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Pull arm64 festive updates from Will Deacon:
"In the end, we ended up with quite a lot more than I expected:
- Support for ARMv8.3 Pointer Authentication in userspace (CRIU and
kernel-side support to come later)
- Support for per-thread stack canaries, pending an update to GCC
that is currently undergoing review
- Support for kexec_file_load(), which permits secure boot of a kexec
payload but also happens to improve the performance of kexec
dramatically because we can avoid the sucky purgatory code from
userspace. Kdump will come later (requires updates to libfdt).
- Optimisation of our dynamic CPU feature framework, so that all
detected features are enabled via a single stop_machine()
invocation
- KPTI whitelisting of Cortex-A CPUs unaffected by Meltdown, so that
they can benefit from global TLB entries when KASLR is not in use
- 52-bit virtual addressing for userspace (kernel remains 48-bit)
- Patch in LSE atomics for per-cpu atomic operations
- Custom preempt.h implementation to avoid unconditional calls to
preempt_schedule() from preempt_enable()
- Support for the new 'SB' Speculation Barrier instruction
- Vectorised implementation of XOR checksumming and CRC32
optimisations
- Workaround for Cortex-A76 erratum #1165522
- Improved compatibility with Clang/LLD
- Support for TX2 system PMUS for profiling the L3 cache and DMC
- Reflect read-only permissions in the linear map by default
- Ensure MMIO reads are ordered with subsequent calls to Xdelay()
- Initial support for memory hotplug
- Tweak the threshold when we invalidate the TLB by-ASID, so that
mremap() performance is improved for ranges spanning multiple PMDs.
- Minor refactoring and cleanups"
* tag 'arm64-upstream' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/arm64/linux: (125 commits)
arm64: kaslr: print PHYS_OFFSET in dump_kernel_offset()
arm64: sysreg: Use _BITUL() when defining register bits
arm64: cpufeature: Rework ptr auth hwcaps using multi_entry_cap_matches
arm64: cpufeature: Reduce number of pointer auth CPU caps from 6 to 4
arm64: docs: document pointer authentication
arm64: ptr auth: Move per-thread keys from thread_info to thread_struct
arm64: enable pointer authentication
arm64: add prctl control for resetting ptrauth keys
arm64: perf: strip PAC when unwinding userspace
arm64: expose user PAC bit positions via ptrace
arm64: add basic pointer authentication support
arm64/cpufeature: detect pointer authentication
arm64: Don't trap host pointer auth use to EL2
arm64/kvm: hide ptrauth from guests
arm64/kvm: consistently handle host HCR_EL2 flags
arm64: add pointer authentication register bits
arm64: add comments about EC exception levels
arm64: perf: Treat EXCLUDE_EL* bit definitions as unsigned
arm64: kpti: Whitelist Cortex-A CPUs that don't implement the CSV3 field
arm64: enable per-task stack canaries
...
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Pull x86 pti updates from Thomas Gleixner:
"No point in speculating what's in this parcel:
- Drop the swap storage limit when L1TF is disabled so the full space
is available
- Add support for the new AMD STIBP always on mitigation mode
- Fix a bunch of STIPB typos"
* 'x86-pti-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
x86/speculation: Add support for STIBP always-on preferred mode
x86/speculation/l1tf: Drop the swap storage limit restriction when l1tf=off
x86/speculation: Change misspelled STIPB to STIBP
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Pull ACPI updates from Rafael Wysocki:
"These update the ACPICA code in the kernel to the 20181213 upstream
revision, make it possible to build the ACPI subsystem without PCI
support, and a new OEM _OSI string, add a new device support to the
ACPI driver for AMD SoCs and fix PM handling in the ACPI driver for
Intel SoCs, fix the SPCR table handling and do some assorted fixes and
cleanups.
Specifics:
- Update the ACPICA code in the kernel to the 20181213 upstream
revision including:
* New Windows _OSI strings (Bob Moore, Jung-uk Kim).
* Buffers-to-string conversions update (Bob Moore).
* Removal of support for expressions in package elements (Bob
Moore).
* New option to display method/object evaluation in debug output
(Bob Moore).
* Compiler improvements (Bob Moore, Erik Schmauss).
* Minor debugger fix (Erik Schmauss).
* Disassembler improvement (Erik Schmauss).
* Assorted cleanups (Bob Moore, Colin Ian King, Erik Schmauss).
- Add support for a new OEM _OSI string to indicate special handling
of secondary graphics adapters on some systems (Alex Hung).
- Make it possible to build the ACPI subystem without PCI support
(Sinan Kaya).
- Make the SPCR table handling regard baud rate 0 in accordance with
the specification of it and make the DSDT override code support
DSDT code names generated by recent ACPICA (Andy Shevchenko, Wang
Dongsheng, Nathan Chancellor).
- Add clock frequency for Hisilicon Hip08 SPI controller to the ACPI
driver for AMD SoCs (APD) (Jay Fang).
- Fix the PM handling during device init in the ACPI driver for Intel
SoCs (LPSS) (Hans de Goede).
- Avoid double panic()s by clearing the APEI GHES block_status before
panic() (Lenny Szubowicz).
