diff options
| author |   Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> | 2016-10-28 01:22:25 -0700 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> | 2017-06-30 12:00:51 -0700 |
| commit | 3859a271a003aba01e45b85c9d8b355eb7bf25f9 (patch) | |
| tree | 850c019e6a6449857e864b6a545b053ffe2f99a9 /include/linux/msg.h | |
| parent | ARM: Prepare for randomized task_struct (diff) | |
| download | wireguard-linux-3859a271a003aba01e45b85c9d8b355eb7bf25f9.tar.xz wireguard-linux-3859a271a003aba01e45b85c9d8b355eb7bf25f9.zip | |
randstruct: Mark various structs for randomization
This marks many critical kernel structures for randomization. These are
structures that have been targeted in the past in security exploits, or
contain functions pointers, pointers to function pointer tables, lists,
workqueues, ref-counters, credentials, permissions, or are otherwise
sensitive. This initial list was extracted from Brad Spengler/PaX Team's
code in the last public patch of grsecurity/PaX based on my understanding
of the code. Changes or omissions from the original code are mine and
don't reflect the original grsecurity/PaX code.
Left out of this list is task_struct, which requires special handling
and will be covered in a subsequent patch.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'include/linux/msg.h')
| -rw-r--r-- | include/linux/msg.h | 2 |
1 files changed, 1 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/include/linux/msg.h b/include/linux/msg.h index f3f302f9c197..a001305f5a79 100644 --- a/include/linux/msg.h +++ b/include/linux/msg.h @@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ struct msg_queue { struct list_head q_messages; struct list_head q_receivers; struct list_head q_senders; -}; +} __randomize_layout; /* Helper routines for sys_msgsnd and sys_msgrcv */ extern long do_msgsnd(int msqid, long mtype, void __user *mtext, |