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Pull vfs acl updates from Christian Brauner:
"These are general fixes and preparatory changes related to the ongoing
posix acl rework. The actual rework where we build a type safe posix
acl api wasn't ready for this merge window but we're hopeful for the
next merge window.
General fixes:
- Some filesystems like 9p and cifs have to implement custom posix
acl handlers because they require access to the dentry in order to
set and get posix acls while the set and get inode operations
currently don't. But the ntfs3 filesystem has no such requirement
and thus implemented custom posix acl xattr handlers when it really
didn't have to. So this pr contains patch that just implements set
and get inode operations for ntfs3 and switches it to rely on the
generic posix acl xattr handlers. (We would've appreciated reviews
from the ntfs3 maintainers but we didn't get any. But hey, if we
really broke it we'll fix it. But fstests for ntfs3 said it's
fine.)
- The posix_acl_fix_xattr_common() helper has been adapted so it can
be used by a few more callers and avoiding open-coding the same
checks over and over.
Other than the two general fixes this series introduces a new helper
vfs_set_acl_prepare(). The reason for this helper is so that we can
mitigate one of the source that change {g,u}id values directly in the
uapi struct. With the vfs_set_acl_prepare() helper we can move the
idmapped mount fixup into the generic posix acl set handler.
The advantage of this is that it allows us to remove the
posix_acl_setxattr_idmapped_mnt() helper which so far we had to call
in vfs_setxattr() to account for idmapped mounts. While semantically
correct the problem with this approach was that we had to keep the
value parameter of the generic vfs_setxattr() call as non-const. This
is rectified in this series.
Ultimately, we will get rid of all the extreme kludges and type
unsafety once we have merged the posix api - hopefully during the next
merge window - built solely around get and set inode operations. Which
incidentally will also improve handling of posix acls in security and
especially in integrity modesl. While this will come with temporarily
having two inode operation for posix acls that is nothing compared to
the problems we have right now and so well worth it. We'll end up with
something that we can actually reason about instead of needing to
write novels to explain what's going on"
* tag 'fs.acl.rework.prep.v6.1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/vfs/idmapping:
xattr: always us is_posix_acl_xattr() helper
acl: fix the comments of posix_acl_xattr_set
xattr: constify value argument in vfs_setxattr()
ovl: use vfs_set_acl_prepare()
acl: move idmapping handling into posix_acl_xattr_set()
acl: add vfs_set_acl_prepare()
acl: return EOPNOTSUPP in posix_acl_fix_xattr_common()
ntfs3: rework xattr handlers and switch to POSIX ACL VFS helpers
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It turns out Apple doesn't capitalise the "mini" in "Macmini" in DMI, which
is inconsistent with other model line names.
Correct the capitalisation of Macmini in the quirk for skipping loading
platform certs on T2 Macs.
Currently users get:
------------[ cut here ]------------
[Firmware Bug]: Page fault caused by firmware at PA: 0xffffa30640054000
WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 8 at arch/x86/platform/efi/quirks.c:735 efi_crash_gracefully_on_page_fault+0x55/0xe0
Modules linked in:
CPU: 1 PID: 8 Comm: kworker/u12:0 Not tainted 5.18.14-arch1-2-t2 #1 4535eb3fc40fd08edab32a509fbf4c9bc52d111e
Hardware name: Apple Inc. Macmini8,1/Mac-7BA5B2DFE22DDD8C, BIOS 1731.120.10.0.0 (iBridge: 19.16.15071.0.0,0) 04/24/2022
Workqueue: efi_rts_wq efi_call_rts
...
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
efi: Froze efi_rts_wq and disabled EFI Runtime Services
integrity: Couldn't get size: 0x8000000000000015
integrity: MODSIGN: Couldn't get UEFI db list
efi: EFI Runtime Services are disabled!
integrity: Couldn't get size: 0x8000000000000015
integrity: Couldn't get UEFI dbx list
Fixes: 155ca952c7ca ("efi: Do not import certificates from UEFI Secure Boot for T2 Macs")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Aditya Garg <gargaditya08@live.com>
Tested-by: Samuel Jiang <chyishian.jiang@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Orlando Chamberlain <redecorating@protonmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
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The uapi POSIX ACL struct passed through the value argument during
setxattr() contains {g,u}id values encoded via ACL_{GROUP,USER} entries
that should actually be stored in the form of k{g,u}id_t (See [1] for a
long explanation of the issue.).
In 0c5fd887d2bb ("acl: move idmapped mount fixup into vfs_{g,s}etxattr()")
we took the mount's idmapping into account in order to let overlayfs
handle POSIX ACLs on idmapped layers correctly. The fixup is currently
performed directly in vfs_setxattr() which piles on top of the earlier
hackiness by handling the mount's idmapping and stuff the vfs{g,u}id_t
values into the uapi struct as well. While that is all correct and works
fine it's just ugly.
Now that we have introduced vfs_make_posix_acl() earlier move handling
idmapped mounts out of vfs_setxattr() and into the POSIX ACL handler
where it belongs.
Note that we also need to call vfs_make_posix_acl() for EVM which
interpretes POSIX ACLs during security_inode_setxattr(). Leave them a
longer comment for future reference.
All filesystems that support idmapped mounts via FS_ALLOW_IDMAP use the
standard POSIX ACL xattr handlers and are covered by this change. This
includes overlayfs which simply calls vfs_{g,s}etxattr().
The following filesystems use custom POSIX ACL xattr handlers: 9p, cifs,
ecryptfs, and ntfs3 (and overlayfs but we've covered that in the paragraph
above) and none of them support idmapped mounts yet.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20220801145520.1532837-1-brauner@kernel.org/ [1]
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Seth Forshee (DigitalOcean) <sforshee@kernel.org>
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Limit validating the hash algorithm to just security.ima xattr, not
the security.evm xattr or any of the protected EVM security xattrs,
nor posix acls.
Fixes: 50f742dd9147 ("IMA: block writes of the security.ima xattr with unsupported algorithms")
Reported-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
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Pull integrity updates from Mimi Zohar:
"Aside from the one EVM cleanup patch, all the other changes are kexec
related.
