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-rw-r--r--arch/x86/Kconfig8
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/boot/compressed/kaslr.c50
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/boot/header.S10
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c13
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c50
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/events/intel/core.c10
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/hyperv/hv_init.c67
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/hyperv/hv_vtl.c61
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/hyperv/ivm.c11
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/include/asm/apic.h8
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h4
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h3
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h43
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/include/asm/module.h8
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/include/asm/mshyperv.h7
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/include/asm/msr.h4
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h23
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/include/asm/posted_intr.h83
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/include/asm/set_memory.h2
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/include/asm/setup.h2
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/include/asm/shared/tdx.h11
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/include/asm/sighandling.h22
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h10
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/include/asm/syscall.h43
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/include/asm/tdx.h79
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/include/asm/tdx_global_metadata.h (renamed from arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx_global_metadata.h)19
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/include/asm/trace/fpu.h15
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h2
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h72
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/setup_data.h13
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/svm.h2
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/vmx.h5
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/Makefile2
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/acpi/madt_wakeup.c2
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c81
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic_noop.c8
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic_numachip.c2
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/apic/x2apic_uv_x.c2
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c2
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/core.c6
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver.h1
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c30
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c2
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/crash.c26
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/e820.c18
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/ioport.c13
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/irq.c63
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c58
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/machine_kexec_64.c22
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/process.c6
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/setup.c42
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/signal_32.c4
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/signal_64.c4
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/smp.c24
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c10
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/traps.c2
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig12
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kvm/Makefile1
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c60
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h33
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kvm/ioapic.c7
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kvm/ioapic.h2
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kvm/irq.c3
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kvm/irq_comm.c37
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c43
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kvm/lapic.h6
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kvm/mmu.h6
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c53
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu_internal.h5
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kvm/mmu/page_track.c3
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.c29
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.h1
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c68
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kvm/smm.h3
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c36
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c229
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c163
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h14
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kvm/vmx/common.h182
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c1123
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c60
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kvm/vmx/pmu_intel.c52
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kvm/vmx/pmu_intel.h28
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kvm/vmx/posted_intr.c43
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kvm/vmx/posted_intr.h3
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c3595
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h204
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx_arch.h167
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx_errno.h40
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S3
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c314
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h143
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h47
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kvm/x86.c135
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kvm/x86.h49
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kvm/xen.c3
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/mm/dump_pagetables.c71
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/mm/init_32.c3
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/mm/init_64.c18
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c7
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/mm/pat/memtype.c194
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/mm/pat/memtype_interval.c63
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c16
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c9
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/mm/pti.c5
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/pci/Makefile6
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/pci/intel_mid.c (renamed from arch/x86/pci/intel_mid_pci.c)0
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/power/hibernate.c19
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/realmode/init.c2
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/um/asm/checksum.h3
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/um/asm/processor.h8
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/um/os-Linux/mcontext.c218
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/um/ptrace.c76
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/um/shared/sysdep/kernel-offsets.h2
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/um/shared/sysdep/mcontext.h9
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/um/shared/sysdep/stub-data.h23
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/um/shared/sysdep/stub.h2
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/um/shared/sysdep/stub_32.h13
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/um/shared/sysdep/stub_64.h17
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/um/tls_32.c26
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/seamcall.S3
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c428
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.h48
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx_global_metadata.c50
124 files changed, 8172 insertions, 1362 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
index 0be4937203c7..71019b3b54ea 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -89,7 +89,7 @@ config X86
select ARCH_HAS_DMA_OPS if GART_IOMMU || XEN
select ARCH_HAS_EARLY_DEBUG if KGDB
select ARCH_HAS_ELF_RANDOMIZE
- select ARCH_HAS_EXECMEM_ROX if X86_64
+ select ARCH_HAS_EXECMEM_ROX if X86_64 && STRICT_MODULE_RWX
select ARCH_HAS_FAST_MULTIPLIER
select ARCH_HAS_FORTIFY_SOURCE
select ARCH_HAS_GCOV_PROFILE_ALL
@@ -1858,8 +1858,7 @@ endchoice
config X86_SGX
bool "Software Guard eXtensions (SGX)"
depends on X86_64 && CPU_SUP_INTEL && X86_X2APIC
- depends on CRYPTO=y
- depends on CRYPTO_SHA256=y
+ select CRYPTO_LIB_SHA256
select MMU_NOTIFIER
select NUMA_KEEP_MEMINFO if NUMA
select XARRAY_MULTI
@@ -2006,6 +2005,9 @@ config ARCH_SUPPORTS_KEXEC_BZIMAGE_VERIFY_SIG
config ARCH_SUPPORTS_KEXEC_JUMP
def_bool y
+config ARCH_SUPPORTS_KEXEC_HANDOVER
+ def_bool X86_64
+
config ARCH_SUPPORTS_CRASH_DUMP
def_bool X86_64 || (X86_32 && HIGHMEM)
diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/kaslr.c b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/kaslr.c
index f03d59ea6e40..3b0948ad449f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/kaslr.c
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/kaslr.c
@@ -760,6 +760,49 @@ static void process_e820_entries(unsigned long minimum,
}
}
+/*
+ * If KHO is active, only process its scratch areas to ensure we are not
+ * stepping onto preserved memory.
+ */
+static bool process_kho_entries(unsigned long minimum, unsigned long image_size)
+{
+ struct kho_scratch *kho_scratch;
+ struct setup_data *ptr;
+ struct kho_data *kho;
+ int i, nr_areas = 0;
+
+ if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KEXEC_HANDOVER))
+ return false;
+
+ ptr = (struct setup_data *)(unsigned long)boot_params_ptr->hdr.setup_data;
+ while (ptr) {
+ if (ptr->type == SETUP_KEXEC_KHO) {
+ kho = (struct kho_data *)(unsigned long)ptr->data;
+ kho_scratch = (void *)(unsigned long)kho->scratch_addr;
+ nr_areas = kho->scratch_size / sizeof(*kho_scratch);
+ break;
+ }
+
+ ptr = (struct setup_data *)(unsigned long)ptr->next;
+ }
+
+ if (!nr_areas)
+ return false;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < nr_areas; i++) {
+ struct kho_scratch *area = &kho_scratch[i];
+ struct mem_vector region = {
+ .start = area->addr,
+ .size = area->size,
+ };
+
+ if (process_mem_region(&region, minimum, image_size))
+ break;
+ }
+
+ return true;
+}
+
static unsigned long find_random_phys_addr(unsigned long minimum,
unsigned long image_size)
{
@@ -775,7 +818,12 @@ static unsigned long find_random_phys_addr(unsigned long minimum,
return 0;
}
- if (!process_efi_entries(minimum, image_size))
+ /*
+ * During kexec handover only process KHO scratch areas that are known
+ * not to contain any data that must be preserved.
+ */
+ if (!process_kho_entries(minimum, image_size) &&
+ !process_efi_entries(minimum, image_size))
process_e820_entries(minimum, image_size);
phys_addr = slots_fetch_random();
diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/header.S b/arch/x86/boot/header.S
index e30649e44d8f..e1f4fd5bc8ee 100644
--- a/arch/x86/boot/header.S
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/header.S
@@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ SYSSEG = 0x1000 /* historical load address >> 4 */
.section ".bstext", "ax"
#ifdef CONFIG_EFI_STUB
# "MZ", MS-DOS header
- .word MZ_MAGIC
+ .word IMAGE_DOS_SIGNATURE
.org 0x38
#
# Offset to the PE header.
@@ -51,16 +51,16 @@ SYSSEG = 0x1000 /* historical load address >> 4 */
.long LINUX_PE_MAGIC
.long pe_header
pe_header:
- .long PE_MAGIC
+ .long IMAGE_NT_SIGNATURE
coff_header:
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
.set image_file_add_flags, IMAGE_FILE_32BIT_MACHINE
- .set pe_opt_magic, PE_OPT_MAGIC_PE32
+ .set pe_opt_magic, IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC
.word IMAGE_FILE_MACHINE_I386
#else
.set image_file_add_flags, 0
- .set pe_opt_magic, PE_OPT_MAGIC_PE32PLUS
+ .set pe_opt_magic, IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR64_MAGIC
.word IMAGE_FILE_MACHINE_AMD64
#endif
.word section_count # nr_sections
@@ -111,7 +111,7 @@ extra_header_fields:
.long salign # SizeOfHeaders
.long 0 # CheckSum
.word IMAGE_SUBSYSTEM_EFI_APPLICATION # Subsystem (EFI application)
- .word IMAGE_DLL_CHARACTERISTICS_NX_COMPAT # DllCharacteristics
+ .word IMAGE_DLLCHARACTERISTICS_NX_COMPAT # DllCharacteristics
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
.long 0 # SizeOfStackReserve
.long 0 # SizeOfStackCommit
diff --git a/arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c b/arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c
index fbc1215d2746..b6db4e0b936b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c
+++ b/arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c
@@ -869,12 +869,12 @@ static void *snp_alloc_vmsa_page(int cpu)
return page_address(p + 1);
}
-static int wakeup_cpu_via_vmgexit(u32 apic_id, unsigned long start_ip)
+static int wakeup_cpu_via_vmgexit(u32 apic_id, unsigned long start_ip, unsigned int cpu)
{
struct sev_es_save_area *cur_vmsa, *vmsa;
struct svsm_ca *caa;
u8 sipi_vector;
- int cpu, ret;
+ int ret;
u64 cr4;
/*
@@ -895,15 +895,6 @@ static int wakeup_cpu_via_vmgexit(u32 apic_id, unsigned long start_ip)
/* Override start_ip with known protected guest start IP */
start_ip = real_mode_header->sev_es_trampoline_start;
-
- /* Find the logical CPU for the APIC ID */
- for_each_present_cpu(cpu) {
- if (arch_match_cpu_phys_id(cpu, apic_id))
- break;
- }
- if (cpu >= nr_cpu_ids)
- return -EINVAL;
-
cur_vmsa = per_cpu(sev_vmsa, cpu);
/*
diff --git a/arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c b/arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c
index edab6d6049be..7b2833705d47 100644
--- a/arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c
@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@
/* TDX Module call error codes */
#define TDCALL_RETURN_CODE(a) ((a) >> 32)
#define TDCALL_INVALID_OPERAND 0xc0000100
+#define TDCALL_OPERAND_BUSY 0x80000200
#define TDREPORT_SUBTYPE_0 0
@@ -109,12 +110,13 @@ static inline u64 tdg_vm_wr(u64 field, u64 value, u64 mask)
* REPORTDATA to be included into TDREPORT.
* @tdreport: Address of the output buffer to store TDREPORT.
*
- * Refer to section titled "TDG.MR.REPORT leaf" in the TDX Module
- * v1.0 specification for more information on TDG.MR.REPORT TDCALL.
+ * Refer to section titled "TDG.MR.REPORT leaf" in the TDX Module v1.0
+ * specification for more information on TDG.MR.REPORT TDCALL.
+ *
* It is used in the TDX guest driver module to get the TDREPORT0.
*
- * Return 0 on success, -EINVAL for invalid operands, or -EIO on
- * other TDCALL failures.
+ * Return 0 on success, -ENXIO for invalid operands, -EBUSY for busy operation,
+ * or -EIO on other TDCALL failures.
*/
int tdx_mcall_get_report0(u8 *reportdata, u8 *tdreport)
{
@@ -128,7 +130,9 @@ int tdx_mcall_get_report0(u8 *reportdata, u8 *tdreport)
ret = __tdcall(TDG_MR_REPORT, &args);
if (ret) {
if (TDCALL_RETURN_CODE(ret) == TDCALL_INVALID_OPERAND)
- return -EINVAL;
+ return -ENXIO;
+ else if (TDCALL_RETURN_CODE(ret) == TDCALL_OPERAND_BUSY)
+ return -EBUSY;
return -EIO;
}
@@ -137,6 +141,42 @@ int tdx_mcall_get_report0(u8 *reportdata, u8 *tdreport)
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tdx_mcall_get_report0);
/**
+ * tdx_mcall_extend_rtmr() - Wrapper to extend RTMR registers using
+ * TDG.MR.RTMR.EXTEND TDCALL.
+ * @index: Index of RTMR register to be extended.
+ * @data: Address of the input buffer with RTMR register extend data.
+ *
+ * Refer to section titled "TDG.MR.RTMR.EXTEND leaf" in the TDX Module v1.0
+ * specification for more information on TDG.MR.RTMR.EXTEND TDCALL.
+ *
+ * It is used in the TDX guest driver module to allow user to extend the RTMR
+ * registers.
+ *
+ * Return 0 on success, -ENXIO for invalid operands, -EBUSY for busy operation,
+ * or -EIO on other TDCALL failures.
+ */
+int tdx_mcall_extend_rtmr(u8 index, u8 *data)
+{
+ struct tdx_module_args args = {
+ .rcx = virt_to_phys(data),
+ .rdx = index,
+ };
+ u64 ret;
+
+ ret = __tdcall(TDG_MR_RTMR_EXTEND, &args);
+ if (ret) {
+ if (TDCALL_RETURN_CODE(ret) == TDCALL_INVALID_OPERAND)
+ return -ENXIO;
+ if (TDCALL_RETURN_CODE(ret) == TDCALL_OPERAND_BUSY)
+ return -EBUSY;
+ return -EIO;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tdx_mcall_extend_rtmr);
+
+/**
* tdx_hcall_get_quote() - Wrapper to request TD Quote using GetQuote
* hypercall.
* @buf: Address of the directly mapped shared kernel buffer which
diff --git a/arch/x86/events/intel/core.c b/arch/x86/events/intel/core.c
index 466283326630..c2fb729c270e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/events/intel/core.c
+++ b/arch/x86/events/intel/core.c
@@ -2826,7 +2826,7 @@ static void intel_pmu_read_event(struct perf_event *event)
* If the PEBS counters snapshotting is enabled,
* the topdown event is available in PEBS records.