- Clean up a function invocation in the ACPI core and get rid of some
code duplication by using the DEFINE_SHOW_ATTRIBUTE macro in the
APEI support code (Alexey Dobriyan, Yangtao Li)"
* tag 'acpi-4.21-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rafael/linux-pm: (31 commits)
ACPI / tables: Add an ifdef around amlcode and dsdt_amlcode
ACPI/APEI: Clear GHES block_status before panic()
ACPI: Make PCI slot detection driver depend on PCI
ACPI/IORT: Stub out ACS functions when CONFIG_PCI is not set
arm64: select ACPI PCI code only when both features are enabled
PCI/ACPI: Allow ACPI to be built without CONFIG_PCI set
ACPICA: Remove PCI bits from ACPICA when CONFIG_PCI is unset
ACPI: Allow CONFIG_PCI to be unset for reboot
ACPI: Move PCI reset to a separate function
ACPI / OSI: Add OEM _OSI string to enable dGPU direct output
ACPI / tables: add DSDT AmlCode new declaration name support
ACPICA: Update version to 20181213
ACPICA: change coding style to match ACPICA, no functional change
ACPICA: Debug output: Add option to display method/object evaluation
ACPICA: disassembler: disassemble OEMx tables as AML
ACPICA: Add "Windows 2018.2" string in the _OSI support
ACPICA: Expressions in package elements are not supported
ACPICA: Update buffer-to-string conversions
ACPICA: add comments, no functional change
ACPICA: Remove defines that use deprecated flag
...
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Pull kvm fix from Paolo Bonzini:
"A simple patch for a pretty bad bug: Unbreak AMD nested
virtualization."
* tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm:
KVM: x86: nSVM: fix switch to guest mmu
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Pull x86 fixes from Ingo Molnar:
"The biggest part is a series of reverts for the macro based GCC
inlining workarounds. It caused regressions in distro build and other
kernel tooling environments, and the GCC project was very receptive to
fixing the underlying inliner weaknesses - so as time ran out we
decided to do a reasonably straightforward revert of the patches. The
plan is to rely on the 'asm inline' GCC 9 feature, which might be
backported to GCC 8 and could thus become reasonably widely available
on modern distros.
Other than those reverts, there's misc fixes from all around the
place.
I wish our final x86 pull request for v4.20 was smaller..."
* 'x86-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
Revert "kbuild/Makefile: Prepare for using macros in inline assembly code to work around asm() related GCC inlining bugs"
Revert "x86/objtool: Use asm macros to work around GCC inlining bugs"
Revert "x86/refcount: Work around GCC inlining bug"
Revert "x86/alternatives: Macrofy lock prefixes to work around GCC inlining bugs"
Revert "x86/bug: Macrofy the BUG table section handling, to work around GCC inlining bugs"
Revert "x86/paravirt: Work around GCC inlining bugs when compiling paravirt ops"
Revert "x86/extable: Macrofy inline assembly code to work around GCC inlining bugs"
Revert "x86/cpufeature: Macrofy inline assembly code to work around GCC inlining bugs"
Revert "x86/jump-labels: Macrofy inline assembly code to work around GCC inlining bugs"
x86/mtrr: Don't copy uninitialized gentry fields back to userspace
x86/fsgsbase/64: Fix the base write helper functions
x86/mm/cpa: Fix cpa_flush_array() TLB invalidation
x86/vdso: Pass --eh-frame-hdr to the linker
x86/mm: Fix decoy address handling vs 32-bit builds
x86/intel_rdt: Ensure a CPU remains online for the region's pseudo-locking sequence
x86/dump_pagetables: Fix LDT remap address marker
x86/mm: Fix guard hole handling
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We are compiling PCI code today for systems with ACPI and no PCI
device present. Remove the useless code and reduce the tight
dependency.
Signed-off-by: Sinan Kaya <okaya@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com> # PCI parts
Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
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Recent optimizations in MMU code broke nested SVM with NPT in L1
completely: when we do nested_svm_{,un}init_mmu_context() we want
to switch from TDP MMU to shadow MMU, both init_kvm_tdp_mmu() and
kvm_init_shadow_mmu() check if re-configuration is needed by looking
at cache source data. The data, however, doesn't change - it's only
the type of the MMU which changes. We end up not re-initializing
guest MMU as shadow and everything goes off the rails.
The issue could have been fixed by putting MMU type into extended MMU
role but this is not really needed. We can just split root and guest MMUs
the exact same way we did for nVMX, their types never change in the
lifetime of a vCPU.
There is still room for improvement: currently, we reset all MMU roots
when switching from L1 to L2 and back and this is not needed.
Fixes: 7dcd57552008 ("x86/kvm/mmu: check if tdp/shadow MMU reconfiguration is needed")
Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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This reverts commit 77b0bf55bc675233d22cd5df97605d516d64525e.
See this commit for details about the revert:
e769742d3584 ("Revert "x86/jump-labels: Macrofy inline assembly code to work around GCC inlining bugs"")
Conflicts:
arch/x86/Makefile
Reported-by: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Richard Biener <rguenther@suse.de>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Segher Boessenkool <segher@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Nadav Amit <namit@vmware.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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This reverts commit c06c4d8090513f2974dfdbed2ac98634357ac475.
See this commit for details about the revert:
e769742d3584 ("Revert "x86/jump-labels: Macrofy inline assembly code to work around GCC inlining bugs"")
Reported-by: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Richard Biener <rguenther@suse.de>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Segher Boessenkool <segher@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Nadav Amit <namit@vmware.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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This reverts commit 9e1725b410594911cc5981b6c7b4cea4ec054ca8.
See this commit for details about the revert:
e769742d3584 ("Revert "x86/jump-labels: Macrofy inline assembly code to work around GCC inlining bugs"")
The conflict resolution for interaction with:
288e4521f0f6: ("x86/asm: 'Simplify' GEN_*_RMWcc() macros")
was provided by Masahiro Yamada.
Conflicts:
arch/x86/include/asm/refcount.h
Reported-by: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Richard Biener <rguenther@suse.de>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Segher Boessenkool <segher@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Nadav Amit <namit@vmware.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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This reverts commit 77f48ec28e4ccff94d2e5f4260a83ac27a7f3099.
