diff options
| author |   Gang Yan <yangang@kylinos.cn> | 2026-08-14 17:37:40 +0800 |
|---|---|---|
| committer |   Leon Romanovsky <leon@kernel.org> | 2026-09-01 06:20:18 -0400 |
| commit | d10e2a08799e858d3e71ea4169bcd018f216d444 (patch) | |
| tree | 7390a068af15dda3097cd5dcd5dd2a9adefe3175 | |
| parent | RDMA/rxe: validate access flags before swapping the MR's PD (diff) | |
RDMA/rxe: Fix integer overflow in mr_check_range() leading to OOB access
mr_check_range() validates that [iova, iova+length) falls within the
registered MR range using wraparound-prone arithmetic:
if (iova < mr->ibmr.iova ||
iova + length > mr->ibmr.iova + mr->ibmr.length)
A remote peer can craft an RDMA-Write/Read RETH so that iova + length
wraps to 0 (e.g. iova=0xfffffffffffffff8, length=8), bypassing the
check. rxe_mr_iova_to_index() then computes a huge index (int idx, only
guarded by WARN_ON) and rxe_mr_copy_xarray() dereferences
mr->page_info[huge], causing an out-of-bounds read/write and a kernel
oops that is triggerable by an unauthenticated remote peer.
Rewrite the check in overflow-safe form; the first two clauses guarantee
that the subsequent subtractions do not underflow:
if (iova < mr->ibmr.iova ||
length > mr->ibmr.length ||
iova - mr->ibmr.iova > mr->ibmr.length - length)
With the fix, mr_check_range() returns -EINVAL for the crafted iova and
the responder reports REMOTE_ACCESS_ERROR instead of triggering the OOB.
Fixes: 8700e3e7c485 ("Soft RoCE driver")
Signed-off-by: Gang Yan <yangang@kylinos.cn>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260814093740.292954-1-gang.yan@linux.dev
Reviewed-by: Zhu Yanjun <yanjun.zhu@linux.dev>
Reviewed-by: Shukai Ni <shukai.ni@kuleuven.be>
Tested-by: Shukai Ni <shukai.ni@kuleuven.be>
Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leon@kernel.org>
| -rw-r--r-- | drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_mr.c | 3 |
1 files changed, 2 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_mr.c b/drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_mr.c index 875eceb55fdf..71d9ea477289 100644 --- a/drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_mr.c +++ b/drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_mr.c @@ -33,7 +33,8 @@ int mr_check_range(struct rxe_mr *mr, u64 iova, size_t length) case IB_MR_TYPE_USER: case IB_MR_TYPE_MEM_REG: if (iova < mr->ibmr.iova || - iova + length > mr->ibmr.iova + mr->ibmr.length) { + length > mr->ibmr.length || + iova - mr->ibmr.iova > mr->ibmr.length - length) { rxe_dbg_mr(mr, "iova/length out of range\n"); return -EINVAL; } |