On different architectures different keyrings are used to verify the
kexec'ed kernel image signature. Here are a number of preparatory
cleanup patches and the patches themselves for making the keyrings -
builtin_trusted_keyring, .machine, .secondary_trusted_keyring, and
.platform - consistent across the different architectures"
* tag 'integrity-v6.0' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity:
kexec, KEYS, s390: Make use of built-in and secondary keyring for signature verification
arm64: kexec_file: use more system keyrings to verify kernel image signature
kexec, KEYS: make the code in bzImage64_verify_sig generic
kexec: clean up arch_kexec_kernel_verify_sig
kexec: drop weak attribute from functions
kexec_file: drop weak attribute from functions
evm: Use IS_ENABLED to initialize .enabled
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Pull x86 kdump updates from Borislav Petkov:
- Add the ability to pass early an RNG seed to the kernel from the boot
loader
- Add the ability to pass the IMA measurement of kernel and bootloader
to the kexec-ed kernel
* tag 'x86_kdump_for_v6.0_rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
x86/setup: Use rng seeds from setup_data
x86/kexec: Carry forward IMA measurement log on kexec
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Pull fs idmapping updates from Christian Brauner:
"This introduces the new vfs{g,u}id_t types we agreed on. Similar to
k{g,u}id_t the new types are just simple wrapper structs around
regular {g,u}id_t types.
They allow to establish a type safety boundary in the VFS for idmapped
mounts preventing confusion betwen {g,u}ids mapped into an idmapped
mount and {g,u}ids mapped into the caller's or the filesystem's
idmapping.
An initial set of helpers is introduced that allows to operate on
vfs{g,u}id_t types. We will remove all references to non-type safe
idmapped mounts helpers in the very near future. The patches do
already exist.
This converts the core attribute changing codepaths which become
significantly easier to reason about because of this change.
Just a few highlights here as the patches give detailed overviews of
what is happening in the commit messages:
- The kernel internal struct iattr contains type safe vfs{g,u}id_t
values clearly communicating that these values have to take a given
mount's idmapping into account.
- The ownership values placed in struct iattr to change ownership are
identical for idmapped and non-idmapped mounts going forward. This
also allows to simplify stacking filesystems such as overlayfs that
change attributes In other words, they always represent the values.
- Instead of open coding checks for whether ownership changes have
been requested and an actual update of the inode is required we now
have small static inline wrappers that abstract this logic away
removing a lot of code duplication from individual filesystems that
all open-coded the same checks"
* tag 'fs.idmapped.vfsuid.v5.20' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/brauner/linux:
mnt_idmapping: align kernel doc and parameter order
mnt_idmapping: use new helpers in mapped_fs{g,u}id()
fs: port HAS_UNMAPPED_ID() to vfs{g,u}id_t
mnt_idmapping: return false when comparing two invalid ids
attr: fix kernel doc
attr: port attribute changes to new types
security: pass down mount idmapping to setattr hook
quota: port quota helpers mount ids
fs: port to iattr ownership update helpers
fs: introduce tiny iattr ownership update helpers
fs: use mount types in iattr
fs: add two type safe mapping helpers
mnt_idmapping: add vfs{g,u}id_t
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The lockdown LSM is primarily used in conjunction with UEFI Secure Boot.
This LSM may also be used on machines without UEFI. It can also be
enabled when UEFI Secure Boot is disabled. One of lockdown's features
is to prevent kexec from loading untrusted kernels. Lockdown can be
enabled through a bootparam or after the kernel has booted through
securityfs.
If IMA appraisal is used with the "ima_appraise=log" boot param,
lockdown can be defeated with kexec on any machine when Secure Boot is
disabled or unavailable. IMA prevents setting "ima_appraise=log" from
the boot param when Secure Boot is enabled, but this does not cover
cases where lockdown is used without Secure Boot.
To defeat lockdown, boot without Secure Boot and add ima_appraise=log to
the kernel command line; then:
$ echo "integrity" > /sys/kernel/security/lockdown
$ echo "appraise func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK appraise_type=imasig" > \
/sys/kernel/security/ima/policy
$ kexec -ls unsigned-kernel
Add a call to verify ima appraisal is set to "enforce" whenever lockdown
is enabled. This fixes CVE-2022-21505.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 29d3c1c8dfe7 ("kexec: Allow kexec_file() with appropriate IMA policy when locked down")
Signed-off-by: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: John Haxby <john.haxby@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Use IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_XXX) instead of #ifdef/#endif statements to
initialize .enabled, minor simplicity improvement.
Signed-off-by: Xiu Jianfeng <xiujianfeng@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Ahmad Fatoum <a.fatoum@pengutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
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On failure to allocate the SHA1 tfm, IMA fails to initialize and exits
without freeing the ima_algo_array. Add the missing kfree() for
ima_algo_array to avoid the potential memory leak.
Signed-off-by: Jianglei Nie <niejianglei2021@163.com>
Fixes: 6d94809af6b0 ("ima: Allocate and initialize tfm for each PCR bank")
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
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Currently, an unsigned kernel could be kexec'ed when IMA arch specific
policy is configured unless lockdown is enabled. Enforce kernel
signature verification check in the kexec_file_load syscall when IMA
arch specific policy is configured.
Fixes: 99d5cadfde2b ("kexec_file: split KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG into KEXEC_SIG and KEXEC_SIG_FORCE")
Reported-and-suggested-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Coiby Xu <coxu@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
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When the ima-modsig is enabled, the rc passed to evm_verifyxattr() may be
negative, which may cause the integer overflow problem.
Fixes: 39b07096364a ("ima: Implement support for module-style appended signatures")
Signed-off-by: Huaxin Lu <luhuaxin1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
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Although the violation digest in the IMA measurement list is always
zeroes, the size of the digest should be based on the hash algorithm.
Until recently the hash algorithm was hard coded to sha1. Fix the
violation digest size included in the IMA measurement list.