See this commit for details about the revert:
e769742d3584 ("Revert "x86/jump-labels: Macrofy inline assembly code to work around GCC inlining bugs"")
Reported-by: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Richard Biener <rguenther@suse.de>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Segher Boessenkool <segher@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Nadav Amit <namit@vmware.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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This reverts commit f81f8ad56fd1c7b99b2ed1c314527f7d9ac447c6.
See this commit for details about the revert:
e769742d3584 ("Revert "x86/jump-labels: Macrofy inline assembly code to work around GCC inlining bugs"")
Reported-by: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Richard Biener <rguenther@suse.de>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Segher Boessenkool <segher@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Nadav Amit <namit@vmware.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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This reverts commit 494b5168f2de009eb80f198f668da374295098dd.
See this commit for details about the revert:
e769742d3584 ("Revert "x86/jump-labels: Macrofy inline assembly code to work around GCC inlining bugs"")
Reported-by: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Richard Biener <rguenther@suse.de>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Segher Boessenkool <segher@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Nadav Amit <namit@vmware.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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This reverts commit 0474d5d9d2f7f3b11262f7bf87d0e7314ead9200.
See this commit for details about the revert:
e769742d3584 ("Revert "x86/jump-labels: Macrofy inline assembly code to work around GCC inlining bugs"")
Reported-by: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Richard Biener <rguenther@suse.de>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Segher Boessenkool <segher@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Nadav Amit <namit@vmware.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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This reverts commit d5a581d84ae6b8a4a740464b80d8d9cf1e7947b2.
See this commit for details about the revert:
e769742d3584 ("Revert "x86/jump-labels: Macrofy inline assembly code to work around GCC inlining bugs"")
Reported-by: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Richard Biener <rguenther@suse.de>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Segher Boessenkool <segher@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Nadav Amit <namit@vmware.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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This reverts commit 5bdcd510c2ac9efaf55c4cbd8d46421d8e2320cd.
The macro based workarounds for GCC's inlining bugs caused regressions: distcc
and other distro build setups broke, and the fixes are not easy nor will they
solve regressions on already existing installations.
So we are reverting this patch and the 8 followup patches.
What makes this revert easier is that GCC9 will likely include the new 'asm inline'
syntax that makes inlining of assembly blocks a lot more robust.
This is a superior method to any macro based hackeries - and might even be
backported to GCC8, which would make all modern distros get the inlining
fixes as well.
Many thanks to Masahiro Yamada and others for helping sort out these problems.
Reported-by: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Richard Biener <rguenther@suse.de>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Segher Boessenkool <segher@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Nadav Amit <namit@vmware.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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Currently the copy_to_user of data in the gentry struct is copying
uninitiaized data in field _pad from the stack to userspace.
Fix this by explicitly memset'ing gentry to zero, this also will zero any
compiler added padding fields that may be in struct (currently there are
none).
Detected by CoverityScan, CID#200783 ("Uninitialized scalar variable")
Fixes: b263b31e8ad6 ("x86, mtrr: Use explicit sizing and padding for the 64-bit ioctls")
Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Cc: security@kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181218172956.1440-1-colin.king@canonical.com
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Some guests OSes (including Windows 10) write to MSR 0xc001102c
on some cases (possibly while trying to apply a CPU errata).
Make KVM ignore reads and writes to that MSR, so the guest won't
crash.
The MSR is documented as "Execution Unit Configuration (EX_CFG)",
at AMD's "BIOS and Kernel Developer's Guide (BKDG) for AMD Family
15h Models 00h-0Fh Processors".
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Reported by syzkaller:
CPU: 1 PID: 5962 Comm: syz-executor118 Not tainted 4.20.0-rc6+ #374
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
RIP: 0010:kvm_apic_hw_enabled arch/x86/kvm/lapic.h:169 [inline]
RIP: 0010:vcpu_scan_ioapic arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:7449 [inline]
RIP: 0010:vcpu_enter_guest arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:7602 [inline]
RIP: 0010:vcpu_run arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:7874 [inline]
RIP: 0010:kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x5296/0x7320 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:8074
Call Trace:
kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x5c8/0x1150 arch/x86/kvm/../../../virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:2596
vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:46 [inline]
file_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:509 [inline]
do_vfs_ioctl+0x1de/0x1790 fs/ioctl.c:696
ksys_ioctl+0xa9/0xd0 fs/ioctl.c:713
__do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:720 [inline]
__se_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:718 [inline]
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x73/0xb0 fs/ioctl.c:718
do_syscall_64+0x1b9/0x820 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
The reason is that the testcase writes hyperv synic HV_X64_MSR_SINT14 msr
and triggers scan ioapic logic to load synic vectors into EOI exit bitmap.
However, irqchip is not initialized by this simple testcase, ioapic/apic
objects should not be accessed.
This patch fixes it by also considering whether or not apic is present.
Reported-by: syzbot+39810e6c400efadfef71@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@tencent.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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nested_get_vmcs12_pages() processes the posted_intr address in vmcs12. It
caches the kmap()ed page object and pointer, however, it doesn't handle
errors correctly: it's possible to cache a valid pointer, then release
the page and later dereference the dangling pointer.
I was able to reproduce with the following steps:
1. Call vmlaunch with valid posted_intr_desc_addr but an invalid
MSR_EFER. This causes nested_get_vmcs12_pages() to cache the kmap()ed
pi_desc_page and pi_desc. Later the invalid EFER value fails
check_vmentry_postreqs() which fails the first vmlaunch.
