diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'security/apparmor')
36 files changed, 908 insertions, 645 deletions
diff --git a/security/apparmor/.gitignore b/security/apparmor/.gitignore index d5b291e94264..6d1eb1c15c18 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/.gitignore +++ b/security/apparmor/.gitignore @@ -1,6 +1,4 @@ -# -# Generated include files -# +# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only net_names.h capability_names.h rlim_names.h diff --git a/security/apparmor/Kconfig b/security/apparmor/Kconfig index 0fe336860773..cb3496e00d8a 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/Kconfig +++ b/security/apparmor/Kconfig @@ -6,8 +6,6 @@ config SECURITY_APPARMOR select SECURITY_PATH select SECURITYFS select SECURITY_NETWORK - select ZLIB_INFLATE - select ZLIB_DEFLATE default n help This enables the AppArmor security module. @@ -17,29 +15,6 @@ config SECURITY_APPARMOR If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N. -config SECURITY_APPARMOR_HASH - bool "Enable introspection of sha1 hashes for loaded profiles" - depends on SECURITY_APPARMOR - select CRYPTO - select CRYPTO_SHA1 - default y - help - This option selects whether introspection of loaded policy - is available to userspace via the apparmor filesystem. - -config SECURITY_APPARMOR_HASH_DEFAULT - bool "Enable policy hash introspection by default" - depends on SECURITY_APPARMOR_HASH - default y - help - This option selects whether sha1 hashing of loaded policy - is enabled by default. The generation of sha1 hashes for - loaded policy provide system administrators a quick way - to verify that policy in the kernel matches what is expected, - however it can slow down policy load on some devices. In - these cases policy hashing can be disabled by default and - enabled only if needed. - config SECURITY_APPARMOR_DEBUG bool "Build AppArmor with debug code" depends on SECURITY_APPARMOR @@ -69,14 +44,76 @@ config SECURITY_APPARMOR_DEBUG_MESSAGES When enabled, various debug messages will be logged to the kernel message buffer. +config SECURITY_APPARMOR_INTROSPECT_POLICY + bool "Allow loaded policy to be introspected" + depends on SECURITY_APPARMOR + default y + help + This option selects whether introspection of loaded policy + is available to userspace via the apparmor filesystem. This + adds to kernel memory usage. It is required for introspection + of loaded policy, and check point and restore support. It + can be disabled for embedded systems where reducing memory and + cpu is paramount. + +config SECURITY_APPARMOR_HASH + bool "Enable introspection of sha1 hashes for loaded profiles" + depends on SECURITY_APPARMOR_INTROSPECT_POLICY + select CRYPTO + select CRYPTO_SHA1 + default y + help + This option selects whether introspection of loaded policy + hashes is available to userspace via the apparmor + filesystem. This option provides a light weight means of + checking loaded policy. This option adds to policy load + time and can be disabled for small embedded systems. + +config SECURITY_APPARMOR_HASH_DEFAULT + bool "Enable policy hash introspection by default" + depends on SECURITY_APPARMOR_HASH + default y + help + This option selects whether sha1 hashing of loaded policy + is enabled by default. The generation of sha1 hashes for + loaded policy provide system administrators a quick way + to verify that policy in the kernel matches what is expected, + however it can slow down policy load on some devices. In + these cases policy hashing can be disabled by default and + enabled only if needed. + +config SECURITY_APPARMOR_EXPORT_BINARY + bool "Allow exporting the raw binary policy" + depends on SECURITY_APPARMOR_INTROSPECT_POLICY + select ZLIB_INFLATE + select ZLIB_DEFLATE + default y + help + This option allows reading back binary policy as it was loaded. + It increases the amount of kernel memory needed by policy and + also increases policy load time. This option is required for + checkpoint and restore support, and debugging of loaded policy. + +config SECURITY_APPARMOR_PARANOID_LOAD + bool "Perform full verification of loaded policy" + depends on SECURITY_APPARMOR + default y + help + This options allows controlling whether apparmor does a full + verification of loaded policy. This should not be disabled + except for embedded systems where the image is read only, + includes policy, and has some form of integrity check. + Disabling the check will speed up policy loads. + config SECURITY_APPARMOR_KUNIT_TEST - bool "Build KUnit tests for policy_unpack.c" + bool "Build KUnit tests for policy_unpack.c" if !KUNIT_ALL_TESTS depends on KUNIT=y && SECURITY_APPARMOR + default KUNIT_ALL_TESTS help This builds the AppArmor KUnit tests. KUnit tests run during boot and output the results to the debug log - in TAP format (http://testanything.org/). Only useful for kernel devs + in TAP format (https://testanything.org/). Only useful for kernel devs running KUnit test harness and are not for inclusion into a production build. diff --git a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c index 280741fc0f5f..d066ccc219e2 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c +++ b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c @@ -36,6 +36,7 @@ #include "include/policy_ns.h" #include "include/resource.h" #include "include/policy_unpack.h" +#include "include/task.h" /* * The apparmor filesystem interface used for policy load and introspection @@ -70,6 +71,7 @@ struct rawdata_f_data { struct aa_loaddata *loaddata; }; +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_EXPORT_BINARY #define RAWDATA_F_DATA_BUF(p) (char *)(p + 1) static void rawdata_f_data_free(struct rawdata_f_data *private) @@ -94,9 +96,10 @@ static struct rawdata_f_data *rawdata_f_data_alloc(size_t size) return ret; } +#endif /** - * aa_mangle_name - mangle a profile name to std profile layout form + * mangle_name - mangle a profile name to std profile layout form * @name: profile name to mangle (NOT NULL) * @target: buffer to store mangled name, same length as @name (MAYBE NULL) * @@ -341,38 +344,6 @@ static struct dentry *aafs_create_dir(const char *name, struct dentry *parent) } /** - * aafs_create_symlink - create a symlink in the apparmorfs filesystem - * @name: name of dentry to create - * @parent: parent directory for this dentry - * @target: if symlink, symlink target string - * @private: private data - * @iops: struct of inode_operations that should be used - * - * If @target parameter is %NULL, then the @iops parameter needs to be - * setup to handle .readlink and .get_link inode_operations. - */ -static struct dentry *aafs_create_symlink(const char *name, - struct dentry *parent, - const char *target, - void *private, - const struct inode_operations *iops) -{ - struct dentry *dent; - char *link = NULL; - - if (target) { - if (!link) - return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); - } - dent = aafs_create(name, S_IFLNK | 0444, parent, private, link, NULL, - iops); - if (IS_ERR(dent)) - kfree(link); - - return dent; -} - -/** * aafs_remove - removes a file or directory from the apparmorfs filesystem * * @dentry: dentry of the file/directory/symlink to removed. @@ -433,7 +404,7 @@ static struct aa_loaddata *aa_simple_write_to_buffer(const char __user *userbuf, data->size = copy_size; if (copy_from_user(data->data, userbuf, copy_size)) { - kvfree(data); + aa_put_loaddata(data); return ERR_PTR(-EFAULT); } @@ -454,7 +425,7 @@ static ssize_t policy_update(u32 mask, const char __user *buf, size_t size, */ error = aa_may_manage_policy(label, ns, mask); if (error) - return error; + goto end_section; data = aa_simple_write_to_buffer(buf, size, size, pos); error = PTR_ERR(data); @@ -462,6 +433,7 @@ static ssize_t policy_update(u32 mask, const char __user *buf, size_t size, error = aa_replace_profiles(ns, label, mask, data); aa_put_loaddata(data); } +end_section: end_current_label_crit_section(label); return error; @@ -623,7 +595,7 @@ static __poll_t ns_revision_poll(struct file *file, poll_table *pt) void __aa_bump_ns_revision(struct aa_ns *ns) { - WRITE_ONCE(ns->revision, ns->revision + 1); + WRITE_ONCE(ns->revision, READ_ONCE(ns->revision) + 1); wake_up_interruptible(&ns->wait); } @@ -839,12 +811,10 @@ static ssize_t query_label(char *buf, size_t buf_len, struct multi_transaction { struct kref count; ssize_t size; - char data[0]; + char data[]; }; #define MULTI_TRANSACTION_LIMIT (PAGE_SIZE - sizeof(struct multi_transaction)) -/* TODO: replace with per file lock */ -static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(multi_transaction_lock); static void multi_transaction_kref(struct kref *kref) { @@ -878,10 +848,10 @@ static void multi_transaction_set(struct file *file, AA_BUG(n > MULTI_TRANSACTION_LIMIT); new->size = n; - spin_lock(&multi_transaction_lock); + spin_lock(&file->f_lock); old = (struct multi_transaction *) file->private_data; file->private_data = new; - spin_unlock(&multi_transaction_lock); + spin_unlock(&file->f_lock); put_multi_transaction(old); } @@ -910,9 +880,10 @@ static ssize_t multi_transaction_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, struct multi_transaction *t; ssize_t ret; - spin_lock(&multi_transaction_lock); + spin_lock(&file->f_lock); t = get_multi_transaction(file->private_data); - spin_unlock(&multi_transaction_lock); + spin_unlock(&file->f_lock); + if (!t) return 0; @@ -1233,7 +1204,7 @@ SEQ_NS_FOPS(name); /* policy/raw_data/ * file ops */ - +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_EXPORT_BINARY #define SEQ_RAWDATA_FOPS(NAME) \ static int seq_rawdata_ ##NAME ##_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)\ { \ @@ -1326,44 +1297,47 @@ SEQ_RAWDATA_FOPS(compressed_size); static int deflate_decompress(char *src, size_t slen, char *dst, size_t dlen) { - int error; - struct z_stream_s strm; +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_EXPORT_BINARY + if (aa_g_rawdata_compression_level != 0) { + int error = 0; + struct z_stream_s strm; - if (aa_g_rawdata_compression_level == 0) { - if (dlen < slen) - return -EINVAL; - memcpy(dst, src, slen); - return 0; - } - - memset(&strm, 0, sizeof(strm)); + memset(&strm, 0, sizeof(strm)); - strm.workspace = kvzalloc(zlib_inflate_workspacesize(), GFP_KERNEL); - if (!strm.workspace) - return -ENOMEM; + strm.workspace = kvzalloc(zlib_inflate_workspacesize(), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!strm.workspace) + return -ENOMEM; - strm.next_in = src; - strm.avail_in = slen; + strm.next_in = src; + strm.avail_in = slen; - error = zlib_inflateInit(&strm); - if (error != Z_OK) { - error = -ENOMEM; - goto fail_inflate_init; - } + error = zlib_inflateInit(&strm); + if (error != Z_OK) { + error = -ENOMEM; + goto fail_inflate_init; + } - strm.next_out = dst; - strm.avail_out = dlen; + strm.next_out = dst; + strm.avail_out = dlen; - error = zlib_inflate(&strm, Z_FINISH); - if (error != Z_STREAM_END) - error = -EINVAL; - else - error = 0; + error = zlib_inflate(&strm, Z_FINISH); + if (error != Z_STREAM_END) + error = -EINVAL; + else + error = 0; - zlib_inflateEnd(&strm); + zlib_inflateEnd(&strm); fail_inflate_init: - kvfree(strm.workspace); - return error; + kvfree(strm.workspace); + + return error; + } +#endif + + if (dlen < slen) + return -EINVAL; + memcpy(dst, src, slen); + return 0; } static ssize_t rawdata_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t size, @@ -1389,7 +1363,7 @@ static int rawdata_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) struct aa_loaddata *loaddata; struct rawdata_f_data *private; - if (!policy_view_capable(NULL)) + if (!aa_current_policy_view_capable(NULL)) return -EACCES; loaddata = __aa_get_loaddata(inode->i_private); @@ -1524,10 +1498,12 @@ fail: return PTR_ERR(dent); } +#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_EXPORT_BINARY */ + /** fns to setup dynamic per profile/namespace files **/ -/** +/* * * Requires: @profile->ns->lock held */ @@ -1554,7 +1530,7 @@ void __aafs_profile_rmdir(struct aa_profile *profile) } } -/** +/* * * Requires: @old->ns->lock held */ @@ -1589,6 +1565,7 @@ static struct dentry *create_profile_file(struct dentry *dir, const char *name, return dent; } +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_EXPORT_BINARY static int profile_depth(struct aa_profile *profile) { int depth = 0; @@ -1690,7 +1667,7 @@ static const struct inode_operations rawdata_link_abi_iops = { static const struct inode_operations rawdata_link_data_iops = { .get_link = rawdata_get_link_data, }; - +#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_EXPORT_BINARY */ /* * Requires: @profile->ns->lock held @@ -1761,31 +1738,34 @@ int __aafs_profile_mkdir(struct aa_profile *profile, struct dentry *parent) profile->dents[AAFS_PROF_HASH] = dent; } +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_EXPORT_BINARY if (profile->rawdata) { - dent = aafs_create_symlink("raw_sha1", dir, NULL, - profile->label.proxy, + if (aa_g_hash_policy) { + dent = aafs_create("raw_sha1", S_IFLNK | 0444, dir, + profile->label.proxy, NULL, NULL, &rawdata_link_sha1_iops); - if (IS_ERR(dent)) - goto fail; - aa_get_proxy(profile->label.proxy); - profile->dents[AAFS_PROF_RAW_HASH] = dent; - - dent = aafs_create_symlink("raw_abi", dir, NULL, - profile->label.proxy, - &rawdata_link_abi_iops); + if (IS_ERR(dent)) + goto fail; + aa_get_proxy(profile->label.proxy); + profile->dents[AAFS_PROF_RAW_HASH] = dent; + } + dent = aafs_create("raw_abi", S_IFLNK | 0444, dir, + profile->label.proxy, NULL, NULL, + &rawdata_link_abi_iops); if (IS_ERR(dent)) goto fail; aa_get_proxy(profile->label.proxy); profile->dents[AAFS_PROF_RAW_ABI] = dent; - dent = aafs_create_symlink("raw_data", dir, NULL, - profile->label.proxy, - &rawdata_link_data_iops); + dent = aafs_create("raw_data", S_IFLNK | 0444, dir, + profile->label.proxy, NULL, NULL, + &rawdata_link_data_iops); if (IS_ERR(dent)) goto fail; aa_get_proxy(profile->label.proxy); profile->dents[AAFS_PROF_RAW_DATA] = dent; } +#endif /*CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_EXPORT_BINARY */ list_for_each_entry(child, &profile->base.profiles, base.list) { error = __aafs_profile_mkdir(child, prof_child_dir(profile)); @@ -1804,7 +1784,8 @@ fail2: return error; } -static int ns_mkdir_op(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode) +static int ns_mkdir_op(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *dir, + struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode) { struct aa_ns *ns, *parent; /* TODO: improve permission check */ @@ -1911,7 +1892,7 @@ static