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-rw-r--r--security/keys/Kconfig49
-rw-r--r--security/keys/big_key.c334
-rw-r--r--security/keys/compat.c40
-rw-r--r--security/keys/dh.c144
-rw-r--r--security/keys/encrypted-keys/ecryptfs_format.c2
-rw-r--r--security/keys/encrypted-keys/ecryptfs_format.h2
-rw-r--r--security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c114
-rw-r--r--security/keys/encrypted-keys/masterkey_trusted.c2
-rw-r--r--security/keys/gc.c5
-rw-r--r--security/keys/internal.h48
-rw-r--r--security/keys/key.c44
-rw-r--r--security/keys/keyctl.c238
-rw-r--r--security/keys/keyctl_pkey.c16
-rw-r--r--security/keys/keyring.c38
-rw-r--r--security/keys/permission.c31
-rw-r--r--security/keys/proc.c2
-rw-r--r--security/keys/process_keys.c61
-rw-r--r--security/keys/request_key.c12
-rw-r--r--security/keys/request_key_auth.c7
-rw-r--r--security/keys/trusted-keys/Kconfig38
-rw-r--r--security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile12
-rw-r--r--security/keys/trusted-keys/tpm2key.asn111
-rw-r--r--security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_caam.c80
-rw-r--r--security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c397
-rw-r--r--security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tee.c313
-rw-r--r--security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c443
-rw-r--r--security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c293
-rw-r--r--security/keys/user_defined.c11
28 files changed, 1828 insertions, 959 deletions
diff --git a/security/keys/Kconfig b/security/keys/Kconfig
index 47c041563d41..abb03a1b2a5c 100644
--- a/security/keys/Kconfig
+++ b/security/keys/Kconfig
@@ -60,9 +60,7 @@ config BIG_KEYS
bool "Large payload keys"
depends on KEYS
depends on TMPFS
- select CRYPTO
- select CRYPTO_AES
- select CRYPTO_GCM
+ depends on CRYPTO_LIB_CHACHA20POLY1305 = y
help
This option provides support for holding large keys within the kernel
(for example Kerberos ticket caches). The data may be stored out to
@@ -72,20 +70,19 @@ config BIG_KEYS
config TRUSTED_KEYS
tristate "TRUSTED KEYS"
- depends on KEYS && TCG_TPM
- select CRYPTO
- select CRYPTO_HMAC
- select CRYPTO_SHA1
- select CRYPTO_HASH_INFO
+ depends on KEYS
help
This option provides support for creating, sealing, and unsealing
keys in the kernel. Trusted keys are random number symmetric keys,
- generated and RSA-sealed by the TPM. The TPM only unseals the keys,
- if the boot PCRs and other criteria match. Userspace will only ever
- see encrypted blobs.
+ generated and sealed by a trust source selected at kernel boot-time.
+ Userspace will only ever see encrypted blobs.
If you are unsure as to whether this is required, answer N.
+if TRUSTED_KEYS
+source "security/keys/trusted-keys/Kconfig"
+endif
+
config ENCRYPTED_KEYS
tristate "ENCRYPTED KEYS"
depends on KEYS
@@ -97,10 +94,21 @@ config ENCRYPTED_KEYS
select CRYPTO_RNG
help
This option provides support for create/encrypting/decrypting keys
- in the kernel. Encrypted keys are kernel generated random numbers,
- which are encrypted/decrypted with a 'master' symmetric key. The
- 'master' key can be either a trusted-key or user-key type.
- Userspace only ever sees/stores encrypted blobs.
+ in the kernel. Encrypted keys are instantiated using kernel
+ generated random numbers or provided decrypted data, and are
+ encrypted/decrypted with a 'master' symmetric key. The 'master'
+ key can be either a trusted-key or user-key type. Only encrypted
+ blobs are ever output to Userspace.
+
+ If you are unsure as to whether this is required, answer N.
+
+config USER_DECRYPTED_DATA
+ bool "Allow encrypted keys with user decrypted data"
+ depends on ENCRYPTED_KEYS
+ help
+ This option provides support for instantiating encrypted keys using
+ user-provided decrypted data. The decrypted data must be hex-ascii
+ encoded.
If you are unsure as to whether this is required, answer N.
@@ -108,7 +116,7 @@ config KEY_DH_OPERATIONS
bool "Diffie-Hellman operations on retained keys"
depends on KEYS
select CRYPTO
- select CRYPTO_HASH
+ select CRYPTO_KDF800108_CTR
select CRYPTO_DH
help
This option provides support for calculating Diffie-Hellman
@@ -116,3 +124,12 @@ config KEY_DH_OPERATIONS
in the kernel.
If you are unsure as to whether this is required, answer N.
+
+config KEY_NOTIFICATIONS
+ bool "Provide key/keyring change notifications"
+ depends on KEYS && WATCH_QUEUE
+ help
+ This option provides support for getting change notifications
+ on keys and keyrings on which the caller has View permission.
+ This makes use of pipes to handle the notification buffer and
+ provides KEYCTL_WATCH_KEY to enable/disable watches.
diff --git a/security/keys/big_key.c b/security/keys/big_key.c
index 001abe530a0d..c3367622c683 100644
--- a/security/keys/big_key.c
+++ b/security/keys/big_key.c
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
/* Large capacity key type
*
- * Copyright (C) 2017 Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2017-2020 Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>. All Rights Reserved.
* Copyright (C) 2013 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
* Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
*/
@@ -12,38 +12,21 @@
#include <linux/file.h>
#include <linux/shmem_fs.h>
#include <linux/err.h>
-#include <linux/scatterlist.h>
#include <linux/random.h>
-#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
#include <keys/user-type.h>
#include <keys/big_key-type.h>
-#include <crypto/aead.h>
-#include <crypto/gcm.h>
-
-struct big_key_buf {
- unsigned int nr_pages;
- void *virt;
- struct scatterlist *sg;
- struct page *pages[];
-};
+#include <crypto/chacha20poly1305.h>
/*
* Layout of key payload words.
*/
-enum {
- big_key_data,
- big_key_path,
- big_key_path_2nd_part,
- big_key_len,
-};
-
-/*
- * Crypto operation with big_key data
- */
-enum big_key_op {
- BIG_KEY_ENC,
- BIG_KEY_DEC,
+struct big_key_payload {
+ u8 *data;
+ struct path path;
+ size_t length;
};
+#define to_big_key_payload(payload) \
+ (struct big_key_payload *)((payload).data)
/*
* If the data is under this limit, there's no point creating a shm file to
@@ -53,16 +36,6 @@ enum big_key_op {
#define BIG_KEY_FILE_THRESHOLD (sizeof(struct inode) + sizeof(struct dentry))
/*
- * Key size for big_key data encryption
- */
-#define ENC_KEY_SIZE 32
-
-/*
- * Authentication tag length
- */
-#define ENC_AUTHTAG_SIZE 16
-
-/*
* big_key defined keys take an arbitrary string as the description and an
* arbitrary blob of data as the payload
*/
@@ -75,173 +48,59 @@ struct key_type key_type_big_key = {
.destroy = big_key_destroy,
.describe = big_key_describe,
.read = big_key_read,
- /* no ->update(); don't add it without changing big_key_crypt() nonce */
+ .update = big_key_update,
};
/*
- * Crypto names for big_key data authenticated encryption
- */
-static const char big_key_alg_name[] = "gcm(aes)";
-#define BIG_KEY_IV_SIZE GCM_AES_IV_SIZE
-
-/*
- * Crypto algorithms for big_key data authenticated encryption
- */
-static struct crypto_aead *big_key_aead;
-
-/*
- * Since changing the key affects the entire object, we need a mutex.
- */
-static DEFINE_MUTEX(big_key_aead_lock);
-
-/*
- * Encrypt/decrypt big_key data
- */
-static int big_key_crypt(enum big_key_op op, struct big_key_buf *buf, size_t datalen, u8 *key)
-{
- int ret;
- struct aead_request *aead_req;
- /* We always use a zero nonce. The reason we can get away with this is
- * because we're using a different randomly generated key for every
- * different encryption. Notably, too, key_type_big_key doesn't define
- * an .update function, so there's no chance we'll wind up reusing the
- * key to encrypt updated data. Simply put: one key, one encryption.
- */
- u8 zero_nonce[BIG_KEY_IV_SIZE];
-
- aead_req = aead_request_alloc(big_key_aead, GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!aead_req)
- return -ENOMEM;
-
- memset(zero_nonce, 0, sizeof(zero_nonce));
- aead_request_set_crypt(aead_req, buf->sg, buf->sg, datalen, zero_nonce);
- aead_request_set_callback(aead_req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP, NULL, NULL);
- aead_request_set_ad(aead_req, 0);
-
- mutex_lock(&big_key_aead_lock);
- if (crypto_aead_setkey(big_key_aead, key, ENC_KEY_SIZE)) {
- ret = -EAGAIN;
- goto error;
- }
- if (op == BIG_KEY_ENC)
- ret = crypto_aead_encrypt(aead_req);
- else
- ret = crypto_aead_decrypt(aead_req);
-error:
- mutex_unlock(&big_key_aead_lock);
- aead_request_free(aead_req);
- return ret;
-}
-
-/*
- * Free up the buffer.
- */
-static void big_key_free_buffer(struct big_key_buf *buf)
-{
- unsigned int i;
-
- if (buf->virt) {
- memset(buf->virt, 0, buf->nr_pages * PAGE_SIZE);
- vunmap(buf->virt);
- }
-
- for (i = 0; i < buf->nr_pages; i++)
- if (buf->pages[i])
- __free_page(buf->pages[i]);
-
- kfree(buf);
-}
-
-/*
- * Allocate a buffer consisting of a set of pages with a virtual mapping
- * applied over them.
- */
-static void *big_key_alloc_buffer(size_t len)
-{
- struct big_key_buf *buf;
- unsigned int npg = (len + PAGE_SIZE - 1) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
- unsigned int i, l;
-
- buf = kzalloc(sizeof(struct big_key_buf) +
- sizeof(struct page) * npg +
- sizeof(struct scatterlist) * npg,
- GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!buf)
- return NULL;
-
- buf->nr_pages = npg;
- buf->sg = (void *)(buf->pages + npg);
- sg_init_table(buf->sg, npg);
-
- for (i = 0; i < buf->nr_pages; i++) {
- buf->pages[i] = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!buf->pages[i])
- goto nomem;
-
- l = min_t(size_t, len, PAGE_SIZE);
- sg_set_page(&buf->sg[i], buf->pages[i], l, 0);
- len -= l;
- }
-
- buf->virt = vmap(buf->pages, buf->nr_pages, VM_MAP, PAGE_KERNEL);
- if (!buf->virt)
- goto nomem;
-
- return buf;
-
-nomem:
- big_key_free_buffer(buf);
- return NULL;
-}
-
-/*
* Preparse a big key
*/
int big_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
{
- struct big_key_buf *buf;
- struct path *path = (struct path *)&prep->payload.data[big_key_path];
+ struct big_key_payload *payload = to_big_key_payload(prep->payload);
struct file *file;
- u8 *enckey;
+ u8 *buf, *enckey;
ssize_t written;
- size_t datalen = prep->datalen, enclen = datalen + ENC_AUTHTAG_SIZE;
+ size_t datalen = prep->datalen;
+ size_t enclen = datalen + CHACHA20POLY1305_AUTHTAG_SIZE;
int ret;
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(*payload) != sizeof(prep->payload.data));
+
if (datalen <= 0 || datalen > 1024 * 1024 || !prep->data)
return -EINVAL;
/* Set an arbitrary quota */
prep->quotalen = 16;
- prep->payload.data[big_key_len] = (void *)(unsigned long)datalen;
+ payload->length = datalen;
if (datalen > BIG_KEY_FILE_THRESHOLD) {
/* Create a shmem file to store the data in. This will permit the data
* to be swapped out if needed.
*
* File content is stored encrypted with randomly generated key.
+ * Since the key is random for each file, we can set the nonce
+ * to zero, provided we never define a ->update() call.
*/
loff_t pos = 0;
- buf = big_key_alloc_buffer(enclen);
+ buf = kvmalloc(enclen, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!buf)
return -ENOMEM;
- memcpy(buf->virt, prep->data, datalen);
/* generate random key */
- enckey = kmalloc(ENC_KEY_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
+ enckey = kmalloc(CHACHA20POLY1305_KEY_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!enckey) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto error;
}
- ret = get_random_bytes_wait(enckey, ENC_KEY_SIZE);
+ ret = get_random_bytes_wait(enckey, CHACHA20POLY1305_KEY_SIZE);
if (unlikely(ret))
goto err_enckey;
- /* encrypt aligned data */
- ret = big_key_crypt(BIG_KEY_ENC, buf, datalen, enckey);
- if (ret)
- goto err_enckey;
+ /* encrypt data */
+ chacha20poly1305_encrypt(buf, prep->data, datalen, NULL, 0,
+ 0, enckey);
/* save aligned data to file */
file = shmem_kernel_file_setup("", enclen, 0);
@@ -250,22 +109,22 @@ int big_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
goto err_enckey;
}
- written = kernel_write(file, buf->virt, enclen, &pos);
+ written = kernel_write(file, buf, enclen, &pos);
if (written != enclen) {
ret = written;
if (written >= 0)
- ret = -ENOMEM;
+ ret = -EIO;
goto err_fput;
}
/* Pin the mount and dentry to the key so that we can open it again
* later
*/
- prep->payload.data[big_key_data] = enckey;
- *path = file->f_path;
- path_get(path);
+ payload->data = enckey;
+ payload->path = file->f_path;
+ path_get(&payload->path);
fput(file);
- big_key_free_buffer(buf);
+ kvfree_sensitive(buf, enclen);
} else {
/* Just store the data in a buffer */
void *data = kmalloc(datalen, GFP_KERNEL);
@@ -273,7 +132,7 @@ int big_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
if (!data)
return -ENOMEM;
- prep->payload.data[big_key_data] = data;
+ payload->data = data;
memcpy(data, prep->data, prep->datalen);
}
return 0;
@@ -281,9 +140,9 @@ int big_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
err_fput:
fput(file);
err_enckey:
- kzfree(enckey);
+ kfree_sensitive(enckey);
error:
- big_key_free_buffer(buf);
+ kvfree_sensitive(buf, enclen);
return ret;
}
@@ -292,12 +151,11 @@ error:
*/
void big_key_free_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
{
- if (prep->datalen > BIG_KEY_FILE_THRESHOLD) {
- struct path *path = (struct path *)&prep->payload.data[big_key_path];
+ struct big_key_payload *payload = to_big_key_payload(prep->payload);
- path_put(path);
- }
- kzfree(prep->payload.data[big_key_data]);
+ if (prep->datalen > BIG_KEY_FILE_THRESHOLD)
+ path_put(&payload->path);
+ kfree_sensitive(payload->data);
}
/*
@@ -306,13 +164,12 @@ void big_key_free_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
*/
void big_key_revoke(struct key *key)
{
- struct path *path = (struct path *)&key->payload.data[big_key_path];
+ struct big_key_payload *payload = to_big_key_payload(key->payload);
/* clear the quota */
key_payload_reserve(key, 0);
- if (key_is_positive(key) &&
- (size_t)key->payload.data[big_key_len] > BIG_KEY_FILE_THRESHOLD)
- vfs_truncate(path, 0);
+ if (key_is_positive(key) && payload->length > BIG_KEY_FILE_THRESHOLD)
+ vfs_truncate(&payload->path, 0);
}
/*
@@ -320,17 +177,32 @@ void big_key_revoke(struct key *key)
*/
void big_key_destroy(struct key *key)
{
- size_t datalen = (size_t)key->payload.data[big_key_len];
-
- if (datalen > BIG_KEY_FILE_THRESHOLD) {
- struct path *path = (struct path *)&key->payload.data[big_key_path];
+ struct big_key_payload *payload = to_big_key_payload(key->payload);
- path_put(path);
- path->mnt = NULL;
- path->dentry = NULL;
+ if (payload->length > BIG_KEY_FILE_THRESHOLD) {
+ path_put(&payload->path);
+ payload->path.mnt = NULL;
+ payload->path.dentry = NULL;
}
- kzfree(key->payload.data[big_key_data]);
- key->payload.data[big_key_data] = NULL;
+ kfree_sensitive(payload->data);
+ payload->data = NULL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Update a big key
+ */
+int big_key_update(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
+{
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = key_payload_reserve(key, prep->datalen);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ret;
+
+ if (key_is_positive(key))
+ big_key_destroy(key);
+
+ return generic_key_instantiate(key, prep);
}
/*
@@ -338,72 +210,70 @@ void big_key_destroy(struct key *key)
*/
void big_key_describe(const struct key *key, struct seq_file *m)
{
- size_t datalen = (size_t)key->payload.data[big_key_len];
+ struct big_key_payload *payload = to_big_key_payload(key->payload);
seq_puts(m, key->description);
if (key_is_positive(key))
seq_printf(m, ": %zu [%s]",
- datalen,
- datalen > BIG_KEY_FILE_THRESHOLD ? "file" : "buff");
+ payload->length,
+ payload->length > BIG_KEY_FILE_THRESHOLD ? "file" : "buff");
}
/*
* read the key data
* - the key's semaphore is read-locked
*/
-long big_key_read(const struct key *key, char __user *buffer, size_t buflen)
+long big_key_read(const struct key *key, char *buffer, size_t buflen)
{
- size_t datalen = (size_t)key->payload.data[big_key_len];
+ struct big_key_payload *payload = to_big_key_payload(key->payload);
+ size_t datalen = payload->length;
long ret;
if (!buffer || buflen < datalen)
return datalen;
if (datalen > BIG_KEY_FILE_THRESHOLD) {
- struct big_key_buf *buf;
- struct path *path = (struct path *)&key->payload.data[big_key_path];
struct file *file;
- u8 *enckey = (u8 *)key->payload.data[big_key_data];
- size_t enclen = datalen + ENC_AUTHTAG_SIZE;
+ u8 *buf, *enckey = payload->data;
+ size_t enclen = datalen + CHACHA20POLY1305_AUTHTAG_SIZE;
loff_t pos = 0;
- buf = big_key_alloc_buffer(enclen);
+ buf = kvmalloc(enclen, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!buf)
return -ENOMEM;
- file = dentry_open(path, O_RDONLY, current_cred());
+ file = dentry_open(&payload->path, O_RDONLY, current_cred());
if (IS_ERR(file)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(file);
goto error;
}
/* read file to kernel and decrypt */
- ret = kernel_read(file, buf->virt, enclen, &pos);
- if (ret >= 0 && ret != enclen) {
- ret = -EIO;
+ ret = kernel_read(file, buf, enclen, &pos);
+ if (ret != enclen) {
+ if (ret >= 0)
+ ret = -EIO;
goto err_fput;
}
- ret = big_key_crypt(BIG_KEY_DEC, buf, enclen, enckey);
- if (ret)
+ ret = chacha20poly1305_decrypt(buf, buf, enclen, NULL, 0, 0,
+ enckey) ? 0 : -EBADMSG;
+ if (unlikely(ret))
goto err_fput;
ret = datalen;
- /* copy decrypted data to user */
- if (copy_to_user(buffer, buf->virt, datalen) != 0)
- ret = -EFAULT;
+ /* copy out decrypted data */
+ memcpy(buffer, buf, datalen);
err_fput:
fput(file);
error:
- big_key_free_buffer(buf);
+ kvfree_sensitive(buf, enclen);
} else {
ret = datalen;
- if (copy_to_user(buffer, key->payload.data[big_key_data],
- datalen) != 0)
- ret = -EFAULT;
+ memcpy(buffer, payload->data, datalen);
}
return ret;
@@ -414,39 +284,7 @@ error:
*/
static int __init big_key_init(void)
{
- int ret;
-
- /* init block cipher */
- big_key_aead = crypto_alloc_aead(big_key_alg_name, 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
- if (IS_ERR(big_key_aead)) {
- ret = PTR_ERR(big_key_aead);
- pr_err("Can't alloc crypto: %d\n", ret);
- return ret;
- }
-
- if (unlikely(crypto_aead_ivsize(big_key_aead) != BIG_KEY_IV_SIZE)) {
- WARN(1, "big key algorithm changed?");
- ret = -EINVAL;
- goto free_aead;
- }
-
- ret = crypto_aead_setauthsize(big_key_aead, ENC_AUTHTAG_SIZE);
- if (ret < 0) {
- pr_err("Can't set crypto auth tag len: %d\n", ret);
- goto free_aead;
- }
-
- ret = register_key_type(&key_type_big_key);
- if (ret < 0) {
- pr_err("Can't register type: %d\n", ret);
- goto free_aead;
- }
-
- return 0;
-
-free_aead:
- crypto_free_aead(big_key_aead);
- return ret;
+ return register_key_type(&key_type_big_key);
}
late_initcall(big_key_init);
diff --git a/security/keys/compat.c b/security/keys/compat.c
index b975f8f11124..1545efdca562 100644
--- a/security/keys/compat.c
+++ b/security/keys/compat.c
@@ -12,39 +12,6 @@
#include "internal.h"
/*
- * Instantiate a key with the specified compatibility multipart payload and
- * link the key into the destination keyring if one is given.
