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2020-02-10Merge tag 'selinux-pr-20200210' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinuxLinus Torvalds2-10/+4
Pull SELinux fixes from Paul Moore: "Two small fixes: one fixes a locking problem in the recently merged label translation code, the other fixes an embarrassing 'binderfs' / 'binder' filesystem name check" * tag 'selinux-pr-20200210' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux: selinux: fix sidtab string cache locking selinux: fix typo in filesystem name
2020-02-08Merge branch 'merge.nfs-fs_parse.1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfsLinus Torvalds1-8/+3
Pull vfs file system parameter updates from Al Viro: "Saner fs_parser.c guts and data structures. The system-wide registry of syntax types (string/enum/int32/oct32/.../etc.) is gone and so is the horror switch() in fs_parse() that would have to grow another case every time something got added to that system-wide registry. New syntax types can be added by filesystems easily now, and their namespace is that of functions - not of system-wide enum members. IOW, they can be shared or kept private and if some turn out to be widely useful, we can make them common library helpers, etc., without having to do anything whatsoever to fs_parse() itself. And we already get that kind of requests - the thing that finally pushed me into doing that was "oh, and let's add one for timeouts - things like 15s or 2h". If some filesystem really wants that, let them do it. Without somebody having to play gatekeeper for the variants blessed by direct support in fs_parse(), TYVM. Quite a bit of boilerplate is gone. And IMO the data structures make a lot more sense now. -200LoC, while we are at it" * 'merge.nfs-fs_parse.1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: (25 commits) tmpfs: switch to use of invalfc() cgroup1: switch to use of errorfc() et.al. procfs: switch to use of invalfc() hugetlbfs: switch to use of invalfc() cramfs: switch to use of errofc() et.al. gfs2: switch to use of errorfc() et.al. fuse: switch to use errorfc() et.al. ceph: use errorfc() and friends instead of spelling the prefix out prefix-handling analogues of errorf() and friends turn fs_param_is_... into functions fs_parse: handle optional arguments sanely fs_parse: fold fs_parameter_desc/fs_parameter_spec fs_parser: remove fs_parameter_description name field add prefix to fs_context->log ceph_parse_param(), ceph_parse_mon_ips(): switch to passing fc_log new primitive: __fs_parse() switch rbd and libceph to p_log-based primitives struct p_log, variants of warnf() et.al. taking that one instead teach logfc() to handle prefices, give it saner calling conventions get rid of cg_invalf() ...
2020-02-07fs_parse: fold fs_parameter_desc/fs_parameter_specAl Viro1-7/+3
The former contains nothing but a pointer to an array of the latter... Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2020-02-07fs_parser: remove fs_parameter_description name fieldEric Sandeen1-2/+1
Unused now. Signed-off-by: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com> Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2020-02-05selinux: fix sidtab string cache lockingOndrej Mosnacek1-9/+3
Avoiding taking a lock in an IRQ context is not enough to prevent deadlocks, as discovered by syzbot: === WARNING: SOFTIRQ-safe -> SOFTIRQ-unsafe lock order detected 5.5.0-syzkaller #0 Not tainted ----------------------------------------------------- syz-executor.0/8927 [HC0[0]:SC0[2]:HE1:SE0] is trying to acquire: ffff888027c94098 (&(&s->cache_lock)->rlock){+.+.}, at: spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:338 [inline] ffff888027c94098 (&(&s->cache_lock)->rlock){+.+.}, at: sidtab_sid2str_put.part.0+0x36/0x880 security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c:533 and this task is already holding: ffffffff898639b0 (&(&nf_conntrack_locks[i])->rlock){+.-.}, at: spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:338 [inline] ffffffff898639b0 (&(&nf_conntrack_locks[i])->rlock){+.-.}, at: nf_conntrack_lock+0x17/0x70 net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c:91 which would create a new lock dependency: (&(&nf_conntrack_locks[i])->rlock){+.-.} -> (&(&s->cache_lock)->rlock){+.+.} but this new dependency connects a SOFTIRQ-irq-safe lock: (&(&nf_conntrack_locks[i])->rlock){+.-.} [...] other info that might help us debug this: Possible interrupt unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(&(&s->cache_lock)->rlock); local_irq_disable(); lock(&(&nf_conntrack_locks[i])->rlock); lock(&(&s->cache_lock)->rlock); <Interrupt> lock(&(&nf_conntrack_locks[i])->rlock); *** DEADLOCK *** [...] === Fix this by simply locking with irqsave/irqrestore and stop giving up on !in_task(). It makes the locking a bit slower, but it shouldn't make a big difference in real workloads. Under the scenario from [1] (only cache hits) it only increased the runtime overhead from the security_secid_to_secctx() function from ~2% to ~3% (it was ~5-65% before introducing the cache). [1] https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1733259 Fixes: d97bd23c2d7d ("selinux: cache the SID -> context string translation") Reported-by: syzbot+61cba5033e2072d61806@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2020-02-05selinux: fix typo in filesystem nameHridya Valsaraju1-1/+1
Correct the filesystem name to "binder" to enable genfscon per-file labelling for binderfs. Fixes: 7a4b5194747 ("selinux: allow per-file labelling for binderfs") Signed-off-by: Hridya Valsaraju <hridya@google.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> [PM: slight style changes to the subj/description] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2020-01-28Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/net-nextLinus Torvalds1-1/+4
