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Follow the standard nodename pattern "^mmc(@.*)?$" defined in
Documentation/devicetree/bindings/mmc/mmc-controller.yaml
Otherwise, after the dt-binding is converted to json-schema,
'make ARCH=arm dtbs_check' will show warnings like this:
sdhc@5a000000: $nodename:0: 'sdhc@5a000000' does not match '^mmc(@.*)?$'
Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>
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The mconsole code only ever accesses proc for the initial pid
namespace. Instead of depending upon the proc_mnt which is
for proc_flush_task have uml create it's own mount of proc
instead.
This allows proc_flush_task to evolve and remove the
need for having a proc_mnt to do it's job.
Cc: Jeff Dike <jdike@addtoit.com>
Cc: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Cc: Anton Ivanov <anton.ivanov@cambridgegreys.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
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Inspection of the control flow reveals that mconsole_proc is either
called from mconsole_stop called from mc_work_proc or from
mc_work_proc directly. The function mc_work_proc is dispatched to a
kernel thread with schedule_work.
All of the threads that run dispatched by schedule_work are in the
init pid namespace.
So make the code clearer and by using init_pid_ns instead of
task_active_pid_ns(current).
Cc: Jeff Dike <jdike@addtoit.com>
Cc: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Cc: Anton Ivanov <anton.ivanov@cambridgegreys.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
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Commit 25b92693a1b6 ("arm64: mm: convert cpu_do_switch_mm() to C") added
a new use of the ASID() macro, so update the comment in asm/mmu.h which
reasons about why an atomic reload of 'mm->context.id.counter' is not
required.
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
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Default printk log level is KERN_WARNING. This makes automatic log
parsing problematic, since we get false positive alarms on not critical
information.
Set all not critical cache related information to KERN_INFO, the same level
as used on most kernel drivers.
Signed-off-by: Oleksij Rempel <o.rempel@pengutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Bogendoerfer <tsbogend@alpha.franken.de>
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There is no need to have the 'struct device_node *node' variable static
since new value always be assigned before use it.
Signed-off-by: YueHaibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Bogendoerfer <tsbogend@alpha.franken.de>
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KVM/arm fixes for 5.6, take #1
- Fix compilation on 32bit
- Move VHE guest entry/exit into the VHE-specific entry code
- Make sure all functions called by the non-VHE HYP code is tagged as __always_inline
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In older version of systemd(219), at boot time, udevadm is called with :
/usr/bin/udevadm trigger --type=devices --action=add"
This program generates an echo "add" in /sys/devices/system/cpu/cpu<x>/uevent,
leading to the "kvm: disabled by bios" message in case of your Bios disabled
the virtualization extensions.
On a modern system running up to 256 CPU threads, this pollutes the Kernel logs.
This patch offers to ratelimit this message to avoid any userspace program triggering
this uevent printing this message too often.
This patch is only a workaround but greatly reduce the pollution without
breaking the current behavior of printing a message if some try to instantiate
KVM on a system that doesn't support it.
Note that recent versions of systemd (>239) do not have trigger this behavior.
This patch will be useful at least for some using older systemd with recent Kernels.
Signed-off-by: Erwan Velu <e.velu@criteo.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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struct cpufreq_policy is quite big and it is not a good idea
to allocate one on the stack. Just use cpufreq_cpu_get and
cpufreq_cpu_put which is even simpler.
Reported-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Restrict -Werror to well-tested configurations and allow disabling it
via Kconfig.
Reported-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Compile error with CONFIG_KVM_INTEL=y and W=1:
CC arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.o
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:68:32: error: 'vmx_cpu_id' defined but not used [-Werror=unused-const-variable=]
68 | static const struct x86_cpu_id vmx_cpu_id[] = {
| ^~~~~~~~~~
cc1: all warnings being treated as errors
When building with =y, the MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE macro doesn't generate a
reference to the structure (or any code at all). This makes W=1 compiles
unhappy.
Wrap both in a #ifdef to avoid the issue.