2. Call vmlanuch with a valid EFER but an invalid posted_intr_desc_addr
(I set it to 2G - 0x80). The second time we call nested_get_vmcs12_pages
pi_desc_page is unmapped and released and pi_desc_page is set to NULL
(the "shouldn't happen" clause). Due to the invalid
posted_intr_desc_addr, kvm_vcpu_gpa_to_page() fails and
nested_get_vmcs12_pages() returns. It doesn't return an error value so
vmlaunch proceeds. Note that at this time we have a dangling pointer in
vmx->nested.pi_desc and POSTED_INTR_DESC_ADDR in L0's vmcs.
3. Issue an IPI in L2 guest code. This triggers a call to
vmx_complete_nested_posted_interrupt() and pi_test_and_clear_on() which
dereferences the dangling pointer.
Vulnerable code requires nested and enable_apicv variables to be set to
true. The host CPU must also support posted interrupts.
Fixes: 5e2f30b756a37 "KVM: nVMX: get rid of nested_get_page()"
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Andy Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Cfir Cohen <cfir@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Liran Alon <liran.alon@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
|
Andy spotted a regression in the fs/gs base helpers after the patch series
was committed. The helper functions which write fs/gs base are not just
writing the base, they are also changing the index. That's wrong and needs
to be separated because writing the base has not to modify the index.
While the regression is not causing any harm right now because the only
caller depends on that behaviour, it's a guarantee for subtle breakage down
the road.
Make the index explicitly changed from the caller, instead of including
the code in the helpers.
Subsequently, the task write helpers do not handle for the current task
anymore. The range check for a base value is also factored out, to minimize
code redundancy from the caller.
Fixes: b1378a561fd1 ("x86/fsgsbase/64: Introduce FS/GS base helper functions")
Suggested-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Chang S. Bae <chang.seok.bae@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Ravi Shankar <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181126195524.32179-1-chang.seok.bae@intel.com
|
|
Different AMD processors may have different implementations of STIBP.
When STIBP is conditionally enabled, some implementations would benefit
from having STIBP always on instead of toggling the STIBP bit through MSR
writes. This preference is advertised through a CPUID feature bit.
When conditional STIBP support is requested at boot and the CPU advertises
STIBP always-on mode as preferred, switch to STIBP "on" support. To show
that this transition has occurred, create a new spectre_v2_user_mitigation
value and a new spectre_v2_user_strings message. The new mitigation value
is used in spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation() to print the new mitigation
message as well as to return a new string from stibp_state().
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181213230352.6937.74943.stgit@tlendack-t1.amdoffice.net
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|
In commit:
a7295fd53c39 ("x86/mm/cpa: Use flush_tlb_kernel_range()")
I misread the CAP array code and incorrectly used
tlb_flush_kernel_range(), resulting in missing TLB flushes and
consequent failures.
Instead do a full invalidate in this case -- for now.
Reported-by: StDenis, Tom <Tom.StDenis@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@surriel.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: dave.hansen@intel.com
Fixes: a7295fd53c39 ("x86/mm/cpa: Use flush_tlb_kernel_range()")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181203171043.089868285@infradead.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
|
|
Commit
379d98ddf413 ("x86: vdso: Use $LD instead of $CC to link")
accidentally broke unwinding from userspace, because ld would strip the
.eh_frame sections when linking.
Originally, the compiler would implicitly add --eh-frame-hdr when
invoking the linker, but when this Makefile was converted from invoking
ld via the compiler, to invoking it directly (like vmlinux does),
the flag was missed. (The EH_FRAME section is important for the VDSO
shared libraries, but not for vmlinux.)
Fix the problem by explicitly specifying --eh-frame-hdr, which restores
parity with the old method.
See relevant bug reports for additional info:
https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=201741
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1659295
Fixes: 379d98ddf413 ("x86: vdso: Use $LD instead of $CC to link")
Reported-by: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Carlos O'Donell <carlos@redhat.com>
Reported-by: "H. J. Lu" <hjl.tools@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Alistair Strachan <astrachan@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Tested-by: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Carlos O'Donell <carlos@redhat.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Joel Fernandes <joel@joelfernandes.org>
Cc: kernel-team@android.com
Cc: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: X86 ML <x86@kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181214223637.35954-1-astrachan@google.com
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|
A decoy address is used by set_mce_nospec() to update the cache attributes
for a page that may contain poison (multi-bit ECC error) while attempting
to minimize the possibility of triggering a speculative access to that
page.
When reserve_memtype() is handling a decoy address it needs to convert it
to its real physical alias. The conversion, AND'ing with __PHYSICAL_MASK,
is broken for a 32-bit physical mask and reserve_memtype() is passed the
last physical page. Gert reports triggering the:
BUG_ON(start >= end);
...assertion when running a 32-bit non-PAE build on a platform that has
a driver resource at the top of physical memory:
BIOS-e820: [mem 0x00000000fff00000-0x00000000ffffffff] reserved
Given that the decoy address scheme is only targeted at 64-bit builds and
assumes that the top of physical address space is free for use as a decoy
address range, simply bypass address sanitization in the 32-bit case.
Lastly, there was no need to crash the system when this failure occurred,
and no need to crash future systems if the assumptions of decoy addresses
are ever violated. Change the BUG_ON() to a WARN() with an error return.
Fixes: 510ee090abc3 ("x86/mm/pat: Prepare {reserve, free}_memtype() for...")
Reported-by: Gert Robben <t2@gert.gr>
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: Gert Robben <t2@gert.gr>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: platform-driver-x86@vger.kernel.org
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/154454337985.789277.12133288391664677775.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com
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|
The user triggers the creation of a pseudo-locked region when writing
the requested schemata to the schemata resctrl file. The pseudo-locking
of a region is required to be done on a CPU that is associated with the
cache on which the pseudo-locked region will reside. In order to run the
locking code on a specific CPU, the needed CPU has to be selected and
ensured to remain online during the entire locking sequence.