Pull networking updates from David Miller: 1) Add WireGuard 2) Add HE and TWT support to ath11k driver, from John Crispin. 3) Add ESP in TCP encapsulation support, from Sabrina Dubroca. 4) Add variable window congestion control to TIPC, from Jon Maloy. 5) Add BCM84881 PHY driver, from Russell King. 6) Start adding netlink support for ethtool operations, from Michal Kubecek. 7) Add XDP drop and TX action support to ena driver, from Sameeh Jubran. 8) Add new ipv4 route notifications so that mlxsw driver does not have to handle identical routes itself. From Ido Schimmel. 9) Add BPF dynamic program extensions, from Alexei Starovoitov. 10) Support RX and TX timestamping in igc, from Vinicius Costa Gomes. 11) Add support for macsec HW offloading, from Antoine Tenart. 12) Add initial support for MPTCP protocol, from Christoph Paasch, Matthieu Baerts, Florian Westphal, Peter Krystad, and many others. 13) Add Octeontx2 PF support, from Sunil Goutham, Geetha sowjanya, Linu Cherian, and others. * git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/net-next: (1469 commits) net: phy: add default ARCH_BCM_IPROC for MDIO_BCM_IPROC udp: segment looped gso packets correctly netem: change mailing list qed: FW debug features qed: rt init valid initialization changed qed: Debug feature: ilt and mdump qed: FW Add fw overlay feature qed: FW HSI changes qed: FW iscsi/fcoe changes qed: Add abstraction for different hsi values per chip qed: FW Additional ll2 type qed: Use dmae to write to widebus registers in fw_funcs qed: FW Parser offsets modified qed: FW Queue Manager changes qed: FW Expose new registers and change windows qed: FW Internal ram offsets modifications MAINTAINERS: Add entry for Marvell OcteonTX2 Physical Function driver Documentation: net: octeontx2: Add RVU HW and drivers overview octeontx2-pf: ethtool RSS config support octeontx2-pf: Add basic ethtool support ...
2020-01-20selinux: fix regression introduced by move_mount(2) syscallStephen Smalley1-0/+10
commit 2db154b3ea8e ("vfs: syscall: Add move_mount(2) to move mounts around") introduced a new move_mount(2) system call and a corresponding new LSM security_move_mount hook but did not implement this hook for any existing LSM. This creates a regression for SELinux with respect to consistent checking of mounts; the existing selinux_mount hook checks mounton permission to the mount point path. Provide a SELinux hook implementation for move_mount that applies this same check for consistency. In the future we may wish to add a new move_mount filesystem permission and check as well, but this addresses the immediate regression. Fixes: 2db154b3ea8e ("vfs: syscall: Add move_mount(2) to move mounts around") Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Reviewed-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2020-01-16selinux: do not allocate ancillary buffer on first loadOndrej Mosnacek1-15/+13
In security_load_policy(), we can defer allocating the newpolicydb ancillary array to after checking state->initialized, thereby avoiding the pointless allocation when loading policy the first time. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> [PM: merged portions by hand] Reviewed-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2020-01-16selinux: remove redundant allocation and helper functionsPaul Moore1-58/+36
This patch removes the inode, file, and superblock security blob allocation functions and moves the associated code into the respective LSM hooks. This patch also removes the inode_doinit() function as it was a trivial wrapper around inode_doinit_with_dentry() and called from one location in the code. Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2020-01-16selinux: remove redundant selinux_nlmsg_permHuaisheng Ye1-39/+34
selinux_nlmsg_perm is used for only by selinux_netlink_send. Remove the redundant function to simplify the code. Fix a typo by suggestion from Stephen. Signed-off-by: Huaisheng Ye <yehs1@lenovo.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2020-01-16selinux: fix wrong buffer types in policydb.cOndrej Mosnacek1-2/+2
Two places used u32 where there should have been __le32. Fixes sparse warnings: CHECK [...]/security/selinux/ss/services.c [...]/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c:2669:16: warning: incorrect type in assignment (different base types) [...]/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c:2669:16: expected unsigned int [...]/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c:2669:16: got restricted __le32 [usertype] [...]/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c:2674:24: warning: incorrect type in assignment (different base types) [...]/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c:2674:24: expected unsigned int [...]/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c:2674:24: got restricted __le32 [usertype] [...]/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c:2675:24: warning: incorrect type in assignment (different base types) [...]/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c:2675:24: expected unsigned int [...]/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c:2675:24: got restricted __le32 [usertype] [...]/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c:2676:24: warning: incorrect type in assignment (different base types) [...]/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c:2676:24: expected unsigned int [...]/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c:2676:24: got restricted __le32 [usertype] [...]/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c:2681:32: warning: incorrect type in assignment (different base types) [...]/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c:2681:32: expected unsigned int [...]/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c:2681:32: got restricted __le32 [usertype] [...]/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c:2701:16: warning: incorrect type in assignment (different base types) [...]/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c:2701:16: expected unsigned int [...]/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c:2701:16: got restricted __le32 [usertype] [...]/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c:2706:24: warning: incorrect type in assignment (different base types) [...]/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c:2706:24: expected unsigned int [...]/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c:2706:24: got restricted __le32 [usertype] [...]/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c:2707:24: warning: incorrect type in assignment (different base types) [...]/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c:2707:24: expected unsigned int [...]/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c:2707:24: got restricted __le32 [usertype] Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2020-01-15net: bridge: vlan: add rtm definitions and dump supportNikolay Aleksandrov1-1/+4
This patch adds vlan rtm definitions: - NEWVLAN: to be used for creating vlans, setting options and notifications - DELVLAN: to be used for deleting vlans - GETVLAN: used for dumping vlan information Dumping vlans which can span multiple messages is added now with basic information (vid and flags). We use nlmsg_parse() to validate the header length in order to be able to extend the message with filtering attributes later. Signed-off-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <nikolay@cumulusnetworks.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2020-01-10selinux: reorder hooks to make runtime disable less brokenOndrej Mosnacek1-31/+70