Signed-off-by: Valdis Kletnieks <valdis.kletnieks@vt.edu>
[Do the same for CONFIG_KVM_AMD. - Paolo]
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Nick Desaulniers Reported:
When building with:
$ make CC=clang arch/x86/ CFLAGS=-Wframe-larger-than=1000
The following warning is observed:
arch/x86/kernel/kvm.c:494:13: warning: stack frame size of 1064 bytes in
function 'kvm_send_ipi_mask_allbutself' [-Wframe-larger-than=]
static void kvm_send_ipi_mask_allbutself(const struct cpumask *mask, int
vector)
^
Debugging with:
https://github.com/ClangBuiltLinux/frame-larger-than
via:
$ python3 frame_larger_than.py arch/x86/kernel/kvm.o \
kvm_send_ipi_mask_allbutself
points to the stack allocated `struct cpumask newmask` in
`kvm_send_ipi_mask_allbutself`. The size of a `struct cpumask` is
potentially large, as it's CONFIG_NR_CPUS divided by BITS_PER_LONG for
the target architecture. CONFIG_NR_CPUS for X86_64 can be as high as
8192, making a single instance of a `struct cpumask` 1024 B.
This patch fixes it by pre-allocate 1 cpumask variable per cpu and use it for
both pv tlb and pv ipis..
Reported-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
Acked-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@tencent.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Introduce some pv check helpers for consistency.
Suggested-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@tencent.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Even if APICv is disabled at startup, the backing page and ir_list need
to be initialized in case they are needed later. The only case in
which this can be skipped is for userspace irqchip, and that must be
done because avic_init_backing_page dereferences vcpu->arch.apic
(which is NULL for userspace irqchip).
Tested-by: rmuncrief@humanavance.com
Fixes: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=206579
Reviewed-by: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Our new dev board (Huawei D06CS) has a MegaRAID SAS HBA as the storage
controller, and we cannot access the HiSilicon SAS HBA, which we normally
use; so enable the driver config option so we can boot a distro with the
default defconfig.
Signed-off-by: John Garry <john.garry@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Wei Xu <xuwei5@hisilicon.com>
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This patch adds a AES DT node for Xilinx ZynqMP SoC.
Signed-off-by: Kalyani Akula <kalyani.akula@xilinx.com>
Acked-by: Michal Simek <michal.simek@xilinx.com>
Signed-off-by: Michal Simek <michal.simek@xilinx.com>
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The qcom-tsens binding requires a SoC-specific and a TSENS
family-specific binding to be specified in the compatible string.
Since them family-specific binding is not listed in the .dtsi file, we
see the following warnings in 'make dtbs_check'. Fix them.
/home/amit/work/builds/build-aarch64/arch/arm64/boot/dts/qcom/msm8996-mtp.dt.yaml:
thermal-sensor@4a9000: compatible: ['qcom,msm8996-tsens'] is not valid
under any of the given schemas (Possible causes of the failure):
/home/amit/work/builds/build-aarch64/arch/arm64/boot/dts/qcom/msm8996-mtp.dt.yaml:
thermal-sensor@4a9000: compatible: ['qcom,msm8996-tsens'] is too short
/home/amit/work/builds/build-aarch64/arch/arm64/boot/dts/qcom/msm8996-mtp.dt.yaml:
thermal-sensor@4a9000: compatible:0: 'qcom,msm8996-tsens' is not one of
['qcom,msm8916-tsens', 'qcom,msm8974-tsens']
/home/amit/work/builds/build-aarch64/arch/arm64/boot/dts/qcom/msm8996-mtp.dt.yaml:
thermal-sensor@4a9000: compatible:0: 'qcom,msm8996-tsens' is not one of
['qcom,msm8976-tsens', 'qcom,qcs404-tsens']