- *
- * The caller must have the appropriate instantiation permit set for this to
- * work (see keyctl_assume_authority). No other permissions are required.
- *
- * If successful, 0 will be returned.
- */
-static long compat_keyctl_instantiate_key_iov(
- key_serial_t id,
- const struct compat_iovec __user *_payload_iov,
- unsigned ioc,
- key_serial_t ringid)
-{
- struct iovec iovstack[UIO_FASTIOV], *iov = iovstack;
- struct iov_iter from;
- long ret;
-
- if (!_payload_iov)
- ioc = 0;
-
- ret = compat_import_iovec(WRITE, _payload_iov, ioc,
- ARRAY_SIZE(iovstack), &iov,
- &from);
- if (ret < 0)
- return ret;
-
- ret = keyctl_instantiate_key_common(id, &from, ringid);
- kfree(iov);
- return ret;
-}
-
-/*
* The key control system call, 32-bit compatibility version for 64-bit archs
*/
COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE5(keyctl, u32, option,
@@ -114,8 +81,8 @@ COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE5(keyctl, u32, option,
return keyctl_reject_key(arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5);
case KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE_IOV:
- return compat_keyctl_instantiate_key_iov(
- arg2, compat_ptr(arg3), arg4, arg5);
+ return keyctl_instantiate_key_iov(arg2, compat_ptr(arg3), arg4,
+ arg5);
case KEYCTL_INVALIDATE:
return keyctl_invalidate_key(arg2);
@@ -156,6 +123,9 @@ COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE5(keyctl, u32, option,
case KEYCTL_CAPABILITIES:
return keyctl_capabilities(compat_ptr(arg2), arg3);
+ case KEYCTL_WATCH_KEY:
+ return keyctl_watch_key(arg2, arg3, arg4);
+
default:
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
diff --git a/security/keys/dh.c b/security/keys/dh.c
index c4c629bb1c03..b339760a31dd 100644
--- a/security/keys/dh.c
+++ b/security/keys/dh.c
@@ -11,10 +11,11 @@
#include <crypto/hash.h>
#include <crypto/kpp.h>
#include <crypto/dh.h>
+#include <crypto/kdf_sp800108.h>
#include <keys/user-type.h>
#include "internal.h"
-static ssize_t dh_data_from_key(key_serial_t keyid, void **data)
+static ssize_t dh_data_from_key(key_serial_t keyid, const void **data)
{
struct key *key;
key_ref_t key_ref;
@@ -58,9 +59,9 @@ error:
static void dh_free_data(struct dh *dh)
{
- kzfree(dh->key);
- kzfree(dh->p);
- kzfree(dh->g);
+ kfree_sensitive(dh->key);
+ kfree_sensitive(dh->p);
+ kfree_sensitive(dh->g);
}
struct dh_completion {
@@ -79,17 +80,9 @@ static void dh_crypto_done(struct crypto_async_request *req, int err)
complete(&compl->completion);
}
-struct kdf_sdesc {
- struct shash_desc shash;
- char ctx[];
-};
-
-static int kdf_alloc(struct kdf_sdesc **sdesc_ret, char *hashname)
+static int kdf_alloc(struct crypto_shash **hash, char *hashname)
{
struct crypto_shash *tfm;
- struct kdf_sdesc *sdesc;
- int size;
- int err;
/* allocate synchronous hash */
tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(hashname, 0, 0);
@@ -98,112 +91,30 @@ static int kdf_alloc(struct kdf_sdesc **sdesc_ret, char *hashname)
return PTR_ERR(tfm);
}
- err = -EINVAL;
- if (crypto_shash_digestsize(tfm) == 0)
- goto out_free_tfm;
-
- err = -ENOMEM;
- size = sizeof(struct shash_desc) + crypto_shash_descsize(tfm);
- sdesc = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!sdesc)
- goto out_free_tfm;
- sdesc->shash.tfm = tfm;
+ if (crypto_shash_digestsize(tfm) == 0) {
+ crypto_free_shash(tfm);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
- *sdesc_ret = sdesc;
+ *hash = tfm;
return 0;
-
-out_free_tfm:
- crypto_free_shash(tfm);
- return err;
}
-static void kdf_dealloc(struct kdf_sdesc *sdesc)
+static void kdf_dealloc(struct crypto_shash *hash)
{
- if (!sdesc)
- return;
-
- if (sdesc->shash.tfm)
- crypto_free_shash(sdesc->shash.tfm);
-
- kzfree(sdesc);
-}
-
-/*
- * Implementation of the KDF in counter mode according to SP800-108 section 5.1
- * as well as SP800-56A section 5.8.1 (Single-step KDF).
- *
- * SP800-56A:
- * The src pointer is defined as Z || other info where Z is the shared secret
- * from DH and other info is an arbitrary string (see SP800-56A section
- * 5.8.1.2).
- *
- * 'dlen' must be a multiple of the digest size.
- */
-static int kdf_ctr(struct kdf_sdesc *sdesc, const u8 *src, unsigned int slen,
- u8 *dst, unsigned int dlen, unsigned int zlen)
-{
- struct shash_desc *desc = &sdesc->shash;
- unsigned int h = crypto_shash_digestsize(desc->tfm);
- int err = 0;
- u8 *dst_orig = dst;
- __be32 counter = cpu_to_be32(1);
-
- while (dlen) {
- err = crypto_shash_init(desc);
- if (err)
- goto err;
-
- err = crypto_shash_update(desc, (u8 *)&counter, sizeof(__be32));
- if (err)
- goto err;
-
- if (zlen && h) {
- u8 tmpbuffer[32];
- size_t chunk = min_t(size_t, zlen, sizeof(tmpbuffer));
- memset(tmpbuffer, 0, chunk);
-
- do {
- err = crypto_shash_update(desc, tmpbuffer,
- chunk);
- if (err)
- goto err;
-
- zlen -= chunk;
- chunk = min_t(size_t, zlen, sizeof(tmpbuffer));
- } while (zlen);
- }
-
- if (src && slen) {
- err = crypto_shash_update(desc, src, slen);
- if (err)
- goto err;
- }
-
- err = crypto_shash_final(desc, dst);
- if (err)
- goto err;
-
- dlen -= h;
- dst += h;
- counter = cpu_to_be32(be32_to_cpu(counter) + 1);
- }
-
- return 0;
-
-err:
- memzero_explicit(dst_orig, dlen);
- return err;
+ if (hash)
+ crypto_free_shash(hash);
}
-static int keyctl_dh_compute_kdf(struct kdf_sdesc *sdesc,
+static int keyctl_dh_compute_kdf(struct crypto_shash *hash,
char __user *buffer, size_t buflen,
- uint8_t *kbuf, size_t kbuflen, size_t lzero)
+ uint8_t *kbuf, size_t kbuflen)
{
+ struct kvec kbuf_iov = { .iov_base = kbuf, .iov_len = kbuflen };
uint8_t *outbuf = NULL;
int ret;
- size_t outbuf_len = roundup(buflen,
- crypto_shash_digestsize(sdesc->shash.tfm));
+ size_t outbuf_len = roundup(buflen, crypto_shash_digestsize(hash));
outbuf = kmalloc(outbuf_len, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!outbuf) {
@@ -211,7 +122,7 @@ static int keyctl_dh_compute_kdf(struct kdf_sdesc *sdesc,
goto err;
}
- ret = kdf_ctr(sdesc, kbuf, kbuflen, outbuf, outbuf_len, lzero);
+ ret = crypto_kdf108_ctr_generate(hash, &kbuf_iov, 1, outbuf, outbuf_len);
if (ret)
goto err;
@@ -220,7 +131,7 @@ static int keyctl_dh_compute_kdf(struct kdf_sdesc *sdesc,
ret = -EFAULT;
err:
- kzfree(outbuf);
+ kfree_sensitive(outbuf);
return ret;
}
@@ -240,7 +151,7 @@ long __keyctl_dh_compute(struct keyctl_dh_params __user *params,
struct kpp_request *req;
uint8_t *secret;
uint8_t *outbuf;
- struct kdf_sdesc *sdesc = NULL;
+ struct crypto_shash *hash = NULL;
if (!params || (!buffer && buflen)) {
ret = -EINVAL;
@@ -273,7 +184,7 @@ long __keyctl_dh_compute(struct keyctl_dh_params __user *params,
}
/* allocate KDF from the kernel crypto API */
- ret = kdf_alloc(&sdesc, hashname);
+ ret = kdf_alloc(&hash, hashname);
kfree(hashname);
if (ret)
goto out1;
@@ -383,9 +294,8 @@ long __keyctl_dh_compute(struct keyctl_dh_params __user *params,
goto out6;
}
- ret = keyctl_dh_compute_kdf(sdesc, buffer, buflen, outbuf,
- req->dst_len + kdfcopy->otherinfolen,
- outlen - req->dst_len);
+ ret = keyctl_dh_compute_kdf(hash, buffer, buflen, outbuf,
+ req->dst_len + kdfcopy->otherinfolen);
} else if (copy_to_user(buffer, outbuf, req->dst_len) == 0) {
ret = req->dst_len;
} else {
@@ -395,15 +305,15 @@ long __keyctl_dh_compute(struct keyctl_dh_params __user *params,
out6:
kpp_request_free(req);
out5:
- kzfree(outbuf);
+ kfree_sensitive(outbuf);
out4:
crypto_free_kpp(tfm);
out3:
- kzfree(secret);
+ kfree_sensitive(secret);
out2:
dh_free_data(&dh_inputs);
out1:
- kdf_dealloc(sdesc);
+ kdf_dealloc(hash);
return ret;
}
diff --git a/security/keys/encrypted-keys/ecryptfs_format.c b/security/keys/encrypted-keys/ecryptfs_format.c
index a7339d4de811..8fdd76105ce3 100644
--- a/security/keys/encrypted-keys/ecryptfs_format.c
+++ b/security/keys/encrypted-keys/ecryptfs_format.c
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
*
* Copyright (C) 2006 International Business Machines Corp.
* Copyright (C) 2010 Politecnico di Torino, Italy
- * TORSEC group -- http://security.polito.it
+ * TORSEC group -- https://security.polito.it
*
* Authors:
* Michael A. Halcrow <mahalcro@us.ibm.com>
diff --git a/security/keys/encrypted-keys/ecryptfs_format.h b/security/keys/encrypted-keys/ecryptfs_format.h
index 939621d870e4..ed8466578616 100644
--- a/security/keys/encrypted-keys/ecryptfs_format.h
+++ b/security/keys/encrypted-keys/ecryptfs_format.h
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
*
* Copyright (C) 2006 International Business Machines Corp.
* Copyright (C) 2010 Politecnico di Torino, Italy
- * TORSEC group -- http://security.polito.it
+ * TORSEC group -- https://security.polito.it
*
* Authors:
* Michael A. Halcrow <mahalcro@us.ibm.com>
diff --git a/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c b/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c
index 60720f58cbe0..e05cfc2e49ae 100644
--- a/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c
+++ b/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
/*
* Copyright (C) 2010 IBM Corporation
* Copyright (C) 2010 Politecnico di Torino, Italy
- * TORSEC group -- http://security.polito.it
+ * TORSEC group -- https://security.polito.it
*
* Authors:
* Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@
#include <crypto/aes.h>
#include <crypto/algapi.h>
#include <crypto/hash.h>
-#include <crypto/sha.h>
+#include <crypto/sha2.h>
#include <crypto/skcipher.h>
#include "encrypted.h"
@@ -78,6 +78,11 @@ static const match_table_t key_tokens = {
{Opt_err, NULL}
};
+static bool user_decrypted_data = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_USER_DECRYPTED_DATA);
+module_param(user_decrypted_data, bool, 0);
+MODULE_PARM_DESC(user_decrypted_data,
+ "Allow instantiation of encrypted keys using provided decrypted data");
+
static int aes_get_sizes(void)
{
struct crypto_skcipher *tfm;
@@ -158,7 +163,7 @@ static int valid_master_desc(const char *new_desc, const char *orig_desc)
* datablob_parse - parse the keyctl data
*
* datablob format:
- * new [<format>] <master-key name> <decrypted data length>
+ * new [<format>] <master-key name> <decrypted data length> [<decrypted data>]
* load [<format>] <master-key name> <decrypted data length>
* <encrypted iv + data>
* update <new-master-key name>
@@ -170,7 +175,7 @@ static int valid_master_desc(const char *new_desc, const char *orig_desc)
*/
static int datablob_parse(char *datablob, const char **format,
char **master_desc, char **decrypted_datalen,
- char **hex_encoded_iv)
+ char **hex_encoded_iv, char **decrypted_data)
{
substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
int ret = -EINVAL;
@@ -231,6 +236,7 @@ static int datablob_parse(char *datablob, const char **format,
"when called from .update method\n", keyword);
break;
}
+ *decrypted_data = strsep(&datablob, " \t");
ret = 0;
break;
case Opt_load:
@@ -323,19 +329,6 @@ error:
return ukey;
}
-static int calc_hash(struct crypto_shash *tfm, u8 *digest,
- const u8 *buf, unsigned int buflen)
-{
- SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK(desc, tfm);
- int err;
-
- desc->tfm = tfm;
-
- err = crypto_shash_digest(desc, buf, buflen, digest);
- shash_desc_zero(desc);
- return err;
-}
-
static int calc_hmac(u8 *digest, const u8 *key, unsigned int keylen,
const u8 *buf, unsigned int buflen)
{
@@ -351,7 +344,7 @@ static int calc_hmac(u8 *digest, const u8 *key, unsigned int keylen,
err = crypto_shash_setkey(tfm, key, keylen);
if (!err)
- err = calc_hash(tfm, digest, buf, buflen);
+ err = crypto_shash_tfm_digest(tfm, buf, buflen, digest);
crypto_free_shash(tfm);
return err;
}
@@ -381,8 +374,9 @@ static int get_derived_key(u8 *derived_key, enum derived_key_type key_type,
memcpy(derived_buf + strlen(derived_buf) + 1, master_key,
master_keylen);
- ret = calc_hash(hash_tfm, derived_key, derived_buf, derived_buf_len);
- kzfree(derived_buf);
+ ret = crypto_shash_tfm_digest(hash_tfm, derived_buf, derived_buf_len,
+ derived_key);
+ kfree_sensitive(derived_buf);
return ret;
}
@@ -607,7 +601,8 @@ out:
static struct encrypted_key_payload *encrypted_key_alloc(struct key *key,
const char *format,
const char *master_desc,
- const char *datalen)
+ const char *datalen,
+ const char *decrypted_data)
{
struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload = NULL;
unsigned short datablob_len;
@@ -616,6 +611,7 @@ static struct encrypted_key_payload *encrypted_key_alloc(struct key *key,
unsigned int encrypted_datalen;
unsigned int format_len;
long dlen;
+ int i;
int ret;
ret = kstrtol(datalen, 10, &dlen);
@@ -625,6 +621,24 @@ static struct encrypted_key_payload *encrypted_key_alloc(struct key *key,
format_len = (!format) ? strlen(key_format_default) : strlen(format);
decrypted_datalen = dlen;
payload_datalen = decrypted_datalen;
+
+ if (decrypted_data) {
+ if (!user_decrypted_data) {
+ pr_err("encrypted key: instantiation of keys using provided decrypted data is disabled since CONFIG_USER_DECRYPTED_DATA is set to false\n");
+ return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+ }
+ if (strlen(decrypted_data) != decrypted_datalen) {
+ pr_err("encrypted key: decrypted data provided does not match decrypted data length provided\n");
+ return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+ }
+ for (i = 0; i < strlen(decrypted_data); i++) {
+ if (!isxdigit(decrypted_data[i])) {
+ pr_err("encrypted key: decrypted data provided must contain only hexadecimal characters\n");
+ return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
if (format) {
if (!strcmp(format, key_format_ecryptfs)) {
if (dlen != ECRYPTFS_MAX_KEY_BYTES) {
@@ -752,13 +766,14 @@ static void __ekey_init(struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload,
/*
* encrypted_init - initialize an encrypted key
*
- * For a new key, use a random number for both the iv and data
- * itself. For an old key, decrypt the hex encoded data.