Commit b1d9e6b0646d ("LSM: Switch to lists of hooks") switched the LSM infrastructure to use per-hook lists, which meant that removing the hooks for a given module was no longer atomic. Even though the commit clearly documents that modules implementing runtime revmoval of hooks (only SELinux attempts this madness) need to take special precautions to avoid race conditions, SELinux has never addressed this. By inserting an artificial delay between the loop iterations of security_delete_hooks() (I used 100 ms), booting to a state where SELinux is enabled, but policy is not yet loaded, and running these commands: while true; do ping -c 1 <some IP>; done & echo -n 1 >/sys/fs/selinux/disable kill %1 wait ...I was able to trigger NULL pointer dereferences in various places. I also have a report of someone getting panics on a stock RHEL-8 kernel after setting SELINUX=disabled in /etc/selinux/config and rebooting (without adding "selinux=0" to kernel command-line). Reordering the SELinux hooks such that those that allocate structures are removed last seems to prevent these panics. It is very much possible that this doesn't make the runtime disable completely race-free, but at least it makes the operation much less fragile. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: b1d9e6b0646d ("LSM: Switch to lists of hooks") Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2020-01-10selinux: treat atomic flags more carefullyOndrej Mosnacek3-31/+61
The disabled/enforcing/initialized flags are all accessed concurrently by threads so use the appropriate accessors that ensure atomicity and document that it is expected. Use smp_load/acquire...() helpers (with memory barriers) for the initialized flag, since it gates access to the rest of the state structures. Note that the disabled flag is currently not used for anything other than avoiding double disable, but it will be used for bailing out of hooks once security_delete_hooks() is removed. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2020-01-10selinux: make default_noexec read-only after initStephen Smalley1-1/+1
SELinux checks whether VM_EXEC is set in the VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS during initialization and saves the result in default_noexec for use in its mmap and mprotect hook function implementations to decide whether to apply EXECMEM, EXECHEAP, EXECSTACK, and EXECMOD checks. Mark default_noexec as ro_after_init to prevent later clearing it and thereby disabling these checks. It is only set legitimately from init code. Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2020-01-10selinux: move ibpkeys code under CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND.Ravi Kumar Siddojigari2-2/+15
Move cache based pkey sid retrieval code which was added with commit "409dcf31" under CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND. As its going to alloc a new cache which impacts low RAM devices which was enabled by default. Suggested-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: Ravi Kumar Siddojigari <rsiddoji@codeaurora.org> [PM: checkpatch.pl cleanups, fixed capitalization in the description] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2020-01-10selinux: remove redundant msg_msg_alloc_securityHuaisheng Ye1-11/+6
selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security only calls msg_msg_alloc_security but do nothing else. And also msg_msg_alloc_security is just used by the former. Remove the redundant function to simplify the code. Signed-off-by: Huaisheng Ye <yehs1@lenovo.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2020-01-07Documentation,selinux: fix references to old selinuxfs mount pointStephen Smalley1-3/+4
selinuxfs was originally mounted on /selinux, and various docs and kconfig help texts referred to nodes under it. In Linux 3.0, /sys/fs/selinux was introduced as the preferred mount point for selinuxfs. Fix all the old references to /selinux/ to /sys/fs/selinux/. While we are there, update the description of the selinux boot parameter to reflect the fact that the default value is always 1 since commit be6ec88f41ba94 ("selinux: Remove SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM_VALUE") and drop discussion of runtime disable since it is deprecated. Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2020-01-07selinux: deprecate disabling SELinux and runtimePaul Moore2-0/+10
Deprecate the CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE functionality. The code was originally developed to make it easier for Linux distributions to support architectures where adding parameters to the kernel command line was difficult. Unfortunately, supporting runtime disable meant we had to make some security trade-offs when it came to the LSM hooks, as documented in the Kconfig help text: NOTE: selecting this option will disable the '__ro_after_init' kernel hardening feature for security hooks. Please consider using the selinux=0 boot parameter instead of enabling this option. Fortunately it looks as if that the original motivation for the runtime disable functionality is gone, and Fedora/RHEL appears to be the only major distribution enabling this capability at build time so we are now taking steps to remove it entirely from the kernel. The first step is to mark the functionality as deprecated and print an error when it is used (what this patch is doing). As Fedora/RHEL makes progress in transitioning the distribution away from runtime disable, we will introduce follow-up patches over several kernel releases which will block for increasing periods of time when the runtime disable is used. Finally we will remove the option entirely once we believe all users have moved to the kernel cmdline approach. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Acked-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2020-01-06selinux: allow per-file labelling for binderfsHridya Valsaraju1-0/+1
This patch allows genfscon per-file labeling for binderfs. This is required to have separate permissions to allow access to binder, hwbinder and vndbinder devices which are relocating to binderfs. Acked-by: Jeff Vander Stoep <jeffv@google.com> Acked-by: Mark Salyzyn <salyzyn@android.com> Signed-off-by: Hridya Valsaraju <hridya@google.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2020-01-06selinuxfs: use scnprintf to get real length for inodeliuyang341-2/+2
