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diff --git a/Documentation/livepatch/reliable-stacktrace.rst b/Documentation/livepatch/reliable-stacktrace.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..8d950f3ffedd --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/livepatch/reliable-stacktrace.rst @@ -0,0 +1,309 @@ +=================== +Reliable Stacktrace +=================== + +This document outlines basic information about reliable stacktracing. + +.. Table of Contents: + +.. contents:: :local: + +1. Introduction +=============== + +The kernel livepatch consistency model relies on accurately identifying which +functions may have live state and therefore may not be safe to patch. One way +to identify which functions are live is to use a stacktrace. + +Existing stacktrace code may not always give an accurate picture of all +functions with live state, and best-effort approaches which can be helpful for +debugging are unsound for livepatching. Livepatching depends on architectures +to provide a *reliable* stacktrace which ensures it never omits any live +functions from a trace. + + +2. Requirements +=============== + +Architectures must implement one of the reliable stacktrace functions. +Architectures using CONFIG_ARCH_STACKWALK must implement +'arch_stack_walk_reliable', and other architectures must implement +'save_stack_trace_tsk_reliable'. + +Principally, the reliable stacktrace function must ensure that either: + +* The trace includes all functions that the task may be returned to, and the + return code is zero to indicate that the trace is reliable. + +* The return code is non-zero to indicate that the trace is not reliable. + +.. note:: + In some cases it is legitimate to omit specific functions from the trace, + but all other functions must be reported. These cases are described in + further detail below. + +Secondly, the reliable stacktrace function must be robust to cases where +the stack or other unwind state is corrupt or otherwise unreliable. The +function should attempt to detect such cases and return a non-zero error +code, and should not get stuck in an infinite loop or access memory in +an unsafe way. Specific cases are described in further detail below. + + +3. Compile-time analysis +======================== + +To ensure that kernel code can be correctly unwound in all cases, +architectures may need to verify that code has been compiled in a manner +expected by the unwinder. For example, an unwinder may expect that +functions manipulate the stack pointer in a limited way, or that all +functions use specific prologue and epilogue sequences. Architectures +with such requirements should verify the kernel compilation using +objtool. + +In some cases, an unwinder may require metadata to correctly unwind. +Where necessary, this metadata should be generated at build time using +objtool. + + +4. Considerations +================= + +The unwinding process varies across architectures, their respective procedure +call standards, and kernel configurations. This section describes common +details that architectures should consider. + +4.1 Identifying successful termination +-------------------------------------- + +Unwinding may terminate early for a number of reasons, including: + +* Stack or frame pointer corruption. + +* Missing unwind support for an uncommon scenario, or a bug in the unwinder. + +* Dynamically generated code (e.g. eBPF) or foreign code (e.g. EFI runtime + services) not following the conventions expected by the unwinder. + +To ensure that this does not result in functions being omitted from the trace, +even if not caught by other checks, it is strongly recommended that +architectures verify that a stacktrace ends at an expected location, e.g. + +* Within a specific function that is an entry point to the kernel. + +* At a specific location on a stack expected for a kernel entry point. + +* On a specific stack expected for a kernel entry point (e.g. if the + architecture has separate task and IRQ stacks). + +4.2 Identifying unwindable code +------------------------------- + +Unwinding typically relies on code following specific conventions (e.g. +manipulating a frame pointer), but there can be code which may not follow these +conventions and may require special handling in the unwinder, e.g. + +* Exception vectors and entry assembly. + +* Procedure Linkage Table (PLT) entries and veneer functions. + +* Trampoline assembly (e.g. ftrace, kprobes). + +* Dynamically generated code (e.g. eBPF, optprobe trampolines). + +* Foreign code (e.g. EFI runtime services). + +To ensure that such cases do not result in functions being omitted from a +trace, it is strongly recommended that architectures positively identify code +which is known to be reliable to unwind from, and reject unwinding from all +other code. + +Kernel code including modules and eBPF can be distinguished from foreign code +using '__kernel_text_address()'. Checking for this also helps to detect stack +corruption. + +There are several ways an architecture may identify kernel code which is deemed +unreliable to unwind from, e.g. + +* Placing such code into special linker sections, and rejecting unwinding from + any code in these sections. + +* Identifying specific portions of code using bounds information. + +4.3 Unwinding across interrupts and exceptions +---------------------------------------------- + +At function call boundaries the stack and other unwind state is expected to be +in a consistent state suitable for reliable unwinding, but this may not be the +case part-way through a function. For example, during a function prologue or +epilogue a frame pointer may be transiently invalid, or during the function +body the return address may be held in an arbitrary general purpose register. +For some architectures this may change at runtime as a result of dynamic +instrumentation. + +If an interrupt or other exception is taken while the stack or other unwind +state is in an inconsistent state, it may not be possible to reliably unwind, +and it may not be possible to identify whether such unwinding will be reliable. +See below for examples. + +Architectures which cannot identify when it is reliable to unwind such cases +(or where it is never reliable) must reject unwinding across exception +boundaries. Note that it may be reliable to unwind across certain +exceptions (e.g. IRQ) but unreliable to unwind across other exceptions +(e.g. NMI). + +Architectures which can identify when it is reliable to unwind such cases (or +have no such cases) should attempt to