcache(&pid->inodes, &pid->lock); } static struct dentry *proc_pid_instantiate(struct dentry * dentry, @@ -3321,7 +3414,8 @@ static struct dentry *proc_pid_instantiate(struct dentry * dentry, { struct inode *inode; - inode = proc_pid_make_inode(dentry->d_sb, task, S_IFDIR | S_IRUGO | S_IXUGO); + inode = proc_pid_make_base_inode(dentry->d_sb, task, + S_IFDIR | S_IRUGO | S_IXUGO); if (!inode) return ERR_PTR(-ENOENT); @@ -3340,6 +3434,7 @@ struct dentry *proc_pid_lookup(struct dentry *dentry, unsigned int flags) { struct task_struct *task; unsigned tgid; + struct proc_fs_info *fs_info; struct pid_namespace *ns; struct dentry *result = ERR_PTR(-ENOENT); @@ -3347,7 +3442,8 @@ struct dentry *proc_pid_lookup(struct dentry *dentry, unsigned int flags) if (tgid == ~0U) goto out; - ns = dentry->d_sb->s_fs_info; + fs_info = proc_sb_info(dentry->d_sb); + ns = fs_info->pid_ns; rcu_read_lock(); task = find_task_by_pid_ns(tgid, ns); if (task) @@ -3356,7 +3452,14 @@ struct dentry *proc_pid_lookup(struct dentry *dentry, unsigned int flags) if (!task) goto out; + /* Limit procfs to only ptraceable tasks */ + if (fs_info->hide_pid == HIDEPID_NOT_PTRACEABLE) { + if (!has_pid_permissions(fs_info, task, HIDEPID_NO_ACCESS)) + goto out_put_task; + } + result = proc_pid_instantiate(dentry, task, NULL); +out_put_task: put_task_struct(task); out: return result; @@ -3382,20 +3485,8 @@ retry: pid = find_ge_pid(iter.tgid, ns); if (pid) { iter.tgid = pid_nr_ns(pid, ns); - iter.task = pid_task(pid, PIDTYPE_PID); - /* What we to know is if the pid we have find is the - * pid of a thread_group_leader. Testing for task - * being a thread_group_leader is the obvious thing - * todo but there is a window when it fails, due to - * the pid transfer logic in de_thread. - * - * So we perform the straight forward test of seeing - * if the pid we have found is the pid of a thread - * group leader, and don't worry if the task we have - * found doesn't happen to be a thread group leader. - * As we don't care in the case of readdir. - */ - if (!iter.task || !has_group_leader_pid(iter.task)) { + iter.task = pid_task(pid, PIDTYPE_TGID); + if (!iter.task) { iter.tgid += 1; goto retry; } @@ -3411,20 +3502,21 @@ retry: int proc_pid_readdir(struct file *file, struct dir_context *ctx) { struct tgid_iter iter; - struct pid_namespace *ns = proc_pid_ns(file_inode(file)); + struct proc_fs_info *fs_info = proc_sb_info(file_inode(file)->i_sb); + struct pid_namespace *ns = proc_pid_ns(file_inode(file)->i_sb); loff_t pos = ctx->pos; if (pos >= PID_MAX_LIMIT + TGID_OFFSET) return 0; if (pos == TGID_OFFSET - 2) { - struct inode *inode = d_inode(ns->proc_self); + struct inode *inode = d_inode(fs_info->proc_self); if (!dir_emit(ctx, "self", 4, inode->i_ino, DT_LNK)) return 0; ctx->pos = pos = pos + 1; } if (pos == TGID_OFFSET - 1) { - struct inode *inode = d_inode(ns->proc_thread_self); + struct inode *inode = d_inode(fs_info->proc_thread_self); if (!dir_emit(ctx, "thread-self", 11, inode->i_ino, DT_LNK)) return 0; ctx->pos = pos = pos + 1; @@ -3438,7 +3530,7 @@ int proc_pid_readdir(struct file *file, struct dir_context *ctx) unsigned int len; cond_resched(); - if (!has_pid_permissions(ns, iter.task, HIDEPID_INVISIBLE)) + if (!has_pid_permissions(fs_info, iter.task, HIDEPID_INVISIBLE)) continue; len = snprintf(name, sizeof(name), "%u", iter.tgid); @@ -3465,7 +3557,8 @@ int proc_pid_readdir(struct file *file, struct dir_context *ctx) * This function makes sure that the node is always accessible for members of * same thread group. */ -static int proc_tid_comm_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask) +static int proc_tid_comm_permission(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, + struct inode *inode, int mask) { bool is_same_tgroup; struct