The return value of snprintf maybe over the size of TMPBUFLEN, use scnprintf instead in sel_read_class and sel_read_perm. Signed-off-by: liuyang34 <liuyang34@xiaomi.com> [PM: cleaned up the description] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2019-12-24selinux: remove set but not used variable 'sidtab'YueHaibing1-8/+0
security/selinux/ss/services.c: In function security_port_sid: security/selinux/ss/services.c:2346:17: warning: variable sidtab set but not used [-Wunused-but-set-variable] security/selinux/ss/services.c: In function security_ib_endport_sid: security/selinux/ss/services.c:2435:17: warning: variable sidtab set but not used [-Wunused-but-set-variable] security/selinux/ss/services.c: In function security_netif_sid: security/selinux/ss/services.c:2480:17: warning: variable sidtab set but not used [-Wunused-but-set-variable] security/selinux/ss/services.c: In function security_fs_use: security/selinux/ss/services.c:2831:17: warning: variable sidtab set but not used [-Wunused-but-set-variable] Since commit 66f8e2f03c02 ("selinux: sidtab reverse lookup hash table") 'sidtab' is not used any more, so remove it. Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: YueHaibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2019-12-23selinux: ensure the policy has been loaded before reading the sidtab statsPaul Moore1-0/+6
Check to make sure we have loaded a policy before we query the sidtab's hash stats. Failure to do so could result in a kernel panic/oops due to a dereferenced NULL pointer. Fixes: 66f8e2f03c02 ("selinux: sidtab reverse lookup hash table") Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2019-12-21selinux: ensure we cleanup the internal AVC counters on error in avc_update()Jaihind Yadav1-1/+1
In AVC update we don't call avc_node_kill() when avc_xperms_populate() fails, resulting in the avc->avc_cache.active_nodes counter having a false value. In last patch this changes was missed , so correcting it. Fixes: fa1aa143ac4a ("selinux: extended permissions for ioctls") Signed-off-by: Jaihind Yadav <jaihindyadav@codeaurora.org> Signed-off-by: Ravi Kumar Siddojigari <rsiddoji@codeaurora.org> [PM: merge fuzz, minor description cleanup] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2019-12-18selinux: randomize layout of key structuresStephen Smalley4-4/+4
Randomize the layout of key selinux data structures. Initially this is applied to the selinux_state, selinux_ss, policydb, and task_security_struct data structures. NB To test/use this mechanism, one must install the necessary build-time dependencies, e.g. gcc-plugin-devel on Fedora, and enable CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_RANDSTRUCT in the kernel configuration. Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> [PM: double semi-colon fixed] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2019-12-18selinux: clean up selinux_enabled/disabled/enforcing_bootStephen Smalley7-18/+17
Rename selinux_enabled to selinux_enabled_boot to make it clear that it only reflects whether SELinux was enabled at boot. Replace the references to it in the MAC_STATUS audit log in sel_write_enforce() with hardcoded "1" values because this code is only reachable if SELinux is enabled and does not change its value, and update the corresponding MAC_STATUS audit log in sel_write_disable(). Stop clearing selinux_enabled in selinux_disable() since it is not used outside of initialization code that runs before selinux_disable() can be reached. Mark both selinux_enabled_boot and selinux_enforcing_boot as __initdata since they are only used in initialization code. Wrap the disabled field in the struct selinux_state with CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE since it is only used for runtime disable. Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2019-12-12selinux: remove unnecessary selinux cred requestYang Guo1-4/+3
task_security_struct was obtained at the beginning of may_create and selinux_inode_init_security, no need to obtain again. may_create will be called very frequently when create dir and file. Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org> Signed-off-by: Yang Guo <guoyang2@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Shaokun Zhang <zhangshaokun@hisilicon.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2019-12-10selinux: ensure we cleanup the internal AVC counters on error in avc_insert()Paul Moore1-27/+24
Fix avc_insert() to call avc_node_kill() if we've already allocated an AVC node and the code fails to insert the node in the cache. Fixes: fa1aa143ac4a ("selinux: extended permissions for ioctls") Reported-by: rsiddoji@codeaurora.org Suggested-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2019-12-09selinux: clean up selinux_inode_permission MAY_NOT_BLOCK testsStephen Smalley1-4/+4
Through a somewhat convoluted series of changes, we have ended up with multiple unnecessary occurrences of (flags & MAY_NOT_BLOCK) tests in selinux_inode_permission(). Clean it up and simplify. No functional change. Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2019-12-09selinux: fall back to ref-walk if audit is requiredStephen Smalley3-26/+17
commit bda0be7ad994 ("security: make inode_follow_link RCU-walk aware") passed down the rcu flag to the SELinux AVC, but failed to adjust the test in slow_avc_audit() to also return -ECHILD on LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY. Previously, we only returned -ECHILD if generating an audit record with LSM_AUDIT_DATA_INODE since this was only relevant from inode_permission. Move the handling of MAY_NOT_BLOCK to avc_audit() and its inlined equivalent in selinux_inode_permission() immediately after we determine that audit is required, and always fall back to ref-walk in this case. Fixes: bda0be7ad994 ("security: make inode_follow_link RCU-walk aware") Reported-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> Suggested-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2019-12-09selinux: revert "stop passing MAY_NOT_BLOCK to the AVC upon follow_link"Stephen Smalley3-4/+30
This reverts commit e46e01eebbbc ("selinux: stop passing MAY_NOT_BLOCK to the AVC upon follow_link"). The correct fix is to instead fall back to ref-walk if audit is required irrespective of the specific audit data type. This is done in the next commit. Fixes: e46e01eebbbc ("selinux: stop passing MAY_NOT_BLOCK to the AVC upon follow_link") Reported-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2019-12-09security,lockdown,selinux: implement SELinux lockdownStephen Smalley2-0/+32