This is just a cosmetic change which should not affect attestation.
Reported-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Fixes: 09091c44cb73 ("ima: use IMA default hash algorithm for integrity violations")
Tested-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
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On kexec file load, the Integrity Measurement Architecture (IMA)
subsystem may verify the IMA signature of the kernel and initramfs, and
measure it. The command line parameters passed to the kernel in the
kexec call may also be measured by IMA.
A remote attestation service can verify a TPM quote based on the TPM
event log, the IMA measurement list and the TPM PCR data. This can
be achieved only if the IMA measurement log is carried over from the
current kernel to the next kernel across the kexec call.
PowerPC and ARM64 both achieve this using device tree with a
"linux,ima-kexec-buffer" node. x86 platforms generally don't make use of
device tree, so use the setup_data mechanism to pass the IMA buffer to
the new kernel.
Signed-off-by: Jonathan McDowell <noodles@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> # IMA function definitions
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/YmKyvlF3my1yWTvK@noodles-fedora-PC23Y6EG
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Now that we introduced new infrastructure to increase the type safety
for filesystems supporting idmapped mounts port the first part of the
vfs over to them.
This ports the attribute changes codepaths to rely on the new better
helpers using a dedicated type.
Before this change we used to take a shortcut and place the actual
values that would be written to inode->i_{g,u}id into struct iattr. This
had the advantage that we moved idmappings mostly out of the picture
early on but it made reasoning about changes more difficult than it
should be.
The filesystem was never explicitly told that it dealt with an idmapped
mount. The transition to the value that needed to be stored in
inode->i_{g,u}id appeared way too early and increased the probability of
bugs in various codepaths.
We know place the same value in struct iattr no matter if this is an
idmapped mount or not. The vfs will only deal with type safe
vfs{g,u}id_t. This makes it massively safer to perform permission checks
as the type will tell us what checks we need to perform and what helpers
we need to use.
Fileystems raising FS_ALLOW_IDMAP can't simply write ia_vfs{g,u}id to
inode->i_{g,u}id since they are different types. Instead they need to
use the dedicated vfs{g,u}id_to_k{g,u}id() helpers that map the
vfs{g,u}id into the filesystem.
The other nice effect is that filesystems like overlayfs don't need to
care about idmappings explicitly anymore and can simply set up struct
iattr accordingly directly.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAHk-=win6+ahs1EwLkcq8apqLi_1wXFWbrPf340zYEhObpz4jA@mail.gmail.com [1]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220621141454.2914719-9-brauner@kernel.org
Cc: Seth Forshee <sforshee@digitalocean.com>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CC: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Seth Forshee <sforshee@digitalocean.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
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Before this change we used to take a shortcut and place the actual
values that would be written to inode->i_{g,u}id into struct iattr. This
had the advantage that we moved idmappings mostly out of the picture
early on but it made reasoning about changes more difficult than it
should be.
The filesystem was never explicitly told that it dealt with an idmapped
mount. The transition to the value that needed to be stored in
inode->i_{g,u}id appeared way too early and increased the probability of
bugs in various codepaths.
We know place the same value in struct iattr no matter if this is an
idmapped mount or not. The vfs will only deal with type safe
vfs{g,u}id_t. This makes it massively safer to perform permission checks
as the type will tell us what checks we need to perform and what helpers
we need to use.
Adapt the security_inode_setattr() helper to pass down the mount's
idmapping to account for that change.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220621141454.2914719-8-brauner@kernel.org
Cc: Seth Forshee <sforshee@digitalocean.com>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CC: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Seth Forshee <sforshee@digitalocean.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
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Earlier we introduced new helpers to abstract ownership update and
remove code duplication. This converts all filesystems supporting
idmapped mounts to make use of these new helpers.
For now we always pass the initial idmapping which makes the idmapping
functions these helpers call nops.
This is done because we currently always pass the actual value to be
written to i_{g,u}id via struct iattr. While this allowed us to treat
the {g,u}id values in struct iattr as values that can be directly
written to inode->i_{g,u}id it also increases the potential for
confusion for filesystems.
Now that we are have dedicated types to prevent this confusion we will
ultimately only map the value from the idmapped mount into a filesystem
value that can be written to inode->i_{g,u}id when the filesystem
actually updates the inode. So pass down the initial idmapping until we
finished that conversion at which point we pass down the mount's
idmapping.
No functional changes intended.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220621141454.2914719-6-brauner@kernel.org
Cc: Seth Forshee <sforshee@digitalocean.com>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CC: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Seth Forshee <sforshee@digitalocean.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
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This reverts commit ccf11dbaa07b328fa469415c362d33459c140a37.
Commit ccf11dbaa07b ("evm: Fix memleak in init_desc") said there is
memleak in init_desc. That may be incorrect, as we can see, tmp_tfm is
saved in one of the two global variables hmac_tfm or evm_tfm[hash_algo],
then if init_desc is called next time, there is no need to alloc tfm
again, so in the error path of kmalloc desc or crypto_shash_init(desc),
It is not a problem without freeing tmp_tfm.
And also that commit did not reset the global variable to NULL after
freeing tmp_tfm and this makes *tfm a dangling pointer which may cause a
UAF issue.
Reported-by: Guozihua (Scott) <guozihua@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Xiu Jianfeng <xiujianfeng@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
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Pull IMA updates from Mimi Zohar:
"New is IMA support for including fs-verity file digests and signatures
in the IMA measurement list as well as verifying the fs-verity file
digest based signatures, both based on policy.
In addition, are two bug fixes:
- avoid reading UEFI variables, which cause a page fault, on Apple
Macs with T2 chips.
- remove the original "ima" template Kconfig option to address a boot
command line ordering issue.