void __aa_fs_list_remove_rawdata(struct aa_ns *ns) __aa_fs_remove_rawdata(ent); } -/** +/* * * Requires: @ns->lock held */ @@ -2077,9 +2058,6 @@ fail2: return error; } - -#define list_entry_is_head(pos, head, member) (&pos->member == (head)) - /** * __next_ns - find the next namespace to list * @root: root namespace to stop search at (NOT NULL) @@ -2147,7 +2125,7 @@ static struct aa_profile *__first_profile(struct aa_ns *root, /** * __next_profile - step to the next profile in a profile tree - * @profile: current profile in tree (NOT NULL) + * @p: current profile in tree (NOT NULL) * * Perform a depth first traversal on the profile tree in a namespace * @@ -2298,7 +2276,7 @@ static const struct seq_operations aa_sfs_profiles_op = { static int profiles_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) { - if (!policy_view_capable(NULL)) + if (!aa_current_policy_view_capable(NULL)) return -EACCES; return seq_open(file, &aa_sfs_profiles_op); @@ -2357,12 +2335,15 @@ static struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry_versions[] = { AA_SFS_FILE_BOOLEAN("v6", 1), AA_SFS_FILE_BOOLEAN("v7", 1), AA_SFS_FILE_BOOLEAN("v8", 1), + AA_SFS_FILE_BOOLEAN("v9", 1), { } }; static struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry_policy[] = { AA_SFS_DIR("versions", aa_sfs_entry_versions), AA_SFS_FILE_BOOLEAN("set_load", 1), + /* number of out of band transitions supported */ + AA_SFS_FILE_U64("outofband", MAX_OOB_SUPPORTED), { } }; diff --git a/security/apparmor/audit.c b/security/apparmor/audit.c index 5a98661a8b46..704b0c895605 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/audit.c +++ b/security/apparmor/audit.c @@ -57,18 +57,16 @@ static void audit_pre(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *ca) struct common_audit_data *sa = ca; if (aa_g_audit_header) { - audit_log_format(ab, "apparmor="); - audit_log_string(ab, aa_audit_type[aad(sa)->type]); + audit_log_format(ab, "apparmor=\"%s\"", + aa_audit_type[aad(sa)->type]); } if (aad(sa)->op) { - audit_log_format(ab, " operation="); - audit_log_string(ab, aad(sa)->op); + audit_log_format(ab, " operation=\"%s\"", aad(sa)->op); } if (aad(sa)->info) { - audit_log_format(ab, " info="); - audit_log_string(ab, aad(sa)->info); + audit_log_format(ab, " info=\"%s\"", aad(sa)->info); if (aad(sa)->error) audit_log_format(ab, " error=%d", aad(sa)->error); } @@ -139,7 +137,7 @@ int aa_audit(int type, struct aa_profile *profile, struct common_audit_data *sa, } if (AUDIT_MODE(profile) == AUDIT_QUIET || (type == AUDIT_APPARMOR_DENIED && - AUDIT_MODE(profile) == AUDIT_QUIET)) + AUDIT_MODE(profile) == AUDIT_QUIET_DENIED)) return aad(sa)->error; if (KILL_MODE(profile) && type == AUDIT_APPARMOR_DENIED) @@ -197,8 +195,9 @@ int aa_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule) rule->label = aa_label_parse(&root_ns->unconfined->label, rulestr, GFP_KERNEL, true, false); if (IS_ERR(rule->label)) { + int err = PTR_ERR(rule->label); aa_audit_rule_free(rule); - return PTR_ERR(rule->label); + return err; } *vrule = rule; diff --git a/security/apparmor/domain.c b/security/apparmor/domain.c index 6ceb74e0f789..91689d34d281 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/domain.c +++ b/security/apparmor/domain.c @@ -10,12 +10,13 @@ #include <linux/errno.h> #include <linux/fdtable.h> +#include <linux/fs.h> #include <linux/file.h> #include <linux/mount.h> #include <linux/syscalls.h> -#include <linux/tracehook.h> #include <linux/personality.h> #include <linux/xattr.h> +#include <linux/user_namespace.h> #include "include/audit.h" #include "include/apparmorfs.h" @@ -40,8 +41,8 @@ void aa_free_domain_entries(struct aa_domain *domain) return; for (i = 0; i < domain->size; i++) - kzfree(domain->table[i]); - kzfree(domain->table); + kfree_sensitive(domain->table[i]); + kfree_sensitive(domain->table); domain->table = NULL; } } @@ -118,7 +119,7 @@ static inline unsigned int match_component(struct aa_profile *profile, * @profile: profile to find perms for * @label: label to check access permissions for * @stack: whether this is a stacking request - * @start: state to start match in + * @state: state to start match in * @subns: whether to do permission checks on components in a subns * @request: permissions to request * @perms: perms struct to set @@ -320,17 +321,22 @@ static int aa_xattrs_match(const struct linux_binprm *bprm, might_sleep(); /* transition from exec match to xattr set */ - state = aa_dfa_null_transition(profile->xmatch, state); - + state = aa_dfa_outofband_transition(profile->xmatch, state); d = bprm->file->f_path.dentry; for (i = 0; i < profile->xattr_count; i++) { - size = vfs_getxattr_alloc(d, profile->xattrs[i], &value, - value_size, GFP_KERNEL); + size = vfs_getxattr_alloc(&init_user_ns, d, profile->xattrs[i], + &value, value_size, GFP_KERNEL); if (size >= 0) { u32 perm; - /* Check the xattr value, not just presence */ + /* + * Check the xattr presence before value. This ensure + * that not present xattr can be distinguished from a 0 + * length value or rule that matches any value + */ + state = aa_dfa_null_transition(profile->xmatch, state); + /* Check xattr value */ state = aa_dfa_match_len(profile->xmatch, state, value, size); perm = dfa_user_allow(profile->xmatch, state); @@ -340,7 +346,7 @@ static int aa_xattrs_match(const struct linux_binprm *bprm, } } /* transition to next element */ - state = aa_dfa_null_transition(profile->xmatch, state); + state = aa_dfa_outofband_transition(profile->xmatch, state); if (size < 0) { /* * No xattr match, so verify if transition to @@ -460,7 +466,7 @@ restart: * xattrs, or a longer match */ candidate = profile; - candidate_len = profile->xmatch_len; + candidate_len = max(count, profile->xmatch_len); candidate_xattrs = ret; conflict = false; } @@ -572,7 +578,7 @@ static struct aa_label *x_to_label(struct aa_profile *profile, stack = NULL; break; } - /* fall through - to X_NAME */ + fallthrough; /* to X_NAME */ case AA_X_NAME: if (xindex & AA_X_CHILD) /* released by caller */ @@ -620,8 +626,6 @@ static struct aa_label *profile_transition(struct aa_profile *profile, bool *secure_exec) { struct aa_label *new = NULL; - struct aa_profile *component; - struct label_it i; const char *info = NULL, *name = NULL, *target = NULL; unsigned int state = profile->file.start; struct aa_perms perms = {}; @@ -670,21 +674,6 @@ static struct aa_label *profile_transition(struct aa_profile *profile, info = "profile transition not found"; /* remove MAY_EXEC to audit as failure */ perms.allow &= ~MAY_EXEC; - } else { - /* verify that each component's xattr requirements are - * met, and fail execution otherwise - */ - label_for_each(i, new, component) { - if (aa_xattrs_match(bprm, component, state) < - 0) { - error = -EACCES; - info = "required xattrs not present"; - perms.allow &= ~MAY_EXEC; - aa_put_label(new); - new = NULL; - goto audit; - } - } } } else if (COMPLAIN_MODE(profile)) { /* no exec permission - learning mode */ @@ -854,14 +843,14 @@ static struct aa_label *handle_onexec(struct aa_label *label, } /** - * apparmor_bprm_set_creds - set the new creds on the bprm struct + * apparmor_bprm_creds_for_exec - Update the new creds on the bprm struct * @bprm: binprm for the exec (NOT NULL) * * Returns: %0 or error on failure * * TODO: once the other paths are done see if we can't refactor into a fn */ -int apparmor_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) +int apparmor_bprm_creds_for_exec(struct linux_binprm *bprm) { struct aa_task_ctx *ctx; struct aa_label *label, *new = NULL; @@ -870,14 +859,13 @@ int apparmor_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) const char *info = NULL; int error = 0; bool unsafe = false; + kuid_t i_uid = i_uid_into_mnt(file_mnt_user_ns(bprm->file), + file_inode(bprm->file)); struct path_cond cond = { - file_inode(bprm->file)->i_uid, + i_uid, file_inode(bprm->file)->i_mode }; - if (bprm->called_set_creds) - return 0; - ctx = task_ctx(current); AA_BUG(!cred_label(bprm->cred)); AA_BUG(!ctx); @@ -929,7 +917,8 @@ int apparmor_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) * aways results in a further reduction of permissions. */ if ((bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_NO_NEW_PRIVS) && - !unconfined(label) && !aa_label_is_subset(new, ctx->nnp)) { + !unconfined(label) && + !aa_label_is_unconfined_subset(new, ctx->nnp)) { error = -EPERM; info = "no new privs"; goto audit; @@ -981,8 +970,7 @@ audit: error = fn_for_each(label, profile, aa_audit_file(profile, &nullperms, OP_EXEC, MAY_EXEC, bprm->filename, NULL, new, - file_inode(bprm->file)->i_uid, info, - error)); + i_uid, info, error)); aa_put_label(new); goto done; } @@ -1207,7 +1195,7 @@ int aa_change_hat(const char *hats[], int count, u64 token, int flags) * reduce restrictions. */ if (task_no_new_privs(current) && !unconfined(label) && - !aa_label_is_subset(new, ctx->nnp)) { + !aa_label_is_unconfined_subset(new, ctx->nnp)) { /* not an apparmor denial per se, so don't log it */ AA_DEBUG("no_new_privs - change_hat denied"); error = -EPERM; @@ -1228,7 +1216,7 @@ int aa_change_hat(const char *hats[], int count, u64 token, int flags) * reduce restrictions. */ if (task_no_new_privs(current) && !unconfined(label) && - !aa_label_is_subset(previous, ctx->nnp)) { + !aa_label_is_unconfined_subset(previous, ctx->nnp)) { /* not an apparmor denial per se, so don't log it */ AA_DEBUG("no_new_privs - change_hat denied"); error = -EPERM; @@ -1291,7 +1279,6 @@ static int change_profile_perms_wrapper(const char *op, const char *name, /** * aa_change_profile - perform a one-way profile transition * @fqname: name of profile may include namespace (NOT NULL) - * @onexec: whether this transition is to take place immediately or at exec * @flags: flags affecting change behavior * * Change to new profile @name. Unlike with hats, there is no way @@ -1328,6 +1315,7 @@ int aa_change_profile(const char *fqname, int flags) ctx->nnp = aa_get_label(label); if (!fqname || !*fqname) { + aa_put_label(label); AA_DEBUG("no profile name"); return -EINVAL; } @@ -1346,8 +1334,6 @@ int aa_change_profile(const char *fqname, int flags) op = OP_CHANGE_PROFILE; } - label = aa_get_current_label(); - if (*fqname == '&') { stack = true; /* don't have label_parse() do stacking */ @@ -1424,7 +1410,7 @@ check: * reduce restrictions. */ if (task_no_new_privs(current) && !unconfined(label) && - !aa_label_is_subset(new, ctx->nnp)) { + !aa_label_is_unconfined_subset(new, ctx->nnp)) { /* not an apparmor denial per se, so don't log it */ AA_DEBUG("no_new_privs - change_hat denied"); error = -EPERM; diff --git a/security/apparmor/file.c b/security/apparmor/file.c index f1caf3674e1c..e1b7e93602e4 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/file.c +++ b/security/apparmor/file.c @@ -11,6 +11,8 @@ #include <linux/tty.h> #include <linux/fdtable.h> #include <linux/file.h> +#include <linux/fs.h> +#include <linux/mount.h> #include "include/apparmor.h" #include "include/audit.h" @@ -35,20 +37,6 @@ static u32 map_mask_to_chr_mask(u32 mask) } /** - * audit_file_mask - convert mask to permission string - * @buffer: buffer to write string to (NOT NULL) - * @mask: permission mask to convert - */ -static void audit_file_mask(struct audit_buffer *ab, u32 mask) -{ - char str[10]; - - aa_perm_mask_to_str(str, sizeof(str), aa_file_perm_chrs, - map_mask_to_chr_mask(mask)); - audit_log_string(ab, str); -} - -/** * file_audit_cb - call back for file specific audit fields * @ab: audit_buffer (NOT NULL) * @va: audit struct to audit values of (NOT NULL) @@ -57,14 +45,17 @@ static void file_audit_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va) { struct common_audit_data *sa = va; kuid_t fsuid = current_fsuid(); + char str[10]; if (aad(sa)->request & AA_AUDIT_FILE_MASK) { - audit_log_format(ab, " requested_mask="); - audit_file_mask(ab, aad(sa)->request); + aa_perm_mask_to_str(str, sizeof(str), aa_file_perm_chrs, + map_mask_to_chr_mask(aad(sa)->request)); + audit_log_format(ab, " requested_mask=\"%s\"", str); } if (aad(sa)->denied & AA_AUDIT_FILE_MASK) { - audit_log_format(ab, " denied_mask="); - audit_file_mask(ab, aad(sa)->denied); + aa_perm_mask_to_str(str, sizeof(str), aa_file_perm_chrs, + map_mask_to_chr_mask(aad(sa)->denied)); + audit_log_format(ab, " denied_mask=\"%s\"", str); } if (aad(sa)->request & AA_AUDIT_FILE_MASK) { audit_log_format(ab, " fsuid=%d", @@ -154,13 +145,13 @@ int aa_audit_file(struct aa_profile *profile, struct aa_perms *perms, * is_deleted - test if a file has been completely unlinked * @dentry: dentry of file to test for deletion (NOT NULL) * - * Returns: %1 if deleted else %0 + * Returns: true if deleted else false */ static inline bool is_deleted(struct dentry *dentry) { if (d_unlinked(dentry) && d_backing_inode(dentry)->i_nlink == 0) - return 1; - return 0; + return true; + return false; } static int path_name(const char *op, struct aa_label *label, @@ -353,15 +344,15 @@ int aa_path_perm(const char *op, struct aa_label *label, * this is done as part of the subset test, where a hardlink must have * a subset of permissions that the target has. * - * Returns: %1 if subset else %0 + * Returns: true if subset else false */ static inline bool xindex_is_subset(u32 link, u32 target) { if (((link & ~AA_X_UNSAFE) != (target & ~AA_X_UNSAFE)) || ((link & AA_X_UNSAFE) && !