Implement a SELinux hook for lockdown. If the lockdown module is also enabled, then a denial by the lockdown module will take precedence over SELinux, so SELinux can only further restrict lockdown decisions. The SELinux hook only distinguishes at the granularity of integrity versus confidentiality similar to the lockdown module, but includes the full lockdown reason as part of the audit record as a hint in diagnosing what triggered the denial. To support this auditing, move the lockdown_reasons[] string array from being private to the lockdown module to the security framework so that it can be used by the lsm audit code and so that it is always available even when the lockdown module is disabled. Note that the SELinux implementation allows the integrity and confidentiality reasons to be controlled independently from one another. Thus, in an SELinux policy, one could allow operations that specify an integrity reason while blocking operations that specify a confidentiality reason. The SELinux hook implementation is stricter than the lockdown module in validating the provided reason value. Sample AVC audit output from denials: avc: denied { integrity } for pid=3402 comm="fwupd" lockdown_reason="/dev/mem,kmem,port" scontext=system_u:system_r:fwupd_t:s0 tcontext=system_u:system_r:fwupd_t:s0 tclass=lockdown permissive=0 avc: denied { confidentiality } for pid=4628 comm="cp" lockdown_reason="/proc/kcore access" scontext=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:test_lockdown_integrity_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 tcontext=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:test_lockdown_integrity_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 tclass=lockdown permissive=0 Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Reviewed-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com> [PM: some merge fuzz do the the perf hooks] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2019-12-09selinux: cache the SID -> context string translationOndrej Mosnacek4-94/+288
Translating a context struct to string can be quite slow, especially if the context has a lot of category bits set. This can cause quite noticeable performance impact in situations where the translation needs to be done repeatedly. A common example is a UNIX datagram socket with the SO_PASSSEC option enabled, which is used e.g. by systemd-journald when receiving log messages via datagram socket. This scenario can be reproduced with: cat /dev/urandom | base64 | logger & timeout 30s perf record -p $(pidof systemd-journald) -a -g kill %1 perf report -g none --pretty raw | grep security_secid_to_secctx Before the caching introduced by this patch, computing the context string (security_secid_to_secctx() function) takes up ~65% of systemd-journald's CPU time (assuming a context with 1024 categories set and Fedora x86_64 release kernel configs). After this patch (assuming near-perfect cache hit ratio) this overhead is reduced to just ~2%. This patch addresses the issue by caching a certain number (compile-time configurable) of recently used context strings to speed up repeated translations of the same context, while using only a small amount of memory. The cache is integrated into the existing sidtab table by adding a field to each entry, which when not NULL contains an RCU-protected pointer to a cache entry containing the cached string. The cache entries are kept in a linked list sorted according to how recently they were used. On a cache miss when the cache is full, the least recently used entry is removed to make space for the new entry. The patch migrates security_sid_to_context_core() to use the cache (also a few other functions where it was possible without too much fuss, but these mostly use the translation for logging in case of error, which is rare). Link: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1733259 Cc: Michal Sekletar <msekleta@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Tested-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Reviewed-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org> [PM: lots of merge fixups due to collisions with other sidtab patches] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2019-12-09selinux: sidtab reverse lookup hash tableJeff Vander Stoep9-167/+306
This replaces the reverse table lookup and reverse cache with a hashtable which improves cache-miss reverse-lookup times from O(n) to O(1)* and maintains the same performance as a reverse cache hit. This reduces the time needed to add a new sidtab entry from ~500us to 5us on a Pixel 3 when there are ~10,000 sidtab entries. The implementation uses the kernel's generic hashtable API, It uses the context's string represtation as the hash source, and the kernels generic string hashing algorithm full_name_hash() to reduce the string to a 32 bit value. This change also maintains the improvement introduced in commit ee1a84fdfeed ("selinux: overhaul sidtab to fix bug and improve performance") which removed the need to keep the current sidtab locked during policy reload. It does however introduce periodic locking of the target sidtab while converting the hashtable. Sidtab entries are never modified or removed, so the context struct stored in the sid_to_context tree can also be used for the context_to_sid hashtable to reduce memory usage. This bug was reported by: - On the selinux bug tracker. BUG: kernel softlockup due to too many SIDs/contexts #37 https://github.com/SELinuxProject/selinux-kernel/issues/37 - Jovana Knezevic on Android's bugtracker. Bug: 140252993 "During multi-user performance testing, we create and remove users many times. selinux_android_restorecon_pkgdir goes from 1ms to over 20ms after about 200 user creations and removals. Accumulated over ~280 packages, that adds a significant time to user creation, making perf benchmarks unreliable." * Hashtable lookup is only O(1) when n < the number of buckets. Signed-off-by: Jeff Vander Stoep <jeffv@google.com> Reported-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Reported-by: Jovana Knezevic <jovanak@google.com> Reviewed-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Tested-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> [PM: subj tweak, removed changelog from patch description] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2019-12-01Merge tag 'y2038-cleanups-5.5' of git://git.kernel.org:/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/arnd/playgroundLinus Torvalds1-7/+3
