diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'include/linux/randomize_kstack.h')
-rw-r--r-- | include/linux/randomize_kstack.h | 48 |
1 files changed, 43 insertions, 5 deletions
diff --git a/include/linux/randomize_kstack.h b/include/linux/randomize_kstack.h index bebc911161b6..5d868505a94e 100644 --- a/include/linux/randomize_kstack.h +++ b/include/linux/randomize_kstack.h @@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ #ifndef _LINUX_RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_H #define _LINUX_RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_H +#ifdef CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_OFFSET #include <linux/kernel.h> #include <linux/jump_label.h> #include <linux/percpu-defs.h> @@ -16,8 +17,20 @@ DECLARE_PER_CPU(u32, kstack_offset); * alignment. Also, since this use is being explicitly masked to a max of * 10 bits, stack-clash style attacks are unlikely. For more details see * "VLAs" in Documentation/process/deprecated.rst + * + * The normal __builtin_alloca() is initialized with INIT_STACK_ALL (currently + * only with Clang and not GCC). Initializing the unused area on each syscall + * entry is expensive, and generating an implicit call to memset() may also be + * problematic (such as in noinstr functions). Therefore, if the compiler + * supports it (which it should if it initializes allocas), always use the + * "uninitialized" variant of the builtin. */ -void *__builtin_alloca(size_t size); +#if __has_builtin(__builtin_alloca_uninitialized) +#define __kstack_alloca __builtin_alloca_uninitialized +#else +#define __kstack_alloca __builtin_alloca +#endif + /* * Use, at most, 10 bits of entropy. We explicitly cap this to keep the * "VLA" from being unbounded (see above). 10 bits leaves enough room for @@ -27,21 +40,42 @@ void *__builtin_alloca(size_t size); */ #define KSTACK_OFFSET_MAX(x) ((x) & 0x3FF) -/* - * These macros must be used during syscall entry when interrupts and +/** + * add_random_kstack_offset - Increase stack utilization by previously + * chosen random offset + * + * This should be used in the syscall entry path when interrupts and * preempt are disabled, and after user registers have been stored to - * the stack. + * the stack. For testing the resulting entropy, please see: + * tools/testing/selftests/lkdtm/stack-entropy.sh */ #define add_random_kstack_offset() do { \ if (static_branch_maybe(CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_OFFSET_DEFAULT, \ &randomize_kstack_offset)) { \ u32 offset = raw_cpu_read(kstack_offset); \ - u8 *ptr = __builtin_alloca(KSTACK_OFFSET_MAX(offset)); \ + u8 *ptr = __kstack_alloca(KSTACK_OFFSET_MAX(offset)); \ /* Keep allocation even after "ptr" loses scope. */ \ asm volatile("" :: "r"(ptr) : "memory"); \ } \ } while (0) +/** + * choose_random_kstack_offset - Choose the random offset for the next + * add_random_kstack_offset() + * + * This should only be used during syscall exit when interrupts and + * preempt are disabled. This position in the syscall flow is done to + * frustrate attacks from userspace attempting to learn the next offset: + * - Maximize the timing uncertainty visible from userspace: if the + * offset is chosen at syscall entry, userspace has much more control + * over the timing between choosing offsets. "How long will we be in + * kernel mode?" tends to be more difficult to predict than "how long + * will we be in user mode?" + * - Reduce the lifetime of the new offset sitting in memory during + * kernel mode execution. Exposure of "thread-local" memory content + * (e.g. current, percpu, etc) tends to be easier than arbitrary + * location memory exposure. + */ #define choose_random_kstack_offset(rand) do { \ if (static_branch_maybe(CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_OFFSET_DEFAULT, \ &randomize_kstack_offset)) { \ @@ -50,5 +84,9 @@ void *__builtin_alloca(size_t size); raw_cpu_write(kstack_offset, offset); \ } \ } while (0) +#else /* CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_OFFSET */ +#define add_random_kstack_offset() do { } while (0) +#define choose_random_kstack_offset(rand) do { } while (0) +#endif /* CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_OFFSET */ #endif |