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authorIdo Schimmel <idosch@nvidia.com>2024-03-11 18:23:06 +0200
committerJakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>2024-03-11 20:35:20 -0700
commitd8a21070b6e168d3800c2962a574f16020dd2951 (patch)
tree760fb896cd6d73d822197baf142c1e969b83a690 /net
parentnexthop: Only parse NHA_OP_FLAGS for dump messages that require it (diff)
downloadwireguard-linux-d8a21070b6e168d3800c2962a574f16020dd2951.tar.xz
wireguard-linux-d8a21070b6e168d3800c2962a574f16020dd2951.zip
nexthop: Fix out-of-bounds access during attribute validation
Passing a maximum attribute type to nlmsg_parse() that is larger than the size of the passed policy will result in an out-of-bounds access [1] when the attribute type is used as an index into the policy array. Fix by setting the maximum attribute type according to the policy size, as is already done for RTM_NEWNEXTHOP messages. Add a test case that triggers the bug. No regressions in fib nexthops tests: # ./fib_nexthops.sh [...] Tests passed: 236 Tests failed: 0 [1] BUG: KASAN: global-out-of-bounds in __nla_validate_parse+0x1e53/0x2940 Read of size 1 at addr ffffffff99ab4d20 by task ip/610 CPU: 3 PID: 610 Comm: ip Not tainted 6.8.0-rc7-custom-gd435d6e3e161 #9 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.2-1.fc38 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x8f/0xe0 print_report+0xcf/0x670 kasan_report+0xd8/0x110 __nla_validate_parse+0x1e53/0x2940 __nla_parse+0x40/0x50 rtm_del_nexthop+0x1bd/0x400 rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x3cc/0xf20 netlink_rcv_skb+0x170/0x440 netlink_unicast+0x540/0x820 netlink_sendmsg+0x8d3/0xdb0 ____sys_sendmsg+0x31f/0xa60 ___sys_sendmsg+0x13a/0x1e0 __sys_sendmsg+0x11c/0x1f0 do_syscall_64+0xc5/0x1d0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0x6b [...] The buggy address belongs to the variable: rtm_nh_policy_del+0x20/0x40 Fixes: 2118f9390d83 ("net: nexthop: Adjust netlink policy parsing for a new attribute") Reported-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/CANn89i+UNcG0PJMW5X7gOMunF38ryMh=L1aeZUKH3kL4UdUqag@mail.gmail.com/ Reported-by: syzbot+65bb09a7208ce3d4a633@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/00000000000088981b06133bc07b@google.com/ Signed-off-by: Ido Schimmel <idosch@nvidia.com> Reviewed-by: David Ahern <dsahern@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240311162307.545385-4-idosch@nvidia.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'net')
-rw-r--r--net/ipv4/nexthop.c29
1 files changed, 17 insertions, 12 deletions
diff --git a/net/ipv4/nexthop.c b/net/ipv4/nexthop.c
index d1669000ac1c..4c6915bff31e 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/nexthop.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/nexthop.c
@@ -3244,8 +3244,8 @@ static int nh_valid_get_del_req(const struct nlmsghdr *nlh,
static int rtm_del_nexthop(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh,
struct netlink_ext_ack *extack)
{
+ struct nlattr *tb[ARRAY_SIZE(rtm_nh_policy_del)];
struct net *net = sock_net(skb->sk);
- struct nlattr *tb[NHA_MAX + 1];
struct nl_info nlinfo = {
.nlh = nlh,
.nl_net = net,
@@ -3255,8 +3255,9 @@ static int rtm_del_nexthop(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh,
int err;
u32 id;
- err = nlmsg_parse(nlh, sizeof(struct nhmsg), tb, NHA_MAX,
- rtm_nh_policy_del, extack);
+ err = nlmsg_parse(nlh, sizeof(struct nhmsg), tb,
+ ARRAY_SIZE(rtm_nh_policy_del) - 1, rtm_nh_policy_del,
+ extack);
if (err < 0)
return err;
@@ -3277,16 +3278,17 @@ static int rtm_del_nexthop(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh,
static int rtm_get_nexthop(struct sk_buff *in_skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh,
struct netlink_ext_ack *extack)
{
+ struct nlattr *tb[ARRAY_SIZE(rtm_nh_policy_get)];
struct net *net = sock_net(in_skb->sk);
- struct nlattr *tb[NHA_MAX + 1];
struct sk_buff *skb = NULL;
struct nexthop *nh;
u32 op_flags;
int err;
u32 id;
- err = nlmsg_parse(nlh, sizeof(struct nhmsg), tb, NHA_MAX,
- rtm_nh_policy_get, extack);
+ err = nlmsg_parse(nlh, sizeof(struct nhmsg), tb,
+ ARRAY_SIZE(rtm_nh_policy_get) - 1, rtm_nh_policy_get,
+ extack);
if (err < 0)
return err;
@@ -3405,10 +3407,11 @@ static int nh_valid_dump_req(const struct nlmsghdr *nlh,
struct nh_dump_filter *filter,
struct netlink_callback *cb)
{
- struct nlattr *tb[NHA_MAX + 1];
+ struct nlattr *tb[ARRAY_SIZE(rtm_nh_policy_dump)];
int err;
- err = nlmsg_parse(nlh, sizeof(struct nhmsg), tb, NHA_MAX,
+ err = nlmsg_parse(nlh, sizeof(struct nhmsg), tb,
+ ARRAY_SIZE(rtm_nh_policy_dump) - 1,
rtm_nh_policy_dump, cb->extack);
if (err < 0)
return err;
@@ -3548,10 +3551,11 @@ static int nh_valid_dump_bucket_req(const struct nlmsghdr *nlh,
struct netlink_callback *cb)
{
struct nlattr *res_tb[ARRAY_SIZE(rtm_nh_res_bucket_policy_dump)];
- struct nlattr *tb[NHA_MAX + 1];
+ struct nlattr *tb[ARRAY_SIZE(rtm_nh_policy_dump_bucket)];
int err;
- err = nlmsg_parse(nlh, sizeof(struct nhmsg), tb, NHA_MAX,
+ err = nlmsg_parse(nlh, sizeof(struct nhmsg), tb,
+ ARRAY_SIZE(rtm_nh_policy_dump_bucket) - 1,
rtm_nh_policy_dump_bucket, NULL);
if (err < 0)
return err;
@@ -3716,10 +3720,11 @@ static int nh_valid_get_bucket_req(const struct nlmsghdr *nlh,
u32 *id, u16 *bucket_index,
struct netlink_ext_ack *extack)
{
- struct nlattr *tb[NHA_MAX + 1];
+ struct nlattr *tb[ARRAY_SIZE(rtm_nh_policy_get_bucket)];
int err;
- err = nlmsg_parse(nlh, sizeof(struct nhmsg), tb, NHA_MAX,
+ err = nlmsg_parse(nlh, sizeof(struct nhmsg), tb,
+ ARRAY_SIZE(rtm_nh_policy_get_bucket) - 1,
rtm_nh_policy_get_bucket, extack);
if (err < 0)
return err;