/home/amit/work/builds/build-aarch64/arch/arm64/boot/dts/qcom/msm8996-mtp.dt.yaml:
thermal-sensor@4ad000: compatible: ['qcom,msm8996-tsens'] is not valid
under any of the given schemas (Possible causes of the failure):
/home/amit/work/builds/build-aarch64/arch/arm64/boot/dts/qcom/msm8996-mtp.dt.yaml:
thermal-sensor@4ad000: compatible: ['qcom,msm8996-tsens'] is too short
/home/amit/work/builds/build-aarch64/arch/arm64/boot/dts/qcom/msm8996-mtp.dt.yaml:
thermal-sensor@4ad000: compatible:0: 'qcom,msm8996-tsens' is not one of
['qcom,msm8916-tsens', 'qcom,msm8974-tsens']
/home/amit/work/builds/build-aarch64/arch/arm64/boot/dts/qcom/msm8996-mtp.dt.yaml:
thermal-sensor@4ad000: compatible:0: 'qcom,msm8996-tsens' is not one of
['qcom,msm8976-tsens', 'qcom,qcs404-tsens']
Signed-off-by: Amit Kucheria <amit.kucheria@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Vinod Koul <vkoul@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/ebaa801adade53c567857db2f74af7d2e00f935b.1582871139.git.amit.kucheria@linaro.org
Signed-off-by: Bjorn Andersson <bjorn.andersson@linaro.org>
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The qcom-tsens binding requires a SoC-specific and a TSENS
family-specific binding to be specified in the compatible string.
Since them family-specific binding is not listed in the .dtsi file, we
see the following warnings in 'make dtbs_check'. Fix them.
/home/amit/work/builds/build-aarch64/arch/arm64/boot/dts/qcom/msm8916-mtp.dt.yaml:
thermal-sensor@4a9000: compatible: ['qcom,msm8916-tsens'] is not valid
under any of the given schemas (Possible causes of the failure):
/home/amit/work/builds/build-aarch64/arch/arm64/boot/dts/qcom/msm8916-mtp.dt.yaml:
thermal-sensor@4a9000: compatible: ['qcom,msm8916-tsens'] is too short
/home/amit/work/builds/build-aarch64/arch/arm64/boot/dts/qcom/msm8916-mtp.dt.yaml:
thermal-sensor@4a9000: compatible:0: 'qcom,msm8916-tsens' is not one of
['qcom,msm8976-tsens', 'qcom,qcs404-tsens']
/home/amit/work/builds/build-aarch64/arch/arm64/boot/dts/qcom/msm8916-mtp.dt.yaml:
thermal-sensor@4a9000: compatible:0: 'qcom,msm8916-tsens' is not one of
['qcom,msm8996-tsens', 'qcom,msm8998-tsens', 'qcom,sdm845-tsens']
Signed-off-by: Amit Kucheria <amit.kucheria@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Vinod Koul <vkoul@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/8cea8c0036703bcc4dd2b87a8ca3913c4a28d16e.1582871139.git.amit.kucheria@linaro.org
Signed-off-by: Bjorn Andersson <bjorn.andersson@linaro.org>
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Bring in the Truly display and enable the DSI channels to make the
mdss/gpu probe, even though we're lacking LABIB, preventing us from
seeing anything on the screen.
Tested-by: Vivek Gautam <vivek.gautam@codeaurora.org>
Reviewed-by: Vivek Gautam <vivek.gautam@codeaurora.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190513210747.22429-1-bjorn.andersson@linaro.org
Signed-off-by: Bjorn Andersson <bjorn.andersson@linaro.org>
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add i2c, spi, crypto, rng, watchdog, peripheral nodes, also add
support for wcss Q6 remoteproc driver and enable hw mutex, smem,
mailbox, smp2p and rpmsg drivers
Signed-off-by: Sivaprakash Murugesan <sivaprak@codeaurora.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1582199446-29890-1-git-send-email-sivaprak@codeaurora.org
Signed-off-by: Bjorn Andersson <bjorn.andersson@linaro.org>
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Per convention device nodes for SC7180 should be ordered by address.
This is currently not the case for the venus node, move it to the
correct position.
