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The whole point of SGX is to create a hardware protected place to do
“stuff”. But, before someone is willing to hand over the keys to
the castle , an enclave must often prove that it is running on an
SGX-protected processor. Provisioning enclaves play a key role in
providing proof.
There are actually three different enclaves in play in order to make this
happen:
1. The application enclave. The familiar one we know and love that runs
the actual code that’s doing real work. There can be many of these on
a single system, or even in a single application.
2. The quoting enclave (QE). The QE is mentioned in lots of silly
whitepapers, but, for the purposes of kernel enabling, just pretend they
do not exist.
3. The provisioning enclave. There is typically only one of these
enclaves per system. Provisioning enclaves have access to a special
hardware key.
They can use this key to help to generate certificates which serve as
proof that enclaves are running on trusted SGX hardware. These
certificates can be passed around without revealing the special key.
Any user who can create a provisioning enclave can access the
processor-unique Provisioning Certificate Key which has privacy and
fingerprinting implications. Even if a user is permitted to create
normal application enclaves (via /dev/sgx_enclave), they should not be
able to create provisioning enclaves. That means a separate permissions
scheme is needed to control provisioning enclave privileges.
Implement a separate device file (/dev/sgx_provision) which allows
creating provisioning enclaves. This device will typically have more
strict permissions than the plain enclave device.
The actual device “driver” is an empty stub. Open file descriptors for
this device will represent a token which allows provisioning enclave duty.
This file descriptor can be passed around and ultimately given as an
argument to the /dev/sgx_enclave driver ioctl().
[ bp: Touchups. ]
Suggested-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201112220135.165028-16-jarkko@kernel.org
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Enclaves have two basic states. They are either being built and are
malleable and can be modified by doing things like adding pages. Or,
they are locked down and not accepting changes. They can only be run
after they have been locked down. The ENCLS[EINIT] function induces the
transition from being malleable to locked-down.
Add an ioctl() that performs ENCLS[EINIT]. After this, new pages can
no longer be added with ENCLS[EADD]. This is also the time where the
enclave can be measured to verify its integrity.
Co-developed-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Tested-by: Jethro Beekman <jethro@fortanix.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201112220135.165028-15-jarkko@kernel.org
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SGX enclave pages are inaccessible to normal software. They must be
populated with data by copying from normal memory with the help of the
EADD and EEXTEND functions of the ENCLS instruction.
Add an ioctl() which performs EADD that adds new data to an enclave, and
optionally EEXTEND functions that hash the page contents and use the
hash as part of enclave “measurement” to ensure enclave integrity.
The enclave author gets to decide which pages will be included in the
enclave measurement with EEXTEND. Measurement is very slow and has
sometimes has very little value. For instance, an enclave _could_
measure every page of data and code, but would be slow to initialize.
Or, it might just measure its code and then trust that code to
initialize the bulk of its data after it starts running.
Co-developed-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Tested-by: Jethro Beekman <jethro@fortanix.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201112220135.165028-14-jarkko@kernel.org
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Add an ioctl() that performs the ECREATE function of the ENCLS
instruction, which creates an SGX Enclave Control Structure (SECS).
Although the SECS is an in-memory data structure, it is present in
enclave memory and is not directly accessible by software.
Co-developed-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Tested-by: Jethro Beekman <jethro@fortanix.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201112220135.165028-13-jarkko@kernel.org
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Intel(R) SGX is a new hardware functionality that can be used by
applications to set aside private regions of code and data called
enclaves. New hardware protects enclave code and data from outside
access and modification.
Add a driver that presents a device file and ioctl API to build and
manage enclaves.
[ bp: Small touchups, remove unused encl variable in sgx_encl_find() as
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com> ]
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Co-developed-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Tested-by: Jethro Beekman <jethro@fortanix.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201112220135.165028-12-jarkko@kernel.org
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Commit
8570978ea030 ("x86/boot/compressed/64: Don't pre-map memory in KASLR code")
removed all the references to finalize_identity_maps(), but neglected to
delete the actual function. Remove it.
Signed-off-by: Arvind Sankar <nivedita@alum.mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201005151208.2212886-2-nivedita@alum.mit.edu
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"intel_iommu=off" command line is used to disable iommu but iommu is force
enabled in a tboot system for security reason.
However for better performance on high speed network device, a new option
"intel_iommu=tboot_noforce" is introduced to disable the force on.