*/
- if (is_topdown_event(event) && !is_pebs_counter_event_group(event))
+ if (is_topdown_count(event) && !is_pebs_counter_event_group(event))
static_call(intel_pmu_update_topdown_event)(event, NULL);
else
intel_pmu_drain_pebs_buffer();
@@ -2900,6 +2900,7 @@ static void intel_pmu_config_acr(int idx, u64 mask, u32 reload)
{
struct cpu_hw_events *cpuc = this_cpu_ptr(&cpu_hw_events);
int msr_b, msr_c;
+ int msr_offset;
if (!mask && !cpuc->acr_cfg_b[idx])
return;
@@ -2907,19 +2908,20 @@ static void intel_pmu_config_acr(int idx, u64 mask, u32 reload)
if (idx < INTEL_PMC_IDX_FIXED) {
msr_b = MSR_IA32_PMC_V6_GP0_CFG_B;
msr_c = MSR_IA32_PMC_V6_GP0_CFG_C;
+ msr_offset = x86_pmu.addr_offset(idx, false);
} else {
msr_b = MSR_IA32_PMC_V6_FX0_CFG_B;
msr_c = MSR_IA32_PMC_V6_FX0_CFG_C;
- idx -= INTEL_PMC_IDX_FIXED;
+ msr_offset = x86_pmu.addr_offset(idx - INTEL_PMC_IDX_FIXED, false);
}
if (cpuc->acr_cfg_b[idx] != mask) {
- wrmsrl(msr_b + x86_pmu.addr_offset(idx, false), mask);
+ wrmsrl(msr_b + msr_offset, mask);
cpuc->acr_cfg_b[idx] = mask;
}
/* Only need to update the reload value when there is a valid config value. */
if (mask && cpuc->acr_cfg_c[idx] != reload) {
- wrmsrl(msr_c + x86_pmu.addr_offset(idx, false), reload);
+ wrmsrl(msr_c + msr_offset, reload);
cpuc->acr_cfg_c[idx] = reload;
}
}
diff --git a/arch/x86/hyperv/hv_init.c b/arch/x86/hyperv/hv_init.c
index 5d27194a2efa..3d1d3547095a 100644
--- a/arch/x86/hyperv/hv_init.c
+++ b/arch/x86/hyperv/hv_init.c
@@ -391,40 +391,6 @@ static void __init hv_stimer_setup_percpu_clockev(void)
old_setup_percpu_clockev();
}
-#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HYPERV_VTL_MODE)
-static u8 __init get_vtl(void)
-{
- u64 control = HV_HYPERCALL_REP_COMP_1 | HVCALL_GET_VP_REGISTERS;
- struct hv_input_get_vp_registers *input;
- struct hv_output_get_vp_registers *output;
- unsigned long flags;
- u64 ret;
-
- local_irq_save(flags);
- input = *this_cpu_ptr(hyperv_pcpu_input_arg);
- output = *this_cpu_ptr(hyperv_pcpu_output_arg);
-
- memset(input, 0, struct_size(input, names, 1));
- input->partition_id = HV_PARTITION_ID_SELF;
- input->vp_index = HV_VP_INDEX_SELF;
- input->input_vtl.as_uint8 = 0;
- input->names[0] = HV_REGISTER_VSM_VP_STATUS;
-
- ret = hv_do_hypercall(control, input, output);
- if (hv_result_success(ret)) {
- ret = output->values[0].reg8 & HV_X64_VTL_MASK;
- } else {
- pr_err("Failed to get VTL(error: %lld) exiting...\n", ret);
- BUG();
- }
-
- local_irq_restore(flags);
- return ret;
-}
-#else
-static inline u8 get_vtl(void) { return 0; }
-#endif
-
/*
* This function is to be invoked early in the boot sequence after the
* hypervisor has been detected.
@@ -707,3 +673,36 @@ bool hv_is_hyperv_initialized(void)
return hypercall_msr.enable;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(hv_is_hyperv_initialized);
+
+int hv_apicid_to_vp_index(u32 apic_id)
+{
+ u64 control;
+ u64 status;
+ unsigned long irq_flags;
+ struct hv_get_vp_from_apic_id_in *input;
+ u32 *output, ret;
+
+ local_irq_save(irq_flags);
+
+ input = *this_cpu_ptr(hyperv_pcpu_input_arg);
+ memset(input, 0, sizeof(*input));
+ input->partition_id = HV_PARTITION_ID_SELF;
+ input->apic_ids[0] = apic_id;
+
+ output = *this_cpu_ptr(hyperv_pcpu_output_arg);
+
+ control = HV_HYPERCALL_REP_COMP_1 | HVCALL_GET_VP_INDEX_FROM_APIC_ID;
+ status = hv_do_hypercall(control, input, output);
+ ret = output[0];
+
+ local_irq_restore(irq_flags);
+
+ if (!hv_result_success(status)) {
+ pr_err("failed to get vp index from apic id %d, status %#llx\n",
+ apic_id, status);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(hv_apicid_to_vp_index);
diff --git a/arch/x86/hyperv/hv_vtl.c b/arch/x86/hyperv/hv_vtl.c
index 4580936dcb03..042e8712d8de 100644
--- a/arch/x86/hyperv/hv_vtl.c
+++ b/arch/x86/hyperv/hv_vtl.c
@@ -56,7 +56,12 @@ static void __noreturn hv_vtl_restart(char __maybe_unused *cmd)
void __init hv_vtl_init_platform(void)
{
- pr_info("Linux runs in Hyper-V Virtual Trust Level\n");
+ /*
+ * This function is a no-op if the VTL mode is not enabled.
+ * If it is, this function runs if and only the kernel boots in
+ * VTL2 which the x86 hv initialization path makes sure of.
+ */
+ pr_info("Linux runs in Hyper-V Virtual Trust Level %d\n", ms_hyperv.vtl);
x86_platform.realmode_reserve = x86_init_noop;
x86_platform.realmode_init = x86_init_noop;
@@ -207,63 +212,23 @@ free_lock:
return ret;
}
-static int hv_vtl_apicid_to_vp_id(u32 apic_id)
-{
- u64 control;
- u64 status;
- unsigned long irq_flags;
- struct hv_get_vp_from_apic_id_in *input;
- u32 *output, ret;
-
- local_irq_save(irq_flags);
-
- input = *this_cpu_ptr(hyperv_pcpu_input_arg);
- memset(input, 0, sizeof(*input));
- input->partition_id = HV_PARTITION_ID_SELF;
- input->apic_ids[0] = apic_id;
-
- output = *this_cpu_ptr(hyperv_pcpu_output_arg);
-
- control = HV_HYPERCALL_REP_COMP_1 | HVCALL_GET_VP_ID_FROM_APIC_ID;
- status = hv_do_hypercall(control, input, output);
- ret = output[0];
-
- local_irq_restore(irq_flags);
-
- if (!hv_result_success(status)) {
- pr_err("failed to get vp id from apic id %d, status %#llx\n",
- apic_id, status);
- return -EINVAL;
- }
-
- return ret;
-}
-
-static int hv_vtl_wakeup_secondary_cpu(u32 apicid, unsigned long start_eip)
+static int hv_vtl_wakeup_secondary_cpu(u32 apicid, unsigned long start_eip, unsigned int cpu)
{
- int vp_id, cpu;
-
- /* Find the logical CPU for the APIC ID */
- for_each_present_cpu(cpu) {
- if (arch_match_cpu_phys_id(cpu, apicid))
- break;
- }
- if (cpu >= nr_cpu_ids)
- return -EINVAL;
+ int vp_index;
pr_debug("Bringing up CPU with APIC ID %d in VTL2...\n", apicid);
- vp_id = hv_vtl_apicid_to_vp_id(apicid);
+ vp_index = hv_apicid_to_vp_index(apicid);
- if (vp_id < 0) {
+ if (vp_index < 0) {
pr_err("Couldn't find CPU with APIC ID %d\n", apicid);
return -EINVAL;
}
- if (vp_id > ms_hyperv.max_vp_index) {
- pr_err("Invalid CPU id %d for APIC ID %d\n", vp_id, apicid);
+ if (vp_index > ms_hyperv.max_vp_index) {
+ pr_err("Invalid CPU id %d for APIC ID %d\n", vp_index, apicid);
return -EINVAL;
}
- return hv_vtl_bringup_vcpu(vp_id, cpu, start_eip);
+ return hv_vtl_bringup_vcpu(vp_index, cpu, start_eip);
}
int __init hv_vtl_early_init(void)
diff --git a/arch/x86/hyperv/ivm.c b/arch/x86/hyperv/ivm.c
index 09a165a3c41e..e93a2f488ff7 100644
--- a/arch/x86/hyperv/ivm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/hyperv/ivm.c
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@
#include <linux/bitfield.h>
#include <linux/types.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/cpu.h>
#include <asm/svm.h>
#include <asm/sev.h>
#include <asm/io.h>
@@ -289,7 +290,7 @@ static void snp_cleanup_vmsa(struct sev_es_save_area *vmsa)
free_page((unsigned long)vmsa);
}
-int hv_snp_boot_ap(u32 cpu, unsigned long start_ip)
+int hv_snp_boot_ap(u32 apic_id, unsigned long start_ip, unsigned int cpu)
{
struct sev_es_save_area *vmsa = (struct sev_es_save_area *)
__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO);
@@ -298,10 +299,16 @@ int hv_snp_boot_ap(u32 cpu, unsigned long start_ip)
u64 ret, retry = 5;
struct hv_enable_vp_vtl *start_vp_input;
unsigned long flags;
+ int vp_index;
if (!vmsa)
return -ENOMEM;
+ /* Find the Hyper-V VP index which might be not the same as APIC ID */
+ vp_index = hv_apicid_to_vp_index(apic_id);
+ if (vp_index < 0 || vp_index > ms_hyperv.max_vp_index)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
native_store_gdt(&gdtr);
vmsa->gdtr.base = gdtr.address;
@@ -349,7 +356,7 @@ int hv_snp_boot_ap(u32 cpu, unsigned long start_ip)
start_vp_input = (struct hv_enable_vp_vtl *)ap_start_input_arg;
memset(start_vp_input, 0, sizeof(*start_vp_input));
start_vp_input->partition_id = -1;
- start_vp_input->vp_index = cpu;
+ start_vp_input->vp_index = vp_index;
start_vp_input->target_vtl.target_vtl = ms_hyperv.vtl;
*(u64 *)&start_vp_input->vp_context = __pa(vmsa) | 1;
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/apic.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/apic.h
index 68e10e30fe9b..23d86c9750b9 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/apic.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/apic.h
@@ -313,9 +313,9 @@ struct apic {
u32 (*get_apic_id)(u32 id);
/* wakeup_secondary_cpu */
- int (*wakeup_secondary_cpu)(u32 apicid, unsigned long start_eip);
+ int (*wakeup_secondary_cpu)(u32 apicid, unsigned long start_eip, unsigned int cpu);
/* wakeup secondary CPU using 64-bit wakeup point */
- int (*wakeup_secondary_cpu_64)(u32 apicid, unsigned long start_eip);
+ int (*wakeup_secondary_cpu_64)(u32 apicid, unsigned long start_eip, unsigned int cpu);
char *name;
};
@@ -333,8 +333,8 @@ struct apic_override {
void (*send_IPI_self)(int vector);
u64 (*icr_read)(void);
void (*icr_write)(u32 low, u32 high);
- int (*wakeup_secondary_cpu)(u32 apicid, unsigned long start_eip);
- int (*wakeup_secondary_cpu_64)(u32 apicid, unsigned long start_eip);
+ int (*wakeup_secondary_cpu)(u32 apicid, unsigned long start_eip, unsigned int cpu);
+ int (*wakeup_secondary_cpu_64)(u32 apicid, unsigned long start_eip, unsigned int cpu);
};
/*
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
index 5b50e0e35129..ee176236c2be 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
@@ -336,6 +336,7 @@
#define X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBRS (13*32+14) /* Indirect Branch Restricted Speculation */
#define X86_FEATURE_AMD_STIBP (13*32+15) /* Single Thread Indirect Branch Predictors */
#define X86_FEATURE_AMD_STIBP_ALWAYS_ON (13*32+17) /* Single Thread Indirect Branch Predictors always-on preferred */
+#define X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBRS_SAME_MODE (13*32+19) /* Indirect Branch Restricted Speculation same mode protection*/
#define X86_FEATURE_AMD_PPIN (13*32+23) /* "amd_ppin" Protected Processor Inventory Number */
#define X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSBD (13*32+24) /* Speculative Store Bypass Disable */
#define X86_FEATURE_VIRT_SSBD (13*32+25) /* "virt_ssbd" Virtualized Speculative Store Bypass Disable */
@@ -378,6 +379,7 @@
#define X86_FEATURE_V_SPEC_CTRL (15*32+20) /* "v_spec_ctrl" Virtual SPEC_CTRL */
#define X86_FEATURE_VNMI (15*32+25) /* "vnmi" Virtual NMI */
#define X86_FEATURE_SVME_ADDR_CHK (15*32+28) /* SVME addr check */
+#define X86_FEATURE_BUS_LOCK_THRESHOLD (15*32+29) /* Bus lock threshold */
#define X86_FEATURE_IDLE_HLT (15*32+30) /* IDLE HLT intercept */
/* Intel-defined CPU features, CPUID level 0x00000007:0 (ECX), word 16 */
@@ -446,6 +448,7 @@
#define X86_FEATURE_DEBUG_SWAP (19*32+14) /* "debug_swap" SEV-ES full debug state swap support */
#define X86_FEATURE_RMPREAD (19*32+21) /* RMPREAD instruction */
#define X86_FEATURE_SEGMENTED_RMP (19*32+23) /* Segmented RMP support */
+#define X86_FEATURE_ALLOWED_SEV_FEATURES (19*32+27) /* Allowed SEV Features */
#define X86_FEATURE_SVSM (19*32+28) /* "svsm" SVSM present */
#define X86_FEATURE_HV_INUSE_WR_ALLOWED (19*32+30) /* Allow Write to in-use hypervisor-owned pages */
@@ -457,6 +460,7 @@
#define X86_FEATURE_AUTOIBRS (20*32+ 8) /* Automatic IBRS */
#define X86_FEATURE_NO_SMM_CTL_MSR (20*32+ 9) /* SMM_CTL MSR is not present */
+#define X86_FEATURE_PREFETCHI (20*32+20) /* Prefetch Data/Instruction to Cache Level */
#define X86_FEATURE_SBPB (20*32+27) /* Selective Branch Prediction Barrier */
#define X86_FEATURE_IBPB_BRTYPE (20*32+28) /* MSR_PRED_CMD[IBPB] flushes all branch type predictions */
#define X86_FEATURE_SRSO_NO (20*32+29) /* CPU is not affected by SRSO */
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h
index 823c0434bbad..8d50e3e0a19b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h
@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ KVM_X86_OP(has_emulated_msr)
KVM_X86_OP(vcpu_after_set_cpuid)
KVM_X86_OP(vm_init)
KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL(vm_destroy)
+KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL(vm_pre_destroy)
KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL_RET0(vcpu_precreate)
KVM_X86_OP(vcpu_create)
KVM_X86_OP(vcpu_free)
@@ -115,6 +116,7 @@ KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL(pi_start_assignment)
KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL(apicv_pre_state_restore)
KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL(apicv_post_state_restore)
KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL_RET0(dy_apicv_has_pending_interrupt)
+KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL(protected_apic_has_interrupt)
KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL(set_hv_timer)
KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL(cancel_hv_timer)
KVM_X86_OP(setup_mce)
@@ -126,6 +128,7 @@ KVM_X86_OP(enable_smi_window)
#endif
KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL(dev_get_attr)
KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL(mem_enc_ioctl)
+KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL(vcpu_mem_enc_ioctl)
KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL(mem_enc_register_region)
KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL(mem_enc_unregister_region)
KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL(vm_copy_enc_context_from)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
index 9c971f846108..b4a391929cdb 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
@@ -126,7 +126,8 @@
KVM_ARCH_REQ_FLAGS(31, KVM_REQUEST_WAIT | KVM_REQUEST_NO_WAKEUP)
#define KVM_REQ_HV_TLB_FLUSH \
KVM_ARCH_REQ_FLAGS(32, KVM_REQUEST_WAIT | KVM_REQUEST_NO_WAKEUP)
-#define KVM_REQ_UPDATE_PROTECTED_GUEST_STATE KVM_ARCH_REQ(34)
+#define KVM_REQ_UPDATE_PROTECTED_GUEST_STATE \
+ KVM_ARCH_REQ_FLAGS(34, KVM_REQUEST_WAIT)
#define CR0_RESERVED_BITS \
(~(unsigned long)(X86_CR0_PE | X86_CR0_MP | X86_CR0_EM | X86_CR0_TS \
@@ -412,7 +413,6 @@ struct kvm_rmap_head {
};
struct kvm_pio_request {
- unsigned long linear_rip;
unsigned long count;
int in;
int port;
@@ -609,8 +609,15 @@ struct kvm_pmu {
struct kvm_pmu_ops;
enum {
- KVM_DEBUGREG_BP_ENABLED = 1,
- KVM_DEBUGREG_WONT_EXIT = 2,
+ KVM_DEBUGREG_BP_ENABLED = BIT(0),
+ KVM_DEBUGREG_WONT_EXIT = BIT(1),
+ /*
+ * Guest debug registers (DR0-3, DR6 and DR7) are saved/restored by
+ * hardware on exit from or enter to guest. KVM needn't switch them.
