aboutsummaryrefslogtreecommitdiffstatshomepage
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
authorNikunj A Dadhania <nikunj@amd.com>2025-07-22 13:18:53 +0530
committerBorislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>2025-08-12 12:33:58 +0200
commit5eb1bcdb6a8c088514019c3a9bda5d565beed1af (patch)
treed096ca60e379de53ea7e0d95a82d62fbc5e628fc
parentx86/fpu: Fix NULL dereference in avx512_status() (diff)
downloadwireguard-linux-5eb1bcdb6a8c088514019c3a9bda5d565beed1af.tar.xz
wireguard-linux-5eb1bcdb6a8c088514019c3a9bda5d565beed1af.zip
x86/sev: Improve handling of writes to intercepted TSC MSRs
Currently, when a Secure TSC enabled SNP guest attempts to write to the intercepted GUEST_TSC_FREQ MSR (a read-only MSR), the guest kernel response incorrectly implies a VMM configuration error, when in fact it is the usual VMM configuration to intercept writes to read-only MSRs, unless explicitly documented. Modify the intercepted TSC MSR #VC handling: * Write to GUEST_TSC_FREQ will generate a #GP instead of terminating the guest * Write to MSR_IA32_TSC will generate a #GP instead of silently ignoring it However, continue to terminate the guest when reading from intercepted GUEST_TSC_FREQ MSR with Secure TSC enabled, as intercepted reads indicate an improper VMM configuration for Secure TSC enabled SNP guests. [ bp: simplify comment. ] Fixes: 38cc6495cdec ("x86/sev: Prevent GUEST_TSC_FREQ MSR interception for Secure TSC enabled guests") Suggested-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> Signed-off-by: Nikunj A Dadhania <nikunj@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250722074853.22253-1-nikunj@amd.com
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/coco/sev/vc-handle.c31
1 files changed, 16 insertions, 15 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/coco/sev/vc-handle.c b/arch/x86/coco/sev/vc-handle.c
index faf1fce89ed4..c3b4acbde0d8 100644
--- a/arch/x86/coco/sev/vc-handle.c
+++ b/arch/x86/coco/sev/vc-handle.c
@@ -371,29 +371,30 @@ static enum es_result __vc_handle_msr_caa(struct pt_regs *regs, bool write)
* executing with Secure TSC enabled, so special handling is required for
* accesses of MSR_IA32_TSC and MSR_AMD64_GUEST_TSC_FREQ.
*/
-static enum es_result __vc_handle_secure_tsc_msrs(struct pt_regs *regs, bool write)
+static enum es_result __vc_handle_secure_tsc_msrs(struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt, bool write)
{
+ struct pt_regs *regs = ctxt->regs;
u64 tsc;
/*
- * GUEST_TSC_FREQ should not be intercepted when Secure TSC is enabled.
- * Terminate the SNP guest when the interception is enabled.
+ * Writing to MSR_IA32_TSC can cause subsequent reads of the TSC to
+ * return undefined values, and GUEST_TSC_FREQ is read-only. Generate
+ * a #GP on all writes.
*/
- if (regs->cx == MSR_AMD64_GUEST_TSC_FREQ)
- return ES_VMM_ERROR;
+ if (write) {
+ ctxt->fi.vector = X86_TRAP_GP;
+ ctxt->fi.error_code = 0;
+ return ES_EXCEPTION;
+ }
/*
- * Writes: Writing to MSR_IA32_TSC can cause subsequent reads of the TSC
- * to return undefined values, so ignore all writes.
- *
- * Reads: Reads of MSR_IA32_TSC should return the current TSC value, use
- * the value returned by rdtsc_ordered().
+ * GUEST_TSC_FREQ read should not be intercepted when Secure TSC is
+ * enabled. Terminate the guest if a read is attempted.
*/
- if (write) {
- WARN_ONCE(1, "TSC MSR writes are verboten!\n");
- return ES_OK;
- }
+ if (regs->cx == MSR_AMD64_GUEST_TSC_FREQ)
+ return ES_VMM_ERROR;
+ /* Reads of MSR_IA32_TSC should return the current TSC value. */
tsc = rdtsc_ordered();
regs->ax = lower_32_bits(tsc);
regs->dx = upper_32_bits(tsc);
@@ -416,7 +417,7 @@ static enum es_result vc_handle_msr(struct ghcb *ghcb, struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt)
case MSR_IA32_TSC:
case MSR_AMD64_GUEST_TSC_FREQ:
if (sev_status & MSR_AMD64_SNP_SECURE_TSC)
- return __vc_handle_secure_tsc_msrs(regs, write);
+ return __vc_handle_secure_tsc_msrs(ctxt, write);
break;
default:
break;