By default kernel should panic if iommu init fail in tboot for security
reason, but it's unnecessory if we use "intel_iommu=tboot_noforce,off".
Fix the code setting force_on and move intel_iommu_tboot_noforce
from tboot code to intel iommu code.
Fixes: 7304e8f28bb2 ("iommu/vt-d: Correctly disable Intel IOMMU force on")
Signed-off-by: Zhenzhong Duan <zhenzhong.duan@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Lukasz Hawrylko <lukasz.hawrylko@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Lu Baolu <baolu.lu@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201110071908.3133-1-zhenzhong.duan@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
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Document the functionality of copy_from_user_nmi() to avoid further
confusion. Fix the typo in the existing comment while at it.
Requested-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201117202753.806376613@linutronix.de
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Older firmware can return rc=0x107 rrc=0xd for destroy page if the
page is already non-secure. This should be handled like a success
as already done by newer firmware.
Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Fixes: 1a80b54d1ce1 ("s390/uv: add destroy page call")
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>
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sysrq-t ends up invoking show_opcodes() for each task which tries to access
the user space code of other processes, which is obviously bogus.
It either manages to dump where the foreign task's regs->ip points to in a
valid mapping of the current task or triggers a pagefault and prints "Code:
Bad RIP value.". Both is just wrong.
Add a safeguard in copy_code() and check whether the @regs pointer matches
currents pt_regs. If not, do not even try to access it.
While at it, add commentary why using copy_from_user_nmi() is safe in
copy_code() even if the function name suggests otherwise.
Reported-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201117202753.667274723@linutronix.de
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As the number of cpus increases, the sccb response can exceed 4k for
read cpu and read scp info sclp commands. Hence, all cpu info entries
cant be embedded within a sccb response
Solution:
To overcome this limitation, extended sccb facility is provided by sclp.
1. Check if the extended sccb facility is installed.
2. If extended sccb is installed, perform the read scp and read cpu
command considering a max sccb length of three page size. This max
length is based on factors like max cpus, sccb header.
3. If extended sccb is not installed, perform the read scp and read cpu
sclp command considering a max sccb length of one page size.
Signed-off-by: Sumanth Korikkar <sumanthk@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>
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when we're missing the necessary machine facilities zPCI can
not function. Until now it would silently fail to be initialized,
add an informational print.
Signed-off-by: Niklas Schnelle <schnelle@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>
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Support for Tegra234 was merged in v5.10-rc1, so we might as well enable
it by default.
Signed-off-by: Thierry Reding <treding@nvidia.com>
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Drop the dma_direct_set_offset export and move the declaration to
dma-map-ops.h now that the Allwinner drivers have stopped calling it.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Maxime Ripard <maxime@cerno.tech>
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This is a non-functional change, if anything a better fall-back
handling.
Signed-off-by: Vineet Gupta <vgupta@synopsys.com>
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To start stack unwinding (SP, PC and BLINK) are needed. When the
explicit execution context (pt_regs etc) is not available, unwinder
assumes the task is sleeping (in __switch_to()) and fetches SP and BLINK
from kernel mode stack.
But this assumption is not true, specially in a SMP system, when top
runs on 1 core, there may be active running processes on all cores.
So when unwinding non courrent tasks, ensure they are NOT running.
And while at it, handle the self unwinding case explicitly.
This came out of investigation of a customer reported hang with
rcutorture+top
Link: https://github.com/foss-for-synopsys-dwc-arc-processors/linux/issues/31
Signed-off-by: Vineet Gupta <vgupta@synopsys.com>
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Signed-off-by: Flavio Suligoi <f.suligoi@asem.it>
Signed-off-by: Vineet Gupta <vgupta@synopsys.com>
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The 1-bit shift rotation to the left on x variable located on
4 last if statement can be removed because the computed value is will
not be used afront.
Signed-off-by: Gustavo Pimentel <gustavo.pimentel@synopsys.com>
Signed-off-by: Vineet Gupta <vgupta@synopsys.com>
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This driver uses GPIO descriptors to drive the touchscreen RESET line. In
the existing device trees this has in conflict with intution been flagged
as GPIO_ACTIVE_HIGH and the driver then applies the reverse action by
driving the line low (setting to 0) to enter reset state and driving the
line high (setting to 1) to get out of reset state.