Pull y2038 cleanups from Arnd Bergmann: "y2038 syscall implementation cleanups This is a series of cleanups for the y2038 work, mostly intended for namespace cleaning: the kernel defines the traditional time_t, timeval and timespec types that often lead to y2038-unsafe code. Even though the unsafe usage is mostly gone from the kernel, having the types and associated functions around means that we can still grow new users, and that we may be missing conversions to safe types that actually matter. There are still a number of driver specific patches needed to get the last users of these types removed, those have been submitted to the respective maintainers" Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20191108210236.1296047-1-arnd@arndb.de/ * tag 'y2038-cleanups-5.5' of git://git.kernel.org:/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/arnd/playground: (26 commits) y2038: alarm: fix half-second cut-off y2038: ipc: fix x32 ABI breakage y2038: fix typo in powerpc vdso "LOPART" y2038: allow disabling time32 system calls y2038: itimer: change implementation to timespec64 y2038: move itimer reset into itimer.c y2038: use compat_{get,set}_itimer on alpha y2038: itimer: compat handling to itimer.c y2038: time: avoid timespec usage in settimeofday() y2038: timerfd: Use timespec64 internally y2038: elfcore: Use __kernel_old_timeval for process times y2038: make ns_to_compat_timeval use __kernel_old_timeval y2038: socket: use __kernel_old_timespec instead of timespec y2038: socket: remove timespec reference in timestamping y2038: syscalls: change remaining timeval to __kernel_old_timeval y2038: rusage: use __kernel_old_timeval y2038: uapi: change __kernel_time_t to __kernel_old_time_t y2038: stat: avoid 'time_t' in 'struct stat' y2038: ipc: remove __kernel_time_t reference from headers y2038: vdso: powerpc: avoid timespec references ...
2019-11-30Merge tag 'selinux-pr-20191126' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinuxLinus Torvalds9-5/+74
Pull selinux updates from Paul Moore: "Only three SELinux patches for v5.5: - Remove the size limit on SELinux policies, the limitation was a lingering vestige and no longer necessary. - Allow file labeling before the policy is loaded. This should ease some of the burden when the policy is initially loaded (no need to relabel files), but it should also help enable some new system concepts which dynamically create the root filesystem in the initrd. - Add support for the "greatest lower bound" policy construct which is defined as the intersection of the MLS range of two SELinux labels" * tag 'selinux-pr-20191126' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux: selinux: default_range glblub implementation selinux: allow labeling before policy is loaded selinux: remove load size limit
2019-11-27Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/netLinus Torvalds1-2/+2
Pull networking fixes from David Miller: "This is mostly to fix the iwlwifi regression: 1) Flush GRO state properly in iwlwifi driver, from Alexander Lobakin. 2) Validate TIPC link name with properly length macro, from John Rutherford. 3) Fix completion init and device query timeouts in ibmvnic, from Thomas Falcon. 4) Fix SKB size calculation for netlink messages in psample, from Nikolay Aleksandrov. 5) Similar kind of fix for OVS flow dumps, from Paolo Abeni. 6) Handle queue allocation failure unwind properly in gve driver, we could try to release pages we didn't allocate. From Jeroen de Borst. 7) Serialize TX queue SKB list accesses properly in mscc ocelot driver. From Yangbo Lu" * git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/net: net: usb: aqc111: Use the correct style for SPDX License Identifier net: phy: Use the correct style for SPDX License Identifier net: wireless: intel: iwlwifi: fix GRO_NORMAL packet stalling net: mscc: ocelot: use skb queue instead of skbs list net: mscc: ocelot: avoid incorrect consuming in skbs list gve: Fix the queue page list allocated pages count net: inet_is_local_reserved_port() port arg should be unsigned short openvswitch: fix flow command message size net: phy: dp83869: Fix return paths to return proper values net: psample: fix skb_over_panic net: usbnet: Fix -Wcast-function-type net: hso: Fix -Wcast-function-type net: port < inet_prot_sock(net) --> inet_port_requires_bind_service(net, port) ibmvnic: Serialize device queries ibmvnic: Bound waits for device queries ibmvnic: Terminate waiting device threads after loss of service ibmvnic: Fix completion structure initialization net-sctp: replace some sock_net(sk) with just 'net' net: Fix a documentation bug wrt. ip_unprivileged_port_start tipc: fix link name length check
2019-11-26Merge branch 'perf-core-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tipLinus Torvalds3-1/+76
Pull perf updates from Ingo Molnar: "The main kernel side changes in this cycle were: - Various Intel-PT updates and optimizations (Alexander Shishkin) - Prohibit kprobes on Xen/KVM emulate prefixes (Masami Hiramatsu) - Add support for LSM and SELinux checks to control access to the perf syscall (Joel Fernandes) - Misc other changes, optimizations, fixes and cleanups - see the shortlog for details. There were numerous tooling changes as well - 254 non-merge commits. Here are the main changes - too many to list in detail: - Enhancements to core tooling infrastructure, perf.data, libperf, libtraceevent, event parsing, vendor events, Intel PT, callchains, BPF support and instruction decoding. - There were updates to the following tools: perf annotate perf diff perf inject perf kvm perf list perf maps perf parse perf probe perf record perf report perf script perf stat perf test perf trace - And a lot of other changes: please see the shortlog and Git log for more details" * 'perf-core-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (279 commits) perf parse: Fix potential memory leak when handling tracepoint errors perf probe: Fix spelling mistake "addrees" -> "address" libtraceevent: Fix memory leakage in copy_filter_type libtraceevent: Fix header installation perf intel-bts: Does not support AUX area sampling perf intel-pt: Add support for decoding AUX area samples perf intel-pt: Add support for recording AUX area samples perf pmu: When using default config, record which bits of config were changed by the user perf auxtrace: Add support for queuing AUX area samples perf session: Add facility to peek at all events perf auxtrace: Add support for dumping AUX area samples perf inject: Cut AUX area samples perf record: Add aux-sample-size config term perf record: Add support for AUX area sampling perf auxtrace: Add support for AUX area sample recording perf auxtrace: Move perf_evsel__find_pmu() perf record: Add a function to test for kernel support for AUX area sampling perf tools: Add kernel AUX area sampling definitions perf/core: Make the mlock accounting simple again perf report: Jump to symbol source view from total cycles view ...