(target & AA_X_UNSAFE))) - return 0; + return false; - return 1; + return true; } static int profile_path_link(struct aa_profile *profile, @@ -520,7 +511,7 @@ static int __file_path_perm(const char *op, struct aa_label *label, struct aa_profile *profile; struct aa_perms perms = {}; struct path_cond cond = { - .uid = file_inode(file)->i_uid, + .uid = i_uid_into_mnt(file_mnt_user_ns(file), file_inode(file)), .mode = file_inode(file)->i_mode }; char *buffer; diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h b/security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h index 1fbabdb565a8..9c3fc36a0702 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h +++ b/security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h @@ -36,6 +36,7 @@ extern enum audit_mode aa_g_audit; extern bool aa_g_audit_header; extern bool aa_g_debug; extern bool aa_g_hash_policy; +extern bool aa_g_export_binary; extern int aa_g_rawdata_compression_level; extern bool aa_g_lock_policy; extern bool aa_g_logsyscall; diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/apparmorfs.h b/security/apparmor/include/apparmorfs.h index 6e14f6cecdb9..1e94904f68d9 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/include/apparmorfs.h +++ b/security/apparmor/include/apparmorfs.h @@ -114,7 +114,21 @@ int __aafs_ns_mkdir(struct aa_ns *ns, struct dentry *parent, const char *name, struct dentry *dent); struct aa_loaddata; + +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_EXPORT_BINARY void __aa_fs_remove_rawdata(struct aa_loaddata *rawdata); int __aa_fs_create_rawdata(struct aa_ns *ns, struct aa_loaddata *rawdata); +#else +static inline void __aa_fs_remove_rawdata(struct aa_loaddata *rawdata) +{ + /* empty stub */ +} + +static inline int __aa_fs_create_rawdata(struct aa_ns *ns, + struct aa_loaddata *rawdata) +{ + return 0; +} +#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_EXPORT_BINARY */ #endif /* __AA_APPARMORFS_H */ diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/domain.h b/security/apparmor/include/domain.h index 21b875fe2d37..d14928fe1c6f 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/include/domain.h +++ b/security/apparmor/include/domain.h @@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ struct aa_domain { struct aa_label *x_table_lookup(struct aa_profile *profile, u32 xindex, const char **name); -int apparmor_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm); +int apparmor_bprm_creds_for_exec(struct linux_binprm *bprm); void aa_free_domain_entries(struct aa_domain *domain); int aa_change_hat(const char *hats[], int count, u64 token, int flags); diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/file.h b/security/apparmor/include/file.h index aff26fc71407..029cb20e322d 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/include/file.h +++ b/security/apparmor/include/file.h @@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ static inline void aa_free_file_ctx(struct aa_file_ctx *ctx) { if (ctx) { aa_put_label(rcu_access_pointer(ctx->label)); - kzfree(ctx); + kfree_sensitive(ctx); } } @@ -142,6 +142,7 @@ static inline u16 dfa_map_xindex(u16 mask) */ #define dfa_user_allow(dfa, state) (((ACCEPT_TABLE(dfa)[state]) & 0x7f) | \ ((ACCEPT_TABLE(dfa)[state]) & 0x80000000)) +#define dfa_user_xbits(dfa, state) (((ACCEPT_TABLE(dfa)[state]) >> 7) & 0x7f) #define dfa_user_audit(dfa, state) ((ACCEPT_TABLE2(dfa)[state]) & 0x7f) #define dfa_user_quiet(dfa, state) (((ACCEPT_TABLE2(dfa)[state]) >> 7) & 0x7f) #define dfa_user_xindex(dfa, state) \ @@ -150,6 +151,8 @@ static inline u16 dfa_map_xindex(u16 mask) #define dfa_other_allow(dfa, state) ((((ACCEPT_TABLE(dfa)[state]) >> 14) & \ 0x7f) | \ ((ACCEPT_TABLE(dfa)[state]) & 0x80000000)) +#define dfa_other_xbits(dfa, state) \ + ((((ACCEPT_TABLE(dfa)[state]) >> 7) >> 14) & 0x7f) #define dfa_other_audit(dfa, state) (((ACCEPT_TABLE2(dfa)[state]) >> 14) & 0x7f) #define dfa_other_quiet(dfa, state) \ ((((ACCEPT_TABLE2(dfa)[state]) >> 7) >> 14) & 0x7f) @@ -167,7 +170,7 @@ int aa_audit_file(struct aa_profile *profile, struct aa_perms *perms, * @perms: permission table indexed by the matched state accept entry of @dfa * @trans: transition table for indexed by named x transitions * - * File permission are determined by matching a path against @dfa and then + * File permission are determined by matching a path against @dfa and * then using the value of the accept entry for the matching state as * an index into @perms. If a named exec transition is required it is * looked up in the transition table. diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/ipc.h b/security/apparmor/include/ipc.h index 9cafd80f7731..a1ac6ffb95e9 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/include/ipc.h +++ b/security/apparmor/include/ipc.h @@ -13,24 +13,6 @@ #include <linux/sched.h> -struct aa_profile; - -#define AA_PTRACE_TRACE MAY_WRITE -#define AA_PTRACE_READ MAY_READ -#define AA_MAY_BE_TRACED AA_MAY_APPEND -#define AA_MAY_BE_READ AA_MAY_CREATE -#define PTRACE_PERM_SHIFT 2 - -#define AA_PTRACE_PERM_MASK (AA_PTRACE_READ | AA_PTRACE_TRACE | \ - AA_MAY_BE_READ | AA_MAY_BE_TRACED) -#define AA_SIGNAL_PERM_MASK (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE) - -#define AA_SFS_SIG_MASK "hup int quit ill trap abrt bus fpe kill usr1 " \ - "segv usr2 pipe alrm term stkflt chld cont stop stp ttin ttou urg " \ - "xcpu xfsz vtalrm prof winch io pwr sys emt lost" - -int aa_may_ptrace(struct aa_label *tracer, struct aa_label *tracee, - u32 request); int aa_may_signal(struct aa_label *sender, struct aa_label *target, int sig); #endif /* __AA_IPC_H */ diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/label.h b/security/apparmor/include/label.h index 47942c4ba7ca..860484c6f99a 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/include/label.h +++ b/security/apparmor/include/label.h @@ -77,10 +77,6 @@ struct aa_labelset { #define __labelset_for_each(LS, N) \ for ((N) = rb_first(&(LS)->root); (N); (N) = rb_next(N)) -void aa_labelset_destroy(struct aa_labelset *ls); -void aa_labelset_init(struct aa_labelset *ls); - - enum label_flags { FLAG_HAT = 1, /* profile is a hat */ FLAG_UNCONFINED = 2, /* label unconfined only if all */ @@ -96,6 +92,8 @@ enum label_flags { FLAG_STALE = 0x800, /* replaced/removed */ FLAG_RENAMED = 0x1000, /* label has renaming in it */ FLAG_REVOKED = 0x2000, /* label has revocation in it */ + FLAG_DEBUG1 = 0x4000, + FLAG_DEBUG2 = 0x8000, /* These flags must correspond with PATH_flags */ /* TODO: add new path flags */ @@ -148,6 +146,7 @@ do { \ #define __label_make_stale(X) ((X)->flags |= FLAG_STALE) #define labels_ns(X) (vec_ns(&((X)->vec[0]), (X)->size)) #define labels_set(X) (&labels_ns(X)->labels) +#define labels_view(X) labels_ns(X) #define labels_profile(X) ((X)->vec[(X)->size - 1]) @@ -275,12 +274,14 @@ void aa_labelset_destroy(struct aa_labelset *ls); void aa_labelset_init(struct aa_labelset *ls); void __aa_labelset_update_subtree(struct aa_ns *ns); +void aa_label_destroy(struct aa_label *label); void aa_label_free(struct aa_label *label); void aa_label_kref(struct kref *kref); bool aa_label_init(struct aa_label *label, int size, gfp_t gfp); struct aa_label *aa_label_alloc(int size, struct aa_proxy *proxy, gfp_t gfp); bool aa_label_is_subset(struct aa_label *set, struct aa_label *sub); +bool aa_label_is_unconfined_subset(struct aa_label *set, struct aa_label *sub); struct aa_profile *__aa_label_next_not_in_set(struct label_it *I, struct aa_label *set, struct aa_label *sub); diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/lib.h b/security/apparmor/include/lib.h index 7d27db740bc2..f42359f58eb5 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/include/lib.h +++ b/security/apparmor/include/lib.h @@ -22,6 +22,11 @@ */ #define DEBUG_ON (aa_g_debug) +/* + * split individual debug cases out in preparation for finer grained + * debug controls in the future. + */ +#define AA_DEBUG_LABEL DEBUG_ON #define dbg_printk(__fmt, __args...) pr_debug(__fmt, ##__args) #define AA_DEBUG(fmt, args...) \ do { \ @@ -31,12 +36,17 @@ #define AA_WARN(X) WARN((X), "APPARMOR WARN %s: %s\n", __func__, #X) -#define AA_BUG(X, args...) AA_BUG_FMT((X), "" args) +#define AA_BUG(X, args...) \ + do { \ + _Pragma("GCC diagnostic ignored \"-Wformat-zero-length\""); \ + AA_BUG_FMT((X), "" args); \ + _Pragma("GCC diagnostic warning \"-Wformat-zero-length\""); \ + } while (0) #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_DEBUG_ASSERTS #define AA_BUG_FMT(X, fmt, args...) \ WARN((X), "AppArmor WARN %s: (" #X "): " fmt, __func__, ##args) #else -#define AA_BUG_FMT(X, fmt, args...) +#define AA_BUG_FMT(X, fmt, args...) no_printk(fmt, ##args) #endif #define AA_ERROR(fmt, args...) \ diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/match.h b/security/apparmor/include/match.h index e23f4aadc1ff..884489590588 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/include/match.h +++ b/security/apparmor/include/match.h @@ -37,6 +37,10 @@ #define YYTH_MAGIC 0x1B5E783D #define YYTH_FLAG_DIFF_ENCODE 1 +#define YYTH_FLAG_OOB_TRANS 2 +#define YYTH_FLAGS (YYTH_FLAG_DIFF_ENCODE | YYTH_FLAG_OOB_TRANS) + +#define MAX_OOB_SUPPORTED 1 struct table_set_header { u32 th_magic; /* YYTH_MAGIC */ @@ -94,6 +98,7 @@ struct table_header { struct aa_dfa { struct kref count; u16 flags; + u32 max_oob; struct table_header *tables[YYTD_ID_TSIZE]; }; @@ -127,6 +132,8 @@ unsigned int aa_dfa_match(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int start, const char *str); unsigned int aa_dfa_next(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int state, const char c); +unsigned int aa_dfa_outofband_transition(struct aa_dfa *dfa, + unsigned int state); unsigned int aa_dfa_match_until(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int start, const char *str, const char **retpos); unsigned int aa_dfa_matchn_until(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int start, @@ -181,5 +188,9 @@ static inline void aa_put_dfa(struct aa_dfa *dfa) #define MATCH_FLAG_DIFF_ENCODE 0x80000000 #define MARK_DIFF_ENCODE 0x40000000 +#define MATCH_FLAG_OOB_TRANSITION 0x20000000 +#define MATCH_FLAGS_MASK 0xff000000 +#define MATCH_FLAGS_VALID (MATCH_FLAG_DIFF_ENCODE | MATCH_FLAG_OOB_TRANSITION) +#define MATCH_FLAGS_INVALID (MATCH_FLAGS_MASK & ~MATCH_FLAGS_VALID) #endif /* __AA_MATCH_H */ diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/net.h b/security/apparmor/include/net.h index 2431c011800d..aadb4b29fb66 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/include/net.h +++ b/security/apparmor/include/net.h @@ -107,6 +107,6 @@ int aa_sock_file_perm(struct aa_label *label, const char *op, u32 request, struct socket *sock); int apparmor_secmark_check(struct aa_label *label, char *op, u32 request, - u32 secid, struct sock *sk); + u32 secid, const struct sock *sk); #endif /* __AA_NET_H */ diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/path.h b/security/apparmor/include/path.h index 44a7945fbe3c..343189903dba 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/include/path.h +++ b/security/apparmor/include/path.h @@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ enum path_flags { PATH_CHROOT_REL = 0x8, /* do path lookup relative to chroot */ PATH_CHROOT_NSCONNECT = 0x10, /* connect paths that are at ns root */ - PATH_DELEGATE_DELETED = 0x08000, /* delegate deleted files */ - PATH_MEDIATE_DELETED = 0x10000, /* mediate deleted paths */ + PATH_DELEGATE_DELETED = 0x10000, /* delegate deleted files */ + PATH_MEDIATE_DELETED = 0x20000, /* mediate deleted paths */ }; int aa_path_name(const struct path *path, int flags, char *buffer, diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/policy.h b/security/apparmor/include/policy.h index b5b4b8190e65..639b5b248e63 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/include/policy.h +++ b/security/apparmor/include/policy.h @@ -48,6 +48,10 @@ extern const char *const aa_profile_mode_names[]; #define PROFILE_IS_HAT(_profile) ((_profile)->label.flags & FLAG_HAT) +#define CHECK_DEBUG1(_profile) ((_profile)->label.flags & FLAG_DEBUG1) + +#define CHECK_DEBUG2(_profile) ((_profile)->label.flags & FLAG_DEBUG2) + #define profile_is_stale(_profile) (label_is_stale(&(_profile)->label)) #define on_list_rcu(X) (!list_empty(X) && (X)->prev != LIST_POISON2) @@ -135,7 +139,7 @@ struct aa_profile { const char *attach; struct aa_dfa *xmatch; - int xmatch_len; + unsigned int xmatch_len; enum audit_mode audit; long mode; u32 path_flags; @@ -301,9 +305,11 @@ static inline int AUDIT_MODE(struct aa_profile *profile) return profile->audit; } -bool policy_view_capable(struct aa_ns *ns); -bool policy_admin_capable(struct aa_ns *ns); +bool aa_policy_view_capable(struct aa_label *label, struct aa_ns *ns); +bool aa_policy_admin_capable(struct aa_label *label, struct aa_ns *ns); int aa_may_manage_policy(struct aa_label *label, struct aa_ns *ns, u32 mask); +bool aa_current_policy_view_capable(struct aa_ns *ns); +bool aa_current_policy_admin_capable(struct aa_ns *ns); #endif /* __AA_POLICY_H */ diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/policy_ns.h b/security/apparmor/include/policy_ns.h index 3df6f804922d..33d665516fc1 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/include/policy_ns.h +++ b/security/apparmor/include/policy_ns.h @@ -74,6 +74,7 @@ struct aa_ns { struct dentry *dents[AAFS_NS_SIZEOF]; }; +extern struct aa_label *kernel_t; extern struct aa_ns *root_ns; extern const char *aa_hidden_ns_name; diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/policy_unpack.h b/security/apparmor/include/policy_unpack.h index e0e1ca7ebc38..eb5f7d7f132b 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/include/policy_unpack.h +++ b/security/apparmor/include/policy_unpack.h @@ -28,6 +28,8 @@ void aa_load_ent_free(struct aa_load_ent *ent); struct aa_load_ent *aa_load_ent_alloc(void); #define PACKED_FLAG_HAT 1 +#define PACKED_FLAG_DEBUG1 2 +#define PACKED_FLAG_DEBUG2 4 #define PACKED_MODE_ENFORCE 0 #define PACKED_MODE_COMPLAIN 1 diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/secid.h b/security/apparmor/include/secid.h index 48ff1ddecad5..a912a5d5d04f 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/include/secid.h +++ b/security/apparmor/include/secid.h @@ -21,6 +21,9 @@ struct aa_label; /* secid value that matches any other secid */ #define AA_SECID_WILDCARD 1 +/* sysctl to enable displaying mode when converting secid to secctx */ +extern int apparmor_display_secid_mode; + struct aa_label *aa_secid_to_label(u32 secid); int apparmor_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen); int apparmor_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid); @@ -31,6 +34,4 @@ int aa_alloc_secid(struct aa_label *label, gfp_t gfp); void aa_free_secid(u32 secid); void aa_secid_update(u32 secid, struct aa_label *label); -void aa_secids_init(void); - #endif /* __AA_SECID_H */ diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/task.h b/security/apparmor/include/task.h index f13d12373b25..13437d62c70f 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/include/task.h +++ b/security/apparmor/include/task.h @@ -77,4 +77,22 @@ static inline void aa_clear_task_ctx_trans(struct aa_task_ctx *ctx) ctx->token = 0; } +#define AA_PTRACE_TRACE MAY_WRITE +#define AA_PTRACE_READ MAY_READ +#define AA_MAY_BE_TRACED AA_MAY_APPEND +#define AA_MAY_BE_READ AA_MAY_CREATE +#define PTRACE_PERM_SHIFT 2 + +#define AA_PTRACE_PERM_MASK (AA_PTRACE_READ | AA_PTRACE_TRACE | \ + AA_MAY_BE_READ | AA_MAY_BE_TRACED) +#define AA_SIGNAL_PERM_MASK (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE) + +#define AA_SFS_SIG_MASK "hup int quit ill trap abrt bus fpe kill usr1 " \ + "segv usr2 pipe alrm term stkflt chld cont stop stp ttin ttou urg " \ + "xcpu xfsz vtalrm prof winch io pwr sys emt lost" + +int aa_may_ptrace(struct