At this time, the cpu_hotplug_lock is not taken during the pseudo-lock
region creation and it is thus possible for a CPU to be selected to run
the pseudo-locking code and then that CPU to go offline before the
thread is able to run on it.
Fix this by ensuring that the cpu_hotplug_lock is taken while the CPU on
which code has to run needs to be controlled. Since the cpu_hotplug_lock
is always taken before rdtgroup_mutex the lock order is maintained.
Fixes: e0bdfe8e36f3 ("x86/intel_rdt: Support creation/removal of pseudo-locked region")
Signed-off-by: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: gavin.hindman@intel.com
Cc: jithu.joseph@intel.com
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/b7b17432a80f95a1fa21a1698ba643014f58ad31.1544476425.git.reinette.chatre@intel.com
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Swap storage is restricted to max_swapfile_size (~16TB on x86_64) whenever
the system is deemed affected by L1TF vulnerability. Even though the limit
is quite high for most deployments it seems to be too restrictive for
deployments which are willing to live with the mitigation disabled.
We have a customer to deploy 8x 6,4TB PCIe/NVMe SSD swap devices which is
clearly out of the limit.
Drop the swap restriction when l1tf=off is specified. It also doesn't make
much sense to warn about too much memory for the l1tf mitigation when it is
forcefully disabled by the administrator.
[ tglx: Folded the documentation delta change ]
Fixes: 377eeaa8e11f ("x86/speculation/l1tf: Limit swap file size to MAX_PA/2")
Signed-off-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Tatashin <pasha.tatashin@soleen.com>
Reviewed-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: <linux-mm@kvack.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181113184910.26697-1-mhocko@kernel.org
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The LDT remap placement has been changed. It's now placed before the direct
mapping in the kernel virtual address space for both paging modes.
Change address markers order accordingly.
Fixes: d52888aa2753 ("x86/mm: Move LDT remap out of KASLR region on 5-level paging")
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: bp@alien8.de
Cc: hpa@zytor.com
Cc: dave.hansen@linux.intel.com
Cc: luto@kernel.org
Cc: peterz@infradead.org
Cc: boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com
Cc: jgross@suse.com
Cc: bhe@redhat.com
Cc: hans.van.kranenburg@mendix.com
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Cc: xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181130202328.65359-3-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com
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There is a guard hole at the beginning of the kernel address space, also
used by hypervisors. It occupies 16 PGD entries.
This reserved range is not defined explicitely, it is calculated relative
to other entities: direct mapping and user space ranges.
The calculation got broken by recent changes of the kernel memory layout:
LDT remap range is now mapped before direct mapping and makes the
calculation invalid.
The breakage leads to crash on Xen dom0 boot[1].
Define the reserved range explicitely. It's part of kernel ABI (hypervisors
expect it to be stable) and must not depend on changes in the rest of
kernel memory layout.
[1] https://lists.xenproject.org/archives/html/xen-devel/2018-11/msg03313.html
Fixes: d52888aa2753 ("x86/mm: Move LDT remap out of KASLR region on 5-level paging")
Reported-by: Hans van Kranenburg <hans.van.kranenburg@mendix.com>
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: Hans van Kranenburg <hans.van.kranenburg@mendix.com>
Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: bp@alien8.de
Cc: hpa@zytor.com
Cc: dave.hansen@linux.intel.com
Cc: luto@kernel.org
Cc: peterz@infradead.org
Cc: boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com
Cc: bhe@redhat.com
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Cc: xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181130202328.65359-2-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com
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Pull x86 fixes from Ingo Molnar:
"Three fixes: a boot parameter re-(re-)fix, a retpoline build artifact
fix and an LLVM workaround"
* 'x86-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
x86/vdso: Drop implicit common-page-size linker flag
x86/build: Fix compiler support check for CONFIG_RETPOLINE
x86/boot: Clear RSDP address in boot_params for broken loaders
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Pull kprobes fixes from Ingo Molnar:
"Two kprobes fixes: a blacklist fix and an instruction patching related
corruption fix"
* 'perf-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
kprobes/x86: Blacklist non-attachable interrupt functions
kprobes/x86: Fix instruction patching corruption when copying more than one RIP-relative instruction
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Pull EFI fixes from Ingo Molnar:
"Two fixes: a large-system fix and an earlyprintk fix with certain
resolutions"
* 'efi-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
x86/earlyprintk/efi: Fix infinite loop on some screen widths
x86/efi: Allocate e820 buffer before calling efi_exit_boot_service
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|
GNU linker's -z common-page-size's default value is based on the target
architecture. arch/x86/entry/vdso/Makefile sets it to the architecture
default, which is implicit and redundant. Drop it.
Fixes: 2aae950b21e4 ("x86_64: Add vDSO for x86-64 with gettimeofday/clock_gettime/getcpu")
Reported-by: Dmitry Golovin <dima@golovin.in>
Reported-by: Bill Wendling <morbo@google.com>
Suggested-by: Dmitry Golovin <dima@golovin.in>
Suggested-by: Rui Ueyama <ruiu@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Acked-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org>
Cc: Fangrui Song <maskray@google.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181206191231.192355-1-ndesaulniers@google.com
Link: https://bugs.llvm.org/show_bug.cgi?id=38774
Link: https://github.com/ClangBuiltLinux/linux/issues/31
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|
PREEMPT_NEED_RESCHED is never used directly, so move it into the arch
code where it can potentially be implemented using either a different
bit in the preempt count or as an entirely separate entity.
Cc: Robert Love <rml@tech9.net>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
|
|
These interrupt functions are already non-attachable by kprobes.
Blacklist them explicitly so that they can show up in
/sys/kernel/debug/kprobes/blacklist and tools like BCC can use this
additional information.