2019-11-26net: port < inet_prot_sock(net) --> inet_port_requires_bind_service(net, port)Maciej ┼╗enczykowski1-2/+2
Note that the sysctl write accessor functions guarantee that: net->ipv4.sysctl_ip_prot_sock <= net->ipv4.ip_local_ports.range[0] invariant is maintained, and as such the max() in selinux hooks is actually spurious. ie. even though if (snum < max(inet_prot_sock(sock_net(sk)), low) || snum > high) { per logic is the same as if ((snum < inet_prot_sock(sock_net(sk)) && snum < low) || snum > high) { it is actually functionally equivalent to: if (snum < low || snum > high) { which is equivalent to: if (snum < inet_prot_sock(sock_net(sk)) || snum < low || snum > high) { even though the first clause is spurious. But we want to hold on to it in case we ever want to change what what inet_port_requires_bind_service() means (for example by changing it from a, by default, [0..1024) range to some sort of set). Test: builds, git 'grep inet_prot_sock' finds no other references Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: Maciej ┼╗enczykowski <maze@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2019-11-15y2038: move itimer reset into itimer.cArnd Bergmann1-7/+3
Preparing for a change to the itimer internals, stop using the do_setitimer() symbol and instead use a new higher-level interface. The do_getitimer()/do_setitimer functions can now be made static, allowing the compiler to potentially produce better object code. Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
2019-10-20Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/netDavid S. Miller1-1/+8
Several cases of overlapping changes which were for the most part trivially resolvable. Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2019-10-17perf_event: Add support for LSM and SELinux checksJoel Fernandes (Google)3-1/+76
In current mainline, the degree of access to perf_event_open(2) system call depends on the perf_event_paranoid sysctl. This has a number of limitations: 1. The sysctl is only a single value. Many types of accesses are controlled based on the single value thus making the control very limited and coarse grained. 2. The sysctl is global, so if the sysctl is changed, then that means all processes get access to perf_event_open(2) opening the door to security issues. This patch adds LSM and SELinux access checking which will be used in Android to access perf_event_open(2) for the purposes of attaching BPF programs to tracepoints, perf profiling and other operations from userspace. These operations are intended for production systems. 5 new LSM hooks are added: 1. perf_event_open: This controls access during the perf_event_open(2) syscall itself. The hook is called from all the places that the perf_event_paranoid sysctl is checked to keep it consistent with the systctl. The hook gets passed a 'type' argument which controls CPU, kernel and tracepoint accesses (in this context, CPU, kernel and tracepoint have the same semantics as the perf_event_paranoid sysctl). Additionally, I added an 'open' type which is similar to perf_event_paranoid sysctl == 3 patch carried in Android and several other distros but was rejected in mainline [1] in 2016. 2. perf_event_alloc: This allocates a new security object for the event which stores the current SID within the event. It will be useful when the perf event's FD is passed through IPC to another process which may try to read the FD. Appropriate security checks will limit access. 3. perf_event_free: Called when the event is closed. 4. perf_event_read: Called from the read(2) and mmap(2) syscalls for the event. 5. perf_event_write: Called from the ioctl(2) syscalls for the event. [1] https://lwn.net/Articles/696240/ Since Peter had suggest LSM hooks in 2016 [1], I am adding his Suggested-by tag below. To use this patch, we set the perf_event_paranoid sysctl to -1 and then apply selinux checking as appropriate (default deny everything, and then add policy rules to give access to domains that need it). In the future we can remove the perf_event_paranoid sysctl altogether. Suggested-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Co-developed-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Joel Fernandes (Google) <joel@joelfernandes.org> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org> Cc: rostedt@goodmis.org Cc: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Cc: jeffv@google.com Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com> Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Cc: primiano@google.com Cc: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com> Cc: rsavitski@google.com Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org> Cc: Matthew Garrett <matthewgarrett@google.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191014170308.70668-1-joel@joelfernandes.org
2019-10-08Merge tag 'selinux-pr-20191007' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinuxLinus Torvalds1-1/+8
Pull selinuxfix from Paul Moore: "One patch to ensure we don't copy bad memory up into userspace" * tag 'selinux-pr-20191007' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux: selinux: fix context string corruption in convert_context()
2019-10-07selinux: default_range glblub implementationJoshua Brindle7-1/+62
A policy developer can now specify glblub as a default_range default and the computed transition will be the intersection of the mls range of the two contexts. The glb (greatest lower bound) lub (lowest upper bound) of a range is calculated as the greater of the low sensitivities and the lower of the high sensitivities and the and of each category bitmap. This can be used by MLS solution developers to compute a context that satisfies, for example, the range of a network interface and the range of a user logging in. Some examples are: User Permitted Range | Network Device Label | Computed Label ---------------------|----------------------|---------------- s0-s1:c0.c12 | s0 | s0 s0-s1:c0.c12 | s0-s1:c0.c1023 | s0-s1:c0.c12 s0-s4:c0.c512 | s1-s1:c0.c1023 | s1-s1:c0.c512 s0-s15:c0,c2 | s4-s6:c0.c128 | s4-s6:c0,c2 s0-s4 | s2-s6 | s2-s4 s0-s4 | s5-s8 | INVALID s5-s8 | s0-s4 | INVALID Signed-off-by: Joshua Brindle <joshua.brindle@crunchydata.com> [PM: subject lines and checkpatch.pl fixes] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2019-10-03selinux: fix context string corruption in convert_context()Ondrej Mosnacek1-1/+8
