diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'security/selinux/avc.c')
-rw-r--r-- | security/selinux/avc.c | 119 |
1 files changed, 54 insertions, 65 deletions
diff --git a/security/selinux/avc.c b/security/selinux/avc.c index d18cb32a242a..9a43af0ebd7d 100644 --- a/security/selinux/avc.c +++ b/security/selinux/avc.c @@ -31,6 +31,9 @@ #include "avc_ss.h" #include "classmap.h" +#define CREATE_TRACE_POINTS +#include <trace/events/avc.h> + #define AVC_CACHE_SLOTS 512 #define AVC_DEF_CACHE_THRESHOLD 512 #define AVC_CACHE_RECLAIM 16 @@ -115,11 +118,11 @@ void avc_set_cache_threshold(struct selinux_avc *avc, avc->avc_cache_threshold = cache_threshold; } -static struct avc_callback_node *avc_callbacks; -static struct kmem_cache *avc_node_cachep; -static struct kmem_cache *avc_xperms_data_cachep; -static struct kmem_cache *avc_xperms_decision_cachep; -static struct kmem_cache *avc_xperms_cachep; +static struct avc_callback_node *avc_callbacks __ro_after_init; +static struct kmem_cache *avc_node_cachep __ro_after_init; +static struct kmem_cache *avc_xperms_data_cachep __ro_after_init; +static struct kmem_cache *avc_xperms_decision_cachep __ro_after_init; +static struct kmem_cache *avc_xperms_cachep __ro_after_init; static inline int avc_hash(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass) { @@ -294,26 +297,27 @@ static struct avc_xperms_decision_node struct avc_xperms_decision_node *xpd_node; struct extended_perms_decision *xpd; - xpd_node = kmem_cache_zalloc(avc_xperms_decision_cachep, GFP_NOWAIT); + xpd_node = kmem_cache_zalloc(avc_xperms_decision_cachep, + GFP_NOWAIT | __GFP_NOWARN); if (!xpd_node) return NULL; xpd = &xpd_node->xpd; if (which & XPERMS_ALLOWED) { xpd->allowed = kmem_cache_zalloc(avc_xperms_data_cachep, - GFP_NOWAIT); + GFP_NOWAIT | __GFP_NOWARN); if (!xpd->allowed) goto error; } if (which & XPERMS_AUDITALLOW) { xpd->auditallow = kmem_cache_zalloc(avc_xperms_data_cachep, - GFP_NOWAIT); + GFP_NOWAIT | __GFP_NOWARN); if (!xpd->auditallow) goto error; } if (which & XPERMS_DONTAUDIT) { xpd->dontaudit = kmem_cache_zalloc(avc_xperms_data_cachep, - GFP_NOWAIT); + GFP_NOWAIT | __GFP_NOWARN); if (!xpd->dontaudit) goto error; } @@ -341,7 +345,7 @@ static struct avc_xperms_node *avc_xperms_alloc(void) { struct avc_xperms_node *xp_node; - xp_node = kmem_cache_zalloc(avc_xperms_cachep, GFP_NOWAIT); + xp_node = kmem_cache_zalloc(avc_xperms_cachep, GFP_NOWAIT | __GFP_NOWARN); if (!xp_node) return xp_node; INIT_LIST_HEAD(&xp_node->xpd_head); @@ -497,7 +501,7 @@ static struct avc_node *avc_alloc_node(struct selinux_avc *avc) { struct avc_node *node; - node = kmem_cache_zalloc(avc_node_cachep, GFP_NOWAIT); + node = kmem_cache_zalloc(avc_node_cachep, GFP_NOWAIT | __GFP_NOWARN); if (!node) goto out; @@ -543,6 +547,7 @@ static inline struct avc_node *avc_search_node(struct selinux_avc *avc, /** * avc_lookup - Look up an AVC entry. + * @avc: the access vector cache * @ssid: source security identifier * @tsid: target security identifier * @tclass: target security class @@ -593,6 +598,7 @@ static int avc_latest_notif_update(struct selinux_avc *avc, /** * avc_insert - Insert an AVC entry. + * @avc: the access vector cache * @ssid: source security identifier * @tsid: target security identifier * @tclass: target security class @@ -662,7 +668,7 @@ static void avc_audit_pre_callback(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *a) struct common_audit_data *ad = a; struct selinux_audit_data *sad = ad->selinux_audit_data; u32 av = sad->audited; - const char **perms; + const char *const *perms; int i, perm; audit_log_format(ab, "avc: %s ", sad->denied ? "denied" : "granted"); @@ -702,33 +708,37 @@ static void avc_audit_post_callback(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *a) { struct common_audit_data *ad = a; struct selinux_audit_data *sad = ad->selinux_audit_data; - char *scontext; + char *scontext = NULL; + char *tcontext = NULL; + const char *tclass = NULL; u32 scontext_len; + u32 tcontext_len; int rc; rc = security_sid_to_context(sad->state, sad->ssid, &scontext, &scontext_len); if (rc) audit_log_format(ab, " ssid=%d", sad->ssid); - else { + else audit_log_format(ab, " scontext=%s", scontext); - kfree(scontext); - } - rc = security_sid_to_context(sad->state, sad->tsid, &scontext, - &scontext_len); + rc = security_sid_to_context(sad->state, sad->tsid, &tcontext, + &tcontext_len); if (rc) audit_log_format(ab, " tsid=%d", sad->tsid); - else { - audit_log_format(ab, " tcontext=%s", scontext); - kfree(scontext); - } + else + audit_log_format(ab, " tcontext=%s", tcontext); - audit_log_format(ab, " tclass=%s", secclass_map[sad->tclass-1].name); + tclass = secclass_map[sad->tclass-1].name; + audit_log_format(ab, " tclass=%s", tclass); if (sad->denied) audit_log_format(ab, " permissive=%u", sad->result ? 