Reviewed-by: Douglas Anderson <dianders@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Matthias Kaehlcke <mka@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200227092649.v3.1.I15e0f7eff0c67a2b49d4992f9d80fc1d2fdadf63@changeid
Signed-off-by: Bjorn Andersson <bjorn.andersson@linaro.org>
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Move all pmdomain and clock resources to Venus DT node. And make
possible to support dynamic core assignment on v4.
Signed-off-by: Stanimir Varbanov <stanimir.varbanov@linaro.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200106154929.4331-12-stanimir.varbanov@linaro.org
Signed-off-by: Bjorn Andersson <bjorn.andersson@linaro.org>
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Currently arm64 doesn't initialize the primary CRNG in a (potentially)
trusted manner as we only detect the presence of the RNG once secondary
CPUs are up.
Now that the core RNG code distinguishes the early initialization of the
primary CRNG, we can implement arch_get_random_seed_long_early() to
support this.
This patch does so.
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200210130015.17664-4-mark.rutland@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
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PowerVM systems running compatibility mode on a few Power8 revisions are
still vulnerable to the hardware defect that loses PMU exceptions arriving
prior to a context switch.
The software fix for this issue is enabled through the CPU_FTR_PMAO_BUG
cpu_feature bit, nevertheless this bit also needs to be set for PowerVM
compatibility mode systems.
Fixes: 68f2f0d431d9ea4 ("powerpc: Add a cpu feature CPU_FTR_PMAO_BUG")
Signed-off-by: Desnes A. Nunes do Rosario <desnesn@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Leonardo Bras <leonardo@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200227134715.9715-1-desnesn@linux.ibm.com
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There are two implemented bits in the PPIN_CTL MSR:
Bit 0: LockOut (R/WO)
Set 1 to prevent further writes to MSR_PPIN_CTL.
Bit 1: Enable_PPIN (R/W)
If 1, enables MSR_PPIN to be accessible using RDMSR.
If 0, an attempt to read MSR_PPIN will cause #GP.
So there are four defined values:
0: PPIN is disabled, PPIN_CTL may be updated
1: PPIN is disabled. PPIN_CTL is locked against updates
2: PPIN is enabled. PPIN_CTL may be updated
3: PPIN is enabled. PPIN_CTL is locked against updates
Code would only enable the X86_FEATURE_INTEL_PPIN feature for case "2".
When it should have done so for both case "2" and case "3".
Fix the final test to just check for the enable bit. Also fix some of
the other comments in this function.
Fixes: 3f5a7896a509 ("x86/mce: Include the PPIN in MCE records when available")
Signed-off-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200226011737.9958-1-tony.luck@intel.com
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Some bcm2711 revisions have different DMA constraints on the their PCIE
bus. The lower common denominator, being able to access the lower 3GB of
memory, is the default setting for now. Newer SoC revisions are able to
access the whole memory space.
Raspberry Pi 4's firmware is aware of this limitation and will correct
the PCIE's dma-ranges property if a pcie0 alias is available. So add
it.
Fixes: d5c8dc0d4c88 ("ARM: dts: bcm2711: Enable PCIe controller")
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Saenz Julienne <nsaenzjulienne@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Phil Elwell <phil@raspberrypi.com>
Signed-off-by: Florian Fainelli <f.fainelli@gmail.com>
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This adds the missing properties to the PWR LED for the RPi 3 & 4 boards,
which are already set for the other boards. Without them we will lose
the LED state after suspend.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Wahren <stefan.wahren@i2se.com>
Tested-by: Peter Robinson <pbrobinson@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Florian Fainelli <f.fainelli@gmail.com>
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The boolean module parameter "kvm.use_gisa" controls if newly
created guests will use the GISA facility if provided by the
host system. The default is yes.
# cat /sys/module/kvm/parameters/use_gisa
Y
The parameter can be changed on the fly.
# echo N > /sys/module/kvm/parameters/use_gisa
Already running guests are not affected by this change.
