1 files changed, 78 insertions, 62 deletions

diff --git a/security/apparmor/ipc.c b/security/apparmor/ipc.c
index edac790923c3..11e66b5bbc42 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/ipc.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/ipc.c
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
  * This file contains AppArmor ipc mediation
  *
  * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
- * Copyright 2009-2010 Canonical Ltd.
+ * Copyright 2009-2017 Canonical Ltd.
  *
  * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
  * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
@@ -21,87 +21,103 @@
 #include "include/policy.h"
 #include "include/ipc.h"
 
+/**
+ * audit_ptrace_mask - convert mask to permission string
+ * @buffer: buffer to write string to (NOT NULL)
+ * @mask: permission mask to convert
+ */
+static void audit_ptrace_mask(struct audit_buffer *ab, u32 mask)
+{
+	switch (mask) {
+	case MAY_READ:
+		audit_log_string(ab, "read");
+		break;
+	case MAY_WRITE:
+		audit_log_string(ab, "trace");
+		break;
+	case AA_MAY_BE_READ:
+		audit_log_string(ab, "readby");
+		break;
+	case AA_MAY_BE_TRACED:
+		audit_log_string(ab, "tracedby");
+		break;
+	}
+}
+
 /* call back to audit ptrace fields */
-static void audit_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va)
+static void audit_ptrace_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va)
 {
 	struct common_audit_data *sa = va;
+
+	if (aad(sa)->request & AA_PTRACE_PERM_MASK) {
+		audit_log_format(ab, " requested_mask=");
+		audit_ptrace_mask(ab, aad(sa)->request);
+
+		if (aad(sa)->denied & AA_PTRACE_PERM_MASK) {
+			audit_log_format(ab, " denied_mask=");
+			audit_ptrace_mask(ab, aad(sa)->denied);
+		}
+	}
 	audit_log_format(ab, " peer=");
-	audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, aad(sa)->peer->base.hname);
+	aa_label_xaudit(ab, labels_ns(aad(sa)->label), aad(sa)->peer,
+			FLAGS_NONE, GFP_ATOMIC);
 }
 
-/**
- * aa_audit_ptrace - do auditing for ptrace
- * @profile: profile being enforced  (NOT NULL)
- * @target: profile being traced (NOT NULL)
- * @error: error condition
- *
- * Returns: %0 or error code
- */
-static int aa_audit_ptrace(struct aa_profile *profile,
-			   struct aa_profile *target, int error)
+/* TODO: conditionals */
+static int profile_ptrace_perm(struct aa_profile *profile,
+			       struct aa_profile *peer, u32 request,
+			       struct common_audit_data *sa)
 {
-	DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(sa, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE, OP_PTRACE);
+	struct aa_perms perms = { };
 
-	aad(&sa)->peer = target;
-	aad(&sa)->error = error;
+	/* need because of peer in cross check */
+	if (profile_unconfined(profile) ||
+	    !PROFILE_MEDIATES(profile, AA_CLASS_PTRACE))
+		return 0;
 
-	return aa_audit(AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUTO, profile, &sa, audit_cb);
+	aad(sa)->peer = &peer->label;
+	aa_profile_match_label(profile, &peer->label, AA_CLASS_PTRACE, request,
+			       &perms);
+	aa_apply_modes_to_perms(profile, &perms);
+	return aa_check_perms(profile, &perms, request, sa, audit_ptrace_cb);
 }
 
-/**
- * aa_may_ptrace - test if tracer task can trace the tracee
- * @tracer: profile of the task doing the tracing  (NOT NULL)
- * @tracee: task to be traced
- * @mode: whether PTRACE_MODE_READ || PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH
- *
- * Returns: %0 else error code if permission denied or error
- */
-int aa_may_ptrace(struct aa_profile *tracer, struct aa_profile *tracee,
-		  unsigned int mode)
+static int cross_ptrace_perm(struct aa_profile *tracer,
+			     struct aa_profile *tracee, u32 request,
+			     struct common_audit_data *sa)
 {
-	/* TODO: currently only based on capability, not extended ptrace
-	 *       rules,
-	 *       Test mode for PTRACE_MODE_READ || PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH
-	 */
-
-	if (unconfined(tracer) || tracer == tracee)
+	if (PROFILE_MEDIATES(tracer, AA_CLASS_PTRACE))
+		return xcheck(profile_ptrace_perm(tracer, tracee, request, sa),
+			      profile_ptrace_perm(tracee, tracer,
+						  request << PTRACE_PERM_SHIFT,
+						  sa));
+	/* policy uses the old style capability check for ptrace */
+	if (profile_unconfined(tracer) || tracer == tracee)
 		return 0;
-	/* log this capability request */
-	return aa_capable(tracer, CAP_SYS_PTRACE, 1);
+
+	aad(sa)->label = &tracer->label;
+	aad(sa)->peer = &tracee->label;
+	aad(sa)->request = 0;
+	aad(sa)->error = aa_capable(&tracer->label, CAP_SYS_PTRACE, 1);
+
+	return aa_audit(AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUTO, tracer, sa, audit_ptrace_cb);
 }
 
 /**
- * aa_ptrace - do ptrace permission check and auditing
- * @tracer: task doing the tracing (NOT NULL)
- * @tracee: task being traced (NOT NULL)
- * @mode: ptrace mode either PTRACE_MODE_READ || PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH
+ * aa_may_ptrace - test if tracer task can trace the tracee
+ * @tracer: label of the task doing the tracing  (NOT NULL)
+ * @tracee: task label to be traced
+ * @request: permission request
  *
  * Returns: %0 else error code if permission denied or error
  */
-int aa_ptrace(struct task_struct *tracer, struct task_struct *tracee,
-	      unsigned int mode)
+int aa_may_ptrace(struct aa_label *tracer, struct aa_label *tracee,
+		  u32 request)
 {
-	/*
-	 * tracer can ptrace tracee when
-	 * - tracer is unconfined ||
-	 *   - tracer is in complain mode
-	 *   - tracer has rules allowing it to trace tracee currently this is:
-	 *       - confined by the same profile ||
-	 *       - tracer profile has CAP_SYS_PTRACE
-	 */
-
-	struct aa_profile *tracer_p = aa_get_task_profile(tracer);
-	int error = 0;
-
-	if (!unconfined(tracer_p)) {
-		struct aa_profile *tracee_p = aa_get_task_profile(tracee);
+	DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(sa, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE, OP_PTRACE);
 
-		error = aa_may_ptrace(tracer_p, tracee_p, mode);
-		error = aa_audit_ptrace(tracer_p, tracee_p, error);
+	return xcheck_labels_profiles(tracer, tracee, cross_ptrace_perm,
+				      request, &sa);
+}
 
-		aa_put_profile(tracee_p);
-	}
-	aa_put_profile(tracer_p);
 
-	return error;
-}