The rest is a mixture of code/documentation cleanup"
* tag 'integrity-v5.19' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity:
integrity: Fix sparse warnings in keyring_handler
evm: Clean up some variables
evm: Return INTEGRITY_PASS for enum integrity_status value '0'
efi: Do not import certificates from UEFI Secure Boot for T2 Macs
fsverity: update the documentation
ima: support fs-verity file digest based version 3 signatures
ima: permit fsverity's file digests in the IMA measurement list
ima: define a new template field named 'd-ngv2' and templates
fs-verity: define a function to return the integrity protected file digest
ima: use IMA default hash algorithm for integrity violations
ima: fix 'd-ng' comments and documentation
ima: remove the IMA_TEMPLATE Kconfig option
ima: remove redundant initialization of pointer 'file'.
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Factor out the blacklist hash creation with the get_raw_hash() helper.
This also centralize the "tbs" and "bin" prefixes and make them private,
which help to manage them consistently.
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Cc: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@linux.microsoft.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210712170313.884724-5-mic@digikod.net
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
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Fix the following sparse warnings:
CHECK security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.c
security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.c:76:16: warning: Using plain integer as NULL pointer
security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.c:91:16: warning: Using plain integer as NULL pointer
security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.c:106:16: warning: Using plain integer as NULL pointer
Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
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Make hmac_tfm static since it's not used anywhere else besides the file
it is in.
Remove declaration of hash_tfm since it doesn't exist.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
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Return INTEGRITY_PASS for the enum integrity_status rather than 0.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
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On Apple T2 Macs, when Linux attempts to read the db and dbx efi variables
at early boot to load UEFI Secure Boot certificates, a page fault occurs
in Apple firmware code and EFI runtime services are disabled with the
following logs:
[Firmware Bug]: Page fault caused by firmware at PA: 0xffffb1edc0068000
WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 104 at arch/x86/platform/efi/quirks.c:735 efi_crash_gracefully_on_page_fault+0x50/0xf0
(Removed some logs from here)
Call Trace:
<TASK>
page_fault_oops+0x4f/0x2c0
? search_bpf_extables+0x6b/0x80
? search_module_extables+0x50/0x80
? search_exception_tables+0x5b/0x60
kernelmode_fixup_or_oops+0x9e/0x110
__bad_area_nosemaphore+0x155/0x190
bad_area_nosemaphore+0x16/0x20
do_kern_addr_fault+0x8c/0xa0
exc_page_fault+0xd8/0x180
asm_exc_page_fault+0x1e/0x30
(Removed some logs from here)
? __efi_call+0x28/0x30
? switch_mm+0x20/0x30
? efi_call_rts+0x19a/0x8e0
? process_one_work+0x222/0x3f0
? worker_thread+0x4a/0x3d0
? kthread+0x17a/0x1a0
? process_one_work+0x3f0/0x3f0
? set_kthread_struct+0x40/0x40
? ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30
</TASK>
---[ end trace 1f82023595a5927f ]---
efi: Froze efi_rts_wq and disabled EFI Runtime Services
integrity: Couldn't get size: 0x8000000000000015
integrity: MODSIGN: Couldn't get UEFI db list
efi: EFI Runtime Services are disabled!
integrity: Couldn't get size: 0x8000000000000015
integrity: Couldn't get UEFI dbx list
integrity: Couldn't get size: 0x8000000000000015
integrity: Couldn't get mokx list
integrity: Couldn't get size: 0x80000000
So we avoid reading these UEFI variables and thus prevent the crash.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Aditya Garg <gargaditya08@live.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
|
|
IMA may verify a file's integrity against a "good" value stored in the
'security.ima' xattr or as an appended signature, based on policy. When
the "good value" is stored in the xattr, the xattr may contain a file
hash or signature. In either case, the "good" value is preceded by a
header. The first byte of the xattr header indicates the type of data
- hash, signature - stored in the xattr. To support storing fs-verity
signatures in the 'security.ima' xattr requires further differentiating
the fs-verity signature from the existing IMA signature.
In addition the signatures stored in 'security.ima' xattr, need to be
disambiguated. Instead of directly signing the fs-verity digest, a new
signature format version 3 is defined as the hash of the ima_file_id
structure, which identifies the type of signature and the digest.
The IMA policy defines "which" files are to be measured, verified, and/or
audited. For those files being verified, the policy rules indicate "how"
the file should be verified. For example to require a file be signed,
the appraise policy rule must include the 'appraise_type' option.
appraise_type:= [imasig] | [imasig|modsig] | [sigv3]
where 'imasig' is the original or signature format v2 (default),
where 'modsig' is an appended signature,
where 'sigv3' is the signature format v3.
The policy rule must also indicate the type of digest, if not the IMA
default, by first specifying the digest type:
digest_type:= [verity]
The following policy rule requires fsverity signatures. The rule may be
constrained, for example based on a fsuuid or LSM label.
appraise func=BPRM_CHECK digest_type=verity appraise_type=sigv3
Acked-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
|
|
Permit fsverity's file digest (a hash of struct fsverity_descriptor) to
be included in the IMA measurement list, based on the new measurement
policy rule 'digest_type=verity' option.
To differentiate between a regular IMA file hash from an fsverity's
file digest, use the new d-ngv2 format field included in the ima-ngv2
template.
The following policy rule requires fsverity file digests and specifies
the new 'ima-ngv2' template, which contains the new 'd-ngv2' field. The
policy rule may be constrained, for example based on a fsuuid or LSM
label.
measure func=FILE_CHECK digest_type=verity template=ima-ngv2
Acked-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
|
|
In preparation to differentiate between unsigned regular IMA file
hashes and fs-verity's file digests in the IMA measurement list,
define a new template field named 'd-ngv2'.
Also define two new templates named 'ima-ngv2' and 'ima-sigv2', which
include the new 'd-ngv2' field.
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
|
|
Integrity file violations - ToM/ToU, open writers - are recorded in the IMA
measurement list, containing 0x00's in both the template data and file data
hash fields, but 0xFF's are actually extended into TPM PCRs. Although the
original 'ima' template data field ('d') is limited to 20 bytes, the 'd-ng'
template digest field is not.
The violation file data hash template field ('d-ng') is unnecessarily hard
coded to SHA1. Instead of simply replacing the hard coded SHA1 hash
algorithm with a larger hash algorithm, use the hash algorithm as defined
in "ima_hash_algo". ima_hash_algo is set to either the Kconfig IMA default
hash algorithm or as defined on the boot command line (ima_hash=).