The kvm s390 debug feature shows if a guest is running with GISA.
# grep gisa /sys/kernel/debug/s390dbf/kvm-$pid/sprintf
00 01582725059:843303 3 - 08 00000000e119bc01 gisa 0x00000000c9ac2642 initialized
00 01582725059:903840 3 - 11 000000004391ee22 00[0000000000000000-0000000000000000]: AIV gisa format-1 enabled for cpu 000
...
00 01582725059:916847 3 - 08 0000000094fff572 gisa 0x00000000c9ac2642 cleared
In general, that value should not be changed as the GISA facility
enhances interruption delivery performance.
A reason to switch the GISA facility off might be a performance
comparison run or debugging.
Signed-off-by: Michael Mueller <mimu@linux.ibm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200227091031.102993-1-mimu@linux.ibm.com
Reviewed-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
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Now that everything is in place, we can announce the feature.
Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
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For protected VMs, the VCPU resets are done by the Ultravisor, as KVM
has no access to the VCPU registers.
Note that the ultravisor will only accept a call for the exact reset
that has been requested.
Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>
[borntraeger@de.ibm.com: patch merging, splitting, fixing]
Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
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As PSW restart is handled by the ultravisor (and we only get a start
notification) we must re-check the PSW after a start before injecting
interrupts.
Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
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We're not allowed to inject interrupts on intercepts that leave the
guest state in an "in-between" state where the next SIE entry will do a
continuation, namely secure instruction interception (104) and secure
prefix interception (112).
As our PSW is just a copy of the real one that will be replaced on the
next exit, we can mask out the interrupt bits in the PSW to make sure
that we do not inject anything.
Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
[borntraeger@de.ibm.com: patch merging, splitting, fixing]
Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
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Code 5 for the set cpu state UV call tells the UV to load a PSW from
the SE header (first IPL) or from guest location 0x0 (diag 308 subcode
0/1). Also it sets the cpu into operating state afterwards, so we can
start it.
Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>
[borntraeger@de.ibm.com: patch merging, splitting, fixing]
Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
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VCPU states have to be reported to the ultravisor for SIGP
interpretation, kdump, kexec and reboot.
Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
[borntraeger@de.ibm.com: patch merging, splitting, fixing]
Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
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diag 308 subcode 0 and 1 require several KVM and Ultravisor interactions.
Specific to these "soft" reboots are
* The "unshare all" UVC
* The "prepare for reset" UVC
Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>
[borntraeger@de.ibm.com: patch merging, splitting, fixing]
Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
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Only two program exceptions can be injected for a protected guest:
specification and operand.
For both, a code needs to be specified in the interrupt injection
control of the state description, as the guest prefix page is not
accessible to KVM for such guests.
Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
[borntraeger@de.ibm.com: patch merging, splitting, fixing]
Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
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A lot of the registers are controlled by the Ultravisor and never
visible to KVM. Also some registers are overlayed, like gbea is with
sidad, which might leak data to userspace.
Hence we sync a minimal set of registers for both SIE formats and then
check and sync format 2 registers if necessary.
Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
[borntraeger@de.ibm.com: patch merging, splitting, fixing]
Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
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For protected VMs the hypervisor can not access guest breaking event
address, program parameter, bpbc and todpr. Do not reset those fields
as the control block does not provide access to these fields.
Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
[borntraeger@de.ibm.com: patch merging, splitting, fixing]
Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
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A lot of the registers are controlled by the Ultravisor and never
visible to KVM. Some fields in the sie control block are overlayed, like
gbea. As no known userspace uses the ONE_REG interface on s390 if sync
regs are available, no functionality is lost if it is disabled for
protected guests.
Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
[borntraeger@de.ibm.com: patch merging, splitting, fixing]
Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
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Save response to sidad and disable address checking for protected
guests.
Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
[borntraeger@de.ibm.com: patch merging, splitting, fixing]
Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
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STHYI data has to go through the bounce buffer.
Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>
[borntraeger@de.ibm.com: patch merging, splitting, fixing]
Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
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The current code tries to first pin shared pages, if that fails (e.g.
because the page is not shared) it will export them. For shared pages
this means that we get a new intercept telling us that the guest is
unsharing that page. We will unpin the page at that point in time,
following the same rules as for making a page secure (i.e. waiting for
writeback, no elevated page references, etc.)
Signed-off-by: Claudio Imbrenda <imbrenda@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>
[borntraeger@de.ibm.com: patch merging, splitting, fixing]
Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
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The SPX instruction is handled by the ultravisor. We do get a
notification intercept, though. Let us update our internal view.
In addition to that, when the guest prefix page is not secure, an
intercept 112 (0x70) is indicated. Let us make the prefix pages
secure again.
Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>
[borntraeger@de.ibm.com: patch merging, splitting, fixing]
Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
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Now that we can't access guest memory anymore, we have a dedicated
satellite block that's a bounce buffer for instruction data.
We re-use the memop interface to copy the instruction data to / from
userspace. This lets us re-use a lot of QEMU code which used that
interface to make logical guest memory accesses which are not possible
anymore in protected mode anyway.
Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
[borntraeger@de.ibm.com: patch merging, splitting, fixing]
Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
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Guest registers for protected guests are stored at offset 0x380. We
will copy those to the usual places. Long term we could refactor this
or use register access functions.
Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
[borntraeger@de.ibm.com: patch merging, splitting, fixing]
Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
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SIE intercept code 8 is used only on exception loops for protected
guests. That means we need to stop the guest when we see it. This is
done by userspace.
Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>
Acked-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
[borntraeger@de.ibm.com: patch merging, splitting, fixing]
Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
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The sclp interrupt is kind of special. The ultravisor polices that we
do not inject an sclp interrupt with payload if no sccb is outstanding.
On the other hand we have "asynchronous" event interrupts, e.g. for
console input.
We separate both variants into sclp interrupt and sclp event interrupt.
The sclp interrupt is masked until a previous servc instruction has
finished (sie exit 108).
[frankja@linux.ibm.com: factoring out write_sclp]
Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
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This defines the necessary data structures in the SIE control block to
inject machine checks,external and I/O interrupts. We first define the
the interrupt injection control, which defines the next interrupt to
inject. Then we define the fields that contain the payload for machine
checks,external and I/O interrupts.
This is then used to implement interruption injection for the following
list of interruption types:
- I/O (uses inject io interruption)
__deliver_io
- External (uses inject external interruption)
__deliver_cpu_timer
__deliver_ckc
__deliver_emergency_signal
__deliver_external_call
- cpu restart (uses inject restart interruption)
__deliver_restart
- machine checks (uses mcic, failing address and external damage)
__write_machine_check
Please note that posted interrupts (GISA) are not used for protected
guests as of today.
The service interrupt is handled in a followup patch.
Signed-off-by: Michael Mueller <mimu@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>
[borntraeger@de.ibm.com: patch merging, splitting, fixing]
Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
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We have two new SIE exit codes dealing with instructions.
104 (0x68) for a secure instruction interception, on which the SIE needs
hypervisor action to complete the instruction. We can piggy-back on the
existing instruction handlers.
108 which is merely a notification and provides data for tracking and
management. For example this is used to tell the host about a new value
for the prefix register. As there will be several special case handlers
in later patches, we handle this in a separate function.
Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com>
[borntraeger@de.ibm.com: patch merging, splitting, fixing]
Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
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Since there is no interception for load control and load psw
instruction in the protected mode, we need a new way to get notified
whenever we can inject an IRQ right after the guest has just enabled
the possibility for receiving them.
The new interception codes solve that problem by providing a
notification for changes to IRQ enablement relevant bits in CRs 0, 6
and 14, as well a the machine check mask bit in the PSW.
No special handling is needed for these interception codes, the KVM
pre-run code will consult all necessary CRs and PSW bits and inject
IRQs the guest is enabled for.
Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>
[borntraeger@de.ibm.com: patch merging, splitting, fixing]
Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
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