The correct way to handle active low GPIO lines is to provide the
GPIO_ACTIVE_LOW in the device tree (thus properly describing the hardware)
and letting the GPIO framework invert the assertion (driving high) to a
low level and vice versa.
This is considered a bug since the device trees are incorrectly
mis-specifying the line as active high.
Fix the driver and all device trees specifying a reset line.
Signed-off-by: Linus Walleij <linus.walleij@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Schenker <philippe.schenker@toradex.com>
Acked-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzk@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201104153032.1387747-1-linus.walleij@linaro.org
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com>
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Commit 2284ffea8f0c ("powerpc/64s/exception: Only test KVM in SRR
interrupts when PR KVM is supported") removed KVM guest tests from
interrupts that do not set HV=1, when PR-KVM is not configured.
This is wrong for HV-KVM HPT guest MMIO emulation case which attempts
to load the faulting instruction word with MSR[DR]=1 and MSR[HV]=1 with
the guest MMU context loaded. This can cause host DSI, DSLB interrupts
which must test for KVM guest. Restore this and add a comment.
Fixes: 2284ffea8f0c ("powerpc/64s/exception: Only test KVM in SRR interrupts when PR KVM is supported")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.7+
Signed-off-by: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201117135617.3521127-1-npiggin@gmail.com
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The DLCI driver (dlci.c) implements the Frame Relay protocol. However,
we already have another newer and better implementation of Frame Relay
provided by the HDLC_FR driver (hdlc_fr.c).
The DLCI driver's implementation of Frame Relay is used by only one
hardware driver in the kernel - the SDLA driver (sdla.c).
The SDLA driver provides Frame Relay support for the Sangoma S50x devices.
However, the vendor provides their own driver (along with their own
multi-WAN-protocol implementations including Frame Relay), called WANPIPE.
I believe most users of the hardware would use the vendor-provided WANPIPE
driver instead.
(The WANPIPE driver was even once in the kernel, but was deleted in
commit 8db60bcf3021 ("[WAN]: Remove broken and unmaintained Sangoma
drivers.") because the vendor no longer updated the in-kernel WANPIPE
driver.)
Cc: Mike McLagan <mike.mclagan@linux.org>
Signed-off-by: Xie He <xie.he.0141@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201114150921.685594-1-xie.he.0141@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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BCM63268 SoCs have a reset controller for certain components.
Signed-off-by: Álvaro Fernández Rojas <noltari@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Florian Fainelli <f.fainelli@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Rob Herring <robh@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Bogendoerfer <tsbogend@alpha.franken.de>
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BCM6368 SoCs have a reset controller for certain components.
Signed-off-by: Álvaro Fernández Rojas <noltari@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Florian Fainelli <f.fainelli@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Rob Herring <robh@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Bogendoerfer <tsbogend@alpha.franken.de>
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BCM6362 SoCs have a reset controller for certain components.
Signed-off-by: Álvaro Fernández Rojas <noltari@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Florian Fainelli <f.fainelli@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Rob Herring <robh@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Bogendoerfer <tsbogend@alpha.franken.de>
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BCM6358 SoCs have a reset controller for certain components.
Signed-off-by: Álvaro Fernández Rojas <noltari@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Florian Fainelli <f.fainelli@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Rob Herring <robh@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Bogendoerfer <tsbogend@alpha.franken.de>
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BCM6328 SoCs have a reset controller for certain components.
Signed-off-by: Álvaro Fernández Rojas <noltari@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Florian Fainelli <f.fainelli@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Rob Herring <robh@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Bogendoerfer <tsbogend@alpha.franken.de>
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This allows to add reset controllers support.
Signed-off-by: Álvaro Fernández Rojas <noltari@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Florian Fainelli <f.fainelli@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Bogendoerfer <tsbogend@alpha.franken.de>
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1.Refresh defconfig of CI20 to support OTG and RNG.
2.Refresh defconfig of CU1000-Neo to support OTG/RNG/OST/SC16IS752.
3.Refresh defconfig of CU1830-Neo to support OTG/DTRNG/OST/SC16IS752.
Tested-by: 周正 (Zhou Zheng) <sernia.zhou@foxmail.com>
Tested by: H. Nikolaus Schaller <hns@goldelico.com> # CI20/jz4780
Signed-off-by: 周琰杰 (Zhou Yanjie) <zhouyanjie@wanyeetech.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Bogendoerfer <tsbogend@alpha.franken.de>
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1.Add OTG/OTG PHY/RNG nodes for JZ4780, CGU/OTG nodes for CI20.