+ * DR0-3, DR6 and DR7 are set to their architectural INIT value on VM
+ * exit, host values need to be restored.
+ */
+ KVM_DEBUGREG_AUTO_SWITCH = BIT(2),
};
struct kvm_mtrr {
@@ -911,6 +918,7 @@ struct kvm_vcpu_arch {
bool emulate_regs_need_sync_to_vcpu;
bool emulate_regs_need_sync_from_vcpu;
int (*complete_userspace_io)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+ unsigned long cui_linear_rip;
gpa_t time;
s8 pvclock_tsc_shift;
@@ -1028,6 +1036,7 @@ struct kvm_vcpu_arch {
int pending_ioapic_eoi;
int pending_external_vector;
+ int highest_stale_pending_ioapic_eoi;
/* be preempted when it's in kernel-mode(cpl=0) */
bool preempted_in_kernel;
@@ -1571,6 +1580,13 @@ struct kvm_arch {
struct kvm_mmu_memory_cache split_desc_cache;
gfn_t gfn_direct_bits;
+
+ /*
+ * Size of the CPU's dirty log buffer, i.e. VMX's PML buffer. A Zero
+ * value indicates CPU dirty logging is unsupported or disabled in
+ * current VM.
+ */
+ int cpu_dirty_log_size;
};
struct kvm_vm_stat {
@@ -1674,6 +1690,7 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops {
unsigned int vm_size;
int (*vm_init)(struct kvm *kvm);
void (*vm_destroy)(struct kvm *kvm);
+ void (*vm_pre_destroy)(struct kvm *kvm);
/* Create, but do not attach this VCPU */
int (*vcpu_precreate)(struct kvm *kvm);
@@ -1823,11 +1840,6 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops {
struct x86_exception *exception);
void (*handle_exit_irqoff)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
- /*
- * Size of the CPU's dirty log buffer, i.e. VMX's PML buffer. A zero
- * value indicates CPU dirty logging is unsupported or disabled.
- */
- int cpu_dirty_log_size;
void (*update_cpu_dirty_logging)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
const struct kvm_x86_nested_ops *nested_ops;
@@ -1841,6 +1853,7 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops {
void (*apicv_pre_state_restore)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
void (*apicv_post_state_restore)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
bool (*dy_apicv_has_pending_interrupt)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+ bool (*protected_apic_has_interrupt)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
int (*set_hv_timer)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 guest_deadline_tsc,
bool *expired);
@@ -1857,6 +1870,7 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops {
int (*dev_get_attr)(u32 group, u64 attr, u64 *val);
int (*mem_enc_ioctl)(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp);
+ int (*vcpu_mem_enc_ioctl)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, void __user *argp);
int (*mem_enc_register_region)(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_enc_region *argp);
int (*mem_enc_unregister_region)(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_enc_region *argp);
int (*vm_copy_enc_context_from)(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned int source_fd);
@@ -1930,6 +1944,7 @@ struct kvm_arch_async_pf {
extern u32 __read_mostly kvm_nr_uret_msrs;
extern bool __read_mostly allow_smaller_maxphyaddr;
extern bool __read_mostly enable_apicv;
+extern bool __read_mostly enable_device_posted_irqs;
extern struct kvm_x86_ops kvm_x86_ops;
#define kvm_x86_call(func) static_call(kvm_x86_##func)
@@ -2333,6 +2348,7 @@ int kvm_pv_send_ipi(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long ipi_bitmap_low,
int kvm_add_user_return_msr(u32 msr);
int kvm_find_user_return_msr(u32 msr);
int kvm_set_user_return_msr(unsigned index, u64 val, u64 mask);
+void kvm_user_return_msr_update_cache(unsigned int index, u64 val);
static inline bool kvm_is_supported_user_return_msr(u32 msr)
{
@@ -2416,7 +2432,12 @@ int memslot_rmap_alloc(struct kvm_memory_slot *slot, unsigned long npages);
KVM_X86_QUIRK_FIX_HYPERCALL_INSN | \
KVM_X86_QUIRK_MWAIT_NEVER_UD_FAULTS | \
KVM_X86_QUIRK_SLOT_ZAP_ALL | \
- KVM_X86_QUIRK_STUFF_FEATURE_MSRS)
+ KVM_X86_QUIRK_STUFF_FEATURE_MSRS | \
+ KVM_X86_QUIRK_IGNORE_GUEST_PAT)
+
+#define KVM_X86_CONDITIONAL_QUIRKS \
+ (KVM_X86_QUIRK_CD_NW_CLEARED | \
+ KVM_X86_QUIRK_IGNORE_GUEST_PAT)
/*
* KVM previously used a u32 field in kvm_run to indicate the hypercall was
@@ -2427,7 +2448,7 @@ int memslot_rmap_alloc(struct kvm_memory_slot *slot, unsigned long npages);
static inline bool kvm_arch_has_irq_bypass(void)
{
- return enable_apicv && irq_remapping_cap(IRQ_POSTING_CAP);
+ return enable_device_posted_irqs;
}
#endif /* _ASM_X86_KVM_HOST_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/module.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/module.h
index e988bac0a4a1..3c2de4ce3b10 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/module.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/module.h
@@ -5,12 +5,20 @@
#include <asm-generic/module.h>
#include <asm/orc_types.h>
+struct its_array {
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_ITS
+ void **pages;
+ int num;
+#endif
+};
+
struct mod_arch_specific {
#ifdef CONFIG_UNWINDER_ORC
unsigned int num_orcs;
int *orc_unwind_ip;
struct orc_entry *orc_unwind;
#endif
+ struct its_array its_pages;
};
#endif /* _ASM_X86_MODULE_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/mshyperv.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/mshyperv.h
index 778444310cfb..e1752ba47e67 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/mshyperv.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/mshyperv.h
@@ -269,11 +269,12 @@ int hv_unmap_ioapic_interrupt(int ioapic_id, struct hv_interrupt_entry *entry);
#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
bool hv_ghcb_negotiate_protocol(void);
void __noreturn hv_ghcb_terminate(unsigned int set, unsigned int reason);
-int hv_snp_boot_ap(u32 cpu, unsigned long start_ip);
+int hv_snp_boot_ap(u32 apic_id, unsigned long start_ip, unsigned int cpu);
#else
static inline bool hv_ghcb_negotiate_protocol(void) { return false; }
static inline void hv_ghcb_terminate(unsigned int set, unsigned int reason) {}
-static inline int hv_snp_boot_ap(u32 cpu, unsigned long start_ip) { return 0; }
+static inline int hv_snp_boot_ap(u32 apic_id, unsigned long start_ip,
+ unsigned int cpu) { return 0; }
#endif
#if defined(CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT) || defined(CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_GUEST)
@@ -307,6 +308,7 @@ static __always_inline u64 hv_raw_get_msr(unsigned int reg)
{
return native_rdmsrq(reg);
}
+int hv_apicid_to_vp_index(u32 apic_id);
#else /* CONFIG_HYPERV */
static inline void hyperv_init(void) {}
@@ -328,6 +330,7 @@ static inline void hv_set_msr(unsigned int reg, u64 value) { }
static inline u64 hv_get_msr(unsigned int reg) { return 0; }
static inline void hv_set_non_nested_msr(unsigned int reg, u64 value) { }
static inline u64 hv_get_non_nested_msr(unsigned int reg) { return 0; }
+static inline int hv_apicid_to_vp_index(u32 apic_id) { return -EINVAL; }
#endif /* CONFIG_HYPERV */
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr.h
index 4096b8af4ba7..9c2ea29e12a9 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr.h
@@ -228,7 +228,7 @@ static __always_inline u64 rdpmc(int counter)
#endif /* !CONFIG_PARAVIRT_XXL */
/* Instruction opcode for WRMSRNS supported in binutils >= 2.40 */
-#define WRMSRNS _ASM_BYTES(0x0f,0x01,0xc6)
+#define ASM_WRMSRNS _ASM_BYTES(0x0f,0x01,0xc6)
/* Non-serializing WRMSR, when available. Falls back to a serializing WRMSR. */
static __always_inline void wrmsrns(u32 msr, u64 val)
@@ -237,7 +237,7 @@ static __always_inline void wrmsrns(u32 msr, u64 val)
* WRMSR is 2 bytes. WRMSRNS is 3 bytes. Pad WRMSR with a redundant
* DS prefix to avoid a trailing NOP.
*/
- asm volatile("1: " ALTERNATIVE("ds wrmsr", WRMSRNS, X86_FEATURE_WRMSRNS)
+ asm volatile("1: " ALTERNATIVE("ds wrmsr", ASM_WRMSRNS, X86_FEATURE_WRMSRNS)
"2: " _ASM_EXTABLE_TYPE(1b, 2b, EX_TYPE_WRMSR)
: : "c" (msr), "a" ((u32)val), "d" ((u32)(val >> 32)));
}
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h
index 5ddba366d3b4..97954c936c54 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h
@@ -777,6 +777,9 @@ static inline pgprotval_t check_pgprot(pgprot_t pgprot)
static inline pte_t pfn_pte(unsigned long page_nr, pgprot_t pgprot)
{
phys_addr_t pfn = (phys_addr_t)page_nr << PAGE_SHIFT;
+ /* This bit combination is used to mark shadow stacks */
+ WARN_ON_ONCE((pgprot_val(pgprot) & (_PAGE_DIRTY | _PAGE_RW)) ==
+ _PAGE_DIRTY);
pfn ^= protnone_mask(pgprot_val(pgprot));
pfn &= PTE_PFN_MASK;
return __pte(pfn | check_pgprot(pgprot));
@@ -1073,22 +1076,6 @@ static inline unsigned long pmd_page_vaddr(pmd_t pmd)
*/
#define pmd_page(pmd) pfn_to_page(pmd_pfn(pmd))
-/*
- * Conversion functions: convert a page and protection to a page entry,
- * and a page entry and page directory to the page they refer to.