Including a non-SHA1 file data hash algorithm in the 'd-ng' field of
violations is a cosmetic change. The template data hash field, which is
extended into the TPM PCRs, is not affected by this change and should not
affect attestation of the IMA measurement list.
Tested-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
|
|
Initially the 'd-ng' template field did not prefix the digest with either
"md5" or "sha1" hash algorithms. Prior to being upstreamed this changed,
but the comments and documentation were not updated. Fix the comments
and documentation.
Fixes: 4d7aeee73f53 ("ima: define new template ima-ng and template fields d-ng and n-ng")
Reported-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
|
|
The original 'ima' measurement list template contains a hash, defined
as 20 bytes, and a null terminated pathname, limited to 255
characters. Other measurement list templates permit both larger hashes
and longer pathnames. When the "ima" template is configured as the
default, a new measurement list template (ima_template=) must be
specified before specifying a larger hash algorithm (ima_hash=) on the
boot command line.
To avoid this boot command line ordering issue, remove the legacy "ima"
template configuration option, allowing it to still be specified on the
boot command line.
The root cause of this issue is that during the processing of ima_hash,
we would try to check whether the hash algorithm is compatible with the
template. If the template is not set at the moment we do the check, we
check the algorithm against the configured default template. If the
default template is "ima", then we reject any hash algorithm other than
sha1 and md5.
For example, if the compiled default template is "ima", and the default
algorithm is sha1 (which is the current default). In the cmdline, we put
in "ima_hash=sha256 ima_template=ima-ng". The expected behavior would be
that ima starts with ima-ng as the template and sha256 as the hash
algorithm. However, during the processing of "ima_hash=",
"ima_template=" has not been processed yet, and hash_setup would check
the configured hash algorithm against the compiled default: ima, and
reject sha256. So at the end, the hash algorithm that is actually used
will be sha1.
With template "ima" removed from the configured default, we ensure that
the default tempalte would at least be "ima-ng" which allows for
basically any hash algorithm.
This change would not break the algorithm compatibility checks for IMA.
Fixes: 4286587dccd43 ("ima: add Kconfig default measurement list template")
Signed-off-by: GUO Zihua <guozihua@huawei.com>
Cc: <Stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
|
|
The pointer 'file' is being initialized with a value that is never read,
it is being re-assigned the same value later on closer to where it is
being first used. The initialization is redundant and can be removed.
Cleans up clang scan build warning:
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c:434:15: warning: Value stored to 'file'
during its initialization is never read [deadcode.DeadStores]
Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.i.king@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
|
|
Pull networking updates from Jakub Kicinski:
"The sprinkling of SPI drivers is because we added a new one and Mark
sent us a SPI driver interface conversion pull request.
Core
----
- Introduce XDP multi-buffer support, allowing the use of XDP with
jumbo frame MTUs and combination with Rx coalescing offloads (LRO).
- Speed up netns dismantling (5x) and lower the memory cost a little.
Remove unnecessary per-netns sockets. Scope some lists to a netns.
Cut down RCU syncing. Use batch methods. Allow netdev registration
to complete out of order.
- Support distinguishing timestamp types (ingress vs egress) and
maintaining them across packet scrubbing points (e.g. redirect).
- Continue the work of annotating packet drop reasons throughout the
stack.
- Switch netdev error counters from an atomic to dynamically
allocated per-CPU counters.
- Rework a few preempt_disable(), local_irq_save() and busy waiting
sections problematic on PREEMPT_RT.
- Extend the ref_tracker to allow catching use-after-free bugs.
BPF
---
- Introduce "packing allocator" for BPF JIT images. JITed code is
marked read only, and used to be allocated at page granularity.
Custom allocator allows for more efficient memory use, lower iTLB
pressure and prevents identity mapping huge pages from getting
split.
- Make use of BTF type annotations (e.g. __user, __percpu) to enforce
the correct probe read access method, add appropriate helpers.
- Convert the BPF preload to use light skeleton and drop the
user-mode-driver dependency.
- Allow XDP BPF_PROG_RUN test infra to send real packets, enabling
its use as a packet generator.
- Allow local storage memory to be allocated with GFP_KERNEL if
called from a hook allowed to sleep.
- Introduce fprobe (multi kprobe) to speed up mass attachment (arch
bits to come later).
- Add unstable conntrack lookup helpers for BPF by using the BPF
kfunc infra.
- Allow cgroup BPF progs to return custom errors to user space.
- Add support for AF_UNIX iterator batching.
- Allow iterator programs to use sleepable helpers.
- Support JIT of add, and, or, xor and xchg atomic ops on arm64.
- Add BTFGen support to bpftool which allows to use CO-RE in kernels
without BTF info.
- Large number of libbpf API improvements, cleanups and deprecations.
Protocols
---------
- Micro-optimize UDPv6 Tx, gaining up to 5% in test on dummy netdev.
- Adjust TSO packet sizes based on min_rtt, allowing very low latency
links (data centers) to always send full-sized TSO super-frames.
- Make IPv6 flow label changes (AKA hash rethink) more configurable,
via sysctl and setsockopt. Distinguish between server and client
behavior.
- VxLAN support to "collect metadata" devices to terminate only
configured VNIs. This is similar to VLAN filtering in the bridge.
- Support inserting IPv6 IOAM information to a fraction of frames.
- Add protocol attribute to IP addresses to allow identifying where
given address comes from (kernel-generated, DHCP etc.)
- Support setting socket and IPv6 options via cmsg on ping6 sockets.
- Reject mis-use of ECN bits in IP headers as part of DSCP/TOS.
Define dscp_t and stop taking ECN bits into account in fib-rules.
- Add support for locked bridge ports (for 802.1X).
- tun: support NAPI for packets received from batched XDP buffs,
doubling the performance in some scenarios.
- IPv6 extension header handling in Open vSwitch.
- Support IPv6 control message load balancing in bonding, prevent
neighbor solicitation and advertisement from using the wrong port.