+ * For a new key, use either a random number or user-provided decrypted data in
+ * case it is provided. A random number is used for the iv in both cases. For
+ * an old key, decrypt the hex encoded data.
*/
static int encrypted_init(struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload,
const char *key_desc, const char *format,
const char *master_desc, const char *datalen,
- const char *hex_encoded_iv)
+ const char *hex_encoded_iv, const char *decrypted_data)
{
int ret = 0;
@@ -772,21 +787,26 @@ static int encrypted_init(struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload,
}
__ekey_init(epayload, format, master_desc, datalen);
- if (!hex_encoded_iv) {
- get_random_bytes(epayload->iv, ivsize);
-
- get_random_bytes(epayload->decrypted_data,
- epayload->decrypted_datalen);
- } else
+ if (hex_encoded_iv) {
ret = encrypted_key_decrypt(epayload, format, hex_encoded_iv);
+ } else if (decrypted_data) {
+ get_random_bytes(epayload->iv, ivsize);
+ memcpy(epayload->decrypted_data, decrypted_data,
+ epayload->decrypted_datalen);
+ } else {
+ get_random_bytes(epayload->iv, ivsize);
+ get_random_bytes(epayload->decrypted_data, epayload->decrypted_datalen);
+ }
return ret;
}
/*
* encrypted_instantiate - instantiate an encrypted key
*
- * Decrypt an existing encrypted datablob or create a new encrypted key
- * based on a kernel random number.
+ * Instantiates the key:
+ * - by decrypting an existing encrypted datablob, or
+ * - by creating a new encrypted key based on a kernel random number, or
+ * - using provided decrypted data.
*
* On success, return 0. Otherwise return errno.
*/
@@ -799,6 +819,7 @@ static int encrypted_instantiate(struct key *key,
char *master_desc = NULL;
char *decrypted_datalen = NULL;
char *hex_encoded_iv = NULL;
+ char *decrypted_data = NULL;
size_t datalen = prep->datalen;
int ret;
@@ -811,26 +832,26 @@ static int encrypted_instantiate(struct key *key,
datablob[datalen] = 0;
memcpy(datablob, prep->data, datalen);
ret = datablob_parse(datablob, &format, &master_desc,
- &decrypted_datalen, &hex_encoded_iv);
+ &decrypted_datalen, &hex_encoded_iv, &decrypted_data);
if (ret < 0)
goto out;
epayload = encrypted_key_alloc(key, format, master_desc,
- decrypted_datalen);
+ decrypted_datalen, decrypted_data);
if (IS_ERR(epayload)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(epayload);
goto out;
}
ret = encrypted_init(epayload, key->description, format, master_desc,
- decrypted_datalen, hex_encoded_iv);
+ decrypted_datalen, hex_encoded_iv, decrypted_data);
if (ret < 0) {
- kzfree(epayload);
+ kfree_sensitive(epayload);
goto out;
}
rcu_assign_keypointer(key, epayload);
out:
- kzfree(datablob);
+ kfree_sensitive(datablob);
return ret;
}
@@ -839,7 +860,7 @@ static void encrypted_rcu_free(struct rcu_head *rcu)
struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload;
epayload = container_of(rcu, struct encrypted_key_payload, rcu);
- kzfree(epayload);
+ kfree_sensitive(epayload);
}
/*
@@ -872,7 +893,7 @@ static int encrypted_update(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
buf[datalen] = 0;
memcpy(buf, prep->data, datalen);
- ret = datablob_parse(buf, &format, &new_master_desc, NULL, NULL);
+ ret = datablob_parse(buf, &format, &new_master_desc, NULL, NULL, NULL);
if (ret < 0)
goto out;
@@ -881,7 +902,7 @@ static int encrypted_update(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
goto out;
new_epayload = encrypted_key_alloc(key, epayload->format,
- new_master_desc, epayload->datalen);
+ new_master_desc, epayload->datalen, NULL);
if (IS_ERR(new_epayload)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(new_epayload);
goto out;
@@ -897,19 +918,19 @@ static int encrypted_update(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
rcu_assign_keypointer(key, new_epayload);
call_rcu(&epayload->rcu, encrypted_rcu_free);
out:
- kzfree(buf);
+ kfree_sensitive(buf);
return ret;
}
/*
- * encrypted_read - format and copy the encrypted data to userspace
+ * encrypted_read - format and copy out the encrypted data
*
* The resulting datablob format is:
* <master-key name> <decrypted data length> <encrypted iv> <encrypted data>
*
* On success, return to userspace the encrypted key datablob size.
*/
-static long encrypted_read(const struct key *key, char __user *buffer,
+static long encrypted_read(const struct key *key, char *buffer,
size_t buflen)
{
struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload;
@@ -957,9 +978,8 @@ static long encrypted_read(const struct key *key, char __user *buffer,
key_put(mkey);
memzero_explicit(derived_key, sizeof(derived_key));
- if (copy_to_user(buffer, ascii_buf, asciiblob_len) != 0)
- ret = -EFAULT;
- kzfree(ascii_buf);
+ memcpy(buffer, ascii_buf, asciiblob_len);
+ kfree_sensitive(ascii_buf);
return asciiblob_len;
out:
@@ -974,7 +994,7 @@ out:
*/
static void encrypted_destroy(struct key *key)
{
- kzfree(key->payload.data[0]);
+ kfree_sensitive(key->payload.data[0]);
}
struct key_type key_type_encrypted = {
diff --git a/security/keys/encrypted-keys/masterkey_trusted.c b/security/keys/encrypted-keys/masterkey_trusted.c
index c68528aa49c6..e6d22ce77e98 100644
--- a/security/keys/encrypted-keys/masterkey_trusted.c
+++ b/security/keys/encrypted-keys/masterkey_trusted.c
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
/*
* Copyright (C) 2010 IBM Corporation
* Copyright (C) 2010 Politecnico di Torino, Italy
- * TORSEC group -- http://security.polito.it
+ * TORSEC group -- https://security.polito.it
*
* Authors:
* Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
diff --git a/security/keys/gc.c b/security/keys/gc.c
index 671dd730ecfc..3c90807476eb 100644
--- a/security/keys/gc.c
+++ b/security/keys/gc.c
@@ -131,6 +131,11 @@ static noinline void key_gc_unused_keys(struct list_head *keys)
kdebug("- %u", key->serial);
key_check(key);
+#ifdef CONFIG_KEY_NOTIFICATIONS
+ remove_watch_list(key->watchers, key->serial);
+ key->watchers = NULL;
+#endif
+
/* Throw away the key data if the key is instantiated */
if (state == KEY_IS_POSITIVE && key->type->destroy)
key->type->destroy(key);
diff --git a/security/keys/internal.h b/security/keys/internal.h
index ba3e2da14cef..3c1e7122076b 100644
--- a/security/keys/internal.h
+++ b/security/keys/internal.h
@@ -15,7 +15,10 @@
#include <linux/task_work.h>
#include <linux/keyctl.h>
#include <linux/refcount.h>
+#include <linux/watch_queue.h>
#include <linux/compat.h>
+#include <linux/mm.h>
+#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
struct iovec;
@@ -97,7 +100,8 @@ extern int __key_link_begin(struct key *keyring,
const struct keyring_index_key *index_key,
struct assoc_array_edit **_edit);
extern int __key_link_check_live_key(struct key *keyring, struct key *key);
-extern void __key_link(struct key *key, struct assoc_array_edit **_edit);
+extern void __key_link(struct key *keyring, struct key *key,
+ struct assoc_array_edit **_edit);
extern void __key_link_end(struct key *keyring,
const struct keyring_index_key *index_key,
struct assoc_array_edit *edit);
@@ -161,9 +165,6 @@ extern struct key *request_key_and_link(struct key_type *type,
extern bool lookup_user_key_possessed(const struct key *key,
const struct key_match_data *match_data);
-#define KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE 0x01
-#define KEY_LOOKUP_PARTIAL 0x02
-#define KEY_LOOKUP_FOR_UNLINK 0x04
extern long join_session_keyring(const char *name);
extern void key_change_session_keyring(struct callback_head *twork);
@@ -179,14 +180,32 @@ extern void key_gc_keytype(struct key_type *ktype);
extern int key_task_permission(const key_ref_t key_ref,
const struct cred *cred,
- key_perm_t perm);
+ enum key_need_perm need_perm);
+
+static inline void notify_key(struct key *key,
+ enum key_notification_subtype subtype, u32 aux)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_KEY_NOTIFICATIONS
+ struct key_notification n = {
+ .watch.type = WATCH_TYPE_KEY_NOTIFY,
+ .watch.subtype = subtype,
+ .watch.info = watch_sizeof(n),
+ .key_id = key_serial(key),
+ .aux = aux,
+ };
+
+ post_watch_notification(key->watchers, &n.watch, current_cred(),
+ n.key_id);
+#endif
+}
/*
* Check to see whether permission is granted to use a key in the desired way.
*/
-static inline int key_permission(const key_ref_t key_ref, unsigned perm)
+static inline int key_permission(const key_ref_t key_ref,
+ enum key_need_perm need_perm)
{
- return key_task_permission(key_ref, current_cred(), perm);
+ return key_task_permission(key_ref, current_cred(), need_perm);
}
extern struct key_type key_type_request_key_auth;
@@ -241,11 +260,6 @@ extern long keyctl_instantiate_key_iov(key_serial_t,
const struct iovec __user *,
unsigned, key_serial_t);
extern long keyctl_invalidate_key(key_serial_t);
-
-struct iov_iter;
-extern long keyctl_instantiate_key_common(key_serial_t,
- struct iov_iter *,
- key_serial_t);
extern long keyctl_restrict_keyring(key_serial_t id,
const char __user *_type,
const char __user *_restriction);
@@ -331,6 +345,15 @@ static inline long keyctl_pkey_e_d_s(int op,
extern long keyctl_capabilities(unsigned char __user *_buffer, size_t buflen);
+#ifdef CONFIG_KEY_NOTIFICATIONS
+extern long keyctl_watch_key(key_serial_t, int, int);
+#else
+static inline long keyctl_watch_key(key_serial_t key_id, int watch_fd, int watch_id)
+{
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+}
+#endif
+
/*
* Debugging key validation
*/
@@ -348,5 +371,4 @@ static inline void key_check(const struct key *key)
#define key_check(key) do {} while(0)
#endif
-
#endif /* _INTERNAL_H */
diff --git a/security/keys/key.c b/security/keys/key.c
index 718bf7217420..c45afdd1dfbb 100644
--- a/security/keys/key.c
+++ b/security/keys/key.c
@@ -303,6 +303,8 @@ struct key *key_alloc(struct key_type *type, const char *desc,
key->flags |= 1 << KEY_FLAG_BUILTIN;
if (flags & KEY_ALLOC_UID_KEYRING)
key->flags |= 1 << KEY_FLAG_UID_KEYRING;
+ if (flags & KEY_ALLOC_SET_KEEP)
+ key->flags |= 1 << KEY_FLAG_KEEP;
#ifdef KEY_DEBUGGING
key->magic = KEY_DEBUG_MAGIC;
@@ -382,7 +384,7 @@ int key_payload_reserve(struct key *key, size_t datalen)
spin_lock(&key->user->lock);
if (delta > 0 &&
- (key->user->qnbytes + delta >= maxbytes ||
+ (key->user->qnbytes + delta > maxbytes ||
key->user->qnbytes + delta < key->user->qnbytes)) {
ret = -EDQUOT;
}
@@ -444,6 +446,7 @@ static int __key_instantiate_and_link(struct key *key,
/* mark the key as being instantiated */
atomic_inc(&key->user->nikeys);
mark_key_instantiated(key, 0);
+ notify_key(key, NOTIFY_KEY_INSTANTIATED, 0);
if (test_and_clear_bit(KEY_FLAG_USER_CONSTRUCT, &key->flags))
awaken = 1;
@@ -453,7 +456,7 @@ static int __key_instantiate_and_link(struct key *key,
if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_KEEP, &keyring->flags))
set_bit(KEY_FLAG_KEEP, &key->flags);
- __key_link(key, _edit);
+ __key_link(keyring, key, _edit);
}
/* disable the authorisation key */
@@ -503,6 +506,7 @@ int key_instantiate_and_link(struct key *key,
int ret;
memset(&prep, 0, sizeof(prep));
+ prep.orig_description = key->description;
prep.data = data;
prep.datalen = datalen;
prep.quotalen = key->type->def_datalen;
@@ -601,6 +605,7 @@ int key_reject_and_link(struct key *key,
/* mark the key as being negatively instantiated */
atomic_inc(&key->user->nikeys);
mark_key_instantiated(key, -error);
+ notify_key(key, NOTIFY_KEY_INSTANTIATED, -error);
key->expiry = ktime_get_real_seconds() + timeout;
key_schedule_gc(key->expiry + key_gc_delay);
@@ -611,7 +616,7 @@ int key_reject_and_link(struct key *key,
/* and link it into the destination keyring */
if (keyring && link_ret == 0)
- __key_link(key, &edit);
+ __key_link(keyring, key, &edit);
/* disable the authorisation key */
if (authkey)
@@ -764,9 +769,11 @@ static inline key_ref_t __key_update(key_ref_t key_ref,
down_write(&key->sem);
ret = key->type->update(key, prep);
- if (ret == 0)
+ if (ret == 0) {
/* Updating a negative key positively instantiates it */
mark_key_instantiated(key, 0);
+ notify_key(key, NOTIFY_KEY_UPDATED, 0);
+ }
up_write(&key->sem);
@@ -850,6 +857,7 @@ key_ref_t key_create_or_update(key_ref_t keyring_ref,
goto error_put_type;
memset(&prep, 0, sizeof(prep));
+ prep.orig_description = description;
prep.data = payload;
prep.datalen = plen;
prep.quotalen = index_key.type->def_datalen;
@@ -1023,9 +1031,11 @@ int key_update(key_ref_t key_ref, const void *payload, size_t plen)
down_write(&key->sem);
ret = key->type->update(key, &prep);
- if (ret == 0)
+ if (ret == 0) {
/* Updating a negative key positively instantiates it */
mark_key_instantiated(key, 0);
+ notify_key(key, NOTIFY_KEY_UPDATED, 0);
+ }
up_write(&key->sem);
@@ -1057,15 +1067,17 @@ void key_revoke(struct key *key)
* instantiated
*/
down_write_nested(&key->sem, 1);
- if (!test_and_set_bit(KEY_FLAG_REVOKED, &key->flags) &&
- key->type->revoke)
- key->type->revoke(key);
-
- /* set the death time to no more than the expiry time */
- time = ktime_get_real_seconds();
- if (key->revoked_at == 0 || key->revoked_at > time) {
- key->revoked_at = time;
- key_schedule_gc(key->revoked_at + key_gc_delay);
+ if (!test_and_set_bit(KEY_FLAG_REVOKED, &key->flags)) {
+ notify_key(key, NOTIFY_KEY_REVOKED, 0);
+ if (key->type->revoke)
+ key->type->revoke(key);
+
+ /* set the death time to no more than the expiry time */
+ time = ktime_get_real_seconds();
+ if (key->revoked_at == 0 || key->revoked_at > time) {
+ key->revoked_at = time;
+ key_schedule_gc(key->revoked_at + key_gc_delay);
+ }
}
up_write(&key->sem);
@@ -1087,8 +1099,10 @@ void key_invalidate(struct key *key)
if (!test_bit(KEY_FLAG_INVALIDATED, &key->flags)) {
down_write_nested(&key->sem, 1);
- if (!test_and_set_bit(KEY_FLAG_INVALIDATED, &key->flags))
+ if (!test_and_set_bit(KEY_FLAG_INVALIDATED, &key->flags)) {
+ notify_key(key, NOTIFY_KEY_INVALIDATED, 0);
key_schedule_gc_links();
+ }
up_write(&key->sem);
}
}
diff --git a/security/keys/keyctl.c b/security/keys/keyctl.c
index 9b898c969558..96a92a645216 100644
--- a/security/keys/keyctl.c
+++ b/security/keys/keyctl.c
@@ -37,7 +37,9 @@ static const unsigned char keyrings_capabilities[2] = {
KEYCTL_CAPS0_MOVE
),
[1] = (KEYCTL_CAPS1_NS_KEYRING_NAME |
- KEYCTL_CAPS1_NS_KEY_TAG),
+ KEYCTL_CAPS1_NS_KEY_TAG |
+ (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KEY_NOTIFICATIONS) ? KEYCTL_CAPS1_NOTIFICATIONS : 0)
+ ),
};
static int key_get_type_from_user(char *type,
@@ -142,10 +144,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(add_key, const char __user *, _type,
key_ref_put(keyring_ref);
error3:
- if (payload) {
- memzero_explicit(payload, plen);
- kvfree(payload);
- }
+ kvfree_sensitive(payload, plen);
error2:
kfree(description);
error:
@@ -339,7 +338,7 @@ long keyctl_update_key(key_serial_t id,
payload = NULL;
if (plen) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
- payload = kmalloc(plen, GFP_KERNEL);
+ payload = kvmalloc(plen, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!payload)
goto error;
@@ -360,7 +359,7 @@ long keyctl_update_key(key_serial_t id,
key_ref_put(key_ref);
error2:
- kzfree(payload);
+ kvfree_sensitive(payload, plen);
error:
return ret;
}
@@ -432,7 +431,7 @@ long keyctl_invalidate_key(key_serial_t id)
/* Root is permitted to invalidate certain special keys */
if (capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
- key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, 0, 0);
+ key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, 0, KEY_SYSADMIN_OVERRIDE);
if (IS_ERR(key_ref))
goto error;
if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_ROOT_CAN_INVAL,
@@ -477,7 +476,8 @@ long keyctl_keyring_clear(key_serial_t ringid)
/* Root is permitted to invalidate certain special keyrings */
if (capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
- keyring_ref = lookup_user_key(ringid, 0, 0);
+ keyring_ref = lookup_user_key(ringid, 0,
+ KEY_SYSADMIN_OVERRIDE);
if (IS_ERR(keyring_ref))
goto error;
if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_ROOT_CAN_CLEAR,
@@ -506,7 +506,7 @@ error:
* keyring, otherwise replace the link to the matching key with a link to the
* new key.
*
- * The key must grant the caller Link permission and the the keyring must grant
+ * The key must grant the caller Link permission and the keyring must grant
* the caller Write permission. Furthermore, if an additional link is created,
* the keyring's quota will be extended.