unwind across exception boundaries, as +doing so can prevent unnecessarily stalling livepatch consistency checks and +permits livepatch transitions to complete more quickly. + +4.4 Rewriting of return addresses +--------------------------------- + +Some trampolines temporarily modify the return address of a function in order +to intercept when that function returns with a return trampoline, e.g. + +* An ftrace trampoline may modify the return address so that function graph + tracing can intercept returns. + +* A kprobes (or optprobes) trampoline may modify the return address so that + kretprobes can intercept returns. + +When this happens, the original return address will not be in its usual +location. For trampolines which are not subject to live patching, where an +unwinder can reliably determine the original return address and no unwind state +is altered by the trampoline, the unwinder may report the original return +address in place of the trampoline and report this as reliable. Otherwise, an +unwinder must report these cases as unreliable. + +Special care is required when identifying the original return address, as this +information is not in a consistent location for the duration of the entry +trampoline or return trampoline. For example, considering the x86_64 +'return_to_handler' return trampoline: + +.. code-block:: none + + SYM_CODE_START(return_to_handler) + UNWIND_HINT_UNDEFINED + subq $24, %rsp + + /* Save the return values */ + movq %rax, (%rsp) + movq %rdx, 8(%rsp) + movq %rbp, %rdi + + call ftrace_return_to_handler + + movq %rax, %rdi + movq 8(%rsp), %rdx + movq (%rsp), %rax + addq $24, %rsp + JMP_NOSPEC rdi + SYM_CODE_END(return_to_handler) + +While the traced function runs its return address on the stack points to +the start of return_to_handler, and the original return address is stored in +the task's cur_ret_stack. During this time the unwinder can find the return +address using ftrace_graph_ret_addr(). + +When the traced function returns to return_to_handler, there is no longer a +return address on the stack, though the original return address is still stored +in the task's cur_ret_stack. Within ftrace_return_to_handler(), the original +return address is removed from cur_ret_stack and is transiently moved +arbitrarily by the compiler before being returned in rax. The return_to_handler +trampoline moves this into rdi before jumping to it. + +Architectures might not always be able to unwind such sequences, such as when +ftrace_return_to_handler() has removed the address from cur_ret_stack, and the +location of the return address cannot be reliably determined. + +It is recommended that architectures unwind cases where return_to_handler has +not yet been returned to, but architectures are not required to unwind from the +middle of return_to_handler and can report this as unreliable. Architectures +are not required to unwind from other trampolines which modify the return +address. + +4.5 Obscuring of return addresses +--------------------------------- + +Some trampolines do not rewrite the return address in order to intercept +returns, but do transiently clobber the return address or other unwind state. + +For example, the x86_64 implementation of optprobes patches the probed function +with a JMP instruction which targets the associated optprobe trampoline. When +the probe is hit, the CPU will branch to the optprobe trampoline, and the +address of the probed function is not held in any register or on the stack. + +Similarly, the arm64 implementation of DYNAMIC_FTRACE_WITH_REGS patches traced +functions with the following: + +.. code-block:: none + + MOV X9, X30 + BL <trampoline> + +The MOV saves the link register (X30) into X9 to preserve the return address +before the BL clobbers the link register and branches to the trampoline. At the +start of the trampoline, the address of the traced function is in X9 rather +than the link register as would usually be the case. + +Architectures must either ensure that unwinders either reliably unwind +such cases, or report the unwinding as unreliable. + +4.6 Link register unreliability +------------------------------- + +On some other architectures, 'call' instructions place the return address into a +link register, and 'return' instructions consume the return address from the +link register without modifying the register. On these architectures software +must save the return address to the stack prior to making a function call. Over +the duration of a function call, the return address may be held in the link +register alone, on the stack alone, or in both locations. + +Unwinders typically assume the link register is always live, but this +assumption can lead to unreliable stack traces. For example, consider the +following arm64 assembly for a simple function: + +.. code-block:: none + + function: + STP X29, X30, [SP, -16]! + MOV X29, SP + BL <other_function> + LDP X29, X30, [SP], #16 + RET + +At entry to the function, the link register (x30) points to the caller, and the +frame pointer (X29) points to the caller's frame including the caller's return +address. The first two instructions create a new stackframe and update the +frame pointer, and at this point the link register and the frame pointer both +describe this function's return address. A trace at this point may describe +this function twice, and if the function return is being traced, the unwinder +may consume two entries from the fgraph return stack rather than one entry. + +The BL invokes 'other_function' with the link register pointing to this +function's LDR and the frame pointer pointing to this function's stackframe. +When 'other_function' returns, the link register is left pointing at the BL, +and so a trace at this point could result in 'function' appearing twice in the +backtrace. + +Similarly, a function may deliberately clobber the LR, e.g. + +.. code-block:: none + + caller: + STP X29, X30, [SP, -16]! + MOV X29, SP + ADR LR, <callee> + BLR LR + LDP X29, X30, [SP], #16 + RET + +The ADR places the address of 'callee' into the LR, before the BLR branches to +this address. If a trace is made immediately after the ADR, 'callee' will +appear to be the parent of 'caller', rather than the child. + +Due to cases such as the above, it may only be possible to reliably consume a +link register value at a function call boundary. Architectures where this is +the case must reject unwinding across exception boundaries unless they can +reliably identify when the LR or stack value should be used (e.g. using +metadata generated by objtool). |