Support NS/NA monitor selection similar to existing ARP monitor.
- SMC
- improve performance with TCP_CORK and sendfile()
- support auto-corking
- support TCP_NODELAY
- MCTP (Management Component Transport Protocol)
- add user space tag control interface
- I2C binding driver (as specified by DMTF DSP0237)
- Multi-BSSID beacon handling in AP mode for WiFi.
- Bluetooth:
- handle MSFT Monitor Device Event
- add MGMT Adv Monitor Device Found/Lost events
- Multi-Path TCP:
- add support for the SO_SNDTIMEO socket option
- lots of selftest cleanups and improvements
- Increase the max PDU size in CAN ISOTP to 64 kB.
Driver API
----------
- Add HW counters for SW netdevs, a mechanism for devices which
offload packet forwarding to report packet statistics back to
software interfaces such as tunnels.
- Select the default NIC queue count as a fraction of number of
physical CPU cores, instead of hard-coding to 8.
- Expose devlink instance locks to drivers. Allow device layer of
drivers to use that lock directly instead of creating their own
which always runs into ordering issues in devlink callbacks.
- Add header/data split indication to guide user space enabling of
TCP zero-copy Rx.
- Allow configuring completion queue event size.
- Refactor page_pool to enable fragmenting after allocation.
- Add allocation and page reuse statistics to page_pool.
- Improve Multiple Spanning Trees support in the bridge to allow
reuse of topologies across VLANs, saving HW resources in switches.
- DSA (Distributed Switch Architecture):
- replay and offload of host VLAN entries
- offload of static and local FDB entries on LAG interfaces
- FDB isolation and unicast filtering
New hardware / drivers
----------------------
- Ethernet:
- LAN937x T1 PHYs
- Davicom DM9051 SPI NIC driver
- Realtek RTL8367S, RTL8367RB-VB switch and MDIO
- Microchip ksz8563 switches
- Netronome NFP3800 SmartNICs
- Fungible SmartNICs
- MediaTek MT8195 switches
- WiFi:
- mt76: MediaTek mt7916
- mt76: MediaTek mt7921u USB adapters
- brcmfmac: Broadcom BCM43454/6
- Mobile:
- iosm: Intel M.2 7360 WWAN card
Drivers
-------
- Convert many drivers to the new phylink API built for split PCS
designs but also simplifying other cases.
- Intel Ethernet NICs:
- add TTY for GNSS module for E810T device
- improve AF_XDP performance
- GTP-C and GTP-U filter offload
- QinQ VLAN support
- Mellanox Ethernet NICs (mlx5):
- support xdp->data_meta
- multi-buffer XDP
- offload tc push_eth and pop_eth actions
- Netronome Ethernet NICs (nfp):
- flow-independent tc action hardware offload (police / meter)
- AF_XDP
- Other Ethernet NICs:
- at803x: fiber and SFP support
- xgmac: mdio: preamble suppression and custom MDC frequencies
- r8169: enable ASPM L1.2 if system vendor flags it as safe
- macb/gem: ZynqMP SGMII
- hns3: add TX push mode
- dpaa2-eth: software TSO
- lan743x: multi-queue, mdio, SGMII, PTP
- axienet: NAPI and GRO support
- Mellanox Ethernet switches (mlxsw):
- source and dest IP address rewrites
- RJ45 ports
- Marvell Ethernet switches (prestera):
- basic routing offload
- multi-chain TC ACL offload
- NXP embedded Ethernet switches (ocelot & felix):
- PTP over UDP with the ocelot-8021q DSA tagging protocol
- basic QoS classification on Felix DSA switch using dcbnl
- port mirroring for ocelot switches
- Microchip high-speed industrial Ethernet (sparx5):
- offloading of bridge port flooding flags
- PTP Hardware Clock
- Other embedded switches:
- lan966x: PTP Hardward Clock
- qca8k: mdio read/write operations via crafted Ethernet packets
- Qualcomm 802.11ax WiFi (ath11k):
- add LDPC FEC type and 802.11ax High Efficiency data in radiotap
- enable RX PPDU stats in monitor co-exist mode
- Intel WiFi (iwlwifi):
- UHB TAS enablement via BIOS
- band disablement via BIOS
- channel switch offload
- 32 Rx AMPDU sessions in newer devices
- MediaTek WiFi (mt76):
- background radar detection
- thermal management improvements on mt7915
- SAR support for more mt76 platforms
- MBSSID and 6 GHz band on mt7915
- RealTek WiFi:
- rtw89: AP mode
- rtw89: 160 MHz channels and 6 GHz band
- rtw89: hardware scan
- Bluetooth:
- mt7921s: wake on Bluetooth, SCO over I2S, wide-band-speed (WBS)
- Microchip CAN (mcp251xfd):
- multiple RX-FIFOs and runtime configurable RX/TX rings
- internal PLL, runtime PM handling simplification
- improve chip detection and error handling after wakeup"
* tag 'net-next-5.18' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/net-next: (2521 commits)
llc: fix netdevice reference leaks in llc_ui_bind()
drivers: ethernet: cpsw: fix panic when interrupt coaleceing is set via ethtool
ice: don't allow to run ice_send_event_to_aux() in atomic ctx
ice: fix 'scheduling while atomic' on aux critical err interrupt
net/sched: fix incorrect vlan_push_eth dest field
net: bridge: mst: Restrict info size queries to bridge ports
net: marvell: prestera: add missing destroy_workqueue() in prestera_module_init()
drivers: net: xgene: Fix regression in CRC stripping
net: geneve: add missing netlink policy and size for IFLA_GENEVE_INNER_PROTO_INHERIT
net: dsa: fix missing host-filtered multicast addresses
net/mlx5e: Fix build warning, detected write beyond size of field
iwlwifi: mvm: Don't fail if PPAG isn't supported
selftests/bpf: Fix kprobe_multi test.