*
@@ -561,7 +561,7 @@ long keyctl_keyring_unlink(key_serial_t id, key_serial_t ringid)
goto error;
}
- key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, KEY_LOOKUP_FOR_UNLINK, 0);
+ key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, KEY_LOOKUP_PARTIAL, KEY_NEED_UNLINK);
if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(key_ref);
goto error2;
@@ -661,7 +661,7 @@ long keyctl_describe_key(key_serial_t keyid,
key_put(instkey);
key_ref = lookup_user_key(keyid,
KEY_LOOKUP_PARTIAL,
- 0);
+ KEY_AUTHTOKEN_OVERRIDE);
if (!IS_ERR(key_ref))
goto okay;
}
@@ -798,6 +798,21 @@ error:
}
/*
+ * Call the read method
+ */
+static long __keyctl_read_key(struct key *key, char *buffer, size_t buflen)
+{
+ long ret;
+
+ down_read(&key->sem);
+ ret = key_validate(key);
+ if (ret == 0)
+ ret = key->type->read(key, buffer, buflen);
+ up_read(&key->sem);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
* Read a key's payload.
*
* The key must either grant the caller Read permission, or it must grant the
@@ -812,26 +827,28 @@ long keyctl_read_key(key_serial_t keyid, char __user *buffer, size_t buflen)
struct key *key;
key_ref_t key_ref;
long ret;
+ char *key_data = NULL;
+ size_t key_data_len;
/* find the key first */
- key_ref = lookup_user_key(keyid, 0, 0);
+ key_ref = lookup_user_key(keyid, 0, KEY_DEFER_PERM_CHECK);
if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
ret = -ENOKEY;
- goto error;
+ goto out;
}
key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
ret = key_read_state(key);
if (ret < 0)
- goto error2; /* Negatively instantiated */
+ goto key_put_out; /* Negatively instantiated */
/* see if we can read it directly */
ret = key_permission(key_ref, KEY_NEED_READ);
if (ret == 0)
goto can_read_key;
if (ret != -EACCES)
- goto error2;
+ goto key_put_out;
/* we can't; see if it's searchable from this process's keyrings
* - we automatically take account of the fact that it may be
@@ -839,26 +856,78 @@ long keyctl_read_key(key_serial_t keyid, char __user *buffer, size_t buflen)
*/
if (!is_key_possessed(key_ref)) {
ret = -EACCES;
- goto error2;
+ goto key_put_out;
}
/* the key is probably readable - now try to read it */
can_read_key:
- ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
- if (key->type->read) {
- /* Read the data with the semaphore held (since we might sleep)
- * to protect against the key being updated or revoked.
+ if (!key->type->read) {
+ ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
+ goto key_put_out;
+ }
+
+ if (!buffer || !buflen) {
+ /* Get the key length from the read method */
+ ret = __keyctl_read_key(key, NULL, 0);
+ goto key_put_out;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Read the data with the semaphore held (since we might sleep)
+ * to protect against the key being updated or revoked.
+ *
+ * Allocating a temporary buffer to hold the keys before
+ * transferring them to user buffer to avoid potential
+ * deadlock involving page fault and mmap_lock.
+ *
+ * key_data_len = (buflen <= PAGE_SIZE)
+ * ? buflen : actual length of key data
+ *
+ * This prevents allocating arbitrary large buffer which can
+ * be much larger than the actual key length. In the latter case,
+ * at least 2 passes of this loop is required.
+ */
+ key_data_len = (buflen <= PAGE_SIZE) ? buflen : 0;
+ for (;;) {
+ if (key_data_len) {
+ key_data = kvmalloc(key_data_len, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!key_data) {
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
+ goto key_put_out;
+ }
+ }
+
+ ret = __keyctl_read_key(key, key_data, key_data_len);
+
+ /*
+ * Read methods will just return the required length without
+ * any copying if the provided length isn't large enough.
*/
- down_read(&key->sem);
- ret = key_validate(key);
- if (ret == 0)
- ret = key->type->read(key, buffer, buflen);
- up_read(&key->sem);
+ if (ret <= 0 || ret > buflen)
+ break;
+
+ /*
+ * The key may change (unlikely) in between 2 consecutive
+ * __keyctl_read_key() calls. In this case, we reallocate
+ * a larger buffer and redo the key read when
+ * key_data_len < ret <= buflen.
+ */
+ if (ret > key_data_len) {
+ if (unlikely(key_data))
+ kvfree_sensitive(key_data, key_data_len);
+ key_data_len = ret;
+ continue; /* Allocate buffer */
+ }
+
+ if (copy_to_user(buffer, key_data, ret))
+ ret = -EFAULT;
+ break;
}
+ kvfree_sensitive(key_data, key_data_len);
-error2:
+key_put_out:
key_put(key);
-error:
+out:
return ret;
}
@@ -937,8 +1006,8 @@ long keyctl_chown_key(key_serial_t id, uid_t user, gid_t group)
key_quota_root_maxbytes : key_quota_maxbytes;
spin_lock(&newowner->lock);
- if (newowner->qnkeys + 1 >= maxkeys ||
- newowner->qnbytes + key->quotalen >= maxbytes ||
+ if (newowner->qnkeys + 1 > maxkeys ||
+ newowner->qnbytes + key->quotalen > maxbytes ||
newowner->qnbytes + key->quotalen <
newowner->qnbytes)
goto quota_overrun;
@@ -970,6 +1039,7 @@ long keyctl_chown_key(key_serial_t id, uid_t user, gid_t group)
if (group != (gid_t) -1)
key->gid = gid;
+ notify_key(key, NOTIFY_KEY_SETATTR, 0);
ret = 0;
error_put:
@@ -1020,6 +1090,7 @@ long keyctl_setperm_key(key_serial_t id, key_perm_t perm)
/* if we're not the sysadmin, we can only change a key that we own */
if (capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) || uid_eq(key->uid, current_fsuid())) {
key->perm = perm;
+ notify_key(key, NOTIFY_KEY_SETATTR, 0);
ret = 0;
}
@@ -1093,7 +1164,7 @@ static int keyctl_change_reqkey_auth(struct key *key)
*
* If successful, 0 will be returned.
*/
-long keyctl_instantiate_key_common(key_serial_t id,
+static long keyctl_instantiate_key_common(key_serial_t id,
struct iov_iter *from,
key_serial_t ringid)
{
@@ -1156,10 +1227,7 @@ long keyctl_instantiate_key_common(key_serial_t id,
keyctl_change_reqkey_auth(NULL);
error2:
- if (payload) {
- memzero_explicit(payload, plen);
- kvfree(payload);
- }
+ kvfree_sensitive(payload, plen);
error:
return ret;
}
@@ -1398,7 +1466,7 @@ long keyctl_set_timeout(key_serial_t id, unsigned timeout)
key_put(instkey);
key_ref = lookup_user_key(id,
KEY_LOOKUP_PARTIAL,
- 0);
+ KEY_AUTHTOKEN_OVERRIDE);
if (!IS_ERR(key_ref))
goto okay;
}
@@ -1411,10 +1479,12 @@ long keyctl_set_timeout(key_serial_t id, unsigned timeout)
okay:
key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
ret = 0;
- if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_KEEP, &key->flags))
+ if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_KEEP, &key->flags)) {
ret = -EPERM;
- else
+ } else {
key_set_timeout(key, timeout);
+ notify_key(key, NOTIFY_KEY_SETATTR, 0);
+ }
key_put(key);
error:
@@ -1504,7 +1574,8 @@ long keyctl_get_security(key_serial_t keyid,
return PTR_ERR(instkey);
key_put(instkey);
- key_ref = lookup_user_key(keyid, KEY_LOOKUP_PARTIAL, 0);
+ key_ref = lookup_user_key(keyid, KEY_LOOKUP_PARTIAL,
+ KEY_AUTHTOKEN_OVERRIDE);
if (IS_ERR(key_ref))
return PTR_ERR(key_ref);
}
@@ -1622,7 +1693,7 @@ long keyctl_session_to_parent(void)
/* the replacement session keyring is applied just prior to userspace
* restarting */
- ret = task_work_add(parent, newwork, true);
+ ret = task_work_add(parent, newwork, TWA_RESUME);
if (!ret)
newwork = NULL;
unlock:
@@ -1688,6 +1759,90 @@ error:
return ret;
}
+#ifdef CONFIG_KEY_NOTIFICATIONS
+/*
+ * Watch for changes to a key.
+ *
+ * The caller must have View permission to watch a key or keyring.
+ */
+long keyctl_watch_key(key_serial_t id, int watch_queue_fd, int watch_id)
+{
+ struct watch_queue *wqueue;
+ struct watch_list *wlist = NULL;
+ struct watch *watch = NULL;
+ struct key *key;
+ key_ref_t key_ref;
+ long ret;
+
+ if (watch_id < -1 || watch_id > 0xff)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE, KEY_NEED_VIEW);
+ if (IS_ERR(key_ref))
+ return PTR_ERR(key_ref);
+ key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
+
+ wqueue = get_watch_queue(watch_queue_fd);
+ if (IS_ERR(wqueue)) {
+ ret = PTR_ERR(wqueue);
+ goto err_key;
+ }
+
+ if (watch_id >= 0) {
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
+ if (!key->watchers) {
+ wlist = kzalloc(sizeof(*wlist), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!wlist)
+ goto err_wqueue;
+ init_watch_list(wlist, NULL);
+ }
+
+ watch = kzalloc(sizeof(*watch), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!watch)
+ goto err_wlist;
+
+ init_watch(watch, wqueue);
+ watch->id = key->serial;
+ watch->info_id = (u32)watch_id << WATCH_INFO_ID__SHIFT;
+
+ ret = security_watch_key(key);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto err_watch;
+
+ down_write(&key->sem);
+ if (!key->watchers) {
+ key->watchers = wlist;
+ wlist = NULL;
+ }
+
+ ret = add_watch_to_object(watch, key->watchers);
+ up_write(&key->sem);
+
+ if (ret == 0)
+ watch = NULL;
+ } else {
+ ret = -EBADSLT;
+ if (key->watchers) {
+ down_write(&key->sem);
+ ret = remove_watch_from_object(key->watchers,
+ wqueue, key_serial(key),
+ false);
+ up_write(&key->sem);
+ }
+ }
+
+err_watch:
+ kfree(watch);
+err_wlist:
+ kfree(wlist);
+err_wqueue:
+ put_watch_queue(wqueue);
+err_key:
+ key_put(key);
+ return ret;
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_KEY_NOTIFICATIONS */
+
/*
* Get keyrings subsystem capabilities.
*/
@@ -1857,6 +2012,9 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(keyctl, int, option, unsigned long, arg2, unsigned long, arg3,
case KEYCTL_CAPABILITIES:
return keyctl_capabilities((unsigned char __user *)arg2, (size_t)arg3);
+ case KEYCTL_WATCH_KEY:
+ return keyctl_watch_key((key_serial_t)arg2, (int)arg3, (int)arg4);
+
default:
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
diff --git a/security/keys/keyctl_pkey.c b/security/keys/keyctl_pkey.c
index 931d8dfb4a7f..97bc27bbf079 100644
--- a/security/keys/keyctl_pkey.c
+++ b/security/keys/keyctl_pkey.c
@@ -135,15 +135,23 @@ static int keyctl_pkey_params_get_2(const struct keyctl_pkey_params __user *_par
switch (op) {
case KEYCTL_PKEY_ENCRYPT:
+ if (uparams.in_len > info.max_dec_size ||
+ uparams.out_len > info.max_enc_size)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ break;
case KEYCTL_PKEY_DECRYPT:
if (uparams.in_len > info.max_enc_size ||
uparams.out_len > info.max_dec_size)
return -EINVAL;
break;
case KEYCTL_PKEY_SIGN:
+ if (uparams.in_len > info.max_data_size ||
+ uparams.out_len > info.max_sig_size)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ break;
case KEYCTL_PKEY_VERIFY:
- if (uparams.in_len > info.max_sig_size ||
- uparams.out_len > info.max_data_size)
+ if (uparams.in_len > info.max_data_size ||
+ uparams.in2_len > info.max_sig_size)
return -EINVAL;
break;
default:
@@ -151,7 +159,7 @@ static int keyctl_pkey_params_get_2(const struct keyctl_pkey_params __user *_par
}
params->in_len = uparams.in_len;
- params->out_len = uparams.out_len;
+ params->out_len = uparams.out_len; /* Note: same as in2_len */
return 0;
}
@@ -166,8 +174,6 @@ long keyctl_pkey_query(key_serial_t id,
struct kernel_pkey_query res;
long ret;
- memset(&params, 0, sizeof(params));
-
ret = keyctl_pkey_params_get(id, _info, &params);
if (ret < 0)
goto error;
diff --git a/security/keys/keyring.c b/security/keys/keyring.c
index febf36c6ddc5..4448758f643a 100644
--- a/security/keys/keyring.c
+++ b/security/keys/keyring.c
@@ -79,7 +79,7 @@ static void keyring_revoke(struct key *keyring);
static void keyring_destroy(struct key *keyring);
static void keyring_describe(const struct key *keyring, struct seq_file *m);
static long keyring_read(const struct key *keyring,
- char __user *buffer, size_t buflen);
+ char *buffer, size_t buflen);
struct key_type key_type_keyring = {
.name = "keyring",
@@ -452,14 +452,13 @@ static void keyring_describe(const struct key *keyring, struct seq_file *m)
struct keyring_read_iterator_context {
size_t buflen;
size_t count;
- key_serial_t __user *buffer;
+ key_serial_t *buffer;
};
static int keyring_read_iterator(const void *object, void *data)
{
struct keyring_read_iterator_context *ctx = data;
const struct key *key = keyring_ptr_to_key(object);
- int ret;
kenter("{%s,%d},,{%zu/%zu}",
key->type->name, key->serial, ctx->count, ctx->buflen);
@@ -467,10 +466,7 @@ static int keyring_read_iterator(const void *object, void *data)
if (ctx->count >= ctx->buflen)
return 1;
- ret = put_user(key->serial, ctx->buffer);
- if (ret < 0)
- return ret;
- ctx->buffer++;
+ *ctx->buffer++ = key->serial;
ctx->count += sizeof(key->serial);
return 0;
}
@@ -483,7 +479,7 @@ static int keyring_read_iterator(const void *object, void *data)
* times.
*/
static long keyring_read(const struct key *keyring,
- char __user *buffer, size_t buflen)
+ char *buffer, size_t buflen)
{
struct keyring_read_iterator_context ctx;
long ret;
@@ -495,7 +491,7 @@ static long keyring_read(const struct key *keyring,
/* Copy as many key IDs as fit into the buffer */
if (buffer && buflen) {
- ctx.buffer = (key_serial_t __user *)buffer;
+ ctx.buffer = (key_serial_t *)buffer;
ctx.buflen = buflen;
ctx.count = 0;
ret = assoc_array_iterate(&keyring->keys,
@@ -885,7 +881,7 @@ found:
*
* Keys are matched to the type provided and are then filtered by the match
* function, which is given the description to use in any way it sees fit. The
- * match function may use any attributes of a key that it wishes to to
+ * match function may use any attributes of a key that it wishes to
* determine the match. Normally the match function from the key type would be
* used.
*
@@ -1060,12 +1056,14 @@ int keyring_restrict(key_ref_t keyring_ref, const char *type,
down_write(&keyring->sem);
down_write(&keyring_serialise_restrict_sem);
- if (keyring->restrict_link)
+ if (keyring->restrict_link) {
ret = -EEXIST;
- else if (keyring_detect_restriction_cycle(keyring, restrict_link))
+ } else if (keyring_detect_restriction_cycle(keyring, restrict_link)) {
ret = -EDEADLK;
- else
+ } else {
keyring->restrict_link = restrict_link;
+ notify_key(keyring, NOTIFY_KEY_SETATTR, 0);
+ }
up_write(&keyring_serialise_restrict_sem);
up_write(&keyring->sem);
@@ -1206,7 +1204,7 @@ static int keyring_detect_cycle_iterator(const void *object,
}
/*
- * See if a cycle will will be created by inserting acyclic tree B in acyclic
+ * See if a cycle will be created by inserting acyclic tree B in acyclic
* tree A at the topmost level (ie: as a direct child of A).
*
* Since we are adding B to A at the top level, checking for cycles should just
@@ -1366,12 +1364,14 @@ int __key_link_check_live_key(struct key *keyring, struct key *key)
* holds at most one link to any given key of a particular type+description
* combination.
*/
-void __key_link(struct key *key, struct assoc_array_edit **_edit)
+void __key_link(struct key *keyring, struct key *key,
+ struct assoc_array_edit **_edit)
{
__key_get(key);
assoc_array_insert_set_object(*_edit, keyring_key_to_ptr(key));
assoc_array_apply_edit(*_edit);
*_edit = NULL;
+ notify_key(keyring, NOTIFY_KEY_LINKED, key_serial(key));
}
/*
@@ -1455,7 +1455,7 @@ int key_link(struct key *keyring, struct key *key)
if (ret == 0)
ret = __key_link_check_live_key(keyring, key);
if (ret == 0)
- __key_link(key, &edit);
+ __key_link(keyring, key, &edit);
error_end:
__key_link_end(keyring, &key->index_key, edit);
@@ -1487,7 +1487,7 @@ static int __key_unlink_begin(struct key *keyring, struct key *key,
struct assoc_array_edit *edit;
BUG_ON(*_edit != NULL);
-
+
edit = assoc_array_delete(&keyring->keys, &keyring_assoc_array_ops,
&key->index_key);
if (IS_ERR(edit))
@@ -1507,6 +1507,7 @@ static void __key_unlink(struct key *keyring, struct key *key,
struct assoc_array_edit **_edit)
{
assoc_array_apply_edit(*_edit);
+ notify_key(keyring, NOTIFY_KEY_UNLINKED, key_serial(key));
*_edit = NULL;
key_payload_reserve(keyring, keyring->datalen - KEYQUOTA_LINK_BYTES);
}
@@ -1625,7 +1626,7 @@ int key_move(struct key *key,
goto error;
__key_unlink(from_keyring, key, &from_edit);
- __key_link(key, &to_edit);
+ __key_link(to_keyring, key, &to_edit);
error:
__key_link_end(to_keyring, &key->index_key, to_edit);
__key_unlink_end(from_keyring, key, from_edit);
@@ -1659,6 +1660,7 @@ int keyring_clear(struct key *keyring)
} else {
if (edit)
assoc_array_apply_edit(edit);
+ notify_key(keyring, NOTIFY_KEY_CLEARED, 0);
key_payload_reserve(keyring, 0);
ret = 0;
}
diff --git a/security/keys/permission.c b/security/keys/permission.c
index 085f907b64ac..4a61f804e80f 100644
--- a/security/keys/permission.c
+++ b/security/keys/permission.c
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@
* key_task_permission - Check a key can be used
* @key_ref: The key to check.