Signed-off-by: Andrea Righi <righi.andrea@gmail.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Anil S Keshavamurthy <anil.s.keshavamurthy@intel.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Naveen N. Rao <naveen.n.rao@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181206095648.GA8249@Dell
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
|
|
STIBP stands for Single Thread Indirect Branch Predictors. The acronym,
however, can be easily mis-spelled as STIPB. It is perhaps due to the
presence of another related term - IBPB (Indirect Branch Predictor
Barrier).
Fix the mis-spelling in the code.
Signed-off-by: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: KarimAllah Ahmed <karahmed@amazon.de>
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1544039368-9009-1-git-send-email-longman@redhat.com
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|
It is troublesome to add a diagnostic like this to the Makefile
parse stage because the top-level Makefile could be parsed with
a stale include/config/auto.conf.
Once you are hit by the error about non-retpoline compiler, the
compilation still breaks even after disabling CONFIG_RETPOLINE.
The easiest fix is to move this check to the "archprepare" like
this commit did:
829fe4aa9ac1 ("x86: Allow generating user-space headers without a compiler")
Reported-by: Meelis Roos <mroos@linux.ee>
Tested-by: Meelis Roos <mroos@linux.ee>
Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>
Acked-by: Zhenzhong Duan <zhenzhong.duan@oracle.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Zhenzhong Duan <zhenzhong.duan@oracle.com>
Fixes: 4cd24de3a098 ("x86/retpoline: Make CONFIG_RETPOLINE depend on compiler support")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1543991239-18476-1-git-send-email-yamada.masahiro@socionext.com
Link: https://lkml.org/lkml/2018/12/4/206
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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|
After copy_optimized_instructions() copies several instructions
to the working buffer it tries to fix up the real RIP address, but it
adjusts the RIP-relative instruction with an incorrect RIP address
for the 2nd and subsequent instructions due to a bug in the logic.
This will break the kernel pretty badly (with likely outcomes such as
a kernel freeze, a crash, or worse) because probed instructions can refer
to the wrong data.
For example putting kprobes on cpumask_next() typically hits this bug.
cpumask_next() is normally like below if CONFIG_CPUMASK_OFFSTACK=y
(in this case nr_cpumask_bits is an alias of nr_cpu_ids):
<cpumask_next>:
48 89 f0 mov %rsi,%rax
8b 35 7b fb e2 00 mov 0xe2fb7b(%rip),%esi # ffffffff82db9e64 <nr_cpu_ids>
55 push %rbp
...
If we put a kprobe on it and it gets jump-optimized, it gets
patched by the kprobes code like this:
<cpumask_next>:
e9 95 7d 07 1e jmpq 0xffffffffa000207a
7b fb jnp 0xffffffff81f8a2e2 <cpumask_next+2>
e2 00 loop 0xffffffff81f8a2e9 <cpumask_next+9>
55 push %rbp
This shows that the first two MOV instructions were copied to a
trampoline buffer at 0xffffffffa000207a.
Here is the disassembled result of the trampoline, skipping
the optprobe template instructions:
# Dump of assembly code from 0xffffffffa000207a to 0xffffffffa00020ea:
54 push %rsp
...
48 83 c4 08 add $0x8,%rsp
9d popfq
48 89 f0 mov %rsi,%rax
8b 35 82 7d db e2 mov -0x1d24827e(%rip),%esi # 0xffffffff82db9e67 <nr_cpu_ids+3>
This dump shows that the second MOV accesses *(nr_cpu_ids+3) instead of
the original *nr_cpu_ids. This leads to a kernel freeze because
cpumask_next() always returns 0 and for_each_cpu() never ends.
Fix this by adding 'len' correctly to the real RIP address while
copying.
[ mingo: Improved the changelog. ]
Reported-by: Michael Rodin <michael@rodin.online>
Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Ravi Bangoria <ravi.bangoria@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.15+
Fixes: 63fef14fc98a ("kprobes/x86: Make insn buffer always ROX and use text_poke()")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/153504457253.22602.1314289671019919596.stgit@devbox
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
|
|
Gunnar Krueger reported a systemd-boot failure and bisected it down to:
e6e094e053af75 ("x86/acpi, x86/boot: Take RSDP address from boot params if available")
In case a broken boot loader doesn't clear its 'struct boot_params', clear
rsdp_addr in sanitize_boot_params().
Reported-by: Gunnar Krueger <taijian@posteo.de>
Tested-by: Gunnar Krueger <taijian@posteo.de>
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: bp@alien8.de
Cc: sstabellini@kernel.org
Fixes: e6e094e053af75 ("x86/acpi, x86/boot: Take RSDP address from boot params if available")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181203103811.17056-1-jgross@suse.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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Pull xen fixes from Juergen Gross:
- A revert of a previous commit as it is no longer necessary and has
shown to cause problems in some memory hotplug cases.
- Some small fixes and a minor cleanup.
- A patch for adding better diagnostic data in a very rare failure
case.
* tag 'for-linus-4.20a-rc5-tag' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/xen/tip:
pvcalls-front: fixes incorrect error handling
Revert "xen/balloon: Mark unallocated host memory as UNUSABLE"
xen: xlate_mmu: add missing header to fix 'W=1' warning
xen/x86: add diagnostic printout to xen_mc_flush() in case of error
x86/xen: cleanup includes in arch/x86/xen/spinlock.c
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Pull STIBP fallout fixes from Thomas Gleixner:
"The performance destruction department finally got it's act together
and came up with a cure for the STIPB regression:
- Provide a command line option to control the spectre v2 user space
mitigations. Default is either seccomp or prctl (if seccomp is
disabled in Kconfig). prctl allows mitigation opt-in, seccomp
enables the migitation for sandboxed processes.