aa_label *tracer, struct aa_label *tracee, + u32 request); + + #endif /* __AA_TASK_H */ diff --git a/security/apparmor/ipc.c b/security/apparmor/ipc.c index 4ecedffbdd33..3dbbc59d440d 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/ipc.c +++ b/security/apparmor/ipc.c @@ -9,7 +9,6 @@ */ #include <linux/gfp.h> -#include <linux/ptrace.h> #include "include/audit.h" #include "include/capability.h" @@ -18,117 +17,6 @@ #include "include/ipc.h" #include "include/sig_names.h" -/** - * audit_ptrace_mask - convert mask to permission string - * @buffer: buffer to write string to (NOT NULL) - * @mask: permission mask to convert - */ -static void audit_ptrace_mask(struct audit_buffer *ab, u32 mask) -{ - switch (mask) { - case MAY_READ: - audit_log_string(ab, "read"); - break; - case MAY_WRITE: - audit_log_string(ab, "trace"); - break; - case AA_MAY_BE_READ: - audit_log_string(ab, "readby"); - break; - case AA_MAY_BE_TRACED: - audit_log_string(ab, "tracedby"); - break; - } -} - -/* call back to audit ptrace fields */ -static void audit_ptrace_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va) -{ - struct common_audit_data *sa = va; - - if (aad(sa)->request & AA_PTRACE_PERM_MASK) { - audit_log_format(ab, " requested_mask="); - audit_ptrace_mask(ab, aad(sa)->request); - - if (aad(sa)->denied & AA_PTRACE_PERM_MASK) { - audit_log_format(ab, " denied_mask="); - audit_ptrace_mask(ab, aad(sa)->denied); - } - } - audit_log_format(ab, " peer="); - aa_label_xaudit(ab, labels_ns(aad(sa)->label), aad(sa)->peer, - FLAGS_NONE, GFP_ATOMIC); -} - -/* assumes check for PROFILE_MEDIATES is already done */ -/* TODO: conditionals */ -static int profile_ptrace_perm(struct aa_profile *profile, - struct aa_label *peer, u32 request, - struct common_audit_data *sa) -{ - struct aa_perms perms = { }; - - aad(sa)->peer = peer; - aa_profile_match_label(profile, peer, AA_CLASS_PTRACE, request, - &perms); - aa_apply_modes_to_perms(profile, &perms); - return aa_check_perms(profile, &perms, request, sa, audit_ptrace_cb); -} - -static int profile_tracee_perm(struct aa_profile *tracee, - struct aa_label *tracer, u32 request, - struct common_audit_data *sa) -{ - if (profile_unconfined(tracee) || unconfined(tracer) || - !PROFILE_MEDIATES(tracee, AA_CLASS_PTRACE)) - return 0; - - return profile_ptrace_perm(tracee, tracer, request, sa); -} - -static int profile_tracer_perm(struct aa_profile *tracer, - struct aa_label *tracee, u32 request, - struct common_audit_data *sa) -{ - if (profile_unconfined(tracer)) - return 0; - - if (PROFILE_MEDIATES(tracer, AA_CLASS_PTRACE)) - return profile_ptrace_perm(tracer, tracee, request, sa); - - /* profile uses the old style capability check for ptrace */ - if (&tracer->label == tracee) - return 0; - - aad(sa)->label = &tracer->label; - aad(sa)->peer = tracee; - aad(sa)->request = 0; - aad(sa)->error = aa_capable(&tracer->label, CAP_SYS_PTRACE, - CAP_OPT_NONE); - - return aa_audit(AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUTO, tracer, sa, audit_ptrace_cb); -} - -/** - * aa_may_ptrace - test if tracer task can trace the tracee - * @tracer: label of the task doing the tracing (NOT NULL) - * @tracee: task label to be traced - * @request: permission request - * - * Returns: %0 else error code if permission denied or error - */ -int aa_may_ptrace(struct aa_label *tracer, struct aa_label *tracee, - u32 request) -{ - struct aa_profile *profile; - u32 xrequest = request << PTRACE_PERM_SHIFT; - DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(sa, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE, OP_PTRACE); - - return xcheck_labels(tracer, tracee, profile, - profile_tracer_perm(profile, tracee, request, &sa), - profile_tracee_perm(profile, tracer, xrequest, &sa)); -} - static inline int map_signal_num(int sig) { @@ -142,16 +30,18 @@ static inline int map_signal_num(int sig) } /** - * audit_file_mask - convert mask to permission string - * @buffer: buffer to write string to (NOT NULL) + * audit_signal_mask - convert mask to permission string * @mask: permission mask to convert + * + * Returns: pointer to static string */ -static void audit_signal_mask(struct audit_buffer *ab, u32 mask) +static const char *audit_signal_mask(u32 mask) { if (mask & MAY_READ) - audit_log_string(ab, "receive"); + return "receive"; if (mask & MAY_WRITE) - audit_log_string(ab, "send"); + return "send"; + return ""; } /** @@ -164,11 +54,11 @@ static void audit_signal_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va) struct common_audit_data *sa = va; if (aad(sa)->request & AA_SIGNAL_PERM_MASK) { - audit_log_format(ab, " requested_mask="); - audit_signal_mask(ab, aad(sa)->request); + audit_log_format(ab, " requested_mask=\"%s\"", + audit_signal_mask(aad(sa)->request)); if (aad(sa)->denied & AA_SIGNAL_PERM_MASK) { - audit_log_format(ab, " denied_mask="); - audit_signal_mask(ab, aad(sa)->denied); + audit_log_format(ab, " denied_mask=\"%s\"", + audit_signal_mask(aad(sa)->denied)); } } if (aad(sa)->signal == SIGUNKNOWN) diff --git a/security/apparmor/label.c b/security/apparmor/label.c index 470693239e64..0f36ee907438 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/label.c +++ b/security/apparmor/label.c @@ -197,18 +197,18 @@ static bool vec_is_stale(struct aa_profile **vec, int n) return false; } -static bool vec_unconfined(struct aa_profile **vec, int n) +static long union_vec_flags(struct aa_profile **vec, int n, long mask) { + long u = 0; int i; AA_BUG(!vec); for (i = 0; i < n; i++) { - if (!profile_unconfined(vec[i])) - return false; + u |= vec[i]->label.flags & mask; } - return true; + return u; } static int sort_cmp(const void *a, const void *b) @@ -309,10 +309,8 @@ out: } -static void label_destroy(struct aa_label *label) +void aa_label_destroy(struct aa_label *label) { - struct aa_label *tmp; - AA_BUG(!label); if (!label_isprofile(label)) { @@ -328,16 +326,13 @@ static void label_destroy(struct aa_label *label) } } - if (rcu_dereference_protected(label->proxy->label, true) == label) - rcu_assign_pointer(label->proxy->label, NULL); - + if (label->proxy) { + if (rcu_dereference_protected(label->proxy->label, true) == label) + rcu_assign_pointer(label->proxy->label, NULL); + aa_put_proxy(label->proxy); + } aa_free_secid(label->secid); - tmp = rcu_dereference_protected(label->proxy->label, true); - if (tmp == label) - rcu_assign_pointer(label->proxy->label, NULL); - - aa_put_proxy(label->proxy); label->proxy = (struct aa_proxy *) PROXY_POISON + 1; } @@ -346,7 +341,7 @@ void aa_label_free(struct aa_label *label) if (!label) return; - label_destroy(label); + aa_label_destroy(label); kfree(label); } @@ -430,8 +425,7 @@ struct aa_label *aa_label_alloc(int size, struct aa_proxy *proxy, gfp_t gfp) AA_BUG(size < 1); /* + 1 for null terminator entry on vec */ - new = kzalloc(sizeof(*new) + sizeof(struct aa_profile *) * (size + 1), - gfp); + new = kzalloc(struct_size(new, vec, size + 1), gfp); AA_DEBUG("%s (%p)\n", __func__, new); if (!new) goto fail; @@ -491,7 +485,7 @@ int aa_label_next_confined(struct aa_label *label, int i) } /** - * aa_label_next_not_in_set - return the next profile of @sub not in @set + * __aa_label_next_not_in_set - return the next profile of @sub not in @set * @I: label iterator * @set: label to test against * @sub: label to if is subset of @set @@ -550,6 +544,39 @@ bool aa_label_is_subset(struct aa_label *set, struct aa_label *sub) return __aa_label_next_not_in_set(&i, set, sub) == NULL; } +/** + * aa_label_is_unconfined_subset - test if @sub is a subset of @set + * @set: label to test against + * @sub: label to test if is subset of @set + * + * This checks for subset but taking into account unconfined. IF + * @sub contains an unconfined profile that does not have a matching + * unconfined in @set then this will not cause the test to fail. + * Conversely we don't care about an unconfined in @set that is not in + * @sub + * + * Returns: true if @sub is special_subset of @set + * else false + */ +bool aa_label_is_unconfined_subset(struct aa_label *set, struct aa_label *sub) +{ + struct label_it i = { }; + struct aa_profile *p; + + AA_BUG(!set); + AA_BUG(!sub); + + if (sub == set) + return true; + + do { + p = __aa_label_next_not_in_set(&i, set, sub); + if (p && !profile_unconfined(p)) + break; + } while (p); + + return p == NULL; +} /** @@ -1070,8 +1097,8 @@ static struct aa_label *label_merge_insert(struct aa_label *new, else if (k == b->size) return aa_get_label(b); } - if (vec_unconfined(new->vec, new->size)) - new->flags |= FLAG_UNCONFINED; + new->flags |= union_vec_flags(new->vec, new->size, FLAG_UNCONFINED | + FLAG_DEBUG1 | FLAG_DEBUG2); ls = labels_set(new); write_lock_irqsave(&ls->lock, flags); label = __label_insert(labels_set(new), new, false); @@ -1426,7 +1453,7 @@ bool aa_update_label_name(struct aa_ns *ns, struct aa_label *label, gfp_t gfp) if (label->hname || labels_ns(label) != ns) return res; - if (aa_label_acntsxprint(&name, ns, label, FLAGS_NONE, gfp) == -1) + if (aa_label_acntsxprint(&name, ns, label, FLAGS_NONE, gfp) < 0) return res; ls = labels_set(label); @@ -1531,13 +1558,13 @@ static const char *label_modename(struct aa_ns *ns, struct aa_label *label, label_for_each(i, label, profile) { if (aa_ns_visible(ns, profile->ns, flags & FLAG_VIEW_SUBNS)) { - if (profile->mode == APPARMOR_UNCONFINED) + count++; + if (profile == profile->ns->unconfined) /* special case unconfined so stacks with * unconfined don't report as mixed. ie. * profile_foo//&:ns1:unconfined (mixed) */ continue; - count++; if (mode == -1) mode = profile->mode; else if (mode != profile->mode) @@ -1604,9 +1631,9 @@ int aa_label_snxprint(char *str, size_t size, struct aa_ns *ns, AA_BUG(!str && size != 0); AA_BUG(!label); - if (flags & FLAG_ABS_ROOT) { + if (AA_DEBUG_LABEL && (flags & FLAG_ABS_ROOT)) { ns = root_ns; - len = snprintf(str, size, "="); + len = snprintf(str, size, "_"); update_for_len(total, len, size, str); } else if (!ns) { ns = labels_ns(label); @@ -1676,7 +1703,7 @@ int aa_label_asxprint(char **strp, struct aa_ns *ns, struct aa_label *label, /** * aa_label_acntsxprint - allocate a __counted string buffer and print label - * @strp: buffer to write to. (MAY BE NULL if @size == 0) + * @strp: buffer to write to. * @ns: namespace profile is being viewed from * @label: label to view (NOT NULL) * @flags: flags controlling what label info is printed @@ -1717,7 +1744,7 @@ void aa_label_xaudit(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct aa_ns *ns, if (!use_label_hname(ns, label, flags) || display_mode(ns, label, flags)) { len = aa_label_asxprint(&name, ns, label, flags, gfp); - if (len == -1) { + if (len < 0) { AA_DEBUG("label print error"); return; } @@ -1745,17 +1772,17 @@ void aa_label_seq_xprint(struct seq_file *f, struct aa_ns *ns, int len; len = aa_label_asxprint(&str, ns, label, flags, gfp); - if (len == -1) { + if (len < 0) { AA_DEBUG("label print error"); return; } - seq_printf(f, "%s", str); + seq_puts(f, str); kfree(str); } else if (display_mode(ns, label, flags)) seq_printf(f, "%s (%s)", label->hname, label_modename(ns, label, flags)); else - seq_printf(f, "%s", label->hname); + seq_puts(f, label->hname); } void aa_label_xprintk(struct aa_ns *ns, struct aa_label *label, int flags, @@ -1768,7 +1795,7 @@ void aa_label_xprintk(struct aa_ns *ns, struct aa_label *label, int flags, int len; len = aa_label_asxprint(&str, ns, label, flags, gfp); - if (len == -1) { + if (len < 0) { AA_DEBUG("label print error"); return; } @@ -1868,7 +1895,8 @@ struct aa_label *aa_label_strn_parse(struct aa_label *base, const char *str, AA_BUG(!str); str = skipn_spaces(str, n); - if (str == NULL || (*str == '=' && base != &root_ns->unconfined->label)) + if (str == NULL || (AA_DEBUG_LABEL && *str == '_' && + base != &root_ns->unconfined->label)) return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); len = label_count_strn_entries(str, end - str); @@ -2109,7 +2137,7 @@ static void __labelset_update(struct aa_ns *ns) } /** - * __aa_labelset_udate_subtree - update all labels with a stale component + * __aa_labelset_update_subtree - update all labels with a stale component * @ns: ns to start update at (NOT NULL) * * Requires: @ns lock be held diff --git a/security/apparmor/lib.c b/security/apparmor/lib.c index 30c246a9d440..1c72a61108d3 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/lib.c +++ b/security/apparmor/lib.c @@ -136,7 +136,7 @@ __counted char *aa_str_alloc(int size, gfp_t gfp) { struct counted_str *str; - str = kmalloc(sizeof(struct counted_str) + size, gfp); + str = kmalloc(struct_size(str, name, size), gfp); if (!str) return NULL; @@ -292,13 +292,13 @@ void aa_apply_modes_to_perms(struct aa_profile *profile, struct aa_perms *perms) switch (AUDIT_MODE(profile)) { case AUDIT_ALL: perms->audit = ALL_PERMS_MASK; - /* fall through */ + fallthrough; case AUDIT_NOQUIET: perms->quiet = 0; break; case AUDIT_QUIET: perms->audit = 0; - /* fall through */ + fallthrough; case AUDIT_QUIET_DENIED: perms->quiet = ALL_PERMS_MASK; break; @@ -322,22 +322,39 @@ static u32 map_other(u32 x) ((x & 0x60) << 19); /* SETOPT/GETOPT */ } +static u32 map_xbits(u32 x) +{ + return ((x & 0x1) << 7) | + ((x & 0x7e) << 9); +} + void aa_compute_perms(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int state, struct aa_perms *perms) { + /* This mapping is convulated due to history. + * v1-v4: only file perms + * v5: added policydb which dropped in perm user conditional to + * gain new perm bits, but had to map around the xbits because + * the userspace compiler was still munging them. + * v9: adds using the xbits in policydb because the compiler now + * supports treating policydb permission bits different. + * Unfortunately there is not way to force auditing on the + * perms represented by the xbits + */ *perms = (struct aa_perms) { - .allow = dfa_user_allow(dfa, state), + .allow = dfa_user_allow(dfa, state) | + map_xbits(dfa_user_xbits(dfa, state)), .audit = dfa_user_audit(dfa, state), - .quiet = dfa_user_quiet(dfa, state), + .quiet = dfa_user_quiet(dfa, state) | + map_xbits(dfa_other_xbits(dfa, state)), }; - /* for v5 perm mapping in the policydb, the other set is used + /* for v5-v9 perm mapping in the policydb, the other set is used * to extend the general perm set */ perms->allow |= map_other(dfa_other_allow(dfa, state)); perms->audit |= map_other(dfa_other_audit(dfa, state)); perms->quiet |= map_other(dfa_other_quiet(dfa, state)); -// perms->xindex = dfa_user_xindex(dfa, state); } /** diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c index b621ad74f54a..f56070270c69 