* @cred: The credentials to use.
- * @perm: The permissions to check for.
+ * @need_perm: The permission required.
*
* Check to see whether permission is granted to use a key in the desired way,
* but permit the security modules to override.
@@ -24,12 +24,30 @@
* permissions bits or the LSM check.
*/
int key_task_permission(const key_ref_t key_ref, const struct cred *cred,
- unsigned perm)
+ enum key_need_perm need_perm)
{
struct key *key;
- key_perm_t kperm;
+ key_perm_t kperm, mask;
int ret;
+ switch (need_perm) {
+ default:
+ WARN_ON(1);
+ return -EACCES;
+ case KEY_NEED_UNLINK:
+ case KEY_SYSADMIN_OVERRIDE:
+ case KEY_AUTHTOKEN_OVERRIDE:
+ case KEY_DEFER_PERM_CHECK:
+ goto lsm;
+
+ case KEY_NEED_VIEW: mask = KEY_OTH_VIEW; break;
+ case KEY_NEED_READ: mask = KEY_OTH_READ; break;
+ case KEY_NEED_WRITE: mask = KEY_OTH_WRITE; break;
+ case KEY_NEED_SEARCH: mask = KEY_OTH_SEARCH; break;
+ case KEY_NEED_LINK: mask = KEY_OTH_LINK; break;
+ case KEY_NEED_SETATTR: mask = KEY_OTH_SETATTR; break;
+ }
+
key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
/* use the second 8-bits of permissions for keys the caller owns */
@@ -64,13 +82,12 @@ use_these_perms:
if (is_key_possessed(key_ref))
kperm |= key->perm >> 24;
- kperm = kperm & perm & KEY_NEED_ALL;
-
- if (kperm != perm)
+ if ((kperm & mask) != mask)
return -EACCES;
/* let LSM be the final arbiter */
- return security_key_permission(key_ref, cred, perm);
+lsm:
+ return security_key_permission(key_ref, cred, need_perm);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(key_task_permission);
diff --git a/security/keys/proc.c b/security/keys/proc.c
index 415f3f1c2da0..d0cde6685627 100644
--- a/security/keys/proc.c
+++ b/security/keys/proc.c
@@ -139,6 +139,8 @@ static void *proc_keys_next(struct seq_file *p, void *v, loff_t *_pos)
n = key_serial_next(p, v);
if (n)
*_pos = key_node_serial(n);
+ else
+ (*_pos)++;
return n;
}
diff --git a/security/keys/process_keys.c b/security/keys/process_keys.c
index 09541de31f2f..b5d5333ab330 100644
--- a/security/keys/process_keys.c
+++ b/security/keys/process_keys.c
@@ -465,7 +465,7 @@ key_ref_t search_cred_keyrings_rcu(struct keyring_search_context *ctx)
case -EAGAIN: /* no key */
if (ret)
break;
- /* fall through */
+ fallthrough;
case -ENOKEY: /* negative key */
ret = key_ref;
break;
@@ -487,7 +487,7 @@ key_ref_t search_cred_keyrings_rcu(struct keyring_search_context *ctx)
case -EAGAIN: /* no key */
if (ret)
break;
- /* fall through */
+ fallthrough;
case -ENOKEY: /* negative key */
ret = key_ref;
break;
@@ -509,7 +509,7 @@ key_ref_t search_cred_keyrings_rcu(struct keyring_search_context *ctx)
case -EAGAIN: /* no key */
if (ret)
break;
- /* fall through */
+ fallthrough;
case -ENOKEY: /* negative key */
ret = key_ref;
break;
@@ -609,7 +609,7 @@ bool lookup_user_key_possessed(const struct key *key,
* returned key reference.
*/
key_ref_t lookup_user_key(key_serial_t id, unsigned long lflags,
- key_perm_t perm)
+ enum key_need_perm need_perm)
{
struct keyring_search_context ctx = {
.match_data.cmp = lookup_user_key_possessed,
@@ -773,35 +773,34 @@ try_again:
/* unlink does not use the nominated key in any way, so can skip all
* the permission checks as it is only concerned with the keyring */
- if (lflags & KEY_LOOKUP_FOR_UNLINK) {
- ret = 0;
- goto error;
- }
-
- if (!(lflags & KEY_LOOKUP_PARTIAL)) {
- ret = wait_for_key_construction(key, true);
- switch (ret) {
- case -ERESTARTSYS:
- goto invalid_key;
- default:
- if (perm)
+ if (need_perm != KEY_NEED_UNLINK) {
+ if (!(lflags & KEY_LOOKUP_PARTIAL)) {
+ ret = wait_for_key_construction(key, true);
+ switch (ret) {
+ case -ERESTARTSYS:
+ goto invalid_key;
+ default:
+ if (need_perm != KEY_AUTHTOKEN_OVERRIDE &&
+ need_perm != KEY_DEFER_PERM_CHECK)
+ goto invalid_key;
+ break;
+ case 0:
+ break;
+ }
+ } else if (need_perm != KEY_DEFER_PERM_CHECK) {
+ ret = key_validate(key);
+ if (ret < 0)
goto invalid_key;
- case 0:
- break;
}
- } else if (perm) {
- ret = key_validate(key);
- if (ret < 0)
+
+ ret = -EIO;
+ if (!(lflags & KEY_LOOKUP_PARTIAL) &&
+ key_read_state(key) == KEY_IS_UNINSTANTIATED)
goto invalid_key;
}
- ret = -EIO;
- if (!(lflags & KEY_LOOKUP_PARTIAL) &&
- key_read_state(key) == KEY_IS_UNINSTANTIATED)
- goto invalid_key;
-
/* check the permissions */
- ret = key_task_permission(key_ref, ctx.cred, perm);
+ ret = key_task_permission(key_ref, ctx.cred, need_perm);
if (ret < 0)
goto invalid_key;
@@ -919,6 +918,13 @@ void key_change_session_keyring(struct callback_head *twork)
return;
}
+ /* If get_ucounts fails more bits are needed in the refcount */
+ if (unlikely(!get_ucounts(old->ucounts))) {
+ WARN_ONCE(1, "In %s get_ucounts failed\n", __func__);
+ put_cred(new);
+ return;
+ }
+
new-> uid = old-> uid;
new-> euid = old-> euid;
new-> suid = old-> suid;
@@ -928,6 +934,7 @@ void key_change_session_keyring(struct callback_head *twork)
new-> sgid = old-> sgid;
new->fsgid = old->fsgid;
new->user = get_uid(old->user);
+ new->ucounts = old->ucounts;
new->user_ns = get_user_ns(old->user_ns);
new->group_info = get_group_info(old->group_info);
diff --git a/security/keys/request_key.c b/security/keys/request_key.c
index 957b9e3e1492..2da4404276f0 100644
--- a/security/keys/request_key.c
+++ b/security/keys/request_key.c
@@ -295,26 +295,26 @@ static int construct_get_dest_keyring(struct key **_dest_keyring)
}
}
- /* fall through */
+ fallthrough;
case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_THREAD_KEYRING:
dest_keyring = key_get(cred->thread_keyring);
if (dest_keyring)
break;
- /* fall through */
+ fallthrough;
case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_PROCESS_KEYRING:
dest_keyring = key_get(cred->process_keyring);
if (dest_keyring)
break;
- /* fall through */
+ fallthrough;
case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_SESSION_KEYRING:
dest_keyring = key_get(cred->session_keyring);
if (dest_keyring)
break;
- /* fall through */
+ fallthrough;
case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_USER_SESSION_KEYRING:
ret = look_up_user_keyrings(NULL, &dest_keyring);
if (ret < 0)
@@ -418,7 +418,7 @@ static int construct_alloc_key(struct keyring_search_context *ctx,
goto key_already_present;
if (dest_keyring)
- __key_link(key, &edit);
+ __key_link(dest_keyring, key, &edit);
mutex_unlock(&key_construction_mutex);
if (dest_keyring)
@@ -437,7 +437,7 @@ key_already_present:
if (dest_keyring) {
ret = __key_link_check_live_key(dest_keyring, key);
if (ret == 0)
- __key_link(key, &edit);
+ __key_link(dest_keyring, key, &edit);
__key_link_end(dest_keyring, &ctx->index_key, edit);
if (ret < 0)
goto link_check_failed;
diff --git a/security/keys/request_key_auth.c b/security/keys/request_key_auth.c
index ecba39c93fd9..41e9735006d0 100644
--- a/security/keys/request_key_auth.c
+++ b/security/keys/request_key_auth.c
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ static int request_key_auth_instantiate(struct key *,
static void request_key_auth_describe(const struct key *, struct seq_file *);
static void request_key_auth_revoke(struct key *);
static void request_key_auth_destroy(struct key *);
-static long request_key_auth_read(const struct key *, char __user *, size_t);
+static long request_key_auth_read(const struct key *, char *, size_t);
/*
* The request-key authorisation key type definition.
@@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ static void request_key_auth_describe(const struct key *key,
* - the key's semaphore is read-locked
*/
static long request_key_auth_read(const struct key *key,
- char __user *buffer, size_t buflen)
+ char *buffer, size_t buflen)
{
struct request_key_auth *rka = dereference_key_locked(key);
size_t datalen;
@@ -97,8 +97,7 @@ static long request_key_auth_read(const struct key *key,
if (buflen > datalen)
buflen = datalen;
- if (copy_to_user(buffer, rka->callout_info, buflen) != 0)
- ret = -EFAULT;
+ memcpy(buffer, rka->callout_info, buflen);
}
return ret;
diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/Kconfig b/security/keys/trusted-keys/Kconfig
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..dbfdd8536468
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/Kconfig
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+config TRUSTED_KEYS_TPM
+ bool "TPM-based trusted keys"
+ depends on TCG_TPM >= TRUSTED_KEYS
+ default y
+ select CRYPTO
+ select CRYPTO_HMAC
+ select CRYPTO_SHA1
+ select CRYPTO_HASH_INFO
+ select ASN1_ENCODER
+ select OID_REGISTRY
+ select ASN1
+ help
+ Enable use of the Trusted Platform Module (TPM) as trusted key
+ backend. Trusted keys are random number symmetric keys,
+ which will be generated and RSA-sealed by the TPM.
+ The TPM only unseals the keys, if the boot PCRs and other
+ criteria match.
+
+config TRUSTED_KEYS_TEE
+ bool "TEE-based trusted keys"
+ depends on TEE >= TRUSTED_KEYS
+ default y
+ help
+ Enable use of the Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) as trusted
+ key backend.
+
+config TRUSTED_KEYS_CAAM
+ bool "CAAM-based trusted keys"
+ depends on CRYPTO_DEV_FSL_CAAM_JR >= TRUSTED_KEYS
+ select CRYPTO_DEV_FSL_CAAM_BLOB_GEN
+ default y
+ help
+ Enable use of NXP's Cryptographic Accelerator and Assurance Module
+ (CAAM) as trusted key backend.
+
+if !TRUSTED_KEYS_TPM && !TRUSTED_KEYS_TEE && !TRUSTED_KEYS_CAAM
+comment "No trust source selected!"
+endif
diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile b/security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile
index 7b73cebbb378..735aa0bc08ef 100644
--- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile
+++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile
@@ -4,5 +4,13 @@
#
obj-$(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS) += trusted.o
-trusted-y += trusted_tpm1.o
-trusted-y += trusted_tpm2.o
+trusted-y += trusted_core.o
+trusted-$(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS_TPM) += trusted_tpm1.o
+
+$(obj)/trusted_tpm2.o: $(obj)/tpm2key.asn1.h
+trusted-$(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS_TPM) += trusted_tpm2.o
+trusted-$(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS_TPM) += tpm2key.asn1.o
+
+trusted-$(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS_TEE) += trusted_tee.o
+
+trusted-$(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS_CAAM) += trusted_caam.o
diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/tpm2key.asn1 b/security/keys/trusted-keys/tpm2key.asn1
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..f57f869ad600
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/tpm2key.asn1
@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+---
+--- ASN.1 for TPM 2.0 keys
+---
+
+TPMKey ::= SEQUENCE {
+ type OBJECT IDENTIFIER ({tpm2_key_type}),
+ emptyAuth [0] EXPLICIT BOOLEAN OPTIONAL,
+ parent INTEGER ({tpm2_key_parent}),
+ pubkey OCTET STRING ({tpm2_key_pub}),
+ privkey OCTET STRING ({tpm2_key_priv})
+ }
diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_caam.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_caam.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..e3415c520c0a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_caam.c
@@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2021 Pengutronix, Ahmad Fatoum <kernel@pengutronix.de>
+ */
+
+#include <keys/trusted_caam.h>
+#include <keys/trusted-type.h>
+#include <linux/build_bug.h>
+#include <linux/key-type.h>
+#include <soc/fsl/caam-blob.h>
+
+static struct caam_blob_priv *blobifier;
+
+#define KEYMOD "SECURE_KEY"
+
+static_assert(MAX_KEY_SIZE + CAAM_BLOB_OVERHEAD <= CAAM_BLOB_MAX_LEN);
+static_assert(MAX_BLOB_SIZE <= CAAM_BLOB_MAX_LEN);
+
+static int trusted_caam_seal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob)
+{
+ int ret;
+ struct caam_blob_info info = {
+ .input = p->key, .input_len = p->key_len,
+ .output = p->blob, .output_len = MAX_BLOB_SIZE,
+ .key_mod = KEYMOD, .key_mod_len = sizeof(KEYMOD) - 1,
+ };
+
+ ret = caam_encap_blob(blobifier, &info);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+
+ p->blob_len = info.output_len;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int trusted_caam_unseal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob)
+{
+ int ret;
+ struct caam_blob_info info = {
+ .input = p->blob, .input_len = p->blob_len,
+ .output = p->key, .output_len = MAX_KEY_SIZE,
+ .key_mod = KEYMOD, .key_mod_len = sizeof(KEYMOD) - 1,
+ };
+
+ ret = caam_decap_blob(blobifier, &info);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+
+ p->key_len = info.output_len;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int trusted_caam_init(void)
+{
+ int ret;
+
+ blobifier = caam_blob_gen_init();
+ if (IS_ERR(blobifier))
+ return PTR_ERR(blobifier);
+
+ ret = register_key_type(&key_type_trusted);
+ if (ret)
+ caam_blob_gen_exit(blobifier);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static void trusted_caam_exit(void)
+{
+ unregister_key_type(&key_type_trusted);
+ caam_blob_gen_exit(blobifier);
+}
+
+struct trusted_key_ops trusted_key_caam_ops = {
+ .migratable = 0, /* non-migratable */
+ .init = trusted_caam_init,
+ .seal = trusted_caam_seal,
+ .unseal = trusted_caam_unseal,
+ .exit = trusted_caam_exit,
+};
diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..c6fc50d67214
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c
@@ -0,0 +1,397 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2010 IBM Corporation
+ * Copyright (c) 2019-2021, Linaro Limited
+ *
+ * See Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst
+ */
+
+#include <keys/user-type.h>
+#include <keys/trusted-type.h>
+#include <keys/trusted_tee.h>
+#include <keys/trusted_caam.h>
+#include <keys/trusted_tpm.h>
+#include <linux/capability.h>
+#include <linux/err.h>
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/key-type.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/parser.h>
+#include <linux/random.h>
+#include <linux/rcupdate.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/static_call.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
+#include <linux/uaccess.h>
+
+static char *trusted_rng = "default";
+module_param_named(rng, trusted_rng, charp, 0);
+MODULE_PARM_DESC(rng, "Select trusted key RNG");
+
+static char *trusted_key_source;
+module_param_named(source, trusted_key_source, charp, 0);
+MODULE_PARM_DESC(source, "Select trusted keys source (tpm, tee or caam)");
+
+static const struct trusted_key_source trusted_key_sources[] = {
+#if defined(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS_TPM)
+ { "tpm", &trusted_key_tpm_ops },
+#endif
+#if defined(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS_TEE)
+ { "tee", &trusted_key_tee_ops },
+#endif
+#if defined(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS_CAAM)
+ { "caam", &trusted_key_caam_ops },
+#endif
+};
+
+DEFINE_STATIC_CALL_NULL(trusted_key_init, *trusted_key_sources[0].ops->init);
+DEFINE_STATIC_CALL_NULL(trusted_key_seal, *trusted_key_sources[0].ops->seal);
+DEFINE_STATIC_CALL_NULL(trusted_key_unseal,
+ *trusted_key_sources[0].ops->unseal);
+DEFINE_STATIC_CALL_NULL(trusted_key_get_random,
+ *trusted_key_sources[0].ops->get_random);
+DEFINE_STATIC_CALL_NULL(trusted_key_exit, *trusted_key_sources[0].ops->exit);
+static unsigned char migratable;
+
+enum {
+ Opt_err,
+ Opt_new, Opt_load, Opt_update,
+};
+
+static const match_table_t key_tokens = {
+ {Opt_new, "new"},
+ {Opt_load, "load"},
+ {Opt_update, "update"},
+ {Opt_err, NULL}
+};
+
+/*
+ * datablob_parse - parse the keyctl data and fill in the
+ * payload structure
+ *
+ * On success returns 0, otherwise -EINVAL.
+ */
+static int datablob_parse(char **datablob, struct trusted_key_payload *p)
+{
+ substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
+ long keylen;
+ int ret = -EINVAL;
+ int key_cmd;
+ char *c;
+
+ /* main command */
+ c = strsep(datablob, " \t");
+ if (!c)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ key_cmd = match_token(c, key_tokens, args);
+ switch (key_cmd) {
+ case Opt_new:
+ /* first argument is key size */
+ c = strsep(datablob, " \t");
+ if (!c)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ ret = kstrtol(c, 10, &keylen);
+ if (ret < 0 || keylen < MIN_KEY_SIZE || keylen > MAX_KEY_SIZE)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ p->key_len = keylen;
+ ret = Opt_new;
+ break;
+ case Opt_load:
+ /* first argument is sealed blob */
+ c = strsep(datablob, " \t");
+ if (!c)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ p->blob_len = strlen(c) / 2;
+ if (p->blob_len > MAX_BLOB_SIZE)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ ret = hex2bin(p->blob, c, p->blob_len);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ ret = Opt_load;
+ break;
+ case Opt_update:
+ ret = Opt_update;
+ break;
+ case Opt_err:
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static struct trusted_key_payload *trusted_payload_alloc(struct key *key)
+{
+ struct trusted_key_payload *p = NULL;
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = key_payload_reserve(key, sizeof(*p));
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto err;
+ p = kzalloc(sizeof(*p), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!p)
+ goto err;
+
+ p->migratable = migratable;
+err:
+ return p;
+}
+
+/*
+ * trusted_instantiate - create a new trusted key
+ *
+ * Unseal an existing trusted blob or, for a new key, get a
+ * random key, then seal and create a trusted key-type key,
+ * adding it to the specified keyring.