task_struct *task; @@ -3484,7 +3577,7 @@ static int proc_tid_comm_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask) return 0; } - return generic_permission(inode, mask); + return generic_permission(&init_user_ns, inode, mask); } static const struct inode_operations proc_tid_comm_inode_operations = { @@ -3496,7 +3589,7 @@ static const struct inode_operations proc_tid_comm_inode_operations = { */ static const struct pid_entry tid_base_stuff[] = { DIR("fd", S_IRUSR|S_IXUSR, proc_fd_inode_operations, proc_fd_operations), - DIR("fdinfo", S_IRUSR|S_IXUSR, proc_fdinfo_inode_operations, proc_fdinfo_operations), + DIR("fdinfo", S_IRUGO|S_IXUGO, proc_fdinfo_inode_operations, proc_fdinfo_operations), DIR("ns", S_IRUSR|S_IXUGO, proc_ns_dir_inode_operations, proc_ns_dir_operations), #ifdef CONFIG_NET DIR("net", S_IRUGO|S_IXUGO, proc_net_inode_operations, proc_net_operations), @@ -3587,6 +3680,13 @@ static const struct pid_entry tid_base_stuff[] = { #ifdef CONFIG_PROC_PID_ARCH_STATUS ONE("arch_status", S_IRUGO, proc_pid_arch_status), #endif +#ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP_CACHE_DEBUG + ONE("seccomp_cache", S_IRUSR, proc_pid_seccomp_cache), +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_KSM + ONE("ksm_merging_pages", S_IRUSR, proc_pid_ksm_merging_pages), + ONE("ksm_stat", S_IRUSR, proc_pid_ksm_stat), +#endif }; static int proc_tid_base_readdir(struct file *file, struct dir_context *ctx) @@ -3618,7 +3718,8 @@ static struct dentry *proc_task_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, struct task_struct *task, const void *ptr) { struct inode *inode; - inode = proc_pid_make_inode(dentry->d_sb, task, S_IFDIR | S_IRUGO | S_IXUGO); + inode = proc_pid_make_base_inode(dentry->d_sb, task, + S_IFDIR | S_IRUGO | S_IXUGO); if (!inode) return ERR_PTR(-ENOENT); @@ -3638,6 +3739,7 @@ static struct dentry *proc_task_lookup(struct inode *dir, struct dentry * dentry struct task_struct *task; struct task_struct *leader = get_proc_task(dir); unsigned tid; + struct proc_fs_info *fs_info; struct pid_namespace *ns; struct dentry *result = ERR_PTR(-ENOENT); @@ -3648,7 +3750,8 @@ static struct dentry *proc_task_lookup(struct inode *dir, struct dentry * dentry if (tid == ~0U) goto out; - ns = dentry->d_sb->s_fs_info; + fs_info = proc_sb_info(dentry->d_sb); + ns = fs_info->pid_ns; rcu_read_lock(); task = find_task_by_pid_ns(tid, ns); if (task) @@ -3762,7 +3865,7 @@ static int proc_task_readdir(struct file *file, struct dir_context *ctx) /* f_version caches the tgid value that the last readdir call couldn't * return. lseek aka telldir automagically resets f_version to 0. */ - ns = proc_pid_ns(inode); + ns = proc_pid_ns(inode->i_sb); tid = (int)file->f_version; file->f_version = 0; for (task = first_tid(proc_pid(inode), tid, ctx->pos - 2, ns); @@ -3770,7 +3873,10 @@ static int proc_task_readdir(struct file *file, struct dir_context *ctx) task = next_tid(task), ctx->pos++) { char name[10 + 1]; unsigned int len; + tid = task_pid_nr_ns(task, ns); + if (!tid) + continue; /* The task has just exited. */ len = snprintf(name, sizeof(name), "%u", tid); if (!proc_fill_cache(file, ctx, name, len, proc_task_instantiate, task, NULL)) { @@ -3785,12 +3891,13 @@ static int proc_task_readdir(struct file *file, struct dir_context *ctx) return 0; } -static int proc_task_getattr(const struct path *path, struct kstat *stat, +static int proc_task_getattr(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, + const struct path *path, struct kstat *stat, u32 request_mask, unsigned int query_flags) { struct inode *inode = d_inode(path->dentry); struct task_struct *p = get_proc_task(inode); - generic_fillattr(inode, stat); + generic_fillattr(&init_user_ns, inode, stat); if (p) { stat->nlink += get_nr_threads(p); |