Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/net

Cross-merge networking fixes after downstream PR (net-6.15-rc7).

Conflicts:

tools/testing/selftests/drivers/net/hw/ncdevmem.c
  97c4e094a4b2 ("tests/ncdevmem: Fix double-free of queue array")
  2f1a805f32ba ("selftests: ncdevmem: Implement devmem TCP TX")
https://lore.kernel.org/20250514122900.1e77d62d@canb.auug.org.au

Adjacent changes:

net/core/devmem.c
net/core/devmem.h
  0afc44d8cdf6 ("net: devmem: fix kernel panic when netlink socket close after module unload")
  bd61848900bf ("net: devmem: Implement TX path")

Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>

1 files changed, 57 insertions, 15 deletions

diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
index 12126adbc3a9..0ff057ff11ce 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
@@ -1227,6 +1227,10 @@ static const __initconst struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_whitelist[] = {
 #define GDS		BIT(6)
 /* CPU is affected by Register File Data Sampling */
 #define RFDS		BIT(7)
+/* CPU is affected by Indirect Target Selection */
+#define ITS		BIT(8)
+/* CPU is affected by Indirect Target Selection, but guest-host isolation is not affected */
+#define ITS_NATIVE_ONLY	BIT(9)
 
 static const struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_blacklist[] __initconst = {
 	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_IVYBRIDGE,	     X86_STEP_MAX,	SRBDS),
@@ -1238,22 +1242,25 @@ static const struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_blacklist[] __initconst = {
 	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_BROADWELL_G,	     X86_STEP_MAX,	SRBDS),
 	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_BROADWELL_X,	     X86_STEP_MAX,	MMIO),
 	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_BROADWELL,	     X86_STEP_MAX,	SRBDS),
-	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_SKYLAKE_X,	     X86_STEP_MAX,	MMIO | RETBLEED | GDS),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_SKYLAKE_X,		      0x5,	MMIO | RETBLEED | GDS),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_SKYLAKE_X,	     X86_STEP_MAX,	MMIO | RETBLEED | GDS | ITS),
 	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_SKYLAKE_L,	     X86_STEP_MAX,	MMIO | RETBLEED | GDS | SRBDS),
 	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_SKYLAKE,	     X86_STEP_MAX,	MMIO | RETBLEED | GDS | SRBDS),
-	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_KABYLAKE_L,	     X86_STEP_MAX,	MMIO | RETBLEED | GDS | SRBDS),
-	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_KABYLAKE,	     X86_STEP_MAX,	MMIO | RETBLEED | GDS | SRBDS),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_KABYLAKE_L,		      0xb,	MMIO | RETBLEED | GDS | SRBDS),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_KABYLAKE_L,	     X86_STEP_MAX,	MMIO | RETBLEED | GDS | SRBDS | ITS),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_KABYLAKE,		      0xc,	MMIO | RETBLEED | GDS | SRBDS),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_KABYLAKE,	     X86_STEP_MAX,	MMIO | RETBLEED | GDS | SRBDS | ITS),
 	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_CANNONLAKE_L,	     X86_STEP_MAX,	RETBLEED),
-	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_ICELAKE_L,	     X86_STEP_MAX,	MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED | GDS),
-	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_ICELAKE_D,	     X86_STEP_MAX,	MMIO | GDS),
-	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_ICELAKE_X,	     X86_STEP_MAX,	MMIO | GDS),
-	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_COMETLAKE,	     X86_STEP_MAX,	MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED | GDS),
-	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_COMETLAKE_L,		      0x0,	MMIO | RETBLEED),
-	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_COMETLAKE_L,	     X86_STEP_MAX,	MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED | GDS),
-	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_TIGERLAKE_L,	     X86_STEP_MAX,	GDS),
-	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_TIGERLAKE,	     X86_STEP_MAX,	GDS),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_ICELAKE_L,	     X86_STEP_MAX,	MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED | GDS | ITS | ITS_NATIVE_ONLY),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_ICELAKE_D,	     X86_STEP_MAX,	MMIO | GDS | ITS | ITS_NATIVE_ONLY),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_ICELAKE_X,	     X86_STEP_MAX,	MMIO | GDS | ITS | ITS_NATIVE_ONLY),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_COMETLAKE,	     X86_STEP_MAX,	MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED | GDS | ITS),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_COMETLAKE_L,		      0x0,	MMIO | RETBLEED | ITS),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_COMETLAKE_L,	     X86_STEP_MAX,	MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED | GDS | ITS),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_TIGERLAKE_L,	     X86_STEP_MAX,	GDS | ITS | ITS_NATIVE_ONLY),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_TIGERLAKE,	     X86_STEP_MAX,	GDS | ITS | ITS_NATIVE_ONLY),
 	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_LAKEFIELD,	     X86_STEP_MAX,	MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED),
-	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_ROCKETLAKE,	     X86_STEP_MAX,	MMIO | RETBLEED | GDS),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_ROCKETLAKE,	     X86_STEP_MAX,	MMIO | RETBLEED | GDS | ITS | ITS_NATIVE_ONLY),
 	VULNBL_INTEL_TYPE(INTEL_ALDERLAKE,		     ATOM,	RFDS),
 	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_ALDERLAKE_L,	     X86_STEP_MAX,	RFDS),
 	VULNBL_INTEL_TYPE(INTEL_RAPTORLAKE,		     ATOM,	RFDS),
@@ -1318,6 +1325,32 @@ static bool __init vulnerable_to_rfds(u64 x86_arch_cap_msr)
 	return cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_blacklist, RFDS);
 }
 
+static bool __init vulnerable_to_its(u64 x86_arch_cap_msr)
+{
+	/* The "immunity" bit trumps everything else: */
+	if (x86_arch_cap_msr & ARCH_CAP_ITS_NO)
+		return false;
+	if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_INTEL)
+		return false;
+
+	/* None of the affected CPUs have BHI_CTRL */
+	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_BHI_CTRL))
+		return false;
+
+	/*
+	 * If a VMM did not expose ITS_NO, assume that a guest could
+	 * be running on a vulnerable hardware or may migrate to such
+	 * hardware.
+	 */
+	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR))
+		return true;
+
+	if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_blacklist, ITS))
+		return true;
+
+	return false;
+}
+
 static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 {
 	u64 x86_arch_cap_msr = x86_read_arch_cap_msr();
@@ -1439,9 +1472,12 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 	if (vulnerable_to_rfds(x86_arch_cap_msr))
 		setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_RFDS);
 
-	/* When virtualized, eIBRS could be hidden, assume vulnerable */
-	if (!(x86_arch_cap_msr & ARCH_CAP_BHI_NO) &&
-	    !cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_BHI) &&
+	/*
+	 * Intel parts with eIBRS are vulnerable to BHI attacks. Parts with
+	 * BHI_NO still need to use the BHI mitigation to prevent Intra-mode
+	 * attacks.  When virtualized, eIBRS could be hidden, assume vulnerable.
+	 */
+	if (!cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_BHI) &&
 	    (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS_ENHANCED) ||
 	     boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR)))
 		setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_BHI);
@@ -1449,6 +1485,12 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 	if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBPB) && !cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBPB_RET))
 		setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_IBPB_NO_RET);
 
+	if (vulnerable_to_its(x86_arch_cap_msr)) {
+		setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_ITS);
+		if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_blacklist, ITS_NATIVE_ONLY))
+			setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_ITS_NATIVE_ONLY);
+	}
+
 	if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_MELTDOWN))
 		return;