- *
- * (Currently stuck as a macro because of indirect forward reference
- * to linux/mm.h:page_to_nid())
- */
-#define mk_pte(page, pgprot) \
-({ \
- pgprot_t __pgprot = pgprot; \
- \
- WARN_ON_ONCE((pgprot_val(__pgprot) & (_PAGE_DIRTY | _PAGE_RW)) == \
- _PAGE_DIRTY); \
- pfn_pte(page_to_pfn(page), __pgprot); \
-})
-
static inline int pmd_bad(pmd_t pmd)
{
return (pmd_flags(pmd) & ~(_PAGE_USER | _PAGE_ACCESSED)) !=
@@ -1353,8 +1340,6 @@ static inline void ptep_set_wrprotect(struct mm_struct *mm,
#define flush_tlb_fix_spurious_fault(vma, address, ptep) do { } while (0)
-#define mk_pmd(page, pgprot) pfn_pmd(page_to_pfn(page), (pgprot))
-
#define __HAVE_ARCH_PMDP_SET_ACCESS_FLAGS
extern int pmdp_set_access_flags(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
unsigned long address, pmd_t *pmdp,
@@ -1576,7 +1561,7 @@ static inline pte_t pte_swp_mkexclusive(pte_t pte)
return pte_set_flags(pte, _PAGE_SWP_EXCLUSIVE);
}
-static inline int pte_swp_exclusive(pte_t pte)
+static inline bool pte_swp_exclusive(pte_t pte)
{
return pte_flags(pte) & _PAGE_SWP_EXCLUSIVE;
}
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/posted_intr.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/posted_intr.h
index de788b400fba..a5f761fbf45b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/posted_intr.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/posted_intr.h
@@ -1,19 +1,24 @@
/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
#ifndef _X86_POSTED_INTR_H
#define _X86_POSTED_INTR_H
+
+#include <asm/cmpxchg.h>
+#include <asm/rwonce.h>
#include <asm/irq_vectors.h>
+#include <linux/bitmap.h>
+
#define POSTED_INTR_ON 0
#define POSTED_INTR_SN 1
#define PID_TABLE_ENTRY_VALID 1
+#define NR_PIR_VECTORS 256
+#define NR_PIR_WORDS (NR_PIR_VECTORS / BITS_PER_LONG)
+
/* Posted-Interrupt Descriptor */
struct pi_desc {
- union {
- u32 pir[8]; /* Posted interrupt requested */
- u64 pir64[4];
- };
+ unsigned long pir[NR_PIR_WORDS]; /* Posted interrupt requested */
union {
struct {
u16 notifications; /* Suppress and outstanding bits */
@@ -26,6 +31,65 @@ struct pi_desc {
u32 rsvd[6];
} __aligned(64);
+/*
+ * De-multiplexing posted interrupts is on the performance path, the code
+ * below is written to optimize the cache performance based on the following
+ * considerations:
+ * 1.Posted interrupt descriptor (PID) fits in a cache line that is frequently
+ * accessed by both CPU and IOMMU.
+ * 2.During software processing of posted interrupts, the CPU needs to do
+ * natural width read and xchg for checking and clearing posted interrupt
+ * request (PIR), a 256 bit field within the PID.
+ * 3.On the other side, the IOMMU does atomic swaps of the entire PID cache
+ * line when posting interrupts and setting control bits.
+ * 4.The CPU can access the cache line a magnitude faster than the IOMMU.
+ * 5.Each time the IOMMU does interrupt posting to the PIR will evict the PID
+ * cache line. The cache line states after each operation are as follows,
+ * assuming a 64-bit kernel:
+ * CPU IOMMU PID Cache line state
+ * ---------------------------------------------------------------
+ *...read64 exclusive
+ *...lock xchg64 modified
+ *... post/atomic swap invalid
+ *...-------------------------------------------------------------
+ *
+ * To reduce L1 data cache miss, it is important to avoid contention with
+ * IOMMU's interrupt posting/atomic swap. Therefore, a copy of PIR is used
+ * when processing posted interrupts in software, e.g. to dispatch interrupt
+ * handlers for posted MSIs, or to move interrupts from the PIR to the vIRR
+ * in KVM.
+ *
+ * In addition, the code is trying to keep the cache line state consistent
+ * as much as possible. e.g. when making a copy and clearing the PIR
+ * (assuming non-zero PIR bits are present in the entire PIR), it does:
+ * read, read, read, read, xchg, xchg, xchg, xchg
+ * instead of:
+ * read, xchg, read, xchg, read, xchg, read, xchg
+ */
+static __always_inline bool pi_harvest_pir(unsigned long *pir,
+ unsigned long *pir_vals)
+{
+ unsigned long pending = 0;
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < NR_PIR_WORDS; i++) {
+ pir_vals[i] = READ_ONCE(pir[i]);
+ pending |= pir_vals[i];
+ }
+
+ if (!pending)
+ return false;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < NR_PIR_WORDS; i++) {
+ if (!pir_vals[i])
+ continue;
+
+ pir_vals[i] = arch_xchg(&pir[i], 0);
+ }
+
+ return true;
+}
+
static inline bool pi_test_and_set_on(struct pi_desc *pi_desc)
{
return test_and_set_bit(POSTED_INTR_ON, (unsigned long *)&pi_desc->control);
@@ -43,12 +107,12 @@ static inline bool pi_test_and_clear_sn(struct pi_desc *pi_desc)
static inline bool pi_test_and_set_pir(int vector, struct pi_desc *pi_desc)
{
- return test_and_set_bit(vector, (unsigned long *)pi_desc->pir);
+ return test_and_set_bit(vector, pi_desc->pir);
}
static inline bool pi_is_pir_empty(struct pi_desc *pi_desc)
{
- return bitmap_empty((unsigned long *)pi_desc->pir, NR_VECTORS);
+ return bitmap_empty(pi_desc->pir, NR_VECTORS);
}
static inline void pi_set_sn(struct pi_desc *pi_desc)
@@ -81,6 +145,11 @@ static inline bool pi_test_sn(struct pi_desc *pi_desc)
return test_bit(POSTED_INTR_SN, (unsigned long *)&pi_desc->control);
}
+static inline bool pi_test_pir(int vector, struct pi_desc *pi_desc)
+{
+ return test_bit(vector, (unsigned long *)pi_desc->pir);
+}
+
/* Non-atomic helpers */
static inline void __pi_set_sn(struct pi_desc *pi_desc)
{
@@ -105,7 +174,7 @@ static inline bool pi_pending_this_cpu(unsigned int vector)
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(vector > NR_VECTORS || vector < FIRST_EXTERNAL_VECTOR))
return false;
- return test_bit(vector, (unsigned long *)pid->pir);
+ return test_bit(vector, pid->pir);
}
extern void intel_posted_msi_init(void);
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/set_memory.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/set_memory.h
index 8d9f1c9aaa4c..61f56cdaccb5 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/set_memory.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/set_memory.h
@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@
#include <asm/page.h>
#include <asm-generic/set_memory.h>
+#include <asm/pgtable.h>
#define set_memory_rox set_memory_rox
int set_memory_rox(unsigned long addr, int numpages);
@@ -37,6 +38,7 @@ int set_memory_rox(unsigned long addr, int numpages);
* The caller is required to take care of these.
*/
+int __set_memory_prot(unsigned long addr, int numpages, pgprot_t prot);
int _set_memory_uc(unsigned long addr, int numpages);
int _set_memory_wc(unsigned long addr, int numpages);
int _set_memory_wt(unsigned long addr, int numpages);
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/setup.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/setup.h
index 6324f4c6c545..692af46603a1 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/setup.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/setup.h
@@ -68,6 +68,8 @@ extern void x86_ce4100_early_setup(void);
static inline void x86_ce4100_early_setup(void) { }
#endif
+#include <linux/kexec_handover.h>
+
#ifndef _SETUP
#include <asm/espfix.h>
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/shared/tdx.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/shared/tdx.h
index a28ff6b14145..d8525e6ef50a 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/shared/tdx.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/shared/tdx.h
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@
/* TDX module Call Leaf IDs */
#define TDG_VP_VMCALL 0
#define TDG_VP_INFO 1
+#define TDG_MR_RTMR_EXTEND 2
#define TDG_VP_VEINFO_GET 3
#define TDG_MR_REPORT 4
#define TDG_MEM_PAGE_ACCEPT 6
@@ -67,11 +68,19 @@
#define TD_CTLS_LOCK BIT_ULL(TD_CTLS_LOCK_BIT)
/* TDX hypercall Leaf IDs */
+#define TDVMCALL_GET_TD_VM_CALL_INFO 0x10000
#define TDVMCALL_MAP_GPA 0x10001
#define TDVMCALL_GET_QUOTE 0x10002
#define TDVMCALL_REPORT_FATAL_ERROR 0x10003
-#define TDVMCALL_STATUS_RETRY 1
+/*
+ * TDG.VP.VMCALL Status Codes (returned in R10)
+ */
+#define TDVMCALL_STATUS_SUCCESS 0x0000000000000000ULL
+#define TDVMCALL_STATUS_RETRY 0x0000000000000001ULL
+#define TDVMCALL_STATUS_INVALID_OPERAND 0x8000000000000000ULL
+#define TDVMCALL_STATUS_ALIGN_ERROR 0x8000000000000002ULL
+#define TDVMCALL_STATUS_SUBFUNC_UNSUPPORTED 0x8000000000000003ULL
/*
* Bitmasks of exposed registers (with VMM).
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/sighandling.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/sighandling.h
index e770c4fc47f4..8727c7e21dd1 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/sighandling.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/sighandling.h
@@ -24,4 +24,26 @@ int ia32_setup_rt_frame(struct ksignal *ksig, struct pt_regs *regs);
int x64_setup_rt_frame(struct ksignal *ksig, struct pt_regs *regs);
int x32_setup_rt_frame(struct ksignal *ksig, struct pt_regs *regs);
+/*
+ * To prevent immediate repeat of single step trap on return from SIGTRAP
+ * handler if the trap flag (TF) is set without an external debugger attached,
+ * clear the software event flag in the augmented SS, ensuring no single-step
+ * trap is pending upon ERETU completion.
+ *
+ * Note, this function should be called in sigreturn() before the original
+ * state is restored to make sure the TF is read from the entry frame.
+ */
+static __always_inline void prevent_single_step_upon_eretu(struct pt_regs *regs)
+{
+ /*
+ * If the trap flag (TF) is set, i.e., the sigreturn() SYSCALL instruction
+ * is being single-stepped, do not clear the software event flag in the
+ * augmented SS, thus a debugger won't skip over the following instruction.
+ */
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_FRED
+ if (!(regs->flags & X86_EFLAGS_TF))
+ regs->fred_ss.swevent = 0;
+#endif
+}
+
#endif /* _ASM_X86_SIGHANDLING_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h
index 9b7fa99ae951..ad954a1a6656 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h
@@ -116,6 +116,7 @@ enum {
INTERCEPT_INVPCID,
INTERCEPT_MCOMMIT,
INTERCEPT_TLBSYNC,
+ INTERCEPT_BUSLOCK,
INTERCEPT_IDLE_HLT = 166,
};
@@ -159,7 +160,12 @@ struct __attribute__ ((__packed__)) vmcb_control_area {
u64 avic_physical_id; /* Offset 0xf8 */
u8 reserved_7[8];
u64 vmsa_pa; /* Used for an SEV-ES guest */
- u8 reserved_8[720];
+ u8 reserved_8[16];
+ u16 bus_lock_counter; /* Offset 0x120 */
+ u8 reserved_9[22];
+ u64 allowed_sev_features; /* Offset 0x138 */
+ u64 guest_sev_features; /* Offset 0x140 */
+ u8 reserved_10[664];
/*
* Offset 0x3e0, 32 bytes reserved
* for use by hypervisor/software.
@@ -291,6 +297,8 @@ static_assert((X2AVIC_MAX_PHYSICAL_ID & AVIC_PHYSICAL_MAX_INDEX_MASK) == X2AVIC_
#define SVM_SEV_FEAT_ALTERNATE_INJECTION BIT(4)
#define SVM_SEV_FEAT_DEBUG_SWAP BIT(5)
+#define VMCB_ALLOWED_SEV_FEATURES_VALID BIT_ULL(63)
+
struct vmcb_seg {
u16 selector;
u16 attrib;
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/syscall.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/syscall.h
index 7c488ff0c764..c10dbb74cd00 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/syscall.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/syscall.h
@@ -38,6 +38,13 @@ static inline int syscall_get_nr(struct task_struct *task, struct pt_regs *regs)
return regs->orig_ax;
}
+static inline void syscall_set_nr(struct task_struct *task,
+ struct pt_regs *regs,
+ int nr)
+{
+ regs->orig_ax = nr;
+}
+
static inline void syscall_rollback(struct task_struct *task,
struct pt_regs *regs)
{
@@ -90,6 +97,18 @@ static inline void syscall_get_arguments(struct task_struct *task,
args[5] = regs->bp;
}
+static inline void syscall_set_arguments(struct task_struct *task,
+ struct pt_regs *regs,
+ const unsigned long *args)
+{
+ regs->bx = args[0];
+ regs->cx = args[1];
+ regs->dx = args[2];
+ regs->si = args[3];
+ regs->di = args[4];
+ regs->bp = args[5];
+}
+
static inline int syscall_get_arch(struct task_struct *task)
{
return AUDIT_ARCH_I386;
@@ -121,6 +140,30 @@ static inline void syscall_get_arguments(struct task_struct *task,
}
}
+static inline void syscall_set_arguments(struct task_struct *task,
+ struct pt_regs *regs,
+ const unsigned long *args)
+{
+# ifdef CONFIG_IA32_EMULATION
+ if (task->thread_info.status & TS_COMPAT) {
+ regs->bx = *args++;
+ regs->cx = *args++;
+ regs->dx = *args++;
+ regs->si = *args++;
+ regs->di = *args++;
+ regs->bp = *args;
+ } else
+# endif
+ {
+ regs->di = *args++;
+ regs->si = *args++;
+ regs->dx = *args++;
+ regs->r10 = *args++;
+ regs->r8 = *args++;
+ regs->r9 = *args;
+ }
+}
+
static inline int syscall_get_arch(struct task_struct *task)
{
/* x32 tasks should be considered AUDIT_ARCH_X86_64. */
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/tdx.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/tdx.h
index 4a1922ec80cf..7ddef3a69866 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/tdx.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/tdx.h
@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@
#include <linux/init.h>
#include <linux/bits.h>
+#include <linux/mmzone.h>
#include <asm/errno.h>
#include <asm/ptrace.h>
@@ -18,6 +19,7 @@
* TDX module.