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c +++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c @@ -224,8 +224,10 @@ static int common_perm(const char *op, const struct path *path, u32 mask, */ static int common_perm_cond(const char *op, const struct path *path, u32 mask) { - struct path_cond cond = { d_backing_inode(path->dentry)->i_uid, - d_backing_inode(path->dentry)->i_mode + struct user_namespace *mnt_userns = mnt_user_ns(path->mnt); + struct path_cond cond = { + i_uid_into_mnt(mnt_userns, d_backing_inode(path->dentry)), + d_backing_inode(path->dentry)->i_mode }; if (!path_mediated_fs(path->dentry)) @@ -266,12 +268,13 @@ static int common_perm_rm(const char *op, const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry, u32 mask) { struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry); + struct user_namespace *mnt_userns = mnt_user_ns(dir->mnt); struct path_cond cond = { }; if (!inode || !path_mediated_fs(dentry)) return 0; - cond.uid = inode->i_uid; + cond.uid = i_uid_into_mnt(mnt_userns, inode); cond.mode = inode->i_mode; return common_perm_dir_dentry(op, dir, dentry, mask, &cond); @@ -351,28 +354,50 @@ static int apparmor_path_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, const struct path *new_ } static int apparmor_path_rename(const struct path *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry, - const struct path *new_dir, struct dentry *new_dentry) + const struct path *new_dir, struct dentry *new_dentry, + const unsigned int flags) { struct aa_label *label; int error = 0; if (!path_mediated_fs(old_dentry)) return 0; + if ((flags & RENAME_EXCHANGE) && !path_mediated_fs(new_dentry)) + return 0; label = begin_current_label_crit_section(); if (!unconfined(label)) { + struct user_namespace *mnt_userns = mnt_user_ns(old_dir->mnt); struct path old_path = { .mnt = old_dir->mnt, .dentry = old_dentry }; struct path new_path = { .mnt = new_dir->mnt, .dentry = new_dentry }; - struct path_cond cond = { d_backing_inode(old_dentry)->i_uid, - d_backing_inode(old_dentry)->i_mode + struct path_cond cond = { + i_uid_into_mnt(mnt_userns, d_backing_inode(old_dentry)), + d_backing_inode(old_dentry)->i_mode }; - error = aa_path_perm(OP_RENAME_SRC, label, &old_path, 0, - MAY_READ | AA_MAY_GETATTR | MAY_WRITE | - AA_MAY_SETATTR | AA_MAY_DELETE, - &cond); + if (flags & RENAME_EXCHANGE) { + struct path_cond cond_exchange = { + i_uid_into_mnt(mnt_userns, d_backing_inode(new_dentry)), + d_backing_inode(new_dentry)->i_mode + }; + + error = aa_path_perm(OP_RENAME_SRC, label, &new_path, 0, + MAY_READ | AA_MAY_GETATTR | MAY_WRITE | + AA_MAY_SETATTR | AA_MAY_DELETE, + &cond_exchange); + if (!error) + error = aa_path_perm(OP_RENAME_DEST, label, &old_path, + 0, MAY_WRITE | AA_MAY_SETATTR | + AA_MAY_CREATE, &cond_exchange); + } + + if (!error) + error = aa_path_perm(OP_RENAME_SRC, label, &old_path, 0, + MAY_READ | AA_MAY_GETATTR | MAY_WRITE | + AA_MAY_SETATTR | AA_MAY_DELETE, + &cond); if (!error) error = aa_path_perm(OP_RENAME_DEST, label, &new_path, 0, MAY_WRITE | AA_MAY_SETATTR | @@ -420,8 +445,12 @@ static int apparmor_file_open(struct file *file) label = aa_get_newest_cred_label(file->f_cred); if (!unconfined(label)) { + struct user_namespace *mnt_userns = file_mnt_user_ns(file); struct inode *inode = file_inode(file); - struct path_cond cond = { inode->i_uid, inode->i_mode }; + struct path_cond cond = { + i_uid_into_mnt(mnt_userns, inode), + inode->i_mode + }; error = aa_path_perm(OP_OPEN, label, &file->f_path, 0, aa_map_file_to_perms(file), &cond); @@ -585,7 +614,7 @@ static int apparmor_sb_pivotroot(const struct path *old_path, return error; } -static int apparmor_getprocattr(struct task_struct *task, char *name, +static int apparmor_getprocattr(struct task_struct *task, const char *name, char **value) { int error = -ENOENT; @@ -719,7 +748,14 @@ static void apparmor_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) return; } -static void apparmor_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid) +static void apparmor_current_getsecid_subj(u32 *secid) +{ + struct aa_label *label = aa_get_current_label(); + *secid = label->secid; + aa_put_label(label); +} + +static void apparmor_task_getsecid_obj(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid) { struct aa_label *label = aa_get_task_label(p); *secid = label->secid; @@ -796,7 +832,7 @@ static void apparmor_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk) } /** - * apparmor_clone_security - clone the sk_security field + * apparmor_sk_clone_security - clone the sk_security field */ static void apparmor_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk) @@ -804,7 +840,12 @@ static void apparmor_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk, struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sk); struct aa_sk_ctx *new = SK_CTX(newsk); + if (new->label) + aa_put_label(new->label); new->label = aa_get_label(ctx->label); + + if (new->peer) + aa_put_label(new->peer); new->peer = aa_get_label(ctx->peer); } @@ -845,10 +886,7 @@ static int apparmor_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family, struct aa_label *label; if (kern) { - struct aa_ns *ns = aa_get_current_ns(); - - label = aa_get_label(ns_unconfined(ns)); - aa_put_ns(ns); + label = aa_get_label(kernel_t); } else label = aa_get_current_label(); @@ -896,7 +934,7 @@ static int apparmor_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, } /** - * apparmor_socket_list - check perms before allowing listen + * apparmor_socket_listen - check perms before allowing listen */ static int apparmor_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog) { @@ -1000,7 +1038,7 @@ static int aa_sock_opt_perm(const char *op, u32 request, struct socket *sock, } /** - * apparmor_getsockopt - check perms before getting socket options + * apparmor_socket_getsockopt - check perms before getting socket options */ static int apparmor_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname) @@ -1010,7 +1048,7 @@ static int apparmor_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, } /** - * apparmor_setsockopt - check perms before setting socket options + * apparmor_socket_setsockopt - check perms before setting socket options */ static int apparmor_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname) @@ -1029,7 +1067,7 @@ static int apparmor_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how) #ifdef CONFIG_NETWORK_SECMARK /** - * apparmor_socket_sock_recv_skb - check perms before associating skb to sk + * apparmor_socket_sock_rcv_skb - check perms before associating skb to sk * * Note: can not sleep may be called with locks held * @@ -1142,7 +1180,7 @@ static void apparmor_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent) } #ifdef CONFIG_NETWORK_SECMARK -static int apparmor_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, +static int apparmor_inet_conn_request(const struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, struct request_sock *req) { struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sk); @@ -1232,13 +1270,14 @@ static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = { LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_prepare, apparmor_cred_prepare), LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_transfer, apparmor_cred_transfer), - LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_set_creds, apparmor_bprm_set_creds), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_creds_for_exec, apparmor_bprm_creds_for_exec), LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_committing_creds, apparmor_bprm_committing_creds), LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_committed_creds, apparmor_bprm_committed_creds), LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_free, apparmor_task_free), LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_alloc, apparmor_task_alloc), - LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsecid, apparmor_task_getsecid), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(current_getsecid_subj, apparmor_current_getsecid_subj), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsecid_obj, apparmor_task_getsecid_obj), LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setrlimit, apparmor_task_setrlimit), LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_kill, apparmor_task_kill), @@ -1315,6 +1354,12 @@ bool aa_g_hash_policy = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_HASH_DEFAULT); module_param_named(hash_policy, aa_g_hash_policy, aabool, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR); #endif +/* whether policy exactly as loaded is retained for debug and checkpointing */ +bool aa_g_export_binary = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_EXPORT_BINARY); +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_EXPORT_BINARY +module_param_named(export_binary, aa_g_export_binary, aabool, 0600); +#endif + /* policy loaddata compression level */ int aa_g_rawdata_compression_level = Z_DEFAULT_COMPRESSION; module_param_named(rawdata_compression_level, aa_g_rawdata_compression_level, @@ -1357,7 +1402,7 @@ module_param_named(path_max, aa_g_path_max, aauint, S_IRUSR); * DEPRECATED: read only as strict checking of load is always done now * that none root users (user namespaces) can load policy. */ -bool aa_g_paranoid_load = true; +bool aa_g_paranoid_load = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_PARANOID_LOAD); module_param_named(paranoid_load, aa_g_paranoid_load, aabool, S_IRUGO); static int param_get_aaintbool(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp); @@ -1387,7 +1432,7 @@ static int param_set_aalockpolicy(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp { if (!apparmor_enabled) return -EINVAL; - if (apparmor_initialized && !policy_admin_capable(NULL)) + if (apparmor_initialized && !aa_current_policy_admin_capable(NULL)) return -EPERM; return param_set_bool(val, kp); } @@ -1396,7 +1441,7 @@ static int param_get_aalockpolicy(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp) { if (!apparmor_enabled) return -EINVAL; - if (apparmor_initialized && !policy_view_capable(NULL)) + if (apparmor_initialized && !aa_current_policy_view_capable(NULL)) return -EPERM; return param_get_bool(buffer, kp); } @@ -1405,7 +1450,7 @@ static int param_set_aabool(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp) { if (!apparmor_enabled) return -EINVAL; - if (apparmor_initialized && !policy_admin_capable(NULL)) + if (apparmor_initialized && !aa_current_policy_admin_capable(NULL)) return -EPERM; return param_set_bool(val, kp); } @@ -1414,7 +1459,7 @@ static int param_get_aabool(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp) { if (!apparmor_enabled) return -EINVAL; - if (apparmor_initialized && !policy_view_capable(NULL)) + if (apparmor_initialized && !aa_current_policy_view_capable(NULL)) return -EPERM; return param_get_bool(buffer, kp); } @@ -1440,7 +1485,7 @@ static int param_get_aauint(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp) { if (!apparmor_enabled) return -EINVAL; - if (apparmor_initialized && !policy_view_capable(NULL)) + if (apparmor_initialized && !aa_current_policy_view_capable(NULL)) return -EPERM; return param_get_uint(buffer, kp); } @@ -1511,7 +1556,7 @@ static int param_get_aacompressionlevel(char *buffer, { if (!apparmor_enabled) return -EINVAL; - if (apparmor_initialized && !policy_view_capable(NULL)) + if (apparmor_initialized && !aa_current_policy_view_capable(NULL)) return -EPERM; return param_get_int(buffer, kp); } @@ -1520,7 +1565,7 @@ static int param_get_audit(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp) { if (!apparmor_enabled) return -EINVAL; - if (apparmor_initialized && !policy_view_capable(NULL)) + if (apparmor_initialized && !aa_current_policy_view_capable(NULL)) return -EPERM; return sprintf(buffer, "%s", audit_mode_names[aa_g_audit]); } @@ -1533,7 +1578,7 @@ static int param_set_audit(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp) return -EINVAL; if (!val) return -EINVAL; - if (apparmor_initialized && !policy_admin_capable(NULL)) + if (apparmor_initialized && !aa_current_policy_admin_capable(NULL)) return -EPERM; i = match_string(audit_mode_names, AUDIT_MAX_INDEX, val); @@ -1548,7 +1593,7 @@ static int param_get_mode(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp) { if (!apparmor_enabled) return -EINVAL; - if (apparmor_initialized && !policy_view_capable(NULL)) + if (apparmor_initialized && !aa_current_policy_view_capable(NULL)) return -EPERM; return sprintf(buffer, "%s", aa_profile_mode_names[aa_g_profile_mode]); @@ -1562,7 +1607,7 @@ static int param_set_mode(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp) return -EINVAL; if (!val) return -EINVAL; - if (apparmor_initialized && !policy_admin_capable(NULL)) + if (apparmor_initialized && !aa_current_policy_admin_capable(NULL)) return -EPERM; i = match_string(aa_profile_mode_names, APPARMOR_MODE_NAMES_MAX_INDEX, @@ -1696,9 +1741,9 @@ static int __init alloc_buffers(void) #ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL static int apparmor_dointvec(struct ctl_table *table, int write, - void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos) + void *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos) { - if (!policy_admin_capable(NULL)) + if (!aa_current_policy_admin_capable(NULL)) return -EPERM; if (!apparmor_enabled) return -EINVAL; @@ -1719,6 +1764,14 @@ static struct ctl_table apparmor_sysctl_table[] = { .mode = 0600, .proc_handler = apparmor_dointvec, }, + { + .procname = "apparmor_display_secid_mode", + .data = &apparmor_display_secid_mode, + .maxlen = sizeof(int), + .mode = 0600, + .proc_handler = apparmor_dointvec, + }, + { } }; @@ -1758,32 +1811,16 @@ static unsigned int apparmor_ip_postroute(void *priv, } -static unsigned int apparmor_ipv4_postroute(void *priv, - struct sk_buff *skb, - const struct nf_hook_state *state) -{ - return apparmor_ip_postroute(priv, skb, state); -} - -#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) -static unsigned int apparmor_ipv6_postroute(void *priv, - struct sk_buff *skb, - const struct nf_hook_state *state) -{ - return apparmor_ip_postroute(priv, skb, state); -} -#endif - static const struct nf_hook_ops apparmor_nf_ops[] = { { - .hook = apparmor_ipv4_postroute, + .hook = apparmor_ip_postroute, .pf = NFPROTO_IPV4, .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING, .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST, }, #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) { - .hook = apparmor_ipv6_postroute, + .hook = apparmor_ip_postroute, .pf = NFPROTO_IPV6, .