+ *
+ * On success, return 0. Otherwise return errno.
+ */
+static int trusted_instantiate(struct key *key,
+ struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
+{
+ struct trusted_key_payload *payload = NULL;
+ size_t datalen = prep->datalen;
+ char *datablob, *orig_datablob;
+ int ret = 0;
+ int key_cmd;
+ size_t key_len;
+
+ if (datalen <= 0 || datalen > 32767 || !prep->data)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ orig_datablob = datablob = kmalloc(datalen + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!datablob)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ memcpy(datablob, prep->data, datalen);
+ datablob[datalen] = '\0';
+
+ payload = trusted_payload_alloc(key);
+ if (!payload) {
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ key_cmd = datablob_parse(&datablob, payload);
+ if (key_cmd < 0) {
+ ret = key_cmd;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ dump_payload(payload);
+
+ switch (key_cmd) {
+ case Opt_load:
+ ret = static_call(trusted_key_unseal)(payload, datablob);
+ dump_payload(payload);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ pr_info("key_unseal failed (%d)\n", ret);
+ break;
+ case Opt_new:
+ key_len = payload->key_len;
+ ret = static_call(trusted_key_get_random)(payload->key,
+ key_len);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ if (ret != key_len) {
+ pr_info("key_create failed (%d)\n", ret);
+ ret = -EIO;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ ret = static_call(trusted_key_seal)(payload, datablob);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ pr_info("key_seal failed (%d)\n", ret);
+ break;
+ default:
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ }
+out:
+ kfree_sensitive(orig_datablob);
+ if (!ret)
+ rcu_assign_keypointer(key, payload);
+ else
+ kfree_sensitive(payload);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static void trusted_rcu_free(struct rcu_head *rcu)
+{
+ struct trusted_key_payload *p;
+
+ p = container_of(rcu, struct trusted_key_payload, rcu);
+ kfree_sensitive(p);
+}
+
+/*
+ * trusted_update - reseal an existing key with new PCR values
+ */
+static int trusted_update(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
+{
+ struct trusted_key_payload *p;
+ struct trusted_key_payload *new_p;
+ size_t datalen = prep->datalen;
+ char *datablob, *orig_datablob;
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ if (key_is_negative(key))
+ return -ENOKEY;
+ p = key->payload.data[0];
+ if (!p->migratable)
+ return -EPERM;
+ if (datalen <= 0 || datalen > 32767 || !prep->data)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ orig_datablob = datablob = kmalloc(datalen + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!datablob)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ new_p = trusted_payload_alloc(key);
+ if (!new_p) {
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ memcpy(datablob, prep->data, datalen);
+ datablob[datalen] = '\0';
+ ret = datablob_parse(&datablob, new_p);
+ if (ret != Opt_update) {
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ kfree_sensitive(new_p);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* copy old key values, and reseal with new pcrs */
+ new_p->migratable = p->migratable;
+ new_p->key_len = p->key_len;
+ memcpy(new_p->key, p->key, p->key_len);
+ dump_payload(p);
+ dump_payload(new_p);
+
+ ret = static_call(trusted_key_seal)(new_p, datablob);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ pr_info("key_seal failed (%d)\n", ret);
+ kfree_sensitive(new_p);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ rcu_assign_keypointer(key, new_p);
+ call_rcu(&p->rcu, trusted_rcu_free);
+out:
+ kfree_sensitive(orig_datablob);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * trusted_read - copy the sealed blob data to userspace in hex.
+ * On success, return to userspace the trusted key datablob size.
+ */
+static long trusted_read(const struct key *key, char *buffer,
+ size_t buflen)
+{
+ const struct trusted_key_payload *p;
+ char *bufp;
+ int i;
+
+ p = dereference_key_locked(key);
+ if (!p)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (buffer && buflen >= 2 * p->blob_len) {
+ bufp = buffer;
+ for (i = 0; i < p->blob_len; i++)
+ bufp = hex_byte_pack(bufp, p->blob[i]);
+ }
+ return 2 * p->blob_len;
+}
+
+/*
+ * trusted_destroy - clear and free the key's payload
+ */
+static void trusted_destroy(struct key *key)
+{
+ kfree_sensitive(key->payload.data[0]);
+}
+
+struct key_type key_type_trusted = {
+ .name = "trusted",
+ .instantiate = trusted_instantiate,
+ .update = trusted_update,
+ .destroy = trusted_destroy,
+ .describe = user_describe,
+ .read = trusted_read,
+};
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(key_type_trusted);
+
+static int kernel_get_random(unsigned char *key, size_t key_len)
+{
+ return get_random_bytes_wait(key, key_len) ?: key_len;
+}
+
+static int __init init_trusted(void)
+{
+ int (*get_random)(unsigned char *key, size_t key_len);
+ int i, ret = 0;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(trusted_key_sources); i++) {
+ if (trusted_key_source &&
+ strncmp(trusted_key_source, trusted_key_sources[i].name,
+ strlen(trusted_key_sources[i].name)))
+ continue;
+
+ /*
+ * We always support trusted.rng="kernel" and "default" as
+ * well as trusted.rng=$trusted.source if the trust source
+ * defines its own get_random callback.
+ */
+ get_random = trusted_key_sources[i].ops->get_random;
+ if (trusted_rng && strcmp(trusted_rng, "default")) {
+ if (!strcmp(trusted_rng, "kernel")) {
+ get_random = kernel_get_random;
+ } else if (strcmp(trusted_rng, trusted_key_sources[i].name) ||
+ !get_random) {
+ pr_warn("Unsupported RNG. Supported: kernel");
+ if (get_random)
+ pr_cont(", %s", trusted_key_sources[i].name);
+ pr_cont(", default\n");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!get_random)
+ get_random = kernel_get_random;
+
+ static_call_update(trusted_key_init,
+ trusted_key_sources[i].ops->init);
+ static_call_update(trusted_key_seal,
+ trusted_key_sources[i].ops->seal);
+ static_call_update(trusted_key_unseal,
+ trusted_key_sources[i].ops->unseal);
+ static_call_update(trusted_key_get_random,
+ get_random);
+ static_call_update(trusted_key_exit,
+ trusted_key_sources[i].ops->exit);
+ migratable = trusted_key_sources[i].ops->migratable;
+
+ ret = static_call(trusted_key_init)();
+ if (!ret)
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * encrypted_keys.ko depends on successful load of this module even if
+ * trusted key implementation is not found.
+ */
+ if (ret == -ENODEV)
+ return 0;
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static void __exit cleanup_trusted(void)
+{
+ static_call_cond(trusted_key_exit)();
+}
+
+late_initcall(init_trusted);
+module_exit(cleanup_trusted);
+
+MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tee.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tee.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..c8626686ee1b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tee.c
@@ -0,0 +1,313 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2019-2021 Linaro Ltd.
+ *
+ * Author:
+ * Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@linaro.org>
+ */
+
+#include <linux/err.h>
+#include <linux/key-type.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
+#include <linux/tee_drv.h>
+#include <linux/uuid.h>
+
+#include <keys/trusted_tee.h>
+
+#define DRIVER_NAME "trusted-key-tee"
+
+/*
+ * Get random data for symmetric key
+ *
+ * [out] memref[0] Random data
+ */
+#define TA_CMD_GET_RANDOM 0x0
+
+/*
+ * Seal trusted key using hardware unique key
+ *
+ * [in] memref[0] Plain key
+ * [out] memref[1] Sealed key datablob
+ */
+#define TA_CMD_SEAL 0x1
+
+/*
+ * Unseal trusted key using hardware unique key
+ *
+ * [in] memref[0] Sealed key datablob
+ * [out] memref[1] Plain key
+ */
+#define TA_CMD_UNSEAL 0x2
+
+/**
+ * struct trusted_key_tee_private - TEE Trusted key private data
+ * @dev: TEE based Trusted key device.
+ * @ctx: TEE context handler.
+ * @session_id: Trusted key TA session identifier.
+ * @shm_pool: Memory pool shared with TEE device.
+ */
+struct trusted_key_tee_private {
+ struct device *dev;
+ struct tee_context *ctx;
+ u32 session_id;
+ struct tee_shm *shm_pool;
+};
+
+static struct trusted_key_tee_private pvt_data;
+
+/*
+ * Have the TEE seal(encrypt) the symmetric key
+ */
+static int trusted_tee_seal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob)
+{
+ int ret;
+ struct tee_ioctl_invoke_arg inv_arg;
+ struct tee_param param[4];
+ struct tee_shm *reg_shm_in = NULL, *reg_shm_out = NULL;
+
+ memset(&inv_arg, 0, sizeof(inv_arg));
+ memset(&param, 0, sizeof(param));
+
+ reg_shm_in = tee_shm_register_kernel_buf(pvt_data.ctx, p->key,
+ p->key_len);
+ if (IS_ERR(reg_shm_in)) {
+ dev_err(pvt_data.dev, "key shm register failed\n");
+ return PTR_ERR(reg_shm_in);
+ }
+
+ reg_shm_out = tee_shm_register_kernel_buf(pvt_data.ctx, p->blob,
+ sizeof(p->blob));
+ if (IS_ERR(reg_shm_out)) {
+ dev_err(pvt_data.dev, "blob shm register failed\n");
+ ret = PTR_ERR(reg_shm_out);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ inv_arg.func = TA_CMD_SEAL;
+ inv_arg.session = pvt_data.session_id;
+ inv_arg.num_params = 4;
+
+ param[0].attr = TEE_IOCTL_PARAM_ATTR_TYPE_MEMREF_INPUT;
+ param[0].u.memref.shm = reg_shm_in;
+ param[0].u.memref.size = p->key_len;
+ param[0].u.memref.shm_offs = 0;
+ param[1].attr = TEE_IOCTL_PARAM_ATTR_TYPE_MEMREF_OUTPUT;
+ param[1].u.memref.shm = reg_shm_out;
+ param[1].u.memref.size = sizeof(p->blob);
+ param[1].u.memref.shm_offs = 0;
+
+ ret = tee_client_invoke_func(pvt_data.ctx, &inv_arg, param);
+ if ((ret < 0) || (inv_arg.ret != 0)) {
+ dev_err(pvt_data.dev, "TA_CMD_SEAL invoke err: %x\n",
+ inv_arg.ret);
+ ret = -EFAULT;
+ } else {
+ p->blob_len = param[1].u.memref.size;
+ }
+
+out:
+ if (reg_shm_out)
+ tee_shm_free(reg_shm_out);
+ if (reg_shm_in)
+ tee_shm_free(reg_shm_in);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Have the TEE unseal(decrypt) the symmetric key
+ */
+static int trusted_tee_unseal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob)
+{
+ int ret;
+ struct tee_ioctl_invoke_arg inv_arg;
+ struct tee_param param[4];
+ struct tee_shm *reg_shm_in = NULL, *reg_shm_out = NULL;
+
+ memset(&inv_arg, 0, sizeof(inv_arg));
+ memset(&param, 0, sizeof(param));
+
+ reg_shm_in = tee_shm_register_kernel_buf(pvt_data.ctx, p->blob,
+ p->blob_len);
+ if (IS_ERR(reg_shm_in)) {
+ dev_err(pvt_data.dev, "blob shm register failed\n");
+ return PTR_ERR(reg_shm_in);
+ }
+
+ reg_shm_out = tee_shm_register_kernel_buf(pvt_data.ctx, p->key,
+ sizeof(p->key));
+ if (IS_ERR(reg_shm_out)) {
+ dev_err(pvt_data.dev, "key shm register failed\n");
+ ret = PTR_ERR(reg_shm_out);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ inv_arg.func = TA_CMD_UNSEAL;
+ inv_arg.session = pvt_data.session_id;
+ inv_arg.num_params = 4;
+
+ param[0].attr = TEE_IOCTL_PARAM_ATTR_TYPE_MEMREF_INPUT;
+ param[0].u.memref.shm = reg_shm_in;
+ param[0].u.memref.size = p->blob_len;
+ param[0].u.memref.shm_offs = 0;
+ param[1].attr = TEE_IOCTL_PARAM_ATTR_TYPE_MEMREF_OUTPUT;
+ param[1].u.memref.shm = reg_shm_out;
+ param[1].u.memref.size = sizeof(p->key);
+ param[1].u.memref.shm_offs = 0;
+
+ ret = tee_client_invoke_func(pvt_data.ctx, &inv_arg, param);
+ if ((ret < 0) || (inv_arg.ret != 0)) {
+ dev_err(pvt_data.dev, "TA_CMD_UNSEAL invoke err: %x\n",
+ inv_arg.ret);
+ ret = -EFAULT;
+ } else {
+ p->key_len = param[1].u.memref.size;
+ }
+
+out:
+ if (reg_shm_out)
+ tee_shm_free(reg_shm_out);
+ if (reg_shm_in)
+ tee_shm_free(reg_shm_in);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Have the TEE generate random symmetric key
+ */
+static int trusted_tee_get_random(unsigned char *key, size_t key_len)
+{
+ int ret;
+ struct tee_ioctl_invoke_arg inv_arg;
+ struct tee_param param[4];
+ struct tee_shm *reg_shm = NULL;
+
+ memset(&inv_arg, 0, sizeof(inv_arg));
+ memset(&param, 0, sizeof(param));
+
+ reg_shm = tee_shm_register_kernel_buf(pvt_data.ctx, key, key_len);
+ if (IS_ERR(reg_shm)) {
+ dev_err(pvt_data.dev, "key shm register failed\n");
+ return PTR_ERR(reg_shm);
+ }
+
+ inv_arg.func = TA_CMD_GET_RANDOM;
+ inv_arg.session = pvt_data.session_id;
+ inv_arg.num_params = 4;
+
+ param[0].attr = TEE_IOCTL_PARAM_ATTR_TYPE_MEMREF_OUTPUT;
+ param[0].u.memref.shm = reg_shm;
+ param[0].u.memref.size = key_len;
+ param[0].u.memref.shm_offs = 0;
+
+ ret = tee_client_invoke_func(pvt_data.ctx, &inv_arg, param);
+ if ((ret < 0) || (inv_arg.ret != 0)) {
+ dev_err(pvt_data.dev, "TA_CMD_GET_RANDOM invoke err: %x\n",
+ inv_arg.ret);
+ ret = -EFAULT;
+ } else {
+ ret = param[0].u.memref.size;
+ }
+
+ tee_shm_free(reg_shm);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int optee_ctx_match(struct tee_ioctl_version_data *ver, const void *data)
+{
+ if (ver->impl_id == TEE_IMPL_ID_OPTEE)
+ return 1;
+ else
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int trusted_key_probe(struct device *dev)
+{
+ struct tee_client_device *rng_device = to_tee_client_device(dev);
+ int ret;
+ struct tee_ioctl_open_session_arg sess_arg;
+
+ memset(&sess_arg, 0, sizeof(sess_arg));
+
+ pvt_data.ctx = tee_client_open_context(NULL, optee_ctx_match, NULL,
+ NULL);
+ if (IS_ERR(pvt_data.ctx))
+ return -ENODEV;
+
+ memcpy(sess_arg.uuid, rng_device->id.uuid.b, TEE_IOCTL_UUID_LEN);
+ sess_arg.clnt_login = TEE_IOCTL_LOGIN_REE_KERNEL;
+ sess_arg.num_params = 0;
+
+ ret = tee_client_open_session(pvt_data.ctx, &sess_arg, NULL);
+ if ((ret < 0) || (sess_arg.ret != 0)) {
+ dev_err(dev, "tee_client_open_session failed, err: %x\n",
+ sess_arg.ret);
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ goto out_ctx;
+ }
+ pvt_data.session_id = sess_arg.session;
+
+ ret = register_key_type(&key_type_trusted);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto out_sess;
+
+ pvt_data.dev = dev;
+
+ return 0;
+
+out_sess:
+ tee_client_close_session(pvt_data.ctx, pvt_data.session_id);
+out_ctx:
+ tee_client_close_context(pvt_data.ctx);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int trusted_key_remove(struct device *dev)
+{
+ unregister_key_type(&key_type_trusted);
+ tee_client_close_session(pvt_data.ctx, pvt_data.session_id);
+ tee_client_close_context(pvt_data.ctx);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static const struct tee_client_device_id trusted_key_id_table[] = {
+ {UUID_INIT(0xf04a0fe7, 0x1f5d, 0x4b9b,
+ 0xab, 0xf7, 0x61, 0x9b, 0x85, 0xb4, 0xce, 0x8c)},
+ {}
+};
+MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE(tee, trusted_key_id_table);
+
+static struct tee_client_driver trusted_key_driver = {
+ .id_table = trusted_key_id_table,
+ .driver = {
+ .name = DRIVER_NAME,
+ .bus = &tee_bus_type,
+ .probe = trusted_key_probe,
+ .remove = trusted_key_remove,
+ },
+};
+
+static int trusted_tee_init(void)
+{
+ return driver_register(&trusted_key_driver.driver);
+}
+
+static void trusted_tee_exit(void)
+{
+ driver_unregister(&trusted_key_driver.driver);
+}
+
+struct trusted_key_ops trusted_key_tee_ops = {
+ .migratable = 0, /* non-migratable */
+ .init = trusted_tee_init,
+ .seal = trusted_tee_seal,
+ .unseal = trusted_tee_unseal,
+ .get_random = trusted_tee_get_random,
+ .exit = trusted_tee_exit,
+};
diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c
index d2c5ec1e040b..aa108bea6739 100644
--- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c
+++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c
@@ -1,29 +1,22 @@
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
/*
* Copyright (C) 2010 IBM Corporation
- *
- * Author:
- * David Safford <safford@us.ibm.com>
+ * Copyright (c) 2019-2021, Linaro Limited
*
* See Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst
*/