*/
#define TDX_ERROR _BITUL(63)
+#define TDX_NON_RECOVERABLE _BITUL(62)
#define TDX_SW_ERROR (TDX_ERROR | GENMASK_ULL(47, 40))
#define TDX_SEAMCALL_VMFAILINVALID (TDX_SW_ERROR | _UL(0xFFFF0000))
@@ -33,6 +35,8 @@
#ifndef __ASSEMBLER__
#include <uapi/asm/mce.h>
+#include <asm/tdx_global_metadata.h>
+#include <linux/pgtable.h>
/*
* Used by the #VE exception handler to gather the #VE exception
@@ -64,6 +68,8 @@ bool tdx_early_handle_ve(struct pt_regs *regs);
int tdx_mcall_get_report0(u8 *reportdata, u8 *tdreport);
+int tdx_mcall_extend_rtmr(u8 index, u8 *data);
+
u64 tdx_hcall_get_quote(u8 *buf, size_t size);
void __init tdx_dump_attributes(u64 td_attr);
@@ -100,7 +106,7 @@ void tdx_init(void);
typedef u64 (*sc_func_t)(u64 fn, struct tdx_module_args *args);
-static inline u64 sc_retry(sc_func_t func, u64 fn,
+static __always_inline u64 sc_retry(sc_func_t func, u64 fn,
struct tdx_module_args *args)
{
int retry = RDRAND_RETRY_LOOPS;
@@ -119,11 +125,82 @@ static inline u64 sc_retry(sc_func_t func, u64 fn,
int tdx_cpu_enable(void);
int tdx_enable(void);
const char *tdx_dump_mce_info(struct mce *m);
+const struct tdx_sys_info *tdx_get_sysinfo(void);
+
+int tdx_guest_keyid_alloc(void);
+u32 tdx_get_nr_guest_keyids(void);
+void tdx_guest_keyid_free(unsigned int keyid);
+
+struct tdx_td {
+ /* TD root structure: */
+ struct page *tdr_page;
+
+ int tdcs_nr_pages;
+ /* TD control structure: */
+ struct page **tdcs_pages;
+
+ /* Size of `tdcx_pages` in struct tdx_vp */
+ int tdcx_nr_pages;
+};
+
+struct tdx_vp {
+ /* TDVP root page */
+ struct page *tdvpr_page;
+
+ /* TD vCPU control structure: */
+ struct page **tdcx_pages;
+};
+
+static inline u64 mk_keyed_paddr(u16 hkid, struct page *page)
+{
+ u64 ret;
+
+ ret = page_to_phys(page);
+ /* KeyID bits are just above the physical address bits: */
+ ret |= (u64)hkid << boot_cpu_data.x86_phys_bits;
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static inline int pg_level_to_tdx_sept_level(enum pg_level level)
+{
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(level == PG_LEVEL_NONE);
+ return level - 1;
+}
+
+u64 tdh_vp_enter(struct tdx_vp *vp, struct tdx_module_args *args);
+u64 tdh_mng_addcx(struct tdx_td *td, struct page *tdcs_page);
+u64 tdh_mem_page_add(struct tdx_td *td, u64 gpa, struct page *page, struct page *source, u64 *ext_err1, u64 *ext_err2);
+u64 tdh_mem_sept_add(struct tdx_td *td, u64 gpa, int level, struct page *page, u64 *ext_err1, u64 *ext_err2);
+u64 tdh_vp_addcx(struct tdx_vp *vp, struct page *tdcx_page);
+u64 tdh_mem_page_aug(struct tdx_td *td, u64 gpa, int level, struct page *page, u64 *ext_err1, u64 *ext_err2);
+u64 tdh_mem_range_block(struct tdx_td *td, u64 gpa, int level, u64 *ext_err1, u64 *ext_err2);
+u64 tdh_mng_key_config(struct tdx_td *td);
+u64 tdh_mng_create(struct tdx_td *td, u16 hkid);
+u64 tdh_vp_create(struct tdx_td *td, struct tdx_vp *vp);
+u64 tdh_mng_rd(struct tdx_td *td, u64 field, u64 *data);
+u64 tdh_mr_extend(struct tdx_td *td, u64 gpa, u64 *ext_err1, u64 *ext_err2);
+u64 tdh_mr_finalize(struct tdx_td *td);
+u64 tdh_vp_flush(struct tdx_vp *vp);
+u64 tdh_mng_vpflushdone(struct tdx_td *td);
+u64 tdh_mng_key_freeid(struct tdx_td *td);
+u64 tdh_mng_init(struct tdx_td *td, u64 td_params, u64 *extended_err);
+u64 tdh_vp_init(struct tdx_vp *vp, u64 initial_rcx, u32 x2apicid);
+u64 tdh_vp_rd(struct tdx_vp *vp, u64 field, u64 *data);
+u64 tdh_vp_wr(struct tdx_vp *vp, u64 field, u64 data, u64 mask);
+u64 tdh_phymem_page_reclaim(struct page *page, u64 *tdx_pt, u64 *tdx_owner, u64 *tdx_size);
+u64 tdh_mem_track(struct tdx_td *tdr);
+u64 tdh_mem_page_remove(struct tdx_td *td, u64 gpa, u64 level, u64 *ext_err1, u64 *ext_err2);
+u64 tdh_phymem_cache_wb(bool resume);
+u64 tdh_phymem_page_wbinvd_tdr(struct tdx_td *td);
+u64 tdh_phymem_page_wbinvd_hkid(u64 hkid, struct page *page);
#else
static inline void tdx_init(void) { }
static inline int tdx_cpu_enable(void) { return -ENODEV; }
static inline int tdx_enable(void) { return -ENODEV; }
+static inline u32 tdx_get_nr_guest_keyids(void) { return 0; }
static inline const char *tdx_dump_mce_info(struct mce *m) { return NULL; }
+static inline const struct tdx_sys_info *tdx_get_sysinfo(void) { return NULL; }
#endif /* CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_HOST */
#endif /* !__ASSEMBLER__ */
diff --git a/arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx_global_metadata.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/tdx_global_metadata.h
index 6dd3c9695f59..060a2ad744bf 100644
--- a/arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx_global_metadata.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/tdx_global_metadata.h
@@ -17,9 +17,28 @@ struct tdx_sys_info_tdmr {
u16 pamt_1g_entry_size;
};
+struct tdx_sys_info_td_ctrl {
+ u16 tdr_base_size;
+ u16 tdcs_base_size;
+ u16 tdvps_base_size;
+};
+
+struct tdx_sys_info_td_conf {
+ u64 attributes_fixed0;
+ u64 attributes_fixed1;
+ u64 xfam_fixed0;
+ u64 xfam_fixed1;
+ u16 num_cpuid_config;
+ u16 max_vcpus_per_td;
+ u64 cpuid_config_leaves[128];
+ u64 cpuid_config_values[128][2];
+};
+
struct tdx_sys_info {
struct tdx_sys_info_features features;
struct tdx_sys_info_tdmr tdmr;
+ struct tdx_sys_info_td_ctrl td_ctrl;
+ struct tdx_sys_info_td_conf td_conf;
};
#endif
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/trace/fpu.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/trace/fpu.h
index 0454d5e60e5d..721b408d9a67 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/trace/fpu.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/trace/fpu.h
@@ -44,16 +44,6 @@ DEFINE_EVENT(x86_fpu, x86_fpu_after_save,
TP_ARGS(fpu)
);
-DEFINE_EVENT(x86_fpu, x86_fpu_before_restore,
- TP_PROTO(struct fpu *fpu),
- TP_ARGS(fpu)
-);
-
-DEFINE_EVENT(x86_fpu, x86_fpu_after_restore,
- TP_PROTO(struct fpu *fpu),
- TP_ARGS(fpu)
-);
-
DEFINE_EVENT(x86_fpu, x86_fpu_regs_activated,
TP_PROTO(struct fpu *fpu),
TP_ARGS(fpu)
@@ -64,11 +54,6 @@ DEFINE_EVENT(x86_fpu, x86_fpu_regs_deactivated,
TP_ARGS(fpu)
);
-DEFINE_EVENT(x86_fpu, x86_fpu_init_state,
- TP_PROTO(struct fpu *fpu),
- TP_ARGS(fpu)
-);
-
DEFINE_EVENT(x86_fpu, x86_fpu_dropped,
TP_PROTO(struct fpu *fpu),
TP_ARGS(fpu)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h
index 8707361b24da..cca7d6641287 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h
@@ -256,6 +256,7 @@ enum vmcs_field {
TSC_MULTIPLIER_HIGH = 0x00002033,
TERTIARY_VM_EXEC_CONTROL = 0x00002034,
TERTIARY_VM_EXEC_CONTROL_HIGH = 0x00002035,
+ SHARED_EPT_POINTER = 0x0000203C,
PID_POINTER_TABLE = 0x00002042,
PID_POINTER_TABLE_HIGH = 0x00002043,
GUEST_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS = 0x00002400,
@@ -586,6 +587,7 @@ enum vm_entry_failure_code {
#define EPT_VIOLATION_PROT_READ BIT(3)
#define EPT_VIOLATION_PROT_WRITE BIT(4)
#define EPT_VIOLATION_PROT_EXEC BIT(5)
+#define EPT_VIOLATION_EXEC_FOR_RING3_LIN BIT(6)
#define EPT_VIOLATION_PROT_MASK (EPT_VIOLATION_PROT_READ | \
EPT_VIOLATION_PROT_WRITE | \
EPT_VIOLATION_PROT_EXEC)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h
index 460306b35a4b..6f3499507c5e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h
@@ -441,6 +441,7 @@ struct kvm_sync_regs {
#define KVM_X86_QUIRK_MWAIT_NEVER_UD_FAULTS (1 << 6)
#define KVM_X86_QUIRK_SLOT_ZAP_ALL (1 << 7)
#define KVM_X86_QUIRK_STUFF_FEATURE_MSRS (1 << 8)
+#define KVM_X86_QUIRK_IGNORE_GUEST_PAT (1 << 9)
#define KVM_STATE_NESTED_FORMAT_VMX 0
#define KVM_STATE_NESTED_FORMAT_SVM 1
@@ -844,6 +845,7 @@ struct kvm_sev_snp_launch_start {
};
/* Kept in sync with firmware values for simplicity. */
+#define KVM_SEV_PAGE_TYPE_INVALID 0x0
#define KVM_SEV_SNP_PAGE_TYPE_NORMAL 0x1
#define KVM_SEV_SNP_PAGE_TYPE_ZERO 0x3
#define KVM_SEV_SNP_PAGE_TYPE_UNMEASURED 0x4
@@ -930,4 +932,74 @@ struct kvm_hyperv_eventfd {
#define KVM_X86_SNP_VM 4
#define KVM_X86_TDX_VM 5
+/* Trust Domain eXtension sub-ioctl() commands. */
+enum kvm_tdx_cmd_id {
+ KVM_TDX_CAPABILITIES = 0,
+ KVM_TDX_INIT_VM,
+ KVM_TDX_INIT_VCPU,
+ KVM_TDX_INIT_MEM_REGION,
+ KVM_TDX_FINALIZE_VM,
+ KVM_TDX_GET_CPUID,
+
+ KVM_TDX_CMD_NR_MAX,
+};
+
+struct kvm_tdx_cmd {
+ /* enum kvm_tdx_cmd_id */
+ __u32 id;
+ /* flags for sub-commend. If sub-command doesn't use this, set zero. */
+ __u32 flags;
+ /*
+ * data for each sub-command. An immediate or a pointer to the actual
+ * data in process virtual address. If sub-command doesn't use it,
+ * set zero.
+ */
+ __u64 data;
+ /*
+ * Auxiliary error code. The sub-command may return TDX SEAMCALL
+ * status code in addition to -Exxx.
+ */
+ __u64 hw_error;
+};
+
+struct kvm_tdx_capabilities {
+ __u64 supported_attrs;
+ __u64 supported_xfam;
+ __u64 reserved[254];
+
+ /* Configurable CPUID bits for userspace */
+ struct kvm_cpuid2 cpuid;
+};
+
+struct kvm_tdx_init_vm {
+ __u64 attributes;
+ __u64 xfam;
+ __u64 mrconfigid[6]; /* sha384 digest */
+ __u64 mrowner[6]; /* sha384 digest */
+ __u64 mrownerconfig[6]; /* sha384 digest */
+
+ /* The total space for TD_PARAMS before the CPUIDs is 256 bytes */
+ __u64 reserved[12];
+
+ /*
+ * Call KVM_TDX_INIT_VM before vcpu creation, thus before
+ * KVM_SET_CPUID2.
+ * This configuration supersedes KVM_SET_CPUID2s for VCPUs because the
+ * TDX module directly virtualizes those CPUIDs without VMM. The user
+ * space VMM, e.g. qemu, should make KVM_SET_CPUID2 consistent with
+ * those values. If it doesn't, KVM may have wrong idea of vCPUIDs of
+ * the guest, and KVM may wrongly emulate CPUIDs or MSRs that the TDX
+ * module doesn't virtualize.