Revert "rethook: x86: Add rethook x86 implementation"
Revert "arm64: rethook: Add arm64 rethook implementation"
Revert "powerpc: Add rethook support"
Revert "ARM: rethook: Add rethook arm implementation"
netdevice: add missing dm_private kdoc
net: bridge: mst: prevent NULL deref in br_mst_info_size()
selftests: forwarding: Use same VRF for port and VLAN upper
...
|
|
Pull integrity subsystem updates from Mimi Zohar:
"Except for extending the 'encrypted' key type to support user provided
data, the rest is code cleanup, __setup() usage bug fix, and a trivial
change"
* tag 'integrity-v5.18' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity:
MAINTAINERS: add missing security/integrity/platform_certs
EVM: fix the evm= __setup handler return value
KEYS: encrypted: Instantiate key with user-provided decrypted data
ima: define ima_max_digest_data struct without a flexible array variable
ima: rename IMA_ACTION_FLAGS to IMA_NONACTION_FLAGS
ima: Return error code obtained from securityfs functions
MAINTAINERS: add missing "security/integrity" directory
ima: Fix trivial typos in the comments
|
|
Pull block updates from Jens Axboe:
- BFQ cleanups and fixes (Yu, Zhang, Yahu, Paolo)
- blk-rq-qos completion fix (Tejun)
- blk-cgroup merge fix (Tejun)
- Add offline error return value to distinguish it from an IO error on
the device (Song)
- IO stats fixes (Zhang, Christoph)
- blkcg refcount fixes (Ming, Yu)
- Fix for indefinite dispatch loop softlockup (Shin'ichiro)
- blk-mq hardware queue management improvements (Ming)
- sbitmap dead code removal (Ming, John)
- Plugging merge improvements (me)
- Show blk-crypto capabilities in sysfs (Eric)
- Multiple delayed queue run improvement (David)
- Block throttling fixes (Ming)
- Start deprecating auto module loading based on dev_t (Christoph)
- bio allocation improvements (Christoph, Chaitanya)
- Get rid of bio_devname (Christoph)
- bio clone improvements (Christoph)
- Block plugging improvements (Christoph)
- Get rid of genhd.h header (Christoph)
- Ensure drivers use appropriate flush helpers (Christoph)
- Refcounting improvements (Christoph)
- Queue initialization and teardown improvements (Ming, Christoph)
- Misc fixes/improvements (Barry, Chaitanya, Colin, Dan, Jiapeng,
Lukas, Nian, Yang, Eric, Chengming)
* tag 'for-5.18/block-2022-03-18' of git://git.kernel.dk/linux-block: (127 commits)
block: cancel all throttled bios in del_gendisk()
block: let blkcg_gq grab request queue's refcnt
block: avoid use-after-free on throttle data
block: limit request dispatch loop duration
block/bfq-iosched: Fix spelling mistake "tenative" -> "tentative"
sr: simplify the local variable initialization in sr_block_open()
block: don't merge across cgroup boundaries if blkcg is enabled
block: fix rq-qos breakage from skipping rq_qos_done_bio()
block: flush plug based on hardware and software queue order
block: ensure plug merging checks the correct queue at least once
block: move rq_qos_exit() into disk_release()
block: do more work in elevator_exit
block: move blk_exit_queue into disk_release
block: move q_usage_counter release into blk_queue_release
block: don't remove hctx debugfs dir from blk_mq_exit_queue
block: move blkcg initialization/destroy into disk allocation/release handler
sr: implement ->free_disk to simplify refcounting
sd: implement ->free_disk to simplify refcounting
sd: delay calling free_opal_dev
sd: call sd_zbc_release_disk before releasing the scsi_device reference
...
|
|
__ima_inode_hash() checks if a digest has been already calculated by
looking for the integrity_iint_cache structure associated to the passed
inode.
Users of ima_file_hash() (e.g. eBPF) might be interested in obtaining the
information without having to setup an IMA policy so that the digest is
always available at the time they call this function.
In addition, they likely expect the digest to be fresh, e.g. recalculated
by IMA after a file write. Although getting the digest from the
bprm_committed_creds hook (as in the eBPF test) ensures that the digest is
fresh, as the IMA hook is executed before that hook, this is not always the
case (e.g. for the mmap_file hook).
Call ima_collect_measurement() in __ima_inode_hash(), if the file
descriptor is available (passed by ima_file_hash()) and the digest is not
available/not fresh, and store the file measurement in a temporary
integrity_iint_cache structure.
This change does not cause memory usage increase, due to using the
temporary integrity_iint_cache structure, and due to freeing the
ima_digest_data structure inside integrity_iint_cache before exiting from
__ima_inode_hash().
For compatibility reasons, the behavior of ima_inode_hash() remains
unchanged.
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20220302111404.193900-3-roberto.sassu@huawei.com
|
|
Fix the following warnings in ima_main.c, displayed with W=n make argument:
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c:432: warning: Function parameter or
member 'vma' not described in 'ima_file_mprotect'
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c:636: warning: Function parameter or
member 'inode' not described in 'ima_post_create_tmpfile'
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c:636: warning: Excess function parameter
'file' description in 'ima_post_create_tmpfile'
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c:843: warning: Function parameter or
member 'load_id' not described in 'ima_post_load_data'
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c:843: warning: Excess function parameter
'id' description in 'ima_post_load_data'
Also, fix some style issues in the description of ima_post_create_tmpfile()
and ima_post_path_mknod().
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Shuah Khan <skhan@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20220302111404.193900-2-roberto.sassu@huawei.com
|
|
With the introduction of uefi_check_trust_mok_keys, it signifies the end-
user wants to trust the machine keyring as trusted keys. If they have
chosen to trust the machine keyring, load the qualifying keys into it
during boot, then link it to the secondary keyring . If the user has not
chosen to trust the machine keyring, it will be empty and not linked to
the secondary keyring.
Signed-off-by: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
|
|
A new Machine Owner Key (MOK) variable called MokListTrustedRT has been
introduced in shim. When this UEFI variable is set, it indicates the
end-user has made the decision themselves that they wish to trust MOK keys
within the Linux trust boundary. It is not an error if this variable
does not exist. If it does not exist, the MOK keys should not be trusted
within the kernel.