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING, .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST, @@ -1793,11 +1830,8 @@ static const struct nf_hook_ops apparmor_nf_ops[] = { static int __net_init apparmor_nf_register(struct net *net) { - int ret; - - ret = nf_register_net_hooks(net, apparmor_nf_ops, + return nf_register_net_hooks(net, apparmor_nf_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(apparmor_nf_ops)); - return ret; } static void __net_exit apparmor_nf_unregister(struct net *net) @@ -1831,8 +1865,6 @@ static int __init apparmor_init(void) { int error; - aa_secids_init(); - error = aa_setup_dfa_engine(); if (error) { AA_ERROR("Unable to setup dfa engine\n"); diff --git a/security/apparmor/match.c b/security/apparmor/match.c index 525ce22dc0e9..3e9e1eaf990e 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/match.c +++ b/security/apparmor/match.c @@ -97,6 +97,9 @@ static struct table_header *unpack_table(char *blob, size_t bsize) th.td_flags == YYTD_DATA8)) goto out; + /* if we have a table it must have some entries */ + if (th.td_lolen == 0) + goto out; tsize = table_size(th.td_lolen, th.td_flags); if (bsize < tsize) goto out; @@ -198,10 +201,32 @@ static int verify_dfa(struct aa_dfa *dfa) state_count = dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_BASE]->td_lolen; trans_count = dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_NXT]->td_lolen; + if (state_count == 0) + goto out; for (i = 0; i < state_count; i++) { if (!(BASE_TABLE(dfa)[i] & MATCH_FLAG_DIFF_ENCODE) && (DEFAULT_TABLE(dfa)[i] >= state_count)) goto out; + if (BASE_TABLE(dfa)[i] & MATCH_FLAGS_INVALID) { + pr_err("AppArmor DFA state with invalid match flags"); + goto out; + } + if ((BASE_TABLE(dfa)[i] & MATCH_FLAG_DIFF_ENCODE)) { + if (!(dfa->flags & YYTH_FLAG_DIFF_ENCODE)) { + pr_err("AppArmor DFA diff encoded transition state without header flag"); + goto out; + } + } + if ((BASE_TABLE(dfa)[i] & MATCH_FLAG_OOB_TRANSITION)) { + if (base_idx(BASE_TABLE(dfa)[i]) < dfa->max_oob) { + pr_err("AppArmor DFA out of bad transition out of range"); + goto out; + } + if (!(dfa->flags & YYTH_FLAG_OOB_TRANS)) { + pr_err("AppArmor DFA out of bad transition state without header flag"); + goto out; + } + } if (base_idx(BASE_TABLE(dfa)[i]) + 255 >= trans_count) { pr_err("AppArmor DFA next/check upper bounds error\n"); goto out; @@ -304,9 +329,23 @@ struct aa_dfa *aa_dfa_unpack(void *blob, size_t size, int flags) goto fail; dfa->flags = ntohs(*(__be16 *) (data + 12)); - if (dfa->flags != 0 && dfa->flags != YYTH_FLAG_DIFF_ENCODE) + if (dfa->flags & ~(YYTH_FLAGS)) goto fail; + /* + * TODO: needed for dfa to support more than 1 oob + * if (dfa->flags & YYTH_FLAGS_OOB_TRANS) { + * if (hsize < 16 + 4) + * goto fail; + * dfa->max_oob = ntol(*(__be32 *) (data + 16)); + * if (dfa->max <= MAX_OOB_SUPPORTED) { + * pr_err("AppArmor DFA OOB greater than supported\n"); + * goto fail; + * } + * } + */ + dfa->max_oob = 1; + data += hsize; size -= hsize; @@ -495,6 +534,23 @@ unsigned int aa_dfa_next(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int state, return state; } +unsigned int aa_dfa_outofband_transition(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int state) +{ + u16 *def = DEFAULT_TABLE(dfa); + u32 *base = BASE_TABLE(dfa); + u16 *next = NEXT_TABLE(dfa); + u16 *check = CHECK_TABLE(dfa); + u32 b = (base)[(state)]; + + if (!(b & MATCH_FLAG_OOB_TRANSITION)) + return DFA_NOMATCH; + + /* No Equivalence class remapping for outofband transitions */ + match_char(state, def, base, next, check, -1); + + return state; +} + /** * aa_dfa_match_until - traverse @dfa until accept state or end of input * @dfa: the dfa to match @str against (NOT NULL) diff --git a/security/apparmor/mount.c b/security/apparmor/mount.c index e0828ee7a345..f61247241803 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/mount.c +++ b/security/apparmor/mount.c @@ -217,7 +217,6 @@ static struct aa_perms compute_mnt_perms(struct aa_dfa *dfa, .allow = dfa_user_allow(dfa, state), .audit = dfa_user_audit(dfa, state), .quiet = dfa_user_quiet(dfa, state), - .xindex = dfa_user_xindex(dfa, state), }; return perms; @@ -229,7 +228,8 @@ static const char * const mnt_info_table[] = { "failed srcname match", "failed type match", "failed flags match", - "failed data match" + "failed data match", + "failed perms check" }; /* @@ -284,8 +284,8 @@ static int do_match_mnt(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int start, return 0; } - /* failed at end of flags match */ - return 4; + /* failed at perms check, don't confuse with flags match */ + return 6; } @@ -303,7 +303,7 @@ static int path_flags(struct aa_profile *profile, const struct path *path) * @profile: the confining profile * @mntpath: for the mntpnt (NOT NULL) * @buffer: buffer to be used to lookup mntpath - * @devnme: string for the devname/src_name (MAY BE NULL OR ERRPTR) + * @devname: string for the devname/src_name (MAY BE NULL OR ERRPTR) * @type: string for the dev type (MAYBE NULL) * @flags: mount flags to match * @data: fs mount data (MAYBE NULL) @@ -358,7 +358,7 @@ audit: /** * match_mnt - handle path matching for mount * @profile: the confining profile - * @mntpath: for the mntpnt (NOT NULL) + * @path: for the mntpnt (NOT NULL) * @buffer: buffer to be used to lookup mntpath * @devpath: path devname/src_name (MAYBE NULL) * @devbuffer: buffer to be used to lookup devname/src_name @@ -370,7 +370,7 @@ audit: * Returns: 0 on success else error */ static int match_mnt(struct aa_profile *profile, const struct path *path, - char *buffer, struct path *devpath, char *devbuffer, + char *buffer, const struct path *devpath, char *devbuffer, const char *type, unsigned long flags, void *data, bool binary) { @@ -579,7 +579,7 @@ out: return error; } -static int profile_umount(struct aa_profile *profile, struct path *path, +static int profile_umount(struct aa_profile *profile, const struct path *path, char *buffer) { struct aa_perms perms = { }; @@ -718,6 +718,7 @@ int aa_pivotroot(struct aa_label *label, const struct path *old_path, aa_put_label(target); goto out; } + aa_put_label(target); } else /* already audited error */ error = PTR_ERR(target); diff --git a/security/apparmor/net.c b/security/apparmor/net.c index d8afc39f663a..7efe4d17273d 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/net.c +++ b/security/apparmor/net.c @@ -72,16 +72,18 @@ void audit_net_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va) { struct common_audit_data *sa = va; - audit_log_format(ab, " family="); if (address_family_names[sa->u.net->family]) - audit_log_string(ab, address_family_names[sa->u.net->family]); + audit_log_format(ab, " family=\"%s\"", + address_family_names[sa->u.net->family]); else - audit_log_format(ab, "\"unknown(%d)\"", sa->u.net->family); - audit_log_format(ab, " sock_type="); + audit_log_format(ab, " family=\"unknown(%d)\"", + sa->u.net->family); if (sock_type_names[aad(sa)->net.type]) - audit_log_string(ab, sock_type_names[aad(sa)->net.type]); + audit_log_format(ab, " sock_type=\"%s\"", + sock_type_names[aad(sa)->net.type]); else - audit_log_format(ab, "\"unknown(%d)\"", aad(sa)->net.type); + audit_log_format(ab, " sock_type=\"unknown(%d)\"", + aad(sa)->net.type); audit_log_format(ab, " protocol=%d", aad(sa)->net.protocol); if (aad(sa)->request & NET_PERMS_MASK) { @@ -143,12 +145,13 @@ int aa_af_perm(struct aa_label *label, const char *op, u32 request, u16 family, static int aa_label_sk_perm(struct aa_label *label, const char *op, u32 request, struct sock *sk) { + struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sk); int error = 0; AA_BUG(!label); AA_BUG(!sk); - if (!unconfined(label)) { + if (ctx->label != kernel_t && !unconfined(label)) { struct aa_profile *profile; DEFINE_AUDIT_SK(sa, op, sk); @@ -209,7 +212,7 @@ static int apparmor_secmark_init(struct aa_secmark *secmark) } static int aa_secmark_perm(struct aa_profile *profile, u32 request, u32 secid, - struct common_audit_data *sa, struct sock *sk) + struct common_audit_data *sa) { int i, ret; struct aa_perms perms = { }; @@ -242,13 +245,13 @@ static int aa_secmark_perm(struct aa_profile *profile, u32 request, u32 secid, } int apparmor_secmark_check(struct aa_label *label, char *op, u32 request, - u32 secid, struct sock *sk) + u32 secid, const struct sock *sk) { struct aa_profile *profile; DEFINE_AUDIT_SK(sa, op, sk); return fn_for_each_confined(label, profile, aa_secmark_perm(profile, request, secid, - &sa, sk)); + &sa)); } #endif diff --git a/security/apparmor/path.c b/security/apparmor/path.c index c6da542de27b..45ec994b558d 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/path.c +++ b/security/apparmor/path.c @@ -83,7 +83,7 @@ static int disconnect(const struct path *path, char *buf, char **name, * * Returns: %0 else error code if path lookup fails * When no error the path name is returned in @name which points to - * to a position in @buf + * a position in @buf */ static int d_namespace_path(const struct path *path, char *buf, char **name, int flags, const char *disconnected) @@ -142,7 +142,7 @@ static int d_namespace_path(const struct path *path, char *buf, char **name, error = PTR_ERR(res); *name = buf; goto out; - }; + } } else if (!our_mnt(path->mnt)) connected = 0; diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy.c b/security/apparmor/policy.c index 269f2f53c0b1..499c0209b6a4 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/policy.c +++ b/security/apparmor/policy.c @@ -187,9 +187,9 @@ static void aa_free_data(void *ptr, void *arg) { struct aa_data *data = ptr; - kzfree(data->data); - kzfree(data->key); - kzfree(data); + kfree_sensitive(data->data); + kfree_sensitive(data->key); + kfree_sensitive(data); } /** @@ -217,19 +217,19 @@ void aa_free_profile(struct aa_profile *profile) aa_put_profile(rcu_access_pointer(profile->parent)); aa_put_ns(profile->ns); - kzfree(profile->rename); + kfree_sensitive(profile->rename); aa_free_file_rules(&profile->file); aa_free_cap_rules(&profile->caps); aa_free_rlimit_rules(&profile->rlimits); for (i = 0; i < profile->xattr_count; i++) - kzfree(profile->xattrs[i]); - kzfree(profile->xattrs); + kfree_sensitive(profile->xattrs[i]); + kfree_sensitive(profile->xattrs); for (i = 0; i < profile->secmark_count; i++) - kzfree(profile->secmark[i].label); - kzfree(profile->secmark); - kzfree(profile->dirname); + kfree_sensitive(profile->secmark[i].label); + kfree_sensitive(profile->secmark); + kfree_sensitive(profile->dirname); aa_put_dfa(profile->xmatch); aa_put_dfa(profile->policy.dfa); @@ -237,13 +237,14 @@ void aa_free_profile(struct aa_profile *profile) rht = profile->data; profile->data = NULL; rhashtable_free_and_destroy(rht, aa_free_data, NULL); - kzfree(rht); + kfree_sensitive(rht); } - kzfree(profile->hash); + kfree_sensitive(profile->hash); aa_put_loaddata(profile->rawdata); + aa_label_destroy(&profile->label); - kzfree(profile); + kfree_sensitive(profile); } /** @@ -259,8 +260,7 @@ struct aa_profile *aa_alloc_profile(const char *hname, struct aa_proxy *proxy, struct aa_profile *profile; /* freed by free_profile - usually through aa_put_profile */ - profile = kzalloc(sizeof(*profile) + sizeof(struct aa_profile *) * 2, - gfp); + profile = kzalloc(struct_size(profile, label.vec, 2), gfp); if (!profile) return NULL; @@ -422,7 +422,7 @@ static struct aa_profile *__lookup_profile(struct aa_policy *base, } /** - * aa_lookup_profile - find a profile by its full or partial name + * aa_lookupn_profile - find a profile by its full or partial name * @ns: the namespace to start from (NOT NULL) * @hname: name to do lookup on. Does not contain namespace prefix (NOT NULL) * @n: size of @hname @@ -631,18 +631,35 @@ static int audit_policy(struct aa_label *label, const char *op, return error; } +/* don't call out to other LSMs in the stack for apparmor policy admin + * permissions + */ +static int policy_ns_capable(struct aa_label *label, + struct user_namespace *userns, int cap) +{ + int err; + + /* check for MAC_ADMIN cap in cred */ + err = cap_capable(current_cred(), userns, cap, CAP_OPT_NONE); + if (!err) + err = aa_capable(label, cap, CAP_OPT_NONE); + + return err; +} + /** - * policy_view_capable - check if viewing policy in at @ns is allowed - * ns: namespace being viewed by current task (may be NULL) + * aa_policy_view_capable - check if viewing policy in at @ns is allowed + * label: label that is trying to view policy in ns + * ns: namespace being viewed by @label (may be NULL if @label's ns) * Returns: true if viewing policy is allowed * * If @ns is NULL then the namespace being viewed is assumed to be the * tasks current namespace. */ -bool policy_view_capable(struct aa_ns *ns) +bool aa_policy_view_capable(struct aa_label *label, struct aa_ns *ns) { struct user_namespace *user_ns = current_user_ns(); - struct aa_ns *view_ns = aa_get_current_ns(); + struct aa_ns *view_ns = labels_view(label); bool root_in_user_ns = uid_eq(current_euid(), make_kuid(user_ns, 0)) || in_egroup_p(make_kgid(user_ns, 0)); bool response = false; @@ -654,20 +671,44 @@ bool policy_view_capable(struct aa_ns *ns) (unprivileged_userns_apparmor_policy != 0 && user_ns->level == view_ns->level))) response = true; - aa_put_ns(view_ns); return response; } -bool policy_admin_capable(struct aa_ns *ns) +bool aa_policy_admin_capable(struct aa_label *label, struct aa_ns *ns) { struct user_namespace *user_ns = current_user_ns(); - bool capable = ns_capable(user_ns, CAP_MAC_ADMIN); + bool capable = policy_ns_capable(label, user_ns, CAP_MAC_ADMIN) == 0; AA_DEBUG("cap_mac_admin? %d\n", capable); AA_DEBUG("policy locked? %d\n", aa_g_lock_policy); - return policy_view_capable(ns) && capable && !aa_g_lock_policy; + return aa_policy_view_capable(label, ns) && capable && + !aa_g_lock_policy; +} + +bool aa_current_policy_view_capable(struct aa_ns *ns) +{ + struct aa_label *label; + bool res; + + label = __begin_current_label_crit_section(); + res = aa_policy_view_capable(label, ns); + __end_current_label_crit_section(label); + + return res; +} + +bool aa_current_policy_admin_capable(struct aa_ns *ns) +{ + struct aa_label *label; + bool res; + + label = __begin_current_label_crit_section(); + res = aa_policy_admin_capable(label, ns); + __end_current_label_crit_section(label); + + return res; } /** @@ -693,7 +734,7 @@ int aa_may_manage_policy(struct aa_label *label, struct aa_ns *ns, u32 mask) return audit_policy(label, op, NULL, NULL, "policy_locked", -EACCES); - if (!policy_admin_capable(ns)) + if (!aa_policy_admin_capable(label, ns)) return audit_policy(label, op, NULL, NULL, "not policy admin", -EACCES); @@ -911,16 +952,18 @@ ssize_t aa_replace_profiles(struct aa_ns *policy_ns, struct aa_label *label, mutex_lock_nested(&ns->lock, ns->level); /* check for duplicate rawdata blobs: space and file dedup */ - list_for_each_entry(rawdata_ent, &ns->rawdata_list, list) { - if (aa_rawdata_eq(rawdata_ent, udata)) { - struct aa_loaddata *tmp; - - tmp = __aa_get_loaddata(rawdata_ent); - /* check we didn't fail the race */ - if (tmp) { - aa_put_loaddata(udata); - udata = tmp; - break; + if (!list_empty(&ns->rawdata_list)) { + list_for_each_entry(rawdata_ent, &ns->rawdata_list, list) { + if (aa_rawdata_eq(rawdata_ent, udata)) { + struct aa_loaddata *tmp; + + tmp = __aa_get_loaddata(rawdata_ent); + /* check we didn't fail the race */ + if (tmp) { + aa_put_loaddata(udata); + udata = tmp; + break; + } } } } @@ -928,7 +971,8 @@ ssize_t aa_replace_profiles(struct aa_ns *policy_ns, struct aa_label *label, list_for_each_entry(ent, &lh, list) { struct aa_policy *policy; - ent->new->rawdata = aa_get_loaddata(udata); + if (aa_g_export_binary) + ent->new->rawdata = aa_get_loaddata(udata); error = __lookup_replace(ns, ent->new->base.hname, !