- Rework the code to handle the conditional STIBP/IBPB control and
remove the now unused ptrace_may_access_sched() optimization
attempt
- Disable STIBP automatically when SMT is disabled
- Optimize the switch_to() logic to avoid MSR writes and invocations
of __switch_to_xtra().
- Make the asynchronous speculation TIF updates synchronous to
prevent stale mitigation state.
As a general cleanup this also makes retpoline directly depend on
compiler support and removes the 'minimal retpoline' option which just
pretended to provide some form of security while providing none"
* 'x86-pti-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (31 commits)
x86/speculation: Provide IBPB always command line options
x86/speculation: Add seccomp Spectre v2 user space protection mode
x86/speculation: Enable prctl mode for spectre_v2_user
x86/speculation: Add prctl() control for indirect branch speculation
x86/speculation: Prepare arch_smt_update() for PRCTL mode
x86/speculation: Prevent stale SPEC_CTRL msr content
x86/speculation: Split out TIF update
ptrace: Remove unused ptrace_may_access_sched() and MODE_IBRS
x86/speculation: Prepare for conditional IBPB in switch_mm()
x86/speculation: Avoid __switch_to_xtra() calls
x86/process: Consolidate and simplify switch_to_xtra() code
x86/speculation: Prepare for per task indirect branch speculation control
x86/speculation: Add command line control for indirect branch speculation
x86/speculation: Unify conditional spectre v2 print functions
x86/speculataion: Mark command line parser data __initdata
x86/speculation: Mark string arrays const correctly
x86/speculation: Reorder the spec_v2 code
x86/l1tf: Show actual SMT state
x86/speculation: Rework SMT state change
sched/smt: Expose sched_smt_present static key
...
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Pull x86 fixes from Ingo Molnar:
"Misc fixes:
- MCE related boot crash fix on certain AMD systems
- FPU exception handling fix
- FPU handling race fix
- revert+rewrite of the RSDP boot protocol extension, use boot_params
instead
- documentation fix"
* 'x86-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
x86/MCE/AMD: Fix the thresholding machinery initialization order
x86/fpu: Use the correct exception table macro in the XSTATE_OP wrapper
x86/fpu: Disable bottom halves while loading FPU registers
x86/acpi, x86/boot: Take RSDP address from boot params if available
x86/boot: Mostly revert commit ae7e1238e68f2a ("Add ACPI RSDP address to setup_header")
x86/ptrace: Fix documentation for tracehook_report_syscall_entry()
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Pull perf fixes from Ingo Molnar:
"Misc fixes:
- counter freezing related regression fix
- uprobes race fix
- Intel PMU unusual event combination fix
- .. and diverse tooling fixes"
* 'perf-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
uprobes: Fix handle_swbp() vs. unregister() + register() race once more
perf/x86/intel: Disallow precise_ip on BTS events
perf/x86/intel: Add generic branch tracing check to intel_pmu_has_bts()
perf/x86/intel: Move branch tracing setup to the Intel-specific source file
perf/x86/intel: Fix regression by default disabling perfmon v4 interrupt handling
perf tools beauty ioctl: Support new ISO7816 commands
tools uapi asm-generic: Synchronize ioctls.h
tools arch x86: Update tools's copy of cpufeatures.h
tools headers uapi: Synchronize i915_drm.h
perf tools: Restore proper cwd on return from mnt namespace
tools build feature: Check if get_current_dir_name() is available
perf tools: Fix crash on synthesizing the unit
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Pull tracing fixes from Steven Rostedt:
"While rewriting the function graph tracer, I discovered a design flaw
that was introduced by a patch that tried to fix one bug, but by doing
so created another bug.
As both bugs corrupt the output (but they do not crash the kernel), I
decided to fix the design such that it could have both bugs fixed. The
original fix, fixed time reporting of the function graph tracer when
doing a max_depth of one. This was code that can test how much the
kernel interferes with userspace. But in doing so, it could corrupt
the time keeping of the function profiler.
The issue is that the curr_ret_stack variable was being used for two
different meanings. One was to keep track of the stack pointer on the
ret_stack (shadow stack used by the function graph tracer), and the
other use case was the graph call depth. Although, the two may be
closely related, where they got updated was the issue that lead to the
two different bugs that required the two use cases to be updated
differently.
The big issue with this fix is that it requires changing each
architecture. The good news is, I was able to remove a lot of code
that was duplicated within the architectures and place it into a
single location. Then I could make the fix in one place.
I pushed this code into linux-next to let it settle over a week, and
before doing so, I cross compiled all the affected architectures to
make sure that they built fine.
In the mean time, I also pulled in a patch that fixes the sched_switch
previous tasks state output, that was not actually correct"
* tag 'trace-v4.20-rc3' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace:
sched, trace: Fix prev_state output in sched_switch tracepoint
function_graph: Have profiler use curr_ret_stack and not depth
function_graph: Reverse the order of pushing the ret_stack and the callback
function_graph: Move return callback before update of curr_ret_stack
function_graph: Use new curr_ret_depth to manage depth instead of curr_ret_stack
function_graph: Make ftrace_push_return_trace() static
sparc/function_graph: Simplify with function_graph_enter()
sh/function_graph: Simplify with function_graph_enter()
s390/function_graph: Simplify with function_graph_enter()
riscv/function_graph: Simplify with function_graph_enter()
powerpc/function_graph: Simplify with function_graph_enter()
parisc: function_graph: Simplify with function_graph_enter()
nds32: function_graph: Simplify with function_graph_enter()
MIPS: function_graph: Simplify with function_graph_enter()
microblaze: function_graph: Simplify with function_graph_enter()
arm64: function_graph: Simplify with function_graph_enter()
ARM: function_graph: Simplify with function_graph_enter()
x86/function_graph: Simplify with function_graph_enter()
function_graph: Create function_graph_enter() to consolidate architecture code
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An affected screen resolution is 1366 x 768, which width is not
divisible by 8, the default font width. On such screens, when longer
lines are earlyprintk'ed, overflow-to-next-line can never trigger,
due to the left-most x-coordinate of the next character always less
than the screen width. Earlyprintk will infinite loop in trying to
print the rest of the string but unable to, due to the line being
full.