2.Add OTG/OTG PHY/RNG/OST nodes for X1000, SSI/CGU/OST/OTG/SC16IS752
nodes for CU1000-Neo.
3.Add OTG/OTG PHY/DTRNG/OST nodes for X1830, SSI/CGU/OST/OTG/SC16IS752
nodes for CU1830-Neo.
Tested-by: 周正 (Zhou Zheng) <sernia.zhou@foxmail.com>
Tested by: H. Nikolaus Schaller <hns@goldelico.com> # CI20/jz4780
Signed-off-by: 周琰杰 (Zhou Yanjie) <zhouyanjie@wanyeetech.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Bogendoerfer <tsbogend@alpha.franken.de>
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Pull in mips-fixes to get memblock fix.
- fix bug preventing booting on several platforms
- fix for build error, when modules need has_transparent_hugepage
- fix for memleak in alchemy clk setup
Signed-off-by: Thomas Bogendoerfer <tsbogend@alpha.franken.de>
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This property is for consumers of io-channels. Here it is used in
providers of those channels.
Note dt-schema will currently flag this as an error due to a dependency
between this property and io-channels.
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Cameron <Jonathan.Cameron@huawei.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201115192951.1073632-9-jic23@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzk@kernel.org>
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This property is only useful if a node has children as it allows them
to then use io-channel properties in the parent. Here there are no
children.
This is harmless, but we are planning to shortly drop this property
as it is rarely used correctly and there is little reason it would
ever be needed as we can just provide the io-channels property to
any child nodes that need it.
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Cameron <Jonathan.Cameron@huawei.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201115192951.1073632-8-jic23@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzk@kernel.org>
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This property is relevant to consumers of io-channels. Here it is
used by a provider.
dt-schema will now report and error as this property must be in the
same node as io-channels and it is not here.
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Cameron <Jonathan.Cameron@huawei.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201115192951.1073632-6-jic23@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzk@kernel.org>
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This property is only relevant to consumers of io-channels, not providers.
All these dtsi files have it alongside #io-channel-cells which indicates
they are providers of io-channels, not consumers.
Note that dt-schema will now flag this up due to a dependency between
this property and io-channels.
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Cameron <Jonathan.Cameron@huawei.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201115192951.1073632-5-jic23@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzk@kernel.org>
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Pull s390 fixes from Heiko Carstens:
- fix system call exit path; avoid return to user space with any
TIF/CIF/PIF set
- fix file permission for cpum_sfb_size parameter
- another small defconfig update
* tag 's390-5.10-4' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/s390/linux:
s390/cpum_sf.c: fix file permission for cpum_sfb_size
s390: update defconfigs
s390: fix system call exit path
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Pull MIPS fixes from Thomas Bogendoerfer:
- fix bug preventing booting on several platforms
- fix for build error, when modules need has_transparent_hugepage
- fix for memleak in alchemy clk setup
* tag 'mips_fixes_5.10_1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mips/linux:
MIPS: Alchemy: Fix memleak in alchemy_clk_setup_cpu
MIPS: kernel: Fix for_each_memblock conversion
MIPS: export has_transparent_hugepage() for modules
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It was recently reported that if GICR_TYPER is accessed before the RD base
address is set, we'll suffer from the unset @rdreg dereferencing. Oops...
gpa_t last_rdist_typer = rdreg->base + GICR_TYPER +
(rdreg->free_index - 1) * KVM_VGIC_V3_REDIST_SIZE;
It's "expected" that users will access registers in the redistributor if
the RD has been properly configured (e.g., the RD base address is set). But
it hasn't yet been covered by the existing documentation.