+ */
+ struct kvm_cpuid2 cpuid;
+};
+
+#define KVM_TDX_MEASURE_MEMORY_REGION _BITULL(0)
+
+struct kvm_tdx_init_mem_region {
+ __u64 source_addr;
+ __u64 gpa;
+ __u64 nr_pages;
+};
+
#endif /* _ASM_X86_KVM_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/setup_data.h b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/setup_data.h
index 50c45ead4e7c..2671c4e1b3a0 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/setup_data.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/setup_data.h
@@ -13,7 +13,8 @@
#define SETUP_CC_BLOB 7
#define SETUP_IMA 8
#define SETUP_RNG_SEED 9
-#define SETUP_ENUM_MAX SETUP_RNG_SEED
+#define SETUP_KEXEC_KHO 10
+#define SETUP_ENUM_MAX SETUP_KEXEC_KHO
#define SETUP_INDIRECT (1<<31)
#define SETUP_TYPE_MAX (SETUP_ENUM_MAX | SETUP_INDIRECT)
@@ -78,6 +79,16 @@ struct ima_setup_data {
__u64 size;
} __attribute__((packed));
+/*
+ * Locations of kexec handover metadata
+ */
+struct kho_data {
+ __u64 fdt_addr;
+ __u64 fdt_size;
+ __u64 scratch_addr;
+ __u64 scratch_size;
+} __attribute__((packed));
+
#endif /* __ASSEMBLER__ */
#endif /* _UAPI_ASM_X86_SETUP_DATA_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/svm.h b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/svm.h
index ec1321248dac..9c640a521a67 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/svm.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/svm.h
@@ -95,6 +95,7 @@
#define SVM_EXIT_CR14_WRITE_TRAP 0x09e
#define SVM_EXIT_CR15_WRITE_TRAP 0x09f
#define SVM_EXIT_INVPCID 0x0a2
+#define SVM_EXIT_BUS_LOCK 0x0a5
#define SVM_EXIT_IDLE_HLT 0x0a6
#define SVM_EXIT_NPF 0x400
#define SVM_EXIT_AVIC_INCOMPLETE_IPI 0x401
@@ -225,6 +226,7 @@
{ SVM_EXIT_CR4_WRITE_TRAP, "write_cr4_trap" }, \
{ SVM_EXIT_CR8_WRITE_TRAP, "write_cr8_trap" }, \
{ SVM_EXIT_INVPCID, "invpcid" }, \
+ { SVM_EXIT_BUS_LOCK, "buslock" }, \
{ SVM_EXIT_IDLE_HLT, "idle-halt" }, \
{ SVM_EXIT_NPF, "npf" }, \
{ SVM_EXIT_AVIC_INCOMPLETE_IPI, "avic_incomplete_ipi" }, \
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/vmx.h b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/vmx.h
index a5faf6d88f1b..f0f4a4cf84a7 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/vmx.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/vmx.h
@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@
#define EXIT_REASON_TRIPLE_FAULT 2
#define EXIT_REASON_INIT_SIGNAL 3
#define EXIT_REASON_SIPI_SIGNAL 4
+#define EXIT_REASON_OTHER_SMI 6
#define EXIT_REASON_INTERRUPT_WINDOW 7
#define EXIT_REASON_NMI_WINDOW 8
@@ -92,6 +93,7 @@
#define EXIT_REASON_TPAUSE 68
#define EXIT_REASON_BUS_LOCK 74
#define EXIT_REASON_NOTIFY 75
+#define EXIT_REASON_TDCALL 77
#define VMX_EXIT_REASONS \
{ EXIT_REASON_EXCEPTION_NMI, "EXCEPTION_NMI" }, \
@@ -155,7 +157,8 @@
{ EXIT_REASON_UMWAIT, "UMWAIT" }, \
{ EXIT_REASON_TPAUSE, "TPAUSE" }, \
{ EXIT_REASON_BUS_LOCK, "BUS_LOCK" }, \
- { EXIT_REASON_NOTIFY, "NOTIFY" }
+ { EXIT_REASON_NOTIFY, "NOTIFY" }, \
+ { EXIT_REASON_TDCALL, "TDCALL" }
#define VMX_EXIT_REASON_FLAGS \
{ VMX_EXIT_REASONS_FAILED_VMENTRY, "FAILED_VMENTRY" }
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile b/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile
index 99a783fd4691..0d2a6d953be9 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
# Makefile for the linux kernel.
#
-extra-y += vmlinux.lds
+always-$(KBUILD_BUILTIN) += vmlinux.lds
CPPFLAGS_vmlinux.lds += -U$(UTS_MACHINE)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/madt_wakeup.c b/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/madt_wakeup.c
index f36f28405dcc..6d7603511f52 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/madt_wakeup.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/madt_wakeup.c
@@ -126,7 +126,7 @@ static int __init acpi_mp_setup_reset(u64 reset_vector)
return 0;
}
-static int acpi_wakeup_cpu(u32 apicid, unsigned long start_ip)
+static int acpi_wakeup_cpu(u32 apicid, unsigned long start_ip, unsigned int cpu)
{
if (!acpi_mp_wake_mailbox_paddr) {
pr_warn_once("No MADT mailbox: cannot bringup secondary CPUs. Booting with kexec?\n");
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c b/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c
index ecfe7b497cad..ea1d984166cd 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c
@@ -116,6 +116,24 @@ static struct module *its_mod;
#endif
static void *its_page;
static unsigned int its_offset;
+struct its_array its_pages;
+
+static void *__its_alloc(struct its_array *pages)
+{
+ void *page __free(execmem) = execmem_alloc(EXECMEM_MODULE_TEXT, PAGE_SIZE);
+ if (!page)
+ return NULL;
+
+ void *tmp = krealloc(pages->pages, (pages->num+1) * sizeof(void *),
+ GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!tmp)
+ return NULL;
+
+ pages->pages = tmp;
+ pages->pages[pages->num++] = page;
+
+ return no_free_ptr(page);
+}
/* Initialize a thunk with the "jmp *reg; int3" instructions. */
static void *its_init_thunk(void *thunk, int reg)
@@ -151,6 +169,21 @@ static void *its_init_thunk(void *thunk, int reg)
return thunk + offset;
}
+static void its_pages_protect(struct its_array *pages)
+{
+ for (int i = 0; i < pages->num; i++) {
+ void *page = pages->pages[i];
+ execmem_restore_rox(page, PAGE_SIZE);
+ }
+}
+
+static void its_fini_core(void)
+{
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_STRICT_KERNEL_RWX))
+ its_pages_protect(&its_pages);
+ kfree(its_pages.pages);
+}
+
#ifdef CONFIG_MODULES
void its_init_mod(struct module *mod)
{
@@ -173,10 +206,8 @@ void its_fini_mod(struct module *mod)
its_page = NULL;
mutex_unlock(&text_mutex);
- for (int i = 0; i < mod->its_num_pages; i++) {
- void *page = mod->its_page_array[i];
- execmem_restore_rox(page, PAGE_SIZE);
- }
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_STRICT_MODULE_RWX))
+ its_pages_protect(&mod->arch.its_pages);
}
void its_free_mod(struct module *mod)
@@ -184,37 +215,33 @@ void its_free_mod(struct module *mod)
if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_INDIRECT_THUNK_ITS))
return;
- for (int i = 0; i < mod->its_num_pages; i++) {
- void *page = mod->its_page_array[i];
+ for (int i = 0; i < mod->arch.its_pages.num; i++) {
+ void *page = mod->arch.its_pages.pages[i];
execmem_free(page);
}
- kfree(mod->its_page_array);
+ kfree(mod->arch.its_pages.pages);
}
#endif /* CONFIG_MODULES */
static void *its_alloc(void)
{
- void *page __free(execmem) = execmem_alloc(EXECMEM_MODULE_TEXT, PAGE_SIZE);
-
- if (!page)
- return NULL;
+ struct its_array *pages = &its_pages;
+ void *page;
#ifdef CONFIG_MODULES
- if (its_mod) {
- void *tmp = krealloc(its_mod->its_page_array,
- (its_mod->its_num_pages+1) * sizeof(void *),
- GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!tmp)
- return NULL;
+ if (its_mod)
+ pages = &its_mod->arch.its_pages;
+#endif
- its_mod->its_page_array = tmp;
- its_mod->its_page_array[its_mod->its_num_pages++] = page;
+ page = __its_alloc(pages);
+ if (!page)
+ return NULL;
- execmem_make_temp_rw(page, PAGE_SIZE);
- }
-#endif /* CONFIG_MODULES */
+ execmem_make_temp_rw(page, PAGE_SIZE);
+ if (pages == &its_pages)
+ set_memory_x((unsigned long)page, 1);
- return no_free_ptr(page);
+ return page;
}
static void *its_allocate_thunk(int reg)
@@ -268,7 +295,9 @@ u8 *its_static_thunk(int reg)
return thunk;
}
-#endif
+#else
+static inline void its_fini_core(void) {}
+#endif /* CONFIG_MITIGATION_ITS */
/*
* Nomenclature for variable names to simplify and clarify this code and ease
@@ -2338,6 +2367,8 @@ void __init alternative_instructions(void)
apply_retpolines(__retpoline_sites, __retpoline_sites_end);
apply_returns(__return_sites, __return_sites_end);
+ its_fini_core();
+
/*
* Adjust all CALL instructions to point to func()-10, including
* those in .altinstr_replacement.
@@ -3107,6 +3138,6 @@ void __ref smp_text_poke_batch_add(void *addr, const void *opcode, size_t len, c
*/
void __ref smp_text_poke_single(void *addr, const void *opcode, size_t len, const void *emulate)
{
- __smp_text_poke_batch_add(addr, opcode, len, emulate);
+ smp_text_poke_batch_add(addr, opcode, len, emulate);
smp_text_poke_batch_finish();
}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic_noop.c b/arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic_noop.c
index b5bb7a2e8340..58abb941c45b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic_noop.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic_noop.c
@@ -27,7 +27,13 @@ static void noop_send_IPI_allbutself(int vector) { }
static void noop_send_IPI_all(int vector) { }
static void noop_send_IPI_self(int vector) { }
static void noop_apic_icr_write(u32 low, u32 id) { }
-static int noop_wakeup_secondary_cpu(u32 apicid, unsigned long start_eip) { return -1; }
+
+static int noop_wakeup_secondary_cpu(u32 apicid, unsigned long start_eip,
+ unsigned int cpu)
+{
+ return -1;
+}
+
static u64 noop_apic_icr_read(void) { return 0; }
static u32 noop_get_apic_id(u32 apicid) { return 0; }
static void noop_apic_eoi(void) { }
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic_numachip.c b/arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic_numachip.c
index e272bc7fdc8e..5c5be2d58242 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic_numachip.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic_numachip.c
@@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ static void numachip2_apic_icr_write(int apicid, unsigned int val)
numachip2_write32_lcsr(NUMACHIP2_APIC_ICR, (apicid << 12) | val);
}
-static int numachip_wakeup_secondary(u32 phys_apicid, unsigned long start_rip)
+static int numachip_wakeup_secondary(u32 phys_apicid, unsigned long start_rip, unsigned int cpu)
{
numachip_apic_icr_write(phys_apicid, APIC_DM_INIT);
numachip_apic_icr_write(phys_apicid, APIC_DM_STARTUP |
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/apic/x2apic_uv_x.c b/arch/x86/kernel/apic/x2apic_uv_x.c
index 7fef504ca508..15209f220e1f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/apic/x2apic_uv_x.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/apic/x2apic_uv_x.c
@@ -667,7 +667,7 @@ static __init void build_uv_gr_table(void)
}
}
-static int uv_wakeup_secondary(u32 phys_apicid, unsigned long start_rip)
+static int uv_wakeup_secondary(u32 phys_apicid, unsigned long start_rip, unsigned int cpu)
{
unsigned long val;
int pnode;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
index 93da466dfe2c..b2ad8d13211a 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@
#include "cpu.h"
-u16 invlpgb_count_max __ro_after_init;
+u16 invlpgb_count_max __ro_after_init = 1;
static inline int rdmsrq_amd_safe(unsigned msr, u64 *p)
{
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/core.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/core.c
index 7109cbfcad4f..187d527ef73b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/core.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/core.c
@@ -498,6 +498,7 @@ static void domain_add_cpu_mon(int cpu, struct rdt_resource *r)
struct rdt_hw_mon_domain *hw_dom;
struct rdt_domain_hdr *hdr;
struct rdt_mon_domain *d;
+ struct cacheinfo *ci;
int err;
lockdep_assert_held(&domain_list_lock);
@@ -525,12 +526,13 @@ static void domain_add_cpu_mon(int cpu, struct rdt_resource *r)
d = &hw_dom->d_resctrl;
d->hdr.id = id;
d->hdr.type = RESCTRL_MON_DOMAIN;
- d->ci = get_cpu_cacheinfo_level(cpu, RESCTRL_L3_CACHE);
- if (!d->ci) {
+ ci = get_cpu_cacheinfo_level(cpu, RESCTRL_L3_CACHE);
+ if (!ci) {
pr_warn_once("Can't find L3 cache for CPU:%d resource %s\n", cpu, r->name);
mon_domain_free(hw_dom);
return;
}
+ d->ci_id = ci->id;
cpumask_set_cpu(cpu, &d->hdr.cpu_mask);
arch_mon_domain_online(r, d);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver.h b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver.h
index 4eddb4d571ef..30f39f92c98f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver.h
@@ -2,7 +2,6 @@
#ifndef __ARCH_SGX_DRIVER_H__
#define __ARCH_SGX_DRIVER_H__
-#include <crypto/hash.h>
#include <linux/kref.h>
#include <linux/mmu_notifier.h>
#include <linux/radix-tree.h>
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c
index 776a20172867..66f1efa16fbb 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c
@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@
#include <asm/mman.h>
#include <asm/sgx.h>
+#include <crypto/sha2.h>
#include <linux/mman.h>
#include <linux/delay.h>
#include <linux/file.h>
@@ -463,31 +464,6 @@ static long sgx_ioc_enclave_add_pages(struct sgx_encl *encl, void __user *arg)
return ret;
}
-static int __sgx_get_key_hash(struct crypto_shash *tfm, const void *modulus,
- void *hash)
-{
- SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK(shash, tfm);
-
- shash->tfm = tfm;
-
- return crypto_shash_digest(shash, modulus, SGX_MODULUS_SIZE, hash);
-}
-
-static int sgx_get_key_hash(const void *modulus, void *hash)
-{
- struct crypto_shash *tfm;
- int ret;
-
- tfm = crypto_alloc_shash("sha256", 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
- if (IS_ERR(tfm))
- return PTR_ERR(tfm);
-
- ret = __sgx_get_key_hash(tfm, modulus, hash);
-
- crypto_free_shash(tfm);
- return ret;
-}
-
static int sgx_encl_init(struct sgx_encl *encl, struct sgx_sigstruct *sigstruct,
void *token)
{
@@ -523,9 +499,7 @@ static int sgx_encl_init(struct sgx_encl *encl, struct sgx_sigstruct *sigstruct,
sgx_xfrm_reserved_mask)
return -EINVAL;
- ret = sgx_get_key_hash(sigstruct->modulus, mrsigner);
- if (ret)
- return ret;
+ sha256(sigstruct->modulus, SGX_MODULUS_SIZE, (u8 *)mrsigner);
mutex_lock(&encl->lock);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c
index 6722b2fc82cf..2de01b379aa3 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c
@@ -720,6 +720,8 @@ int arch_memory_failure(unsigned long pfn, int flags)
goto out;
}
+ sgx_unmark_page_reclaimable(page);
+
/*
* TBD: Add additional plumbing to enable pre-emptive
* action for asynchronous poison notification. Until
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/crash.c b/arch/x86/kernel/crash.c
index 0be61c45400c..bcb534688dfe 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/crash.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/crash.c
@@ -278,6 +278,7 @@ static int memmap_exclude_ranges(struct kimage *image, struct crash_mem *cmem,
unsigned long long mend)
{
unsigned long start, end;
+ int ret;
cmem->ranges[0].start = mstart;
cmem->ranges[0].end = mend;
@@ -286,22 +287,43 @@ static int memmap_exclude_ranges(struct kimage *image, struct crash_mem *cmem,
/* Exclude elf header region */
start = image->elf_load_addr;
end = start + image->elf_headers_sz - 1;
- return crash_exclude_mem_range(cmem, start, end);
+ ret = crash_exclude_mem_range(cmem, start, end);
+
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+
+ /* Exclude dm crypt keys region */
+ if (image->dm_crypt_keys_addr) {
+ start = image->dm_crypt_keys_addr;
+ end = start + image->dm_crypt_keys_sz - 1;
+ return crash_exclude_mem_range(cmem, start, end);
+ }
+
+ return ret;
}
/* Prepare memory map for crash dump kernel */
int crash_setup_memmap_entries(struct kimage *image, struct boot_params *params)
{
+ unsigned int nr_ranges = 0;
int i, ret = 0;
unsigned long flags;
struct e820_entry ei;
struct crash_memmap_data cmd;
struct crash_mem *cmem;
- cmem = vzalloc(struct_size(cmem, ranges, 1));
+ /*
+ * Using random kexec_buf for passing dm crypt keys may cause a range
+ * split. So use two slots here.