string_to_context_struct() may garble the context string, so we need to copy back the contents again from the old context struct to avoid storing the corrupted context. Since string_to_context_struct() tokenizes (and therefore truncates) the context string and we are later potentially copying it with kstrdup(), this may eventually cause pieces of uninitialized kernel memory to be disclosed to userspace (when copying to userspace based on the stored length and not the null character). How to reproduce on Fedora and similar: # dnf install -y memcached # systemctl start memcached # semodule -d memcached # load_policy # load_policy # systemctl stop memcached # ausearch -m AVC type=AVC msg=audit(1570090572.648:313): avc: denied { signal } for pid=1 comm="systemd" scontext=system_u:system_r:init_t:s0 tcontext=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t:s0 tclass=process permissive=0 trawcon=73797374656D5F75007400000000000070BE6E847296FFFF726F6D000096FFFF76 Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Milos Malik <mmalik@redhat.com> Fixes: ee1a84fdfeed ("selinux: overhaul sidtab to fix bug and improve performance") Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2019-10-01net: rtnetlink: add linkprop commands to add and delete alternative ifnamesJiri Pirko1-1/+3
Add two commands to add and delete list of link properties. Implement the first property type along - alternative ifnames. Each net device can have multiple alternative names. Signed-off-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri@mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2019-10-01selinux: allow labeling before policy is loadedJonathan Lebon1-0/+12
Currently, the SELinux LSM prevents one from setting the `security.selinux` xattr on an inode without a policy first being loaded. However, this restriction is problematic: it makes it impossible to have newly created files with the correct label before actually loading the policy. This is relevant in distributions like Fedora, where the policy is loaded by systemd shortly after pivoting out of the initrd. In such instances, all files created prior to pivoting will be unlabeled. One then has to relabel them after pivoting, an operation which inherently races with other processes trying to access those same files. Going further, there are use cases for creating the entire root filesystem on first boot from the initrd (e.g. Container Linux supports this today[1], and we'd like to support it in Fedora CoreOS as well[2]). One can imagine doing this in two ways: at the block device level (e.g. laying down a disk image), or at the filesystem level. In the former, labeling can simply be part of the image. But even in the latter scenario, one still really wants to be able to set the right labels when populating the new filesystem. This patch enables this by changing behaviour in the following two ways: 1. allow `setxattr` if we're not initialized 2. don't try to set the in-core inode SID if we're not initialized; instead leave it as `LABEL_INVALID` so that revalidation may be attempted at a later time Note the first hunk of this patch is mostly the same as a previously discussed one[3], though it was part of a larger series which wasn't accepted. [1] https://coreos.com/os/docs/latest/root-filesystem-placement.html [2] https://github.com/coreos/fedora-coreos-tracker/issues/94 [3] https://www.spinics.net/lists/linux-initramfs/msg04593.html Co-developed-by: Victor Kamensky <kamensky@cisco.com> Signed-off-by: Victor Kamensky <kamensky@cisco.com> Signed-off-by: Jonathan Lebon <jlebon@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2019-10-01selinux: remove load size limitzhanglin1-4/+0
Load size was limited to 64MB, this was legacy limitation due to vmalloc() which was removed a while ago. Signed-off-by: zhanglin <zhang.lin16@zte.com.cn> [PM: removed comments in the description about 'real world use cases'] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2019-09-23Merge tag 'selinux-pr-20190917' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinuxLinus Torvalds11-296/+340
Pull selinux updates from Paul Moore: - Add LSM hooks, and SELinux access control hooks, for dnotify, fanotify, and inotify watches. This has been discussed with both the LSM and fs/notify folks and everybody is good with these new hooks. - The LSM stacking changes missed a few calls to current_security() in the SELinux code; we fix those and remove current_security() for good. - Improve our network object labeling cache so that we always return the object's label, even when under memory pressure. Previously we would return an error if we couldn't allocate a new cache entry, now we always return the label even if we can't create a new cache entry for it. - Convert the sidtab atomic_t counter to a normal u32 with READ/WRITE_ONCE() and memory barrier protection. - A few patches to policydb.c to clean things up (remove forward declarations, long lines, bad variable names, etc) * tag 'selinux-pr-20190917' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux: lsm: remove current_security() selinux: fix residual uses of current_security() for the SELinux blob selinux: avoid atomic_t usage in sidtab fanotify, inotify, dnotify, security: add security hook for fs notifications selinux: always return a secid from the network caches if we find one selinux: policydb - rename type_val_to_struct_array selinux: policydb - fix some checkpatch.pl warnings selinux: shuffle around policydb.c to get rid of forward declarations