0 : 1); + trace_selinux_audited(sad, scontext, tcontext, tclass); + kfree(tcontext); + kfree(scontext); + /* in case of invalid context report also the actual context string */ rc = security_sid_to_context_inval(sad->state, sad->ssid, &scontext, &scontext_len); @@ -751,7 +761,11 @@ static void avc_audit_post_callback(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *a) } } -/* This is the slow part of avc audit with big stack footprint */ +/* + * This is the slow part of avc audit with big stack footprint. + * Note that it is non-blocking and can be called from under + * rcu_read_lock(). + */ noinline int slow_avc_audit(struct selinux_state *state, u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, u32 requested, u32 audited, u32 denied, int result, @@ -812,13 +826,18 @@ out: } /** - * avc_update_node Update an AVC entry + * avc_update_node - Update an AVC entry + * @avc: the access vector cache * @event : Updating event * @perms : Permission mask bits - * @ssid,@tsid,@tclass : identifier of an AVC entry + * @driver: xperm driver information + * @xperm: xperm permissions + * @ssid: AVC entry source sid + * @tsid: AVC entry target sid + * @tclass : AVC entry target object class * @seqno : sequence number when decision was made * @xpd: extended_perms_decision to be added to the node - * @flags: the AVC_* flags, e.g. AVC_NONBLOCKING, AVC_EXTENDED_PERMS, or 0. + * @flags: the AVC_* flags, e.g. AVC_EXTENDED_PERMS, or 0. * * if a valid AVC entry doesn't exist,this function returns -ENOENT. * if kmalloc() called internal returns NULL, this function returns -ENOMEM. @@ -837,21 +856,6 @@ static int avc_update_node(struct selinux_avc *avc, struct hlist_head *head; spinlock_t *lock; - /* - * If we are in a non-blocking code path, e.g. VFS RCU walk, - * then we must not add permissions to a cache entry - * because we will not audit the denial. Otherwise, - * during the subsequent blocking retry (e.g. VFS ref walk), we - * will find the permissions already granted in the cache entry - * and won't audit anything at all, leading to silent denials in - * permissive mode that only appear when in enforcing mode. - * - * See the corresponding handling of MAY_NOT_BLOCK in avc_audit() - * and selinux_inode_permission(). - */ - if (flags & AVC_NONBLOCKING) - return 0; - node = avc_alloc_node(avc); if (!node) { rc = -ENOMEM; @@ -931,6 +935,7 @@ out: /** * avc_flush - Flush the cache + * @avc: the access vector cache */ static void avc_flush(struct selinux_avc *avc) { @@ -959,6 +964,7 @@ static void avc_flush(struct selinux_avc *avc) /** * avc_ss_reset - Flush the cache and revalidate migrated permissions. + * @avc: the access vector cache * @seqno: policy sequence number */ int avc_ss_reset(struct selinux_avc *avc, u32 seqno) @@ -1053,7 +1059,7 @@ int avc_has_extended_perms(struct selinux_state *state, node = avc_lookup(state->avc, ssid, tsid, tclass); if (unlikely(!node)) { - node = avc_compute_av(state, ssid, tsid, tclass, &avd, xp_node); + avc_compute_av(state, ssid, tsid, tclass, &avd, xp_node); } else { memcpy(&avd, &node->ae.avd, sizeof(avd)); xp_node = node->ae.xp_node; @@ -1108,11 +1114,12 @@ decision: /** * avc_has_perm_noaudit - Check permissions but perform no auditing. + * @state: SELinux state * @ssid: source security identifier * @tsid: target security identifier * @tclass: target security class * @requested: requested permissions, interpreted based on @tclass - * @flags: AVC_STRICT, AVC_NONBLOCKING, or 0 + * @flags: AVC_STRICT or 0 * @avd: access vector decisions * * Check the AVC to determine whether the @requested permissions are granted @@ -1144,7 +1151,7 @@ inline int avc_has_perm_noaudit(struct selinux_state *state, node = avc_lookup(state->avc, ssid, tsid, tclass); if (unlikely(!node)) - node = avc_compute_av(state, ssid, tsid, tclass, avd, &xp_node); + avc_compute_av(state, ssid, tsid, tclass, avd, &xp_node); else memcpy(avd, &node->ae.avd, sizeof(*avd)); @@ -1159,6 +1166,7 @@ inline int avc_has_perm_noaudit(struct selinux_state *state, /** * avc_has_perm - Check permissions and perform any appropriate auditing. + * @state: SELinux state * @ssid: source security identifier * @tsid: target security identifier * @tclass: target security class @@ -1183,26 +1191,7 @@ int avc_has_perm(struct selinux_state *state, u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, &avd); rc2 = avc_audit(state, ssid, tsid, tclass, requested, &avd, rc, - auditdata, 0); - if (rc2) - return rc2; - return rc; -} - -int avc_has_perm_flags(struct selinux_state *state, - u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, u32 requested, - struct common_audit_data *auditdata, - int flags) -{ - struct av_decision avd; - int rc, rc2; - - rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(state, ssid, tsid, tclass, requested, - (flags & MAY_NOT_BLOCK) ? AVC_NONBLOCKING : 0, - &avd); - - rc2 = avc_audit(state, ssid, tsid, tclass, requested, &avd, rc, - auditdata, flags); + auditdata); if (rc2) return rc2; return rc; |