+ */
+ nr_ranges = 2;
+ cmem = vzalloc(struct_size(cmem, ranges, nr_ranges));
if (!cmem)
return -ENOMEM;
+ cmem->max_nr_ranges = nr_ranges;
+ cmem->nr_ranges = 0;
+
memset(&cmd, 0, sizeof(struct crash_memmap_data));
cmd.params = params;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/e820.c b/arch/x86/kernel/e820.c
index 9920122018a0..c3acbd26408b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/e820.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/e820.c
@@ -1300,6 +1300,24 @@ void __init e820__memblock_setup(void)
}
/*
+ * At this point memblock is only allowed to allocate from memory
+ * below 1M (aka ISA_END_ADDRESS) up until direct map is completely set
+ * up in init_mem_mapping().
+ *
+ * KHO kernels are special and use only scratch memory for memblock
+ * allocations, but memory below 1M is ignored by kernel after early
+ * boot and cannot be naturally marked as scratch.
+ *
+ * To allow allocation of the real-mode trampoline and a few (if any)
+ * other very early allocations from below 1M forcibly mark the memory
+ * below 1M as scratch.
+ *
+ * After real mode trampoline is allocated, we clear that scratch
+ * marking.
+ */
+ memblock_mark_kho_scratch(0, SZ_1M);
+
+ /*
* 32-bit systems are limited to 4BG of memory even with HIGHMEM and
* to even less without it.
* Discard memory after max_pfn - the actual limit detected at runtime.
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/ioport.c b/arch/x86/kernel/ioport.c
index 6290dd120f5e..ff40f09ad911 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/ioport.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/ioport.c
@@ -33,8 +33,9 @@ void io_bitmap_share(struct task_struct *tsk)
set_tsk_thread_flag(tsk, TIF_IO_BITMAP);
}
-static void task_update_io_bitmap(struct task_struct *tsk)
+static void task_update_io_bitmap(void)
{
+ struct task_struct *tsk = current;
struct thread_struct *t = &tsk->thread;
if (t->iopl_emul == 3 || t->io_bitmap) {
@@ -54,7 +55,12 @@ void io_bitmap_exit(struct task_struct *tsk)
struct io_bitmap *iobm = tsk->thread.io_bitmap;
tsk->thread.io_bitmap = NULL;
- task_update_io_bitmap(tsk);
+ /*
+ * Don't touch the TSS when invoked on a failed fork(). TSS
+ * reflects the state of @current and not the state of @tsk.
+ */
+ if (tsk == current)
+ task_update_io_bitmap();
if (iobm && refcount_dec_and_test(&iobm->refcnt))
kfree(iobm);
}
@@ -192,8 +198,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE1(iopl, unsigned int, level)
}
t->iopl_emul = level;
- task_update_io_bitmap(current);
-
+ task_update_io_bitmap();
return 0;
}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/irq.c b/arch/x86/kernel/irq.c
index 81f9b78e0f7b..9ed29ff10e59 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/irq.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/irq.c
@@ -380,61 +380,18 @@ void intel_posted_msi_init(void)
this_cpu_write(posted_msi_pi_desc.ndst, destination);
}
-/*
- * De-multiplexing posted interrupts is on the performance path, the code
- * below is written to optimize the cache performance based on the following
- * considerations:
- * 1.Posted interrupt descriptor (PID) fits in a cache line that is frequently
- * accessed by both CPU and IOMMU.
- * 2.During posted MSI processing, the CPU needs to do 64-bit read and xchg
- * for checking and clearing posted interrupt request (PIR), a 256 bit field
- * within the PID.
- * 3.On the other side, the IOMMU does atomic swaps of the entire PID cache
- * line when posting interrupts and setting control bits.
- * 4.The CPU can access the cache line a magnitude faster than the IOMMU.
- * 5.Each time the IOMMU does interrupt posting to the PIR will evict the PID
- * cache line. The cache line states after each operation are as follows:
- * CPU IOMMU PID Cache line state
- * ---------------------------------------------------------------
- *...read64 exclusive
- *...lock xchg64 modified
- *... post/atomic swap invalid
- *...-------------------------------------------------------------
- *
- * To reduce L1 data cache miss, it is important to avoid contention with
- * IOMMU's interrupt posting/atomic swap. Therefore, a copy of PIR is used
- * to dispatch interrupt handlers.
- *
- * In addition, the code is trying to keep the cache line state consistent
- * as much as possible. e.g. when making a copy and clearing the PIR
- * (assuming non-zero PIR bits are present in the entire PIR), it does:
- * read, read, read, read, xchg, xchg, xchg, xchg
- * instead of:
- * read, xchg, read, xchg, read, xchg, read, xchg
- */
-static __always_inline bool handle_pending_pir(u64 *pir, struct pt_regs *regs)
+static __always_inline bool handle_pending_pir(unsigned long *pir, struct pt_regs *regs)
{
- int i, vec = FIRST_EXTERNAL_VECTOR;
- unsigned long pir_copy[4];
- bool handled = false;
+ unsigned long pir_copy[NR_PIR_WORDS];
+ int vec = FIRST_EXTERNAL_VECTOR;
- for (i = 0; i < 4; i++)
- pir_copy[i] = pir[i];
-
- for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) {
- if (!pir_copy[i])
- continue;
+ if (!pi_harvest_pir(pir, pir_copy))
+ return false;
- pir_copy[i] = arch_xchg(&pir[i], 0);
- handled = true;
- }
-
- if (handled) {
- for_each_set_bit_from(vec, pir_copy, FIRST_SYSTEM_VECTOR)
- call_irq_handler(vec, regs);
- }
+ for_each_set_bit_from(vec, pir_copy, FIRST_SYSTEM_VECTOR)
+ call_irq_handler(vec, regs);
- return handled;
+ return true;
}
/*
@@ -464,7 +421,7 @@ DEFINE_IDTENTRY_SYSVEC(sysvec_posted_msi_notification)
* MAX_POSTED_MSI_COALESCING_LOOP - 1 loops are executed here.
*/
while (++i < MAX_POSTED_MSI_COALESCING_LOOP) {
- if (!handle_pending_pir(pid->pir64, regs))
+ if (!handle_pending_pir(pid->pir, regs))
break;
}
@@ -479,7 +436,7 @@ DEFINE_IDTENTRY_SYSVEC(sysvec_posted_msi_notification)
* process PIR bits one last time such that handling the new interrupts
* are not delayed until the next IRQ.
*/
- handle_pending_pir(pid->pir64, regs);
+ handle_pending_pir(pid->pir, regs);
apic_eoi();
irq_exit();
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c
index 68530fad05f7..24a41f0e0cf1 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c
@@ -27,6 +27,8 @@
#include <asm/kexec-bzimage64.h>
#define MAX_ELFCOREHDR_STR_LEN 30 /* elfcorehdr=0x<64bit-value> */
+#define MAX_DMCRYPTKEYS_STR_LEN 31 /* dmcryptkeys=0x<64bit-value> */
+
/*
* Defines lowest physical address for various segments. Not sure where
@@ -76,6 +78,10 @@ static int setup_cmdline(struct kimage *image, struct boot_params *params,
if (image->type == KEXEC_TYPE_CRASH) {
len = sprintf(cmdline_ptr,
"elfcorehdr=0x%lx ", image->elf_load_addr);
+
+ if (image->dm_crypt_keys_addr != 0)
+ len += sprintf(cmdline_ptr + len,
+ "dmcryptkeys=0x%lx ", image->dm_crypt_keys_addr);
}
memcpy(cmdline_ptr + len, cmdline, cmdline_len);
cmdline_len += len;
@@ -233,6 +239,32 @@ setup_ima_state(const struct kimage *image, struct boot_params *params,
#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_KEXEC */
}
+static void setup_kho(const struct kimage *image, struct boot_params *params,
+ unsigned long params_load_addr,
+ unsigned int setup_data_offset)
+{
+ struct setup_data *sd = (void *)params + setup_data_offset;
+ struct kho_data *kho = (void *)sd + sizeof(*sd);
+
+ if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KEXEC_HANDOVER))
+ return;
+
+ sd->type = SETUP_KEXEC_KHO;
+ sd->len = sizeof(struct kho_data);
+
+ /* Only add if we have all KHO images in place */
+ if (!image->kho.fdt || !image->kho.scratch)
+ return;
+
+ /* Add setup data */
+ kho->fdt_addr = image->kho.fdt;
+ kho->fdt_size = PAGE_SIZE;
+ kho->scratch_addr = image->kho.scratch->mem;
+ kho->scratch_size = image->kho.scratch->bufsz;
+ sd->next = params->hdr.setup_data;
+ params->hdr.setup_data = params_load_addr + setup_data_offset;
+}
+
static int
setup_boot_parameters(struct kimage *image, struct boot_params *params,
unsigned long params_load_addr,
@@ -312,6 +344,13 @@ setup_boot_parameters(struct kimage *image, struct boot_params *params,
sizeof(struct ima_setup_data);
}
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KEXEC_HANDOVER)) {
+ /* Setup space to store preservation metadata */
+ setup_kho(image, params, params_load_addr, setup_data_offset);
+ setup_data_offset += sizeof(struct setup_data) +
+ sizeof(struct kho_data);
+ }
+
/* Setup RNG seed */
setup_rng_seed(params, params_load_addr, setup_data_offset);
@@ -441,6 +480,19 @@ static void *bzImage64_load(struct kimage *image, char *kernel,
ret = crash_load_segments(image);
if (ret)
return ERR_PTR(ret);
+ ret = crash_load_dm_crypt_keys(image);
+ if (ret == -ENOENT) {
+ kexec_dprintk("No dm crypt key to load\n");
+ } else if (ret) {
+ pr_err("Failed to load dm crypt keys\n");
+ return ERR_PTR(ret);
+ }
+ if (image->dm_crypt_keys_addr &&
+ cmdline_len + MAX_ELFCOREHDR_STR_LEN + MAX_DMCRYPTKEYS_STR_LEN >
+ header->cmdline_size) {
+ pr_err("Appending dmcryptkeys=<addr> to command line exceeds maximum allowed length\n");
+ return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+ }
}
#endif
@@ -468,6 +520,8 @@ static void *bzImage64_load(struct kimage *image, char *kernel,
efi_map_sz = efi_get_runtime_map_size();
params_cmdline_sz = sizeof(struct boot_params) + cmdline_len +
MAX_ELFCOREHDR_STR_LEN;
+ if (image->dm_crypt_keys_addr)
+ params_cmdline_sz += MAX_DMCRYPTKEYS_STR_LEN;
params_cmdline_sz = ALIGN(params_cmdline_sz, 16);
kbuf.bufsz = params_cmdline_sz + ALIGN(efi_map_sz, 16) +
sizeof(struct setup_data) +
@@ -479,6 +533,10 @@ static void *bzImage64_load(struct kimage *image, char *kernel,
kbuf.bufsz += sizeof(struct setup_data) +
sizeof(struct ima_setup_data);
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KEXEC_HANDOVER))
+ kbuf.bufsz += sizeof(struct setup_data) +
+ sizeof(struct kho_data);
+
params = kzalloc(kbuf.bufsz, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!params)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/machine_kexec_64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/machine_kexec_64.c
index 949c9e4bfad2..697fb99406e6 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/machine_kexec_64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/machine_kexec_64.c
@@ -630,13 +630,35 @@ static void kexec_mark_crashkres(bool protect)
kexec_mark_range(control, crashk_res.end, protect);
}
+/* make the memory storing dm crypt keys in/accessible */
+static void kexec_mark_dm_crypt_keys(bool protect)
+{
+ unsigned long start_paddr, end_paddr;
+ unsigned int nr_pages;
+
+ if (kexec_crash_image->dm_crypt_keys_addr) {
+ start_paddr = kexec_crash_image->dm_crypt_keys_addr;
+ end_paddr = start_paddr + kexec_crash_image->dm_crypt_keys_sz - 1;
+ nr_pages = (PAGE_ALIGN(end_paddr) - PAGE_ALIGN_DOWN(start_paddr))/PAGE_SIZE;
+ if (protect)
+ set_memory_np((unsigned long)phys_to_virt(start_paddr), nr_pages);
+ else
+ __set_memory_prot(
+ (unsigned long)phys_to_virt(start_paddr),
+ nr_pages,
+ __pgprot(_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_NX | _PAGE_RW));
+ }
+}
+
void arch_kexec_protect_crashkres(void)
{
kexec_mark_crashkres(true);
+ kexec_mark_dm_crypt_keys(true);
}
void arch_kexec_unprotect_crashkres(void)
{
+ kexec_mark_dm_crypt_keys(false);
kexec_mark_crashkres(false);
}
#endif
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/process.c b/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
index c1d2dac72b9c..704883c21f3a 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
@@ -176,6 +176,7 @@ int copy_thread(struct task_struct *p, const struct kernel_clone_args *args)
frame->ret_addr = (unsigned long) ret_from_fork_asm;
p->thread.sp = (unsigned long) fork_frame;
p->thread.io_bitmap = NULL;
+ clear_tsk_thread_flag(p, TIF_IO_BITMAP);
p->thread.iopl_warn = 0;
memset(p->thread.ptrace_bps, 0, sizeof(p->thread.ptrace_bps));
@@ -464,6 +465,11 @@ void native_tss_update_io_bitmap(void)
} else {
struct io_bitmap *iobm = t->io_bitmap;
+ if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!iobm)) {
+ clear_thread_flag(TIF_IO_BITMAP);
+ native_tss_invalidate_io_bitmap();
+ }
+
/*
* Only copy bitmap data when the sequence number differs. The
* update time is accounted to the incoming task.