Signed-off-by: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
|
|
Expose the .machine keyring created in integrity code by adding
a reference. Store a reference to the machine keyring in
system keyring code. The system keyring code needs this to complete
the keyring link to the machine keyring.
Signed-off-by: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
|
|
Currently both Secure Boot DB and Machine Owner Keys (MOK) go through
the same keyring handler (get_handler_for_db). With the addition of the
new machine keyring, the end-user may choose to trust MOK keys.
Introduce a new keyring handler specific for MOK keys. If MOK keys are
trusted by the end-user, use the new keyring handler instead.
Signed-off-by: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
|
|
Many UEFI Linux distributions boot using shim. The UEFI shim provides
what is called Machine Owner Keys (MOK). Shim uses both the UEFI Secure
Boot DB and MOK keys to validate the next step in the boot chain. The
MOK facility can be used to import user generated keys. These keys can
be used to sign an end-users development kernel build. When Linux
boots, both UEFI Secure Boot DB and MOK keys get loaded in the Linux
.platform keyring.
Define a new Linux keyring called machine. This keyring shall contain just
MOK keys and not the remaining keys in the platform keyring. This new
machine keyring will be used in follow on patches. Unlike keys in the
platform keyring, keys contained in the machine keyring will be trusted
within the kernel if the end-user has chosen to do so.
Signed-off-by: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com>
Tested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
|
|
make W=1 generates the following warning in keyring_handler.c
security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.c:71:30: warning: no previous prototype for get_handler_for_db [-Wmissing-prototypes]
__init efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_db(const efi_guid_t *sig_type)
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.c:82:30: warning: no previous prototype for get_handler_for_dbx [-Wmissing-prototypes]
__init efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_dbx(const efi_guid_t *sig_type)
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Add the missing prototypes by including keyring_handler.h.
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
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__setup() handlers should return 1 if the parameter is handled.
Returning 0 causes the entire string to be added to init's
environment strings (limited to 32 strings), unnecessarily polluting it.
Using the documented string "evm=fix" causes an Unknown parameter message:
Unknown kernel command line parameters
"BOOT_IMAGE=/boot/bzImage-517rc5 evm=fix", will be passed to user space.
and that string is added to init's environment string space:
Run /sbin/init as init process
with arguments:
/sbin/init
with environment:
HOME=/
TERM=linux
BOOT_IMAGE=/boot/bzImage-517rc5
evm=fix
With this change, using "evm=fix" acts as expected and an invalid
option ("evm=evm") causes a warning to be printed:
evm: invalid "evm" mode
but init's environment is not polluted with this string, as expected.
Fixes: 7102ebcd65c1 ("evm: permit only valid security.evm xattrs to be updated")
Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Reported-by: Igor Zhbanov <i.zhbanov@omprussia.ru>
Link: lore.kernel.org/r/64644a2f-4a20-bab3-1e15-3b2cdd0defe3@omprussia.ru
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
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To support larger hash digests in the 'iint' cache, instead of defining
the 'digest' field as the maximum digest size, the 'digest' field was
defined as a flexible array variable. The "ima_digest_data" struct was
wrapped inside a local structure with the maximum digest size. But
before adding the record to the iint cache, memory for the exact digest
size was dynamically allocated.
The original reason for defining the 'digest' field as a flexible array
variable is still valid for the 'iint' cache use case. Instead of
wrapping the 'ima_digest_data' struct in a local structure define
'ima_max_digest_data' struct.
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
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Simple policy rule options, such as fowner, uid, or euid, can be checked
immediately, while other policy rule options, such as requiring a file
signature, need to be deferred.
The 'flags' field in the integrity_iint_cache struct contains the policy
action', 'subaction', and non action/subaction.
action: measure/measured, appraise/appraised, (collect)/collected,
audit/audited
subaction: appraise status for each hook (e.g. file, mmap, bprm, read,
creds)
non action/subaction: deferred policy rule options and state
Rename the IMA_ACTION_FLAGS to IMA_NONACTION_FLAGS.
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
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If an error occurs when creating a securityfs file, return the exact
error code to the caller.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
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There are a few minor typos in the comments. Fix these.
Signed-off-by: Austin Kim <austindh.kim@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
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Before printing a policy rule scan for inactive LSM labels in the policy
rule. Inactive LSM labels are identified by args_p != NULL and
rule == NULL.
Fixes: 483ec26eed42 ("ima: ima/lsm policy rule loading logic bug fixes")
Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v5.6+
Acked-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
[zohar@linux.ibm.com: Updated "Fixes" tag]
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
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Commit c2426d2ad5027 ("ima: added support for new kernel cmdline parameter
ima_template_fmt") introduced an additional check on the ima_template
variable to avoid multiple template selection.
Unfortunately, ima_template could be also set by the setup function of the
ima_hash= parameter, when it calls ima_template_desc_current(). This causes
attempts to choose a new template with ima_template= or with
ima_template_fmt=, after ima_hash=, to be ignored.
Achieve the goal of the commit mentioned with the new static variable
template_setup_done, so that template selection requests after ima_hash=
are not ignored.
Finally, call ima_init_template_list(), if not already done, to initialize
the list of templates before lookup_template_desc() is called.
Reported-by: Guo Zihua <guozihua@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: c2426d2ad5027 ("ima: added support for new kernel cmdline parameter ima_template_fmt")
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
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The removal of ima_dir currently fails since ima_policy still exists, so
remove the ima_policy file before removing the directory.
Fixes: 4af4662fa4a9 ("integrity: IMA policy")
Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Acked-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
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Linus Torvalds
Orlando Chamberlain
Christian Brauner
Mimi Zohar
Eric Snowberg
Xiu Jianfeng
Jianglei Nie
Coiby Xu
Huaxin Lu
Jonathan McDowell
Mickaël Salaün
Stefan Berger
Aditya Garg
GUO Zihua
Colin Ian King
Roberto Sassu
Randy Dunlap
Austin Kim