#include <crypto/hash_info.h>
-#include <linux/uaccess.h>
-#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/init.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/parser.h>
#include <linux/string.h>
#include <linux/err.h>
-#include <keys/user-type.h>
#include <keys/trusted-type.h>
#include <linux/key-type.h>
-#include <linux/rcupdate.h>
#include <linux/crypto.h>
#include <crypto/hash.h>
-#include <crypto/sha.h>
-#include <linux/capability.h>
+#include <crypto/sha1.h>
#include <linux/tpm.h>
#include <linux/tpm_command.h>
@@ -63,12 +56,12 @@ static int TSS_sha1(const unsigned char *data, unsigned int datalen,
sdesc = init_sdesc(hashalg);
if (IS_ERR(sdesc)) {
- pr_info("trusted_key: can't alloc %s\n", hash_alg);
+ pr_info("can't alloc %s\n", hash_alg);
return PTR_ERR(sdesc);
}
ret = crypto_shash_digest(&sdesc->shash, data, datalen, digest);
- kzfree(sdesc);
+ kfree_sensitive(sdesc);
return ret;
}
@@ -83,7 +76,7 @@ static int TSS_rawhmac(unsigned char *digest, const unsigned char *key,
sdesc = init_sdesc(hmacalg);
if (IS_ERR(sdesc)) {
- pr_info("trusted_key: can't alloc %s\n", hmac_alg);
+ pr_info("can't alloc %s\n", hmac_alg);
return PTR_ERR(sdesc);
}
@@ -112,7 +105,7 @@ static int TSS_rawhmac(unsigned char *digest, const unsigned char *key,
if (!ret)
ret = crypto_shash_final(&sdesc->shash, digest);
out:
- kzfree(sdesc);
+ kfree_sensitive(sdesc);
return ret;
}
@@ -136,7 +129,7 @@ int TSS_authhmac(unsigned char *digest, const unsigned char *key,
sdesc = init_sdesc(hashalg);
if (IS_ERR(sdesc)) {
- pr_info("trusted_key: can't alloc %s\n", hash_alg);
+ pr_info("can't alloc %s\n", hash_alg);
return PTR_ERR(sdesc);
}
@@ -166,7 +159,7 @@ int TSS_authhmac(unsigned char *digest, const unsigned char *key,
paramdigest, TPM_NONCE_SIZE, h1,
TPM_NONCE_SIZE, h2, 1, &c, 0, 0);
out:
- kzfree(sdesc);
+ kfree_sensitive(sdesc);
return ret;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(TSS_authhmac);
@@ -212,7 +205,7 @@ int TSS_checkhmac1(unsigned char *buffer,
sdesc = init_sdesc(hashalg);
if (IS_ERR(sdesc)) {
- pr_info("trusted_key: can't alloc %s\n", hash_alg);
+ pr_info("can't alloc %s\n", hash_alg);
return PTR_ERR(sdesc);
}
ret = crypto_shash_init(&sdesc->shash);
@@ -251,7 +244,7 @@ int TSS_checkhmac1(unsigned char *buffer,
if (memcmp(testhmac, authdata, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE))
ret = -EINVAL;
out:
- kzfree(sdesc);
+ kfree_sensitive(sdesc);
return ret;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(TSS_checkhmac1);
@@ -305,7 +298,7 @@ static int TSS_checkhmac2(unsigned char *buffer,
sdesc = init_sdesc(hashalg);
if (IS_ERR(sdesc)) {
- pr_info("trusted_key: can't alloc %s\n", hash_alg);
+ pr_info("can't alloc %s\n", hash_alg);
return PTR_ERR(sdesc);
}
ret = crypto_shash_init(&sdesc->shash);
@@ -353,7 +346,7 @@ static int TSS_checkhmac2(unsigned char *buffer,
if (memcmp(testhmac2, authdata2, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE))
ret = -EINVAL;
out:
- kzfree(sdesc);
+ kfree_sensitive(sdesc);
return ret;
}
@@ -403,9 +396,12 @@ static int osap(struct tpm_buf *tb, struct osapsess *s,
int ret;
ret = tpm_get_random(chip, ononce, TPM_NONCE_SIZE);
- if (ret != TPM_NONCE_SIZE)
+ if (ret < 0)
return ret;
+ if (ret != TPM_NONCE_SIZE)
+ return -EIO;
+
tpm_buf_reset(tb, TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND, TPM_ORD_OSAP);
tpm_buf_append_u16(tb, type);
tpm_buf_append_u32(tb, handle);
@@ -496,8 +492,14 @@ static int tpm_seal(struct tpm_buf *tb, uint16_t keytype,
goto out;
ret = tpm_get_random(chip, td->nonceodd, TPM_NONCE_SIZE);
- if (ret != TPM_NONCE_SIZE)
+ if (ret < 0)
goto out;
+
+ if (ret != TPM_NONCE_SIZE) {
+ ret = -EIO;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
ordinal = htonl(TPM_ORD_SEAL);
datsize = htonl(datalen);
pcrsize = htonl(pcrinfosize);
@@ -563,7 +565,7 @@ static int tpm_seal(struct tpm_buf *tb, uint16_t keytype,
*bloblen = storedsize;
}
out:
- kzfree(td);
+ kfree_sensitive(td);
return ret;
}
@@ -590,20 +592,23 @@ static int tpm_unseal(struct tpm_buf *tb,
/* sessions for unsealing key and data */
ret = oiap(tb, &authhandle1, enonce1);
if (ret < 0) {
- pr_info("trusted_key: oiap failed (%d)\n", ret);
+ pr_info("oiap failed (%d)\n", ret);
return ret;
}
ret = oiap(tb, &authhandle2, enonce2);
if (ret < 0) {
- pr_info("trusted_key: oiap failed (%d)\n", ret);
+ pr_info("oiap failed (%d)\n", ret);
return ret;
}
ordinal = htonl(TPM_ORD_UNSEAL);
ret = tpm_get_random(chip, nonceodd, TPM_NONCE_SIZE);
- if (ret != TPM_NONCE_SIZE) {
- pr_info("trusted_key: tpm_get_random failed (%d)\n", ret);
+ if (ret < 0)
return ret;
+
+ if (ret != TPM_NONCE_SIZE) {
+ pr_info("tpm_get_random failed (%d)\n", ret);
+ return -EIO;
}
ret = TSS_authhmac(authdata1, keyauth, TPM_NONCE_SIZE,
enonce1, nonceodd, cont, sizeof(uint32_t),
@@ -631,7 +636,7 @@ static int tpm_unseal(struct tpm_buf *tb,
ret = trusted_tpm_send(tb->data, MAX_BUF_SIZE);
if (ret < 0) {
- pr_info("trusted_key: authhmac failed (%d)\n", ret);
+ pr_info("authhmac failed (%d)\n", ret);
return ret;
}
@@ -643,7 +648,7 @@ static int tpm_unseal(struct tpm_buf *tb,
*datalen, TPM_DATA_OFFSET + sizeof(uint32_t), 0,
0);
if (ret < 0) {
- pr_info("trusted_key: TSS_checkhmac2 failed (%d)\n", ret);
+ pr_info("TSS_checkhmac2 failed (%d)\n", ret);
return ret;
}
memcpy(data, tb->data + TPM_DATA_OFFSET + sizeof(uint32_t), *datalen);
@@ -670,7 +675,7 @@ static int key_seal(struct trusted_key_payload *p,
p->key, p->key_len + 1, p->blob, &p->blob_len,
o->blobauth, o->pcrinfo, o->pcrinfo_len);
if (ret < 0)
- pr_info("trusted_key: srkseal failed (%d)\n", ret);
+ pr_info("srkseal failed (%d)\n", ret);
tpm_buf_destroy(&tb);
return ret;
@@ -692,7 +697,7 @@ static int key_unseal(struct trusted_key_payload *p,
ret = tpm_unseal(&tb, o->keyhandle, o->keyauth, p->blob, p->blob_len,
o->blobauth, p->key, &p->key_len);
if (ret < 0)
- pr_info("trusted_key: srkunseal failed (%d)\n", ret);
+ pr_info("srkunseal failed (%d)\n", ret);
else
/* pull migratable flag out of sealed key */
p->migratable = p->key[--p->key_len];
@@ -703,7 +708,6 @@ static int key_unseal(struct trusted_key_payload *p,
enum {
Opt_err,
- Opt_new, Opt_load, Opt_update,
Opt_keyhandle, Opt_keyauth, Opt_blobauth,
Opt_pcrinfo, Opt_pcrlock, Opt_migratable,
Opt_hash,
@@ -712,9 +716,6 @@ enum {
};
static const match_table_t key_tokens = {
- {Opt_new, "new"},
- {Opt_load, "load"},
- {Opt_update, "update"},
{Opt_keyhandle, "keyhandle=%s"},
{Opt_keyauth, "keyauth=%s"},
{Opt_blobauth, "blobauth=%s"},
@@ -748,6 +749,9 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay,
opt->hash = tpm2 ? HASH_ALGO_SHA256 : HASH_ALGO_SHA1;
+ if (!c)
+ return 0;
+
while ((p = strsep(&c, " \t"))) {
if (*p == '\0' || *p == ' ' || *p == '\t')
continue;
@@ -781,17 +785,37 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay,
return -EINVAL;
break;
case Opt_blobauth:
- if (strlen(args[0].from) != 2 * SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE)
- return -EINVAL;
- res = hex2bin(opt->blobauth, args[0].from,
- SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE);
- if (res < 0)
- return -EINVAL;
+ /*
+ * TPM 1.2 authorizations are sha1 hashes passed in as
+ * hex strings. TPM 2.0 authorizations are simple
+ * passwords (although it can take a hash as well)
+ */
+ opt->blobauth_len = strlen(args[0].from);
+
+ if (opt->blobauth_len == 2 * TPM_DIGEST_SIZE) {
+ res = hex2bin(opt->blobauth, args[0].from,
+ TPM_DIGEST_SIZE);
+ if (res < 0)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ opt->blobauth_len = TPM_DIGEST_SIZE;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (tpm2 && opt->blobauth_len <= sizeof(opt->blobauth)) {
+ memcpy(opt->blobauth, args[0].from,
+ opt->blobauth_len);
+ break;
+ }
+
+ return -EINVAL;
+
break;
+
case Opt_migratable:
if (*args[0].from == '0')
pay->migratable = 0;
- else
+ else if (*args[0].from != '1')
return -EINVAL;
break;
case Opt_pcrlock:
@@ -812,7 +836,7 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay,
if (i == HASH_ALGO__LAST)
return -EINVAL;
if (!tpm2 && i != HASH_ALGO_SHA1) {
- pr_info("trusted_key: TPM 1.x only supports SHA-1.\n");
+ pr_info("TPM 1.x only supports SHA-1.\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
break;
@@ -841,71 +865,6 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay,
return 0;
}
-/*
- * datablob_parse - parse the keyctl data and fill in the
- * payload and options structures
- *
- * On success returns 0, otherwise -EINVAL.
- */
-static int datablob_parse(char *datablob, struct trusted_key_payload *p,
- struct trusted_key_options *o)
-{
- substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
- long keylen;
- int ret = -EINVAL;
- int key_cmd;
- char *c;
-
- /* main command */
- c = strsep(&datablob, " \t");
- if (!c)
- return -EINVAL;
- key_cmd = match_token(c, key_tokens, args);
- switch (key_cmd) {
- case Opt_new:
- /* first argument is key size */
- c = strsep(&datablob, " \t");
- if (!c)
- return -EINVAL;
- ret = kstrtol(c, 10, &keylen);
- if (ret < 0 || keylen < MIN_KEY_SIZE || keylen > MAX_KEY_SIZE)
- return -EINVAL;
- p->key_len = keylen;
- ret = getoptions(datablob, p, o);
- if (ret < 0)
- return ret;
- ret = Opt_new;
- break;
- case Opt_load:
- /* first argument is sealed blob */
- c = strsep(&datablob, " \t");
- if (!c)
- return -EINVAL;
- p->blob_len = strlen(c) / 2;
- if (p->blob_len > MAX_BLOB_SIZE)
- return -EINVAL;
- ret = hex2bin(p->blob, c, p->blob_len);
- if (ret < 0)
- return -EINVAL;
- ret = getoptions(datablob, p, o);
- if (ret < 0)
- return ret;
- ret = Opt_load;
- break;
- case Opt_update:
- /* all arguments are options */
- ret = getoptions(datablob, p, o);
- if (ret < 0)
- return ret;
- ret = Opt_update;
- break;
- case Opt_err:
- return -EINVAL;
- break;
- }
- return ret;
-}
-
static struct trusted_key_options *trusted_options_alloc(void)
{
struct trusted_key_options *options;
@@ -926,258 +885,99 @@ static struct trusted_key_options *trusted_options_alloc(void)
return options;
}
-static struct trusted_key_payload *trusted_payload_alloc(struct key *key)
+static int trusted_tpm_seal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob)
{
- struct trusted_key_payload *p = NULL;
- int ret;
-
- ret = key_payload_reserve(key, sizeof *p);
- if (ret < 0)
- return p;
- p = kzalloc(sizeof *p, GFP_KERNEL);
- if (p)
- p->migratable = 1; /* migratable by default */
- return p;
-}
-
-/*
- * trusted_instantiate - create a new trusted key
- *
- * Unseal an existing trusted blob or, for a new key, get a
- * random key, then seal and create a trusted key-type key,
- * adding it to the specified keyring.
- *
- * On success, return 0. Otherwise return errno.
- */
-static int trusted_instantiate(struct key *key,
- struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
-{
- struct trusted_key_payload *payload = NULL;
struct trusted_key_options *options = NULL;
- size_t datalen = prep->datalen;
- char *datablob;
int ret = 0;
- int key_cmd;
- size_t key_len;
int tpm2;
tpm2 = tpm_is_tpm2(chip);
if (tpm2 < 0)
return tpm2;
- if (datalen <= 0 || datalen > 32767 || !prep->data)
- return -EINVAL;
-
- datablob = kmalloc(datalen + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!datablob)
+ options = trusted_options_alloc();
+ if (!options)
return -ENOMEM;
- memcpy(datablob, prep->data, datalen);
- datablob[datalen] = '\0';
- options = trusted_options_alloc();
- if (!options) {
- ret = -ENOMEM;
- goto out;
- }
- payload = trusted_payload_alloc(key);
- if (!payload) {
- ret = -ENOMEM;
+ ret = getoptions(datablob, p, options);
+ if (ret < 0)
goto out;
- }
+ dump_options(options);
- key_cmd = datablob_parse(datablob, payload, options);
- if (key_cmd < 0) {
- ret = key_cmd;
+ if (!options->keyhandle && !tpm2) {
+ ret = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
- if (!options->keyhandle) {
- ret = -EINVAL;
+ if (tpm2)
+ ret = tpm2_seal_trusted(chip, p, options);
+ else
+ ret = key_seal(p, options);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ pr_info("key_seal failed (%d)\n", ret);
goto out;
}
- dump_payload(payload);
- dump_options(options);
-
- switch (key_cmd) {
- case Opt_load:
- if (tpm2)
- ret = tpm2_unseal_trusted(chip, payload, options);
- else
- ret = key_unseal(payload, options);
- dump_payload(payload);
- dump_options(options);
- if (ret < 0)
- pr_info("trusted_key: key_unseal failed (%d)\n", ret);
- break;
- case Opt_new:
- key_len = payload->key_len;
- ret = tpm_get_random(chip, payload->key, key_len);
- if (ret != key_len) {
- pr_info("trusted_key: key_create failed (%d)\n", ret);
+ if (options->pcrlock) {
+ ret = pcrlock(options->pcrlock);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ pr_info("pcrlock failed (%d)\n", ret);
goto out;
}
- if (tpm2)
- ret = tpm2_seal_trusted(chip, payload, options);
- else
- ret = key_seal(payload, options);
- if (ret < 0)
- pr_info("trusted_key: key_seal failed (%d)\n", ret);
- break;
- default:
- ret = -EINVAL;
- goto out;
}
- if (!ret && options->pcrlock)
- ret = pcrlock(options->pcrlock);
out:
- kzfree(datablob);
- kzfree(options);
- if (!ret)
- rcu_assign_keypointer(key, payload);
- else
- kzfree(payload);
+ kfree_sensitive(options);
return ret;
}
-static void trusted_rcu_free(struct rcu_head *rcu)
+static int trusted_tpm_unseal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob)
{
- struct trusted_key_payload *p;
-
- p = container_of(rcu, struct trusted_key_payload, rcu);
- kzfree(p);
-}
-
-/*
- * trusted_update - reseal an existing key with new PCR values
- */
-static int trusted_update(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
-{
- struct trusted_key_payload *p;
- struct trusted_key_payload *new_p;
- struct trusted_key_options *new_o;
- size_t datalen = prep->datalen;
- char *datablob;
+ struct trusted_key_options *options = NULL;
int ret = 0;
+ int tpm2;
- if (key_is_negative(key))
- return -ENOKEY;
- p = key->payload.data[0];
- if (!p->migratable)
- return -EPERM;
- if (datalen <= 0 || datalen > 32767 || !prep->data)
- return -EINVAL;
+ tpm2 = tpm_is_tpm2(chip);
+ if (tpm2 < 0)
+ return tpm2;
- datablob = kmalloc(datalen + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!datablob)
+ options = trusted_options_alloc();
+ if (!options)
return -ENOMEM;
- new_o = trusted_options_alloc();
- if (!new_o) {
- ret = -ENOMEM;
- goto out;
- }
- new_p = trusted_payload_alloc(key);
- if (!new_p) {
- ret = -ENOMEM;
- goto out;
- }
- memcpy(datablob, prep->data, datalen);
- datablob[datalen] = '\0';
- ret = datablob_parse(datablob, new_p, new_o);
- if (ret != Opt_update) {
- ret = -EINVAL;
- kzfree(new_p);
+ ret = getoptions(datablob, p, options);
+ if (ret < 0)
goto out;
- }
+ dump_options(options);
- if (!new_o->keyhandle) {
+ if (!options->keyhandle && !tpm2) {
ret = -EINVAL;
- kzfree(new_p);
goto out;
}
- /* copy old key values, and reseal with new pcrs */
- new_p->migratable = p->migratable;
- new_p->key_len = p->key_len;
- memcpy(new_p->key, p->key, p->key_len);
- dump_payload(p);
- dump_payload(new_p);
+ if (tpm2)
+ ret = tpm2_unseal_trusted(chip, p, options);
+ else
+ ret = key_unseal(p, options);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ pr_info("key_unseal failed (%d)\n", ret);
- ret = key_seal(new_p, new_o);
- if (ret < 0) {
- pr_info("trusted_key: key_seal failed (%d)\n", ret);
- kzfree(new_p);
- goto out;
- }
- if (new_o->pcrlock) {
- ret = pcrlock(new_o->pcrlock);
+ if (options->pcrlock) {
+ ret = pcrlock(options->pcrlock);
if (ret < 0) {
- pr_info("trusted_key: pcrlock failed (%d)\n", ret);
- kzfree(new_p);
+ pr_info("pcrlock failed (%d)\n", ret);
goto out;
}
}
- rcu_assign_keypointer(key, new_p);
- call_rcu(&p->rcu, trusted_rcu_free);
out:
- kzfree(datablob);
- kzfree(new_o);
+ kfree_sensitive(options);
return ret;
}
-/*
- * trusted_read - copy the sealed blob data to userspace in hex.
