sysctl: Move tainted ctl_table into kernel/panic.c

Move the ctl_table with the "tainted" proc_name into kernel/panic.c.
With it moves the proc_tainted helper function.

This is part of a greater effort to move ctl tables into their
respective subsystems which will reduce the merge conflicts in
kernel/sysctl.c.

Reviewed-by: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Joel Granados <joel.granados@kernel.org>

2 files changed, 50 insertions, 49 deletions

diff --git a/kernel/panic.c b/kernel/panic.c
index b0b9a8bf4560..39e5b1ddf1a8 100644
--- a/kernel/panic.c
+++ b/kernel/panic.c
@@ -84,6 +84,50 @@ ATOMIC_NOTIFIER_HEAD(panic_notifier_list);
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(panic_notifier_list);
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL
+
+/*
+ * Taint values can only be increased
+ * This means we can safely use a temporary.
+ */
+static int proc_taint(const struct ctl_table *table, int write,
+			       void *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	struct ctl_table t;
+	unsigned long tmptaint = get_taint();
+	int err;
+
+	if (write && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+		return -EPERM;
+
+	t = *table;
+	t.data = &tmptaint;
+	err = proc_doulongvec_minmax(&t, write, buffer, lenp, ppos);
+	if (err < 0)
+		return err;
+
+	if (write) {
+		int i;
+
+		/*
+		 * If we are relying on panic_on_taint not producing
+		 * false positives due to userspace input, bail out
+		 * before setting the requested taint flags.
+		 */
+		if (panic_on_taint_nousertaint && (tmptaint & panic_on_taint))
+			return -EINVAL;
+
+		/*
+		 * Poor man's atomic or. Not worth adding a primitive
+		 * to everyone's atomic.h for this
+		 */
+		for (i = 0; i < TAINT_FLAGS_COUNT; i++)
+			if ((1UL << i) & tmptaint)
+				add_taint(i, LOCKDEP_STILL_OK);
+	}
+
+	return err;
+}
+
 static const struct ctl_table kern_panic_table[] = {
 #ifdef CONFIG_SMP
 	{
@@ -97,6 +141,12 @@ static const struct ctl_table kern_panic_table[] = {
 	},
 #endif
 	{
+		.procname	= "tainted",
+		.maxlen		= sizeof(long),
+		.mode		= 0644,
+		.proc_handler	= proc_taint,
+	},
+	{
 		.procname	= "panic",
 		.data		= &panic_timeout,
 		.maxlen		= sizeof(int),
diff --git a/kernel/sysctl.c b/kernel/sysctl.c
index ebcc7d75acd9..9d8db9cef111 100644
--- a/kernel/sysctl.c
+++ b/kernel/sysctl.c
@@ -731,49 +731,6 @@ int proc_douintvec(const struct ctl_table *table, int write, void *buffer,
 				 do_proc_douintvec_conv, NULL);
 }
 
-/*
- * Taint values can only be increased
- * This means we can safely use a temporary.
- */
-static int proc_taint(const struct ctl_table *table, int write,
-			       void *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
-{
-	struct ctl_table t;
-	unsigned long tmptaint = get_taint();
-	int err;
-
-	if (write && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
-		return -EPERM;
-
-	t = *table;
-	t.data = &tmptaint;
-	err = proc_doulongvec_minmax(&t, write, buffer, lenp, ppos);
-	if (err < 0)
-		return err;
-
-	if (write) {
-		int i;
-
-		/*
-		 * If we are relying on panic_on_taint not producing
-		 * false positives due to userspace input, bail out
-		 * before setting the requested taint flags.
-		 */
-		if (panic_on_taint_nousertaint && (tmptaint & panic_on_taint))
-			return -EINVAL;
-
-		/*
-		 * Poor man's atomic or. Not worth adding a primitive
-		 * to everyone's atomic.h for this
-		 */
-		for (i = 0; i < TAINT_FLAGS_COUNT; i++)
-			if ((1UL << i) & tmptaint)
-				add_taint(i, LOCKDEP_STILL_OK);
-	}
-
-	return err;
-}
-
 /**
  * struct do_proc_dointvec_minmax_conv_param - proc_dointvec_minmax() range checking structure
  * @min: pointer to minimum allowable value
@@ -1558,12 +1515,6 @@ int proc_do_static_key(const struct ctl_table *table, int write,
 static const struct ctl_table kern_table[] = {
 #ifdef CONFIG_PROC_SYSCTL
 	{
-		.procname	= "tainted",
-		.maxlen 	= sizeof(long),
-		.mode		= 0644,
-		.proc_handler	= proc_taint,
-	},
-	{
 		.procname	= "sysctl_writes_strict",
 		.data		= &sysctl_writes_strict,
 		.maxlen		= sizeof(int),