This patch makes the trigger consider the right-most x-coordinate,
instead of left-most, as the value to compare against the screen
width threshold.
Signed-off-by: YiFei Zhu <zhuyifei1999@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Arend van Spriel <arend.vanspriel@broadcom.com>
Cc: Bhupesh Sharma <bhsharma@redhat.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com>
Cc: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com>
Cc: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com>
Cc: Jon Hunter <jonathanh@nvidia.com>
Cc: Julien Thierry <julien.thierry@arm.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>
Cc: Nathan Chancellor <natechancellor@gmail.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Sai Praneeth Prakhya <sai.praneeth.prakhya@intel.com>
Cc: Sedat Dilek <sedat.dilek@gmail.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181129171230.18699-12-ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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The following commit:
d64934019f6c ("x86/efi: Use efi_exit_boot_services()")
introduced a regression on systems with large memory maps causing them
to hang on boot. The first "goto get_map" that was removed from
exit_boot() ensured there was enough room for the memory map when
efi_call_early(exit_boot_services) was called. This happens when
(nr_desc > ARRAY_SIZE(params->e820_table).
Chain of events:
exit_boot()
efi_exit_boot_services()
efi_get_memory_map <- at this point the mm can't grow over 8 desc
priv_func()
exit_boot_func()
allocate_e820ext() <- new mm grows over 8 desc from e820 alloc
efi_call_early(exit_boot_services) <- mm key doesn't match so retry
efi_call_early(get_memory_map) <- not enough room for new mm
system hangs
This patch allocates the e820 buffer before calling efi_exit_boot_services()
and fixes the regression.
[ mingo: minor cleanliness edits. ]
Signed-off-by: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Arend van Spriel <arend.vanspriel@broadcom.com>
Cc: Bhupesh Sharma <bhsharma@redhat.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com>
Cc: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com>
Cc: Jon Hunter <jonathanh@nvidia.com>
Cc: Julien Thierry <julien.thierry@arm.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>
Cc: Nathan Chancellor <natechancellor@gmail.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Sai Praneeth Prakhya <sai.praneeth.prakhya@intel.com>
Cc: Sedat Dilek <sedat.dilek@gmail.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: YiFei Zhu <zhuyifei1999@gmail.com>
Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181129171230.18699-2-ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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This reverts commit b3cf8528bb21febb650a7ecbf080d0647be40b9f.
That commit unintentionally broke Xen balloon memory hotplug with
"hotplug_unpopulated" set to 1. As long as "System RAM" resource
got assigned under a new "Unusable memory" resource in IO/Mem tree
any attempt to online this memory would fail due to general kernel
restrictions on having "System RAM" resources as 1st level only.
The original issue that commit has tried to workaround fa564ad96366
("x86/PCI: Enable a 64bit BAR on AMD Family 15h (Models 00-1f, 30-3f,
60-7f)") also got amended by the following 03a551734 ("x86/PCI: Move
and shrink AMD 64-bit window to avoid conflict") which made the
original fix to Xen ballooning unnecessary.
Signed-off-by: Igor Druzhinin <igor.druzhinin@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
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Failure of an element of a Xen multicall is signalled via a WARN()
only if the kernel is compiled with MC_DEBUG. It is impossible to
know which element failed and why it did so.
Change that by printing the related information even without MC_DEBUG,
even if maybe in some limited form (e.g. without information which
caller produced the failing element).
Move the printing out of the switch statement in order to have the
same information for a single call.
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
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Provide the possibility to enable IBPB always in combination with 'prctl'
and 'seccomp'.
Add the extra command line options and rework the IBPB selection to
evaluate the command instead of the mode selected by the STIPB switch case.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com>
Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
Cc: Waiman Long <longman9394@gmail.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Dave Stewart <david.c.stewart@intel.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181125185006.144047038@linutronix.de
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If 'prctl' mode of user space protection from spectre v2 is selected
on the kernel command-line, STIBP and IBPB are applied on tasks which
restrict their indirect branch speculation via prctl.
SECCOMP enables the SSBD mitigation for sandboxed tasks already, so it
makes sense to prevent spectre v2 user space to user space attacks as
well.
The Intel mitigation guide documents how STIPB works:
Setting bit 1 (STIBP) of the IA32_SPEC_CTRL MSR on a logical processor
prevents the predicted targets of indirect branches on any logical
processor of that core from being controlled by software that executes
(or executed previously) on another logical processor of the same core.
Ergo setting STIBP protects the task itself from being attacked from a task
running on a different hyper-thread and protects the tasks running on
different hyper-threads from being attacked.
While the document suggests that the branch predictors are shielded between
the logical processors, the observed performance regressions suggest that
STIBP simply disables the branch predictor more or less completely. Of
course the document wording is vague, but the fact that there is also no
requirement for issuing IBPB when STIBP is used points clearly in that
direction. The kernel still issues IBPB even when STIBP is used until Intel
clarifies the whole mechanism.
IBPB is issued when the task switches out, so malicious sandbox code cannot
mistrain the branch predictor for the next user space task on the same
logical processor.
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com>
Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
Cc: Waiman Long <longman9394@gmail.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Dave Stewart <david.c.stewart@intel.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181125185006.051663132@linutronix.de
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