- * On success, return to userspace the trusted key datablob size.
- */
-static long trusted_read(const struct key *key, char __user *buffer,
- size_t buflen)
+static int trusted_tpm_get_random(unsigned char *key, size_t key_len)
{
- const struct trusted_key_payload *p;
- char *ascii_buf;
- char *bufp;
- int i;
-
- p = dereference_key_locked(key);
- if (!p)
- return -EINVAL;
-
- if (buffer && buflen >= 2 * p->blob_len) {
- ascii_buf = kmalloc_array(2, p->blob_len, GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!ascii_buf)
- return -ENOMEM;
-
- bufp = ascii_buf;
- for (i = 0; i < p->blob_len; i++)
- bufp = hex_byte_pack(bufp, p->blob[i]);
- if (copy_to_user(buffer, ascii_buf, 2 * p->blob_len) != 0) {
- kzfree(ascii_buf);
- return -EFAULT;
- }
- kzfree(ascii_buf);
- }
- return 2 * p->blob_len;
-}
-
-/*
- * trusted_destroy - clear and free the key's payload
- */
-static void trusted_destroy(struct key *key)
-{
- kzfree(key->payload.data[0]);
+ return tpm_get_random(chip, key, key_len);
}
-struct key_type key_type_trusted = {
- .name = "trusted",
- .instantiate = trusted_instantiate,
- .update = trusted_update,
- .destroy = trusted_destroy,
- .describe = user_describe,
- .read = trusted_read,
-};
-
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(key_type_trusted);
-
static void trusted_shash_release(void)
{
if (hashalg)
@@ -1192,14 +992,14 @@ static int __init trusted_shash_alloc(void)
hmacalg = crypto_alloc_shash(hmac_alg, 0, 0);
if (IS_ERR(hmacalg)) {
- pr_info("trusted_key: could not allocate crypto %s\n",
+ pr_info("could not allocate crypto %s\n",
hmac_alg);
return PTR_ERR(hmacalg);
}
hashalg = crypto_alloc_shash(hash_alg, 0, 0);
if (IS_ERR(hashalg)) {
- pr_info("trusted_key: could not allocate crypto %s\n",
+ pr_info("could not allocate crypto %s\n",
hash_alg);
ret = PTR_ERR(hashalg);
goto hashalg_fail;
@@ -1227,16 +1027,13 @@ static int __init init_digests(void)
return 0;
}
-static int __init init_trusted(void)
+static int __init trusted_tpm_init(void)
{
int ret;
- /* encrypted_keys.ko depends on successful load of this module even if
- * TPM is not used.
- */
chip = tpm_default_chip();
if (!chip)
- return 0;
+ return -ENODEV;
ret = init_digests();
if (ret < 0)
@@ -1257,7 +1054,7 @@ err_put:
return ret;
}
-static void __exit cleanup_trusted(void)
+static void trusted_tpm_exit(void)
{
if (chip) {
put_device(&chip->dev);
@@ -1267,7 +1064,11 @@ static void __exit cleanup_trusted(void)
}
}
-late_initcall(init_trusted);
-module_exit(cleanup_trusted);
-
-MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
+struct trusted_key_ops trusted_key_tpm_ops = {
+ .migratable = 1, /* migratable by default */
+ .init = trusted_tpm_init,
+ .seal = trusted_tpm_seal,
+ .unseal = trusted_tpm_unseal,
+ .get_random = trusted_tpm_get_random,
+ .exit = trusted_tpm_exit,
+};
diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
index 08ec7f48f01d..2b2c8eb258d5 100644
--- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
+++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
@@ -4,6 +4,8 @@
* Copyright (C) 2014 Intel Corporation
*/
+#include <linux/asn1_encoder.h>
+#include <linux/oid_registry.h>
#include <linux/string.h>
#include <linux/err.h>
#include <linux/tpm.h>
@@ -12,6 +14,10 @@
#include <keys/trusted-type.h>
#include <keys/trusted_tpm.h>
+#include <asm/unaligned.h>
+
+#include "tpm2key.asn1.h"
+
static struct tpm2_hash tpm2_hash_map[] = {
{HASH_ALGO_SHA1, TPM_ALG_SHA1},
{HASH_ALGO_SHA256, TPM_ALG_SHA256},
@@ -20,6 +26,165 @@ static struct tpm2_hash tpm2_hash_map[] = {
{HASH_ALGO_SM3_256, TPM_ALG_SM3_256},
};
+static u32 tpm2key_oid[] = { 2, 23, 133, 10, 1, 5 };
+
+static int tpm2_key_encode(struct trusted_key_payload *payload,
+ struct trusted_key_options *options,
+ u8 *src, u32 len)
+{
+ const int SCRATCH_SIZE = PAGE_SIZE;
+ u8 *scratch = kmalloc(SCRATCH_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
+ u8 *work = scratch, *work1;
+ u8 *end_work = scratch + SCRATCH_SIZE;
+ u8 *priv, *pub;
+ u16 priv_len, pub_len;
+
+ priv_len = get_unaligned_be16(src) + 2;
+ priv = src;
+
+ src += priv_len;
+
+ pub_len = get_unaligned_be16(src) + 2;
+ pub = src;
+
+ if (!scratch)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ work = asn1_encode_oid(work, end_work, tpm2key_oid,
+ asn1_oid_len(tpm2key_oid));
+
+ if (options->blobauth_len == 0) {
+ unsigned char bool[3], *w = bool;
+ /* tag 0 is emptyAuth */
+ w = asn1_encode_boolean(w, w + sizeof(bool), true);
+ if (WARN(IS_ERR(w), "BUG: Boolean failed to encode"))
+ return PTR_ERR(w);
+ work = asn1_encode_tag(work, end_work, 0, bool, w - bool);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Assume both octet strings will encode to a 2 byte definite length
+ *
+ * Note: For a well behaved TPM, this warning should never
+ * trigger, so if it does there's something nefarious going on
+ */
+ if (WARN(work - scratch + pub_len + priv_len + 14 > SCRATCH_SIZE,
+ "BUG: scratch buffer is too small"))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ work = asn1_encode_integer(work, end_work, options->keyhandle);
+ work = asn1_encode_octet_string(work, end_work, pub, pub_len);
+ work = asn1_encode_octet_string(work, end_work, priv, priv_len);
+
+ work1 = payload->blob;
+ work1 = asn1_encode_sequence(work1, work1 + sizeof(payload->blob),
+ scratch, work - scratch);
+ if (WARN(IS_ERR(work1), "BUG: ASN.1 encoder failed"))
+ return PTR_ERR(work1);
+
+ return work1 - payload->blob;
+}
+
+struct tpm2_key_context {
+ u32 parent;
+ const u8 *pub;
+ u32 pub_len;
+ const u8 *priv;
+ u32 priv_len;
+};
+
+static int tpm2_key_decode(struct trusted_key_payload *payload,
+ struct trusted_key_options *options,
+ u8 **buf)
+{
+ int ret;
+ struct tpm2_key_context ctx;
+ u8 *blob;
+
+ memset(&ctx, 0, sizeof(ctx));
+
+ ret = asn1_ber_decoder(&tpm2key_decoder, &ctx, payload->blob,
+ payload->blob_len);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ret;
+
+ if (ctx.priv_len + ctx.pub_len > MAX_BLOB_SIZE)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ blob = kmalloc(ctx.priv_len + ctx.pub_len + 4, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!blob)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ *buf = blob;
+ options->keyhandle = ctx.parent;
+
+ memcpy(blob, ctx.priv, ctx.priv_len);
+ blob += ctx.priv_len;
+
+ memcpy(blob, ctx.pub, ctx.pub_len);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int tpm2_key_parent(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
+ unsigned char tag,
+ const void *value, size_t vlen)
+{
+ struct tpm2_key_context *ctx = context;
+ const u8 *v = value;
+ int i;
+
+ ctx->parent = 0;
+ for (i = 0; i < vlen; i++) {
+ ctx->parent <<= 8;
+ ctx->parent |= v[i];
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int tpm2_key_type(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
+ unsigned char tag,
+ const void *value, size_t vlen)
+{
+ enum OID oid = look_up_OID(value, vlen);
+
+ if (oid != OID_TPMSealedData) {
+ char buffer[50];
+
+ sprint_oid(value, vlen, buffer, sizeof(buffer));
+ pr_debug("OID is \"%s\" which is not TPMSealedData\n",
+ buffer);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int tpm2_key_pub(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
+ unsigned char tag,
+ const void *value, size_t vlen)
+{
+ struct tpm2_key_context *ctx = context;
+
+ ctx->pub = value;
+ ctx->pub_len = vlen;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int tpm2_key_priv(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
+ unsigned char tag,
+ const void *value, size_t vlen)
+{
+ struct tpm2_key_context *ctx = context;
+
+ ctx->priv = value;
+ ctx->priv_len = vlen;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
/**
* tpm_buf_append_auth() - append TPMS_AUTH_COMMAND to the buffer.
*
@@ -63,9 +228,10 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip,
struct trusted_key_payload *payload,
struct trusted_key_options *options)
{
- unsigned int blob_len;
+ int blob_len = 0;
struct tpm_buf buf;
u32 hash;
+ u32 flags;
int i;
int rc;
@@ -79,10 +245,19 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip,
if (i == ARRAY_SIZE(tpm2_hash_map))
return -EINVAL;
- rc = tpm_buf_init(&buf, TPM2_ST_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_CREATE);
+ if (!options->keyhandle)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ rc = tpm_try_get_ops(chip);
if (rc)
return rc;
+ rc = tpm_buf_init(&buf, TPM2_ST_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_CREATE);
+ if (rc) {
+ tpm_put_ops(chip);
+ return rc;
+ }
+
tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, options->keyhandle);
tpm2_buf_append_auth(&buf, TPM2_RS_PW,
NULL /* nonce */, 0,
@@ -91,29 +266,32 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip,
TPM_DIGEST_SIZE);
/* sensitive */
- tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, 4 + TPM_DIGEST_SIZE + payload->key_len + 1);
+ tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, 4 + options->blobauth_len + payload->key_len);
- tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, TPM_DIGEST_SIZE);
- tpm_buf_append(&buf, options->blobauth, TPM_DIGEST_SIZE);
- tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, payload->key_len + 1);
+ tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, options->blobauth_len);
+ if (options->blobauth_len)
+ tpm_buf_append(&buf, options->blobauth, options->blobauth_len);
+
+ tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, payload->key_len);
tpm_buf_append(&buf, payload->key, payload->key_len);
- tpm_buf_append_u8(&buf, payload->migratable);
/* public */
tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, 14 + options->policydigest_len);
tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, TPM_ALG_KEYEDHASH);
tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, hash);
+ /* key properties */
+ flags = 0;
+ flags |= options->policydigest_len ? 0 : TPM2_OA_USER_WITH_AUTH;
+ flags |= payload->migratable ? 0 : (TPM2_OA_FIXED_TPM |
+ TPM2_OA_FIXED_PARENT);
+ tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, flags);
+
/* policy */
- if (options->policydigest_len) {
- tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, 0);
- tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, options->policydigest_len);
+ tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, options->policydigest_len);
+ if (options->policydigest_len)
tpm_buf_append(&buf, options->policydigest,
options->policydigest_len);
- } else {
- tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, TPM2_OA_USER_WITH_AUTH);
- tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, 0);
- }
/* public parameters */
tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, TPM_ALG_NULL);
@@ -130,7 +308,7 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip,
goto out;
}
- rc = tpm_send(chip, buf.data, tpm_buf_length(&buf));
+ rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf, 4, "sealing data");
if (rc)
goto out;
@@ -144,8 +322,9 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip,
goto out;
}
- memcpy(payload->blob, &buf.data[TPM_HEADER_SIZE + 4], blob_len);
- payload->blob_len = blob_len;
+ blob_len = tpm2_key_encode(payload, options,
+ &buf.data[TPM_HEADER_SIZE + 4],
+ blob_len);
out:
tpm_buf_destroy(&buf);
@@ -156,7 +335,12 @@ out:
else
rc = -EPERM;
}
+ if (blob_len < 0)
+ rc = blob_len;
+ else
+ payload->blob_len = blob_len;
+ tpm_put_ops(chip);
return rc;
}
@@ -182,13 +366,45 @@ static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip,
unsigned int private_len;
unsigned int public_len;
unsigned int blob_len;
+ u8 *blob, *pub;
int rc;
+ u32 attrs;
+
+ rc = tpm2_key_decode(payload, options, &blob);
+ if (rc) {
+ /* old form */
+ blob = payload->blob;
+ payload->old_format = 1;
+ }
- private_len = be16_to_cpup((__be16 *) &payload->blob[0]);
- if (private_len > (payload->blob_len - 2))
+ /* new format carries keyhandle but old format doesn't */
+ if (!options->keyhandle)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ /* must be big enough for at least the two be16 size counts */
+ if (payload->blob_len < 4)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ private_len = get_unaligned_be16(blob);
+
+ /* must be big enough for following public_len */
+ if (private_len + 2 + 2 > (payload->blob_len))
return -E2BIG;
- public_len = be16_to_cpup((__be16 *) &payload->blob[2 + private_len]);
+ public_len = get_unaligned_be16(blob + 2 + private_len);
+ if (private_len + 2 + public_len + 2 > payload->blob_len)
+ return -E2BIG;
+
+ pub = blob + 2 + private_len + 2;
+ /* key attributes are always at offset 4 */
+ attrs = get_unaligned_be32(pub + 4);
+
+ if ((attrs & (TPM2_OA_FIXED_TPM | TPM2_OA_FIXED_PARENT)) ==
+ (TPM2_OA_FIXED_TPM | TPM2_OA_FIXED_PARENT))
+ payload->migratable = 0;
+ else
+ payload->migratable = 1;
+
blob_len = private_len + public_len + 4;
if (blob_len > payload->blob_len)
return -E2BIG;
@@ -204,19 +420,21 @@ static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip,
options->keyauth /* hmac */,
TPM_DIGEST_SIZE);
- tpm_buf_append(&buf, payload->blob, blob_len);
+ tpm_buf_append(&buf, blob, blob_len);
if (buf.flags & TPM_BUF_OVERFLOW) {
rc = -E2BIG;
goto out;
}
- rc = tpm_send(chip, buf.data, tpm_buf_length(&buf));
+ rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf, 4, "loading blob");
if (!rc)
*blob_handle = be32_to_cpup(
(__be32 *) &buf.data[TPM_HEADER_SIZE]);
out:
+ if (blob != payload->blob)
+ kfree(blob);
tpm_buf_destroy(&buf);
if (rc > 0)
@@ -258,16 +476,16 @@ static int tpm2_unseal_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip,
NULL /* nonce */, 0,
TPM2_SA_CONTINUE_SESSION,
options->blobauth /* hmac */,
- TPM_DIGEST_SIZE);
+ options->blobauth_len);
- rc = tpm_send(chip, buf.data, tpm_buf_length(&buf));
+ rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf, 6, "unsealing");
if (rc > 0)
rc = -EPERM;
if (!rc) {
data_len = be16_to_cpup(
(__be16 *) &buf.data[TPM_HEADER_SIZE + 4]);
- if (data_len < MIN_KEY_SIZE || data_len > MAX_KEY_SIZE + 1) {
+ if (data_len < MIN_KEY_SIZE || data_len > MAX_KEY_SIZE) {
rc = -EFAULT;
goto out;
}
@@ -278,9 +496,19 @@ static int tpm2_unseal_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip,
}
data = &buf.data[TPM_HEADER_SIZE + 6];
- memcpy(payload->key, data, data_len - 1);
- payload->key_len = data_len - 1;
- payload->migratable = data[data_len - 1];
+ if (payload->old_format) {
+ /* migratable flag is at the end of the key */
+ memcpy(payload->key, data, data_len - 1);
+ payload->key_len = data_len - 1;
+ payload->migratable = data[data_len - 1];
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * migratable flag already collected from key
+ * attributes
+ */
+ memcpy(payload->key, data, data_len);
+ payload->key_len = data_len;
+ }
}
out:
@@ -304,12 +532,19 @@ int tpm2_unseal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip,
u32 blob_handle;
int rc;
- rc = tpm2_load_cmd(chip, payload, options, &blob_handle);
+ rc = tpm_try_get_ops(chip);
if (rc)
return rc;
+ rc = tpm2_load_cmd(chip, payload, options, &blob_handle);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+
rc = tpm2_unseal_cmd(chip, payload, options, blob_handle);
tpm2_flush_context(chip, blob_handle);
+out:
+ tpm_put_ops(chip);
+
return rc;
}
diff --git a/security/keys/user_defined.c b/security/keys/user_defined.c
index 6f12de4ce549..749e2a4dcb13 100644
--- a/security/keys/user_defined.c
+++ b/security/keys/user_defined.c
@@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(user_preparse);
*/
void user_free_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
{
- kzfree(prep->payload.data[0]);
+ kfree_sensitive(prep->payload.data[0]);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(user_free_preparse);
@@ -91,7 +91,7 @@ static void user_free_payload_rcu(struct rcu_head *head)
struct user_key_payload *payload;
payload = container_of(head, struct user_key_payload, rcu);
- kzfree(payload);
+ kfree_sensitive(payload);
}
/*
@@ -147,7 +147,7 @@ void user_destroy(struct key *key)
{
struct user_key_payload *upayload = key->payload.data[0];
- kzfree(upayload);
+ kfree_sensitive(upayload);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(user_destroy);
@@ -168,7 +168,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(user_describe);
* read the key data
* - the key's semaphore is read-locked
*/
-long user_read(const struct key *key, char __user *buffer, size_t buflen)
+long user_read(const struct key *key, char *buffer, size_t buflen)
{
const struct user_key_payload *upayload;
long ret;
@@ -181,8 +181,7 @@ long user_read(const struct key *key, char __user *buffer, size_t buflen)
if (buflen > upayload->datalen)
buflen = upayload->datalen;
- if (copy_to_user(buffer, upayload->data, buflen) != 0)
- ret = -EFAULT;
+ memcpy(buffer, upayload->data, buflen);
}
return ret;