Per discussion on the list [1], the reporting of the GICR_TYPER.Last bit
for userspace never actually worked. And it's difficult for us to emulate
it correctly given that userspace has the flexibility to access it any
time. Let's just drop the reporting of the Last bit for userspace for now
(userspace should have full knowledge about it anyway) and it at least
prevents kernel from panic ;-)
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/kvmarm/c20865a267e44d1e2c0d52ce4e012263@kernel.org/
Fixes: ba7b3f1275fd ("KVM: arm/arm64: Revisit Redistributor TYPER last bit computation")
Reported-by: Keqian Zhu <zhukeqian1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Zenghui Yu <yuzenghui@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Eric Auger <eric.auger@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201117151629.1738-1-yuzenghui@huawei.com
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
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When section mappings are enabled, we allocate vmemmap pages from
physically continuous memory of size PMD_SIZE using
vmemmap_alloc_block_buf(). Section mappings are good to reduce TLB
pressure. But when system is highly fragmented and memory blocks are
being hot-added at runtime, its possible that such physically continuous
memory allocations can fail. Rather than failing the memory hot-add
procedure, add a fallback option to allocate vmemmap pages from
discontinuous pages using vmemmap_populate_basepages().
Signed-off-by: Sudarshan Rajagopalan <sudaraja@codeaurora.org>
Reviewed-by: Gavin Shan <gshan@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Anshuman Khandual <anshuman.khandual@arm.com>
Acked-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Cc: Anshuman Khandual <anshuman.khandual@arm.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Logan Gunthorpe <logang@deltatee.com>
Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Steven Price <steven.price@arm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/d6c06f2ef39bbe6c715b2f6db76eb16155fdcee6.1602722808.git.sudaraja@codeaurora.org
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
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show_trace_log_lvl() is not used by other compilation units so make it
static and remove the declaration from the header file.
Signed-off-by: Hui Su <sh_def@163.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201113133943.GA136221@rlk
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Even though support for EFI boot remains entirely optional for arm64,
it is unlikely that we will ever be able to repurpose the image header
fields that the EFI loader relies on, i.e., the magic NOP at offset
0x0 and the PE header address at offset 0x3c.
So let's factor out the differences into a 'efi_signature_nop' macro and
a local symbol representing the PE header address, and move the
conditional definitions into efi-header.S, taking into account whether
CONFIG_EFI is enabled or not. While at it, switch to a signature NOP
that behaves more like a NOP, i.e., one that only clobbers the
flags.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201117124729.12642-4-ardb@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
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We no longer map the first 64 KB of the kernel image, as there is nothing
there that we ever need to refer back to once the kernel has booted. Even
though facilities like kallsyms are very careful to only refer to the
region that starts at _stext when mapping virtual addresses to symbol
names, let's avoid any confusion by switching to local .L prefixed symbol
names for the EFI header, as none of them have any significance to the
rest of the kernel.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201117124729.12642-3-ardb@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
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In a previous patch, we increased the size of the EFI PE/COFF header
to 64 KB, which resulted in the _stext symbol to appear at a fixed
offset of 64 KB into the image.
Since 64 KB is also the largest page size we support, this completely
removes the need to map the first 64 KB of the kernel image, given that
it only contains the arm64 Image header and the EFI header, neither of
which we ever access again after booting the kernel. More importantly,
we should avoid an executable mapping of non-executable and not entirely
predictable data, to deal with the unlikely event that we inadvertently
emitted something that looks like an opcode that could be used as a
gadget for speculative execution.
So let's limit the kernel mapping of .text to the [_stext, _etext)
region, which matches the view of generic code (such as kallsyms) when
it reasons about the boundaries of the kernel's .text section.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201117124729.12642-2-ardb@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
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Now that we have a static inline helper to discover the platform's secure
boot mode that can be shared between the EFI stub and the kernel proper,
switch to it, and drop some comments about keeping them in sync manually.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
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Add arm64 IMA arch support. The code and arch policy is mainly inherited
from x86.
Co-developed-by: Chester Lin <clin@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Chester Lin <clin@suse.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
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The scripts/dtc/checks.c requires that the node have empty "dma-ranges"
property must have the same "#address-cells" and "#size-cells" values as
the parent node. Otherwise, the following warnings is reported:
arch/arm64/boot/dts/qcom/ipq6018.dtsi:185.3-14: Warning \
(dma_ranges_format): /soc:dma-ranges: empty "dma-ranges" property but \
its #address-cells (1) differs from / (2)
arch/arm64/boot/dts/qcom/ipq6018.dtsi:185.3-14: Warning \
(dma_ranges_format): /soc:dma-ranges: empty "dma-ranges" property but \
its #size-cells (1) differs from / (2)
Arnd Bergmann figured out why it's necessary:
Also note that the #address-cells=<1> means that any device under
this bus is assumed to only support 32-bit addressing, and DMA will
have to go through a slow swiotlb in the absence of an IOMMU.