(mask & AA_MAY_REPLACE_POLICY), &ent->old, &info); @@ -968,7 +1012,7 @@ ssize_t aa_replace_profiles(struct aa_ns *policy_ns, struct aa_label *label, } /* create new fs entries for introspection if needed */ - if (!udata->dents[AAFS_LOADDATA_DIR]) { + if (!udata->dents[AAFS_LOADDATA_DIR] && aa_g_export_binary) { error = __aa_fs_create_rawdata(ns, udata); if (error) { info = "failed to create raw_data dir and files"; @@ -996,12 +1040,14 @@ ssize_t aa_replace_profiles(struct aa_ns *policy_ns, struct aa_label *label, /* Done with checks that may fail - do actual replacement */ __aa_bump_ns_revision(ns); - __aa_loaddata_update(udata, ns->revision); + if (aa_g_export_binary) + __aa_loaddata_update(udata, ns->revision); list_for_each_entry_safe(ent, tmp, &lh, list) { list_del_init(&ent->list); op = (!ent->old && !ent->rename) ? OP_PROF_LOAD : OP_PROF_REPL; - if (ent->old && ent->old->rawdata == ent->new->rawdata) { + if (ent->old && ent->old->rawdata == ent->new->rawdata && + ent->new->rawdata) { /* dedup actual profile replacement */ audit_policy(label, op, ns_name, ent->new->base.hname, "same as current profile, skipping", diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy_ns.c b/security/apparmor/policy_ns.c index d7ef540027a5..43beaad083fe 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/policy_ns.c +++ b/security/apparmor/policy_ns.c @@ -22,6 +22,9 @@ #include "include/label.h" #include "include/policy.h" +/* kernel label */ +struct aa_label *kernel_t; + /* root profile namespace */ struct aa_ns *root_ns; const char *aa_hidden_ns_name = "---"; @@ -51,10 +54,10 @@ bool aa_ns_visible(struct aa_ns *curr, struct aa_ns *view, bool subns) } /** - * aa_na_name - Find the ns name to display for @view from @curr - * @curr - current namespace (NOT NULL) - * @view - namespace attempting to view (NOT NULL) - * @subns - are subns visible + * aa_ns_name - Find the ns name to display for @view from @curr + * @curr: current namespace (NOT NULL) + * @view: namespace attempting to view (NOT NULL) + * @subns: are subns visible * * Returns: name of @view visible from @curr */ @@ -77,6 +80,23 @@ const char *aa_ns_name(struct aa_ns *curr, struct aa_ns *view, bool subns) return aa_hidden_ns_name; } +static struct aa_profile *alloc_unconfined(const char *name) +{ + struct aa_profile *profile; + + profile = aa_alloc_profile(name, NULL, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!profile) + return NULL; + + profile->label.flags |= FLAG_IX_ON_NAME_ERROR | + FLAG_IMMUTIBLE | FLAG_NS_COUNT | FLAG_UNCONFINED; + profile->mode = APPARMOR_UNCONFINED; + profile->file.dfa = aa_get_dfa(nulldfa); + profile->policy.dfa = aa_get_dfa(nulldfa); + + return profile; +} + /** * alloc_ns - allocate, initialize and return a new namespace * @prefix: parent namespace name (MAYBE NULL) @@ -101,16 +121,9 @@ static struct aa_ns *alloc_ns(const char *prefix, const char *name) init_waitqueue_head(&ns->wait); /* released by aa_free_ns() */ - ns->unconfined = aa_alloc_profile("unconfined", NULL, GFP_KERNEL); + ns->unconfined = alloc_unconfined("unconfined"); if (!ns->unconfined) goto fail_unconfined; - - ns->unconfined->label.flags |= FLAG_IX_ON_NAME_ERROR | - FLAG_IMMUTIBLE | FLAG_NS_COUNT | FLAG_UNCONFINED; - ns->unconfined->mode = APPARMOR_UNCONFINED; - ns->unconfined->file.dfa = aa_get_dfa(nulldfa); - ns->unconfined->policy.dfa = aa_get_dfa(nulldfa); - /* ns and ns->unconfined share ns->unconfined refcount */ ns->unconfined->ns = ns; @@ -121,9 +134,9 @@ static struct aa_ns *alloc_ns(const char *prefix, const char *name) return ns; fail_unconfined: - kzfree(ns->base.hname); + kfree_sensitive(ns->base.hname); fail_ns: - kzfree(ns); + kfree_sensitive(ns); return NULL; } @@ -145,7 +158,7 @@ void aa_free_ns(struct aa_ns *ns) ns->unconfined->ns = NULL; aa_free_profile(ns->unconfined); - kzfree(ns); + kfree_sensitive(ns); } /** @@ -187,7 +200,7 @@ struct aa_ns *aa_find_ns(struct aa_ns *root, const char *name) /** * __aa_lookupn_ns - lookup the namespace matching @hname - * @base: base list to start looking up profile name from (NOT NULL) + * @view: namespace to search in (NOT NULL) * @hname: hierarchical ns name (NOT NULL) * @n: length of @hname * @@ -272,7 +285,7 @@ static struct aa_ns *__aa_create_ns(struct aa_ns *parent, const char *name, } /** - * aa_create_ns - create an ns, fail if it already exists + * __aa_find_or_create_ns - create an ns, fail if it already exists * @parent: the parent of the namespace being created * @name: the name of the namespace * @dir: if not null the dir to put the ns entries in @@ -388,11 +401,22 @@ static void __ns_list_release(struct list_head *head) */ int __init aa_alloc_root_ns(void) { + struct aa_profile *kernel_p; + /* released by aa_free_root_ns - used as list ref*/ root_ns = alloc_ns(NULL, "root"); if (!root_ns) return -ENOMEM; + kernel_p = alloc_unconfined("kernel_t"); + if (!kernel_p) { + destroy_ns(root_ns); + aa_free_ns(root_ns); + return -ENOMEM; + } + kernel_t = &kernel_p->label; + root_ns->unconfined->ns = aa_get_ns(root_ns); + return 0; } @@ -405,6 +429,7 @@ void __init aa_free_root_ns(void) root_ns = NULL; + aa_label_free(kernel_t); destroy_ns(ns); aa_put_ns(ns); } diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c b/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c index 2d743c004bc4..55d31bac4f35 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c +++ b/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c @@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ /* * The AppArmor interface treats data as a type byte followed by the - * actual data. The interface has the notion of a a named entry + * actual data. The interface has the notion of a named entry * which has a name (AA_NAME typecode followed by name string) followed by * the entries typecode and data. Named types allow for optional * elements and extensions to be added and tested for without breaking @@ -125,15 +125,16 @@ void __aa_loaddata_update(struct aa_loaddata *data, long revision) { AA_BUG(!data); AA_BUG(!data->ns); - AA_BUG(!data->dents[AAFS_LOADDATA_REVISION]); AA_BUG(!mutex_is_locked(&data->ns->lock)); AA_BUG(data->revision > revision); data->revision = revision; - d_inode(data->dents[AAFS_LOADDATA_DIR])->i_mtime = - current_time(d_inode(data->dents[AAFS_LOADDATA_DIR])); - d_inode(data->dents[AAFS_LOADDATA_REVISION])->i_mtime = - current_time(d_inode(data->dents[AAFS_LOADDATA_REVISION])); + if ((data->dents[AAFS_LOADDATA_REVISION])) { + d_inode(data->dents[AAFS_LOADDATA_DIR])->i_mtime = + current_time(d_inode(data->dents[AAFS_LOADDATA_DIR])); + d_inode(data->dents[AAFS_LOADDATA_REVISION])->i_mtime = + current_time(d_inode(data->dents[AAFS_LOADDATA_REVISION])); + } } bool aa_rawdata_eq(struct aa_loaddata *l, struct aa_loaddata *r) @@ -163,10 +164,10 @@ static void do_loaddata_free(struct work_struct *work) aa_put_ns(ns); } - kzfree(d->hash); - kzfree(d->name); + kfree_sensitive(d->hash); + kfree_sensitive(d->name); kvfree(d->data); - kzfree(d); + kfree_sensitive(d); } void aa_loaddata_kref(struct kref *kref) @@ -213,7 +214,7 @@ static void *kvmemdup(const void *src, size_t len) } /** - * aa_u16_chunck - test and do bounds checking for a u16 size based chunk + * unpack_u16_chunk - test and do bounds checking for a u16 size based chunk * @e: serialized data read head (NOT NULL) * @chunk: start address for chunk of data (NOT NULL) * @@ -243,11 +244,11 @@ fail: static bool unpack_X(struct aa_ext *e, enum aa_code code) { if (!inbounds(e, 1)) - return 0; + return false; if (*(u8 *) e->pos != code) - return 0; + return false; e->pos++; - return 1; + return true; } /** @@ -261,10 +262,10 @@ static bool unpack_X(struct aa_ext *e, enum aa_code code) * name element in the stream. If @name is NULL any name element will be * skipped and only the typecode will be tested. * - * Returns 1 on success (both type code and name tests match) and the read + * Returns true on success (both type code and name tests match) and the read * head is advanced past the headers * - * Returns: 0 if either match fails, the read head does not move + * Returns: false if either match fails, the read head does not move */ static bool unpack_nameX(struct aa_ext *e, enum aa_code code, const char *name) { @@ -289,11 +290,11 @@ static bool unpack_nameX(struct aa_ext *e, enum aa_code code, const char *name) /* now check if type code matches */ if (unpack_X(e, code)) - return 1; + return true; fail: e->pos = pos; - return 0; + return false; } static bool unpack_u8(struct aa_ext *e, u8 *data, const char *name) @@ -304,14 +305,14 @@ static bool unpack_u8(struct aa_ext *e, u8 *data, const char *name) if (!inbounds(e, sizeof(u8))) goto fail; if (data) - *data = get_unaligned((u8 *)e->pos); + *data = *((u8 *)e->pos); e->pos += sizeof(u8); - return 1; + return true; } fail: e->pos = pos; - return 0; + return false; } static bool unpack_u32(struct aa_ext *e, u32 *data, const char *name) @@ -324,12 +325,12 @@ static bool unpack_u32(struct aa_ext *e, u32 *data, const char *name) if (data) *data = le32_to_cpu(get_unaligned((__le32 *) e->pos)); e->pos += sizeof(u32); - return 1; + return true; } fail: e->pos = pos; - return 0; + return false; } static bool unpack_u64(struct aa_ext *e, u64 *data, const char *name) @@ -342,12 +343,12 @@ static bool unpack_u64(struct aa_ext *e, u64 *data, const char *name) if (data) *data = le64_to_cpu(get_unaligned((__le64 *) e->pos)); e->pos += sizeof(u64); - return 1; + return true; } fail: e->pos = pos; - return 0; + return false; } static size_t unpack_array(struct aa_ext *e, const char *name) @@ -456,7 +457,9 @@ static struct aa_dfa *unpack_dfa(struct aa_ext *e) ((e->pos - e->start) & 7); size_t pad = ALIGN(sz, 8) - sz; int flags = TO_ACCEPT1_FLAG(YYTD_DATA32) | - TO_ACCEPT2_FLAG(YYTD_DATA32) | DFA_FLAG_VERIFY_STATES; + TO_ACCEPT2_FLAG(YYTD_DATA32); + if (aa_g_paranoid_load) + flags |= DFA_FLAG_VERIFY_STATES; dfa = aa_dfa_unpack(blob + pad, size - pad, flags); if (IS_ERR(dfa)) @@ -472,7 +475,7 @@ static struct aa_dfa *unpack_dfa(struct aa_ext *e) * @e: serialized data extent information (NOT NULL) * @profile: profile to add the accept table to (NOT NULL) * - * Returns: 1 if table successfully unpacked + * Returns: true if table successfully unpacked */ static bool unpack_trans_table(struct aa_ext *e, struct aa_profile *profile) { @@ -535,12 +538,12 @@ static bool unpack_trans_table(struct aa_ext *e, struct aa_profile *profile) if (!unpack_nameX(e, AA_STRUCTEND, NULL)) goto fail; } - return 1; + return true; fail: aa_free_domain_entries(&profile->file.trans); e->pos = saved_pos; - return 0; + return false; } static bool unpack_xattrs(struct aa_ext *e, struct aa_profile *profile) @@ -565,11 +568,11 @@ static bool unpack_xattrs(struct aa_ext *e, struct aa_profile *profile) goto fail; } - return 1; + return true; fail: e->pos = pos; - return 0; + return false; } static bool unpack_secmark(struct aa_ext *e, struct aa_profile *profile) @@ -601,7 +604,7 @@ static bool unpack_secmark(struct aa_ext *e, struct aa_profile *profile) goto fail; } - return 1; + return true; fail: if (profile->secmark) { @@ -613,7 +616,7 @@ fail: } e->pos = pos; - return 0; + return false; } static bool unpack_rlimits(struct aa_ext *e, struct aa_profile *profile) @@ -643,11 +646,11 @@ static bool unpack_rlimits(struct aa_ext *e, struct aa_profile *profile) if (!unpack_nameX(e, AA_STRUCTEND, NULL)) goto fail; } - return 1; + return true; fail: e->pos = pos; - return 0; + return false; } static u32 strhash(const void *data, u32 len, u32 seed) @@ -668,6 +671,7 @@ static int datacmp(struct rhashtable_compare_arg *arg, const void *obj) /** * unpack_profile - unpack a serialized profile * @e: serialized data extent information (NOT NULL) + * @ns_name: pointer of newly allocated copy of %NULL in case of error * * NOTE: unpack profile sets audit struct if there is a failure */ @@ -744,14 +748,24 @@ static struct aa_profile *unpack_profile(struct aa_ext *e, char **ns_name) goto fail; if (tmp & PACKED_FLAG_HAT) profile->label.flags |= FLAG_HAT; + if (tmp & PACKED_FLAG_DEBUG1) + profile->label.flags |= FLAG_DEBUG1; + if (tmp & PACKED_FLAG_DEBUG2) + profile->label.flags |= FLAG_DEBUG2; if (!unpack_u32(e, &tmp, NULL)) goto fail; - if (tmp == PACKED_MODE_COMPLAIN || (e->version & FORCE_COMPLAIN_FLAG)) + if (tmp == PACKED_MODE_COMPLAIN || (e->version & FORCE_COMPLAIN_FLAG)) { profile->mode = APPARMOR_COMPLAIN; - else if (tmp == PACKED_MODE_KILL) + } else if (tmp == PACKED_MODE_ENFORCE) { + profile->mode = APPARMOR_ENFORCE; + } else if (tmp == PACKED_MODE_KILL) { profile->mode = APPARMOR_KILL; - else if (tmp == PACKED_MODE_UNCONFINED) + } else if (tmp == PACKED_MODE_UNCONFINED) { profile->mode = APPARMOR_UNCONFINED; + profile->label.flags |= FLAG_UNCONFINED; + } else { + goto fail; + } if (!unpack_u32(e, &tmp, NULL)) goto fail; if (tmp) @@ -890,7 +904,7 @@ static struct aa_profile *unpack_profile(struct aa_ext *e, char **ns_name) while (unpack_strdup(e, &key, NULL)) { data = kzalloc(sizeof(*data), GFP_KERNEL); if (!data) { - kzfree(key); + kfree_sensitive(key); goto fail; } @@ -898,8 +912,8 @@ static struct aa_profile *unpack_profile(struct aa_ext *e, char **ns_name) data->size = unpack_blob(e, &data->data, NULL); data->data = kvmemdup(data->data, data->size); if (data->size && !data->data) { - kzfree(data->key); - kzfree(data); + kfree_sensitive(data->key); + kfree_sensitive(data); goto fail; } @@ -932,7 +946,7 @@ fail: } /** - * verify_head - unpack serialized stream header + * verify_header - unpack serialized stream header * @e: serialized data read head (NOT NULL) * @required: whether the header is required or optional * @ns: Returns - namespace if one is specified else NULL (NOT NULL) @@ -990,8 +1004,8 @@ static bool verify_xindex(int xindex, int table_size) xtype = xindex & AA_X_TYPE_MASK; index = xindex & AA_X_INDEX_MASK; if (xtype == AA_X_TABLE && index >= table_size) - return 0; - return 1; + return false; + return true; } /* verify dfa xindexes are in range of transition tables */ @@ -1000,11 +1014,11 @@ static bool verify_dfa_xindex(struct aa_dfa *dfa, int table_size) int i; for (i = 0; i < dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_ACCEPT]->td_lolen; i++) { if (!verify_xindex(dfa_user_xindex(dfa, i), table_size)) - return 0; + return false; if (!verify_xindex(dfa_other_xindex(dfa, i), table_size)) - return 0; + return false; } - return 1; + return true; } /** @@ -1033,7 +1047,7 @@ void aa_load_ent_free(struct aa_load_ent *ent) aa_put_profile(ent->old); aa_put_profile(ent->new); kfree(ent->ns_name); - kzfree(ent); + kfree_sensitive(ent); } } @@ -1048,6 +1062,7 @@ struct aa_load_ent *aa_load_ent_alloc(void) static int deflate_compress(const char *src, size_t slen, char **dst, size_t *dlen) { +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_EXPORT_BINARY int error; struct z_stream_s strm; void *stgbuf, *dstbuf; @@ -1119,6 +1134,10 @@ fail_deflate_init: fail_deflate: kvfree(stgbuf); goto fail_stg_alloc; +#else + *dlen = slen; + return 0; +#endif } static int compress_loaddata(struct aa_loaddata *data) @@ -1137,7 +1156,8 @@ static int compress_loaddata(struct aa_loaddata *data) if (error) return error; - kvfree(udata); + if (udata != data->data) + kvfree(udata); } else data->compressed_size = data->size; @@ -1212,9 +1232,12 @@ int aa_unpack(struct aa_loaddata *udata, struct list_head *lh, goto fail; } } - error = compress_loaddata(udata); - if (error) - goto fail; + + if (aa_g_export_binary) { + error = compress_loaddata(udata); + if (error) + goto fail; + } return 0; fail_profile: diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy_unpack_test.c b/security/apparmor/policy_unpack_test.c index 533137f45361..0a969b2e03db 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/policy_unpack_test.c +++ b/security/apparmor/policy_unpack_test.c @@ -48,8 +48,8 @@ struct policy_unpack_fixture { size_t e_size; }; -struct aa_ext *build_aa_ext_struct(struct policy_unpack_fixture *puf, - struct kunit *test, size_t buf_size) +static struct aa_ext *build_aa_ext_struct(struct policy_unpack_fixture *puf, + struct kunit *test, size_t buf_size) { char *buf; struct aa_ext *e; @@ -177,7 +177,7 @@ static void policy_unpack_test_unpack_array_out_of_bounds(struct kunit *test) array_size = unpack_array(puf->e, name); - KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, array_size, (u16)0); + KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, array_size, 0); KUNIT_EXPECT_PTR_EQ(test, puf->e->pos, puf->e->start + TEST_NAMED_ARRAY_BUF_OFFSET); } @@ -313,7 +313,7 @@ static void policy_unpack_test_unpack_strdup_out_of_bounds(struct kunit *test) size = unpack_strdup(puf->e, &string, TEST_STRING_NAME); KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, size, 0); - KUNIT_EXPECT_PTR_EQ(test, string, (char *)NULL); + KUNIT_EXPECT_NULL(test, string); KUNIT_EXPECT_PTR_EQ(test, puf->e->pos, start); } @@ -391,10 +391,10 @@ static void policy_unpack_test_unpack_u16_chunk_basic(struct kunit *test) size = unpack_u16_chunk(puf->e, &chunk); - KUNIT_EXPECT_PTR_EQ(test, (void *)chunk, + KUNIT_EXPECT_PTR_EQ(test, chunk, puf->e->start + TEST_U16_OFFSET + 2); - KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, size, (size_t)TEST_U16_DATA); - KUNIT_EXPECT_PTR_EQ(test, puf->e->pos, (void *)(chunk + TEST_U16_DATA)); + KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, size, TEST_U16_DATA); + KUNIT_EXPECT_PTR_EQ(test, puf->e->pos, (chunk + TEST_U16_DATA)); } static void policy_unpack_test_unpack_u16_chunk_out_of_bounds_1( @@ -408,8 +408,8 @@ static void policy_unpack_test_unpack_u16_chunk_out_of_bounds_1( size = unpack_u16_chunk(puf->e, &chunk); - KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, size, (size_t)0); - KUNIT_EXPECT_PTR_EQ(test, chunk, (char *)NULL); + KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, size, 0); + KUNIT_EXPECT_NULL(test, chunk); KUNIT_EXPECT_PTR_EQ(test, puf->e->pos, puf->e->end - 1); } @@ -430,8 +430,8 @@ static void policy_unpack_test_unpack_u16_chunk_out_of_bounds_2( size = unpack_u16_chunk(puf->e, &chunk); - KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, size, (size_t)0); - KUNIT_EXPECT_PTR_EQ(test, chunk, (char *)NULL); + KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, size, 0); + KUNIT_EXPECT_NULL(test, chunk); KUNIT_EXPECT_PTR_EQ(test, puf->e->pos, puf->e->start + TEST_U16_OFFSET); } @@ -439,7 +439,7 @@ static void policy_unpack_test_unpack_u32_with_null_name(struct kunit *test) { struct policy_unpack_fixture *puf = test->priv; bool success; - u32 data; + u32 data = 0; puf->e->pos += TEST_U32_BUF_OFFSET; @@ -456,7 +456,7 @@ static void policy_unpack_test_unpack_u32_with_name(struct kunit *test) struct policy_unpack_fixture *puf = test->priv; const char name[] = TEST_U32_NAME; bool success; - u32 data; + u32 data = 0; puf->e->pos += TEST_NAMED_U32_BUF_OFFSET; @@ -473,7 +473,7 @@ static void policy_unpack_test_unpack_u32_out_of_bounds(struct kunit *test) struct policy_unpack_fixture *puf = test->priv; const char name[] = TEST_U32_NAME; bool success; - u32 data; + u32 data = 0; puf->e->pos += TEST_NAMED_U32_BUF_OFFSET; puf->e->end = puf->e->start + TEST_U32_BUF_OFFSET + sizeof(u32); @@ -489,7 +489,7 @@ static void policy_unpack_test_unpack_u64_with_null_name(struct kunit *test) { struct policy_unpack_fixture *puf = test->priv; bool success; - u64 data; + u64 data = 0; puf->e->pos += TEST_U64_BUF_OFFSET; @@ -506,7 +506,7 @@ static void policy_unpack_test_unpack_u64_with_name(struct kunit *test) struct policy_unpack_fixture *puf = test->priv; const char name[] = TEST_U64_NAME; bool success; - u64 data; + u64 data = 0; puf->e->pos += TEST_NAMED_U64_BUF_OFFSET; @@ -523,7 +523,7 @@ static void policy_unpack_test_unpack_u64_out_of_bounds(struct kunit *test) struct policy_unpack_fixture *puf = test->priv; const char name[] = TEST_U64_NAME; bool success; - u64 data; + u64 data = 0; puf->e->pos += TEST_NAMED_U64_BUF_OFFSET; puf->e->end = puf->e->start + TEST_U64_BUF_OFFSET + sizeof(u64); diff --git a/security/apparmor/procattr.c b/security/apparmor/procattr.c index c929bf4a3df1..86ad26ef72ed 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/procattr.c +++ b/security/apparmor/procattr.c @@ -21,8 +21,6 @@ * @profile: the profile to print profile info about (NOT NULL) * @string: Returns - string containing the profile info (NOT NULL) * - * Returns: length of @string on success else error on failure - * * Requires: profile != NULL * * Creates a string containing the namespace_name://profile_name for @@ -92,7 +90,7 @@ static char *split_token_from_name(const char *op, char *args, u64 *token) } /** - * aa_setprocattr_chagnehat - handle procattr interface to change_hat + * aa_setprocattr_changehat - handle procattr interface to change_hat * @args: args received from writing to /proc/<pid>/attr/current (NOT NULL) * @size: size of the args * @flags: set of flags governing behavior diff --git a/security/apparmor/secid.c b/security/apparmor/secid.c index ce545f99259e..24a0e23f1b2b 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/secid.c +++ b/security/apparmor/secid.c @@ -13,9 +13,9 @@ #include <linux/errno.h> #include <linux/err.h> #include <linux/gfp.h> -#include <linux/idr.h> #include <linux/slab.h> #include <linux/spinlock.h> +#include <linux/xarray.h> #include "include/cred.h" #include "include/lib.h" @@ -29,8 +29,9 @@ */ #define AA_FIRST_SECID 2 -static DEFINE_IDR(aa_secids); -static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(secid_lock); +static DEFINE_XARRAY_FLAGS(aa_secids, XA_FLAGS_LOCK_IRQ | XA_FLAGS_TRACK_FREE); + +int apparmor_display_secid_mode; /* * TODO: allow policy to reserve a secid range? @@ -47,9 +48,9 @@ void aa_secid_update(u32 secid, struct aa_label *label) { unsigned long flags; - spin_lock_irqsave(&secid_lock, flags); - idr_replace(&aa_secids, label, secid); - spin_unlock_irqrestore(&secid_lock, flags); + xa_lock_irqsave(&aa_secids, flags); + __xa_store(&aa_secids, secid, label, 0); + xa_unlock_irqrestore(&aa_secids, flags); } /** @@ -58,19 +59,14 @@ void aa_secid_update(u32 secid, struct aa_label *label) */ struct aa_label *aa_secid_to_label(u32 secid) { - struct aa_label *label; - - rcu_read_lock(); - label = idr_find(&aa_secids, secid); - rcu_read_unlock(); - - return label; + return xa_load(&aa_secids, secid); } int apparmor_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen) { /* TODO: cache secctx and ref count so we don't have to recreate */ struct aa_label *label = aa_secid_to_label(secid); + int flags = FLAG_VIEW_SUBNS | FLAG_HIDDEN_UNCONFINED | FLAG_ABS_ROOT; int len; AA_BUG(!seclen); @@ -78,15 +74,15 @@ int apparmor_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen) if (!label) return -EINVAL; + if (apparmor_display_secid_mode) + flags |= FLAG_SHOW_MODE; + if (secdata) len = aa_label_asxprint(secdata, root_ns, label, - FLAG_SHOW_MODE | FLAG_VIEW_SUBNS | - FLAG_HIDDEN_UNCONFINED | FLAG_ABS_ROOT, - GFP_ATOMIC); + flags, GFP_ATOMIC); else - len = aa_label_snxprint(NULL, 0, root_ns, label, - FLAG_SHOW_MODE | FLAG_VIEW_SUBNS | - FLAG_HIDDEN_UNCONFINED | FLAG_ABS_ROOT); + len = aa_label_snxprint(NULL, 0, root_ns, label, flags); + if (len < 0) return -ENOMEM; @@ -126,19 +122,16 @@ int aa_alloc_secid(struct aa_label *label, gfp_t gfp) unsigned long flags; int ret; - idr_preload(gfp); - spin_lock_irqsave(&secid_lock, flags); - ret = idr_alloc(&aa_secids, label, AA_FIRST_SECID, 0, GFP_ATOMIC); - spin_unlock_irqrestore(&secid_lock, flags); - idr_preload_end(); + xa_lock_irqsave(&aa_secids, flags); + ret = __xa_alloc(&aa_secids, &label->secid, label, + XA_LIMIT(AA_FIRST_SECID, INT_MAX), gfp); + xa_unlock_irqrestore(&aa_secids, flags); if (ret < 0) { label->secid = AA_SECID_INVALID; return ret; } - AA_BUG(ret == AA_SECID_INVALID); - label->secid = ret; return 0; } @@ -150,12 +143,7 @@ void aa_free_secid(u32 secid) { unsigned long flags; - spin_lock_irqsave(&secid_lock, flags); - idr_remove(&aa_secids, secid); - spin_unlock_irqrestore(&secid_lock, flags); -} - -void aa_secids_init(void) -{ - idr_init_base(&aa_secids, AA_FIRST_SECID); + xa_lock_irqsave(&aa_secids, flags); + __xa_erase(&aa_secids, secid); + xa_unlock_irqrestore(&aa_secids, flags); } diff --git a/security/apparmor/task.c b/security/apparmor/task.c index d17130ee6795..503dc0877fb1 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/task.c +++ b/security/apparmor/task.c @@ -12,7 +12,12 @@ * should return to the previous cred if it has not been modified. */ +#include <linux/gfp.h> +#include <linux/ptrace.h> + +#include "include/audit.h" #include "include/cred.h" +#include "include/policy.h" #include "include/task.h" /** @@ -177,3 +182,112 @@ int aa_restore_previous_label(u64 token) return 0; } + +/** + * audit_ptrace_mask - convert mask to permission string + * @mask: permission mask to convert + * + * Returns: pointer to static string + */ +static const char *audit_ptrace_mask(u32 mask) +{ + switch (mask) { + case MAY_READ: + return "read"; + case MAY_WRITE: + return "trace"; + case AA_MAY_BE_READ: + return "readby"; + case AA_MAY_BE_TRACED: + return "tracedby"; + } + return ""; +} + +/* call back to audit ptrace fields */ +static void audit_ptrace_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va) +{ + struct common_audit_data *sa = va; + + if (aad(sa)->request & AA_PTRACE_PERM_MASK) { + audit_log_format(ab, " requested_mask=\"%s\"", + audit_ptrace_mask(aad(sa)->request)); + + if (aad(sa)->denied & AA_PTRACE_PERM_MASK) { + audit_log_format(ab, " denied_mask=\"%s\"", + audit_ptrace_mask(aad(sa)->denied)); + } + } + audit_log_format(ab, " peer="); + aa_label_xaudit(ab, labels_ns(aad(sa)->label), aad(sa)->peer, + FLAGS_NONE, GFP_ATOMIC); +} + +/* assumes check for PROFILE_MEDIATES is already done */ +/* TODO: conditionals */ +static int profile_ptrace_perm(struct aa_profile *profile, + struct aa_label *peer, u32 request, + struct common_audit_data *sa) +{ + struct aa_perms perms = { }; + + aad(sa)->peer = peer; + aa_profile_match_label(profile, peer, AA_CLASS_PTRACE, request, + &perms); + aa_apply_modes_to_perms(profile, &perms); + return aa_check_perms(profile, &perms, request, sa, audit_ptrace_cb); +} + +static int profile_tracee_perm(struct aa_profile *tracee, + struct aa_label *tracer, u32 request, + struct common_audit_data *sa) +{ + if (profile_unconfined(tracee) || unconfined(tracer) || + !PROFILE_MEDIATES(tracee, AA_CLASS_PTRACE)) + return 0; + + return profile_ptrace_perm(tracee, tracer, request, sa); +} + +static int profile_tracer_perm(struct aa_profile *tracer, + struct aa_label *tracee, u32 request, + struct common_audit_data *sa) +{ + if (profile_unconfined(tracer)) + return 0; + + if (PROFILE_MEDIATES(tracer, AA_CLASS_PTRACE)) + return profile_ptrace_perm(tracer, tracee, request, sa); + + /* profile uses the old style capability check for ptrace */ + if (&tracer->label == tracee) + return 0; + + aad(sa)->label = &tracer->label; + aad(sa)->peer = tracee; + aad(sa)->request = 0; + aad(sa)->error = aa_capable(&tracer->label, CAP_SYS_PTRACE, + CAP_OPT_NONE); + + return aa_audit(AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUTO, tracer, sa, audit_ptrace_cb); +} + +/** + * aa_may_ptrace - test if tracer task can trace the tracee + * @tracer: label of the task doing the tracing (NOT NULL) + * @tracee: task label to be traced + * @request: permission request + * + * Returns: %0 else error code if permission denied or error + */ +int aa_may_ptrace(struct aa_label *tracer, struct aa_label *tracee, + u32 request) +{ + struct aa_profile *profile; + u32 xrequest = request << PTRACE_PERM_SHIFT; + DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(sa, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE, OP_PTRACE); + + return xcheck_labels(tracer, tracee, profile, + profile_tracer_perm(profile, tracee, request, &sa), + profile_tracee_perm(profile, tracer, xrequest, &sa)); +} |