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| author |   Marco Elver <elver@google.com> | 2021-07-05 10:44:52 +0200 |
|---|---|---|
| committer |   Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> | 2021-07-16 18:46:38 +0200 |
| commit | 9d7a6c95f62bc335b62aaf9d50590122bd03a796 (patch) | |
| tree | 793a71181113cab26c1fe6e23483de2e8372b484 /kernel | |
| parent | sd: don't mess with SD_MINORS for CONFIG_DEBUG_BLOCK_EXT_DEVT (diff) | |
| download | wireguard-linux-9d7a6c95f62bc335b62aaf9d50590122bd03a796.tar.xz wireguard-linux-9d7a6c95f62bc335b62aaf9d50590122bd03a796.zip | |
perf: Fix required permissions if sigtrap is requested
If perf_event_open() is called with another task as target and
perf_event_attr::sigtrap is set, and the target task's user does not
match the calling user, also require the CAP_KILL capability or
PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH permissions.
Otherwise, with the CAP_PERFMON capability alone it would be possible
for a user to send SIGTRAP signals via perf events to another user's
tasks. This could potentially result in those tasks being terminated if
they cannot handle SIGTRAP signals.
Note: The check complements the existing capability check, but is not
supposed to supersede the ptrace_may_access() check. At a high level we
now have:
capable of CAP_PERFMON and (CAP_KILL if sigtrap)
OR
ptrace_may_access(...) // also checks for same thread-group and uid
Fixes: 97ba62b27867 ("perf: Add support for SIGTRAP on perf events")
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Acked-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 5.13+
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210705084453.2151729-1-elver@google.com
Diffstat (limited to 'kernel')
| -rw-r--r-- | kernel/events/core.c | 25 |
1 files changed, 24 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/events/core.c b/kernel/events/core.c index 464917096e73..c13730b7ac01 100644 --- a/kernel/events/core.c +++ b/kernel/events/core.c @@ -12158,10 +12158,33 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open, } if (task) { + unsigned int ptrace_mode = PTRACE_MODE_READ_REALCREDS; + bool is_capable; + err = down_read_interruptible(&task->signal->exec_update_lock); if (err) goto err_file; + is_capable = perfmon_capable(); + if (attr.sigtrap) { + /* + * perf_event_attr::sigtrap sends signals to the other + * task. Require the current task to also have + * CAP_KILL. + */ + rcu_read_lock(); + is_capable &= ns_capable(__task_cred(task)->user_ns, CAP_KILL); + rcu_read_unlock(); + + /* + * If the required capabilities aren't available, checks + * for ptrace permissions: upgrade to ATTACH, since + * sending signals can effectively change the target + * task. + */ + ptrace_mode = PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH_REALCREDS; + } + /* * Preserve ptrace permission check for backwards compatibility. * @@ -12171,7 +12194,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open, * perf_event_exit_task() that could imply). */ err = -EACCES; - if (!perfmon_capable() && !ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ_REALCREDS)) + if (!is_capable && !ptrace_may_access(task, ptrace_mode)) goto err_cred; } |