Suggested-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: Zhen Lei <thunder.leizhen@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Bjorn Andersson <bjorn.andersson@linaro.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201016090833.1892-3-thunder.leizhen@huawei.com'
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
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The scripts/dtc/checks.c requires that the node have empty "dma-ranges"
property must have the same "#address-cells" and "#size-cells" values as
the parent node. Otherwise, the following warnings is reported:
arch/arm64/boot/dts/broadcom/stingray/stingray-usb.dtsi:7.3-14: Warning \
(dma_ranges_format): /usb:dma-ranges: empty "dma-ranges" property but \
its #address-cells (1) differs from / (2)
arch/arm64/boot/dts/broadcom/stingray/stingray-usb.dtsi:7.3-14: Warning \
(dma_ranges_format): /usb:dma-ranges: empty "dma-ranges" property but \
its #size-cells (1) differs from / (2)
Arnd Bergmann figured out why it's necessary:
Also note that the #address-cells=<1> means that any device under
this bus is assumed to only support 32-bit addressing, and DMA will
have to go through a slow swiotlb in the absence of an IOMMU.
Suggested-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: Zhen Lei <thunder.leizhen@huawei.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201016090833.1892-2-thunder.leizhen@huawei.com'
Acked-by: Florian Fainelli <f.fainelli@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
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Add a device-tree for the Rainier 4U system. Change the model name
on the existing Rainier device-tree to 2U, and remove the two
extra power supplies that are only present on the 4U system. Also
add labels to the fan nodes for use in the 4U device-tree.
Signed-off-by: Eddie James <eajames@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Jeffery <andrew@aj.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201028185647.14565-1-eajames@linux.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Joel Stanley <joel@jms.id.au>
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Add functions for runtime allocation and free.
This allocator and its algorithms are as simple as it gets. They do a
linear search across all EPC sections and find the first free page. They
are not NUMA-aware and only hand out individual pages. The SGX hardware
does not support large pages, so something more complicated like a buddy
allocator is unwarranted.
The free function (sgx_free_epc_page()) implicitly calls ENCLS[EREMOVE],
which returns the page to the uninitialized state. This ensures that the
page is ready for use at the next allocation.
Co-developed-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Acked-by: Jethro Beekman <jethro@fortanix.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201112220135.165028-10-jarkko@kernel.org
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Add a kernel parameter to disable SGX kernel support and document it.
[ bp: Massage. ]
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Acked-by: Jethro Beekman <jethro@fortanix.com>
Tested-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201112220135.165028-9-jarkko@kernel.org
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Kernel support for SGX is ultimately decided by the state of the launch
control bits in the feature control MSR (MSR_IA32_FEAT_CTL). If the
hardware supports SGX, but neglects to support flexible launch control, the
kernel will not enable SGX.
Enable SGX at feature control MSR initialization and update the associated
X86_FEATURE flags accordingly. Disable X86_FEATURE_SGX (and all
derivatives) if the kernel is not able to establish itself as the authority
over SGX Launch Control.
All checks are performed for each logical CPU (not just boot CPU) in order
to verify that MSR_IA32_FEATURE_CONTROL is correctly configured on all
CPUs. All SGX code in this series expects the same configuration from all
CPUs.
This differs from VMX where X86_FEATURE_VMX is intentionally cleared only
for the current CPU so that KVM can provide additional information if KVM
fails to load like which CPU doesn't support VMX. There’s not much the
kernel or an administrator can do to fix the situation, so SGX neglects to
convey additional details about these kinds of failures if they occur.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Co-developed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Acked-by: Jethro Beekman <jethro@fortanix.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201112220135.165028-8-jarkko@kernel.org
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Jarkko Sakkinen
Arvind Sankar
Zhenzhong Duan
Thomas Gleixner
Christian Borntraeger
Sumanth Korikkar
Niklas Schnelle
Thierry Reding
Christoph Hellwig
Vineet Gupta
Flavio Suligoi
Gustavo Pimentel
Linus Walleij
Nicholas Piggin
Xie He
Álvaro Fernández Rojas
周琰杰 (Zhou Yanjie)
Thomas Bogendoerfer
Jonathan Cameron
Linus Torvalds
Zenghui Yu
Sudarshan Rajagopalan
Hui Su
Ard Biesheuvel
Chester Lin
Zhen Lei
Eddie James
Sean Christopherson