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
index 7d9ed79a93c0..fb27be697128 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
@@ -282,8 +282,8 @@ static void __init cleanup_highmap(void)
static void __init reserve_brk(void)
{
if (_brk_end > _brk_start)
- memblock_reserve(__pa_symbol(_brk_start),
- _brk_end - _brk_start);
+ memblock_reserve_kern(__pa_symbol(_brk_start),
+ _brk_end - _brk_start);
/* Mark brk area as locked down and no longer taking any
new allocations */
@@ -356,7 +356,7 @@ static void __init early_reserve_initrd(void)
!ramdisk_image || !ramdisk_size)
return; /* No initrd provided by bootloader */
- memblock_reserve(ramdisk_image, ramdisk_end - ramdisk_image);
+ memblock_reserve_kern(ramdisk_image, ramdisk_end - ramdisk_image);
}
static void __init reserve_initrd(void)
@@ -409,7 +409,7 @@ static void __init add_early_ima_buffer(u64 phys_addr)
}
if (data->size) {
- memblock_reserve(data->addr, data->size);
+ memblock_reserve_kern(data->addr, data->size);
ima_kexec_buffer_phys = data->addr;
ima_kexec_buffer_size = data->size;
}
@@ -447,6 +447,29 @@ int __init ima_get_kexec_buffer(void **addr, size_t *size)
}
#endif
+static void __init add_kho(u64 phys_addr, u32 data_len)
+{
+ struct kho_data *kho;
+ u64 addr = phys_addr + sizeof(struct setup_data);
+ u64 size = data_len - sizeof(struct setup_data);
+
+ if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KEXEC_HANDOVER)) {
+ pr_warn("Passed KHO data, but CONFIG_KEXEC_HANDOVER not set. Ignoring.\n");
+ return;
+ }
+
+ kho = early_memremap(addr, size);
+ if (!kho) {
+ pr_warn("setup: failed to memremap kho data (0x%llx, 0x%llx)\n",
+ addr, size);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ kho_populate(kho->fdt_addr, kho->fdt_size, kho->scratch_addr, kho->scratch_size);
+
+ early_memunmap(kho, size);
+}
+
static void __init parse_setup_data(void)
{
struct setup_data *data;
@@ -475,6 +498,9 @@ static void __init parse_setup_data(void)
case SETUP_IMA:
add_early_ima_buffer(pa_data);
break;
+ case SETUP_KEXEC_KHO:
+ add_kho(pa_data, data_len);
+ break;
case SETUP_RNG_SEED:
data = early_memremap(pa_data, data_len);
add_bootloader_randomness(data->data, data->len);
@@ -549,7 +575,7 @@ static void __init memblock_x86_reserve_range_setup_data(void)
len = sizeof(*data);
pa_next = data->next;
- memblock_reserve(pa_data, sizeof(*data) + data->len);
+ memblock_reserve_kern(pa_data, sizeof(*data) + data->len);
if (data->type == SETUP_INDIRECT) {
len += data->len;
@@ -563,7 +589,7 @@ static void __init memblock_x86_reserve_range_setup_data(void)
indirect = (struct setup_indirect *)data->data;
if (indirect->type != SETUP_INDIRECT)
- memblock_reserve(indirect->addr, indirect->len);
+ memblock_reserve_kern(indirect->addr, indirect->len);
}
pa_data = pa_next;
@@ -766,8 +792,8 @@ static void __init early_reserve_memory(void)
* __end_of_kernel_reserve symbol must be explicitly reserved with a
* separate memblock_reserve() or they will be discarded.
*/
- memblock_reserve(__pa_symbol(_text),
- (unsigned long)__end_of_kernel_reserve - (unsigned long)_text);
+ memblock_reserve_kern(__pa_symbol(_text),
+ (unsigned long)__end_of_kernel_reserve - (unsigned long)_text);
/*
* The first 4Kb of memory is a BIOS owned area, but generally it is
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/signal_32.c b/arch/x86/kernel/signal_32.c
index 98123ff10506..42bbc42bd350 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/signal_32.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/signal_32.c
@@ -152,6 +152,8 @@ SYSCALL32_DEFINE0(sigreturn)
struct sigframe_ia32 __user *frame = (struct sigframe_ia32 __user *)(regs->sp-8);
sigset_t set;
+ prevent_single_step_upon_eretu(regs);
+
if (!access_ok(frame, sizeof(*frame)))
goto badframe;
if (__get_user(set.sig[0], &frame->sc.oldmask)
@@ -175,6 +177,8 @@ SYSCALL32_DEFINE0(rt_sigreturn)
struct rt_sigframe_ia32 __user *frame;
sigset_t set;
+ prevent_single_step_upon_eretu(regs);
+
frame = (struct rt_sigframe_ia32 __user *)(regs->sp - 4);
if (!access_ok(frame, sizeof(*frame)))
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/signal_64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/signal_64.c
index ee9453891901..d483b585c6c6 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/signal_64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/signal_64.c
@@ -250,6 +250,8 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE0(rt_sigreturn)
sigset_t set;
unsigned long uc_flags;
+ prevent_single_step_upon_eretu(regs);
+
frame = (struct rt_sigframe __user *)(regs->sp - sizeof(long));
if (!access_ok(frame, sizeof(*frame)))
goto badframe;
@@ -366,6 +368,8 @@ COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE0(x32_rt_sigreturn)
sigset_t set;
unsigned long uc_flags;
+ prevent_single_step_upon_eretu(regs);
+
frame = (struct rt_sigframe_x32 __user *)(regs->sp - 8);
if (!access_ok(frame, sizeof(*frame)))
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/smp.c b/arch/x86/kernel/smp.c
index 18266cc3d98c..b014e6d229f9 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/smp.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/smp.c
@@ -299,3 +299,27 @@ struct smp_ops smp_ops = {
.send_call_func_single_ipi = native_send_call_func_single_ipi,
};
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(smp_ops);
+
+int arch_cpu_rescan_dead_smt_siblings(void)
+{
+ enum cpuhp_smt_control old = cpu_smt_control;
+ int ret;
+
+ /*
+ * If SMT has been disabled and SMT siblings are in HLT, bring them back
+ * online and offline them again so that they end up in MWAIT proper.
+ *
+ * Called with hotplug enabled.
+ */
+ if (old != CPU_SMT_DISABLED && old != CPU_SMT_FORCE_DISABLED)
+ return 0;
+
+ ret = cpuhp_smt_enable();
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+
+ ret = cpuhp_smt_disable(old);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(arch_cpu_rescan_dead_smt_siblings);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c b/arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c
index b90d872aa0c8..58ede3fa6a75 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c
@@ -695,7 +695,7 @@ static void send_init_sequence(u32 phys_apicid)
/*
* Wake up AP by INIT, INIT, STARTUP sequence.
*/
-static int wakeup_secondary_cpu_via_init(u32 phys_apicid, unsigned long start_eip)
+static int wakeup_secondary_cpu_via_init(u32 phys_apicid, unsigned long start_eip, unsigned int cpu)
{
unsigned long send_status = 0, accept_status = 0;
int num_starts, j, maxlvt;
@@ -842,7 +842,7 @@ int common_cpu_up(unsigned int cpu, struct task_struct *idle)
* Returns zero if startup was successfully sent, else error code from
* ->wakeup_secondary_cpu.
*/
-static int do_boot_cpu(u32 apicid, int cpu, struct task_struct *idle)
+static int do_boot_cpu(u32 apicid, unsigned int cpu, struct task_struct *idle)
{
unsigned long start_ip = real_mode_header->trampoline_start;
int ret;
@@ -896,11 +896,11 @@ static int do_boot_cpu(u32 apicid, int cpu, struct task_struct *idle)
* - Use an INIT boot APIC message
*/
if (apic->wakeup_secondary_cpu_64)
- ret = apic->wakeup_secondary_cpu_64(apicid, start_ip);
+ ret = apic->wakeup_secondary_cpu_64(apicid, start_ip, cpu);
else if (apic->wakeup_secondary_cpu)
- ret = apic->wakeup_secondary_cpu(apicid, start_ip);
+ ret = apic->wakeup_secondary_cpu(apicid, start_ip, cpu);
else
- ret = wakeup_secondary_cpu_via_init(apicid, start_ip);
+ ret = wakeup_secondary_cpu_via_init(apicid, start_ip, cpu);
/* If the wakeup mechanism failed, cleanup the warm reset vector */
if (ret)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c b/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c
index 94c0236963c6..c5c897a86418 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c
@@ -352,7 +352,7 @@ static noinstr bool handle_bug(struct pt_regs *regs)
case BUG_UD1_UBSAN:
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_UBSAN_TRAP)) {
pr_crit("%s at %pS\n",
- report_ubsan_failure(regs, ud_imm),
+ report_ubsan_failure(ud_imm),
(void *)regs->ip);
}
break;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig b/arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig
index fe8ea8c097de..2eeffcec5382 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig
@@ -95,6 +95,8 @@ config KVM_SW_PROTECTED_VM
config KVM_INTEL
tristate "KVM for Intel (and compatible) processors support"
depends on KVM && IA32_FEAT_CTL
+ select KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM if INTEL_TDX_HOST
+ select KVM_GENERIC_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES if INTEL_TDX_HOST
help
Provides support for KVM on processors equipped with Intel's VT
extensions, a.k.a. Virtual Machine Extensions (VMX).
@@ -129,6 +131,16 @@ config X86_SGX_KVM
If unsure, say N.
+config KVM_INTEL_TDX
+ bool "Intel Trust Domain Extensions (TDX) support"
+ default y
+ depends on INTEL_TDX_HOST
+ help
+ Provides support for launching Intel Trust Domain Extensions (TDX)
+ confidential VMs on Intel processors.
+
+ If unsure, say N.
+
config KVM_AMD
tristate "KVM for AMD processors support"
depends on KVM && (CPU_SUP_AMD || CPU_SUP_HYGON)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/Makefile b/arch/x86/kvm/Makefile
index f9dddb8cb466..a5d362c7b504 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/Makefile
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/Makefile
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ kvm-intel-y += vmx/vmx.o vmx/vmenter.o vmx/pmu_intel.o vmx/vmcs12.o \
kvm-intel-$(CONFIG_X86_SGX_KVM) += vmx/sgx.o
kvm-intel-$(CONFIG_KVM_HYPERV) += vmx/hyperv.o vmx/hyperv_evmcs.o
+kvm-intel-$(CONFIG_KVM_INTEL_TDX) += vmx/tdx.o
kvm-amd-y += svm/svm.o svm/vmenter.o svm/pmu.o svm/nested.o svm/avic.o
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
index ecd85f4801cc..b2d006756e02 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
@@ -81,17 +81,8 @@ u32 xstate_required_size(u64 xstate_bv, bool compacted)
return ret;
}
-/*
- * Magic value used by KVM when querying userspace-provided CPUID entries and
- * doesn't care about the CPIUD index because the index of the function in
- * question is not significant. Note, this magic value must have at least one
- * bit set in bits[63:32] and must be consumed as a u64 by cpuid_entry2_find()
- * to avoid false positives when processing guest CPUID input.
- */
-#define KVM_CPUID_INDEX_NOT_SIGNIFICANT -1ull
-
-static struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *cpuid_entry2_find(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
- u32 function, u64 index)
+struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *kvm_find_cpuid_entry2(
+ struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *entries, int nent, u32 function, u64 index)
{
struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *e;
int i;
@@ -108,8 +99,8 @@ static struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *cpuid_entry2_find(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
*/
lockdep_assert_irqs_enabled();
- for (i = 0; i < vcpu->arch.cpuid_nent; i++) {
- e = &vcpu->arch.cpuid_entries[i];
+ for (i = 0; i < nent; i++) {
+ e = &entries[i];
if (e->function != function)
continue;
@@ -140,26 +131,7 @@ static struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *cpuid_entry2_find(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
return NULL;
}
-
-struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *kvm_find_cpuid_entry_index(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
- u32 function, u32 index)
-{
- return cpuid_entry2_find(vcpu, function, index);
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_find_cpuid_entry_index);
-
-struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *kvm_find_cpuid_entry(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
- u32 function)
-{
- return cpuid_entry2_find(vcpu, function, KVM_CPUID_INDEX_NOT_SIGNIFICANT);
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_find_cpuid_entry);
-
-/*
- * cpuid_entry2_find() and KVM_CPUID_INDEX_NOT_SIGNIFICANT should never be used
- * directly outside of kvm_find_cpuid_entry() and kvm_find_cpuid_entry_index().
- */
-#undef KVM_CPUID_INDEX_NOT_SIGNIFICANT
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_find_cpuid_entry2);
static int kvm_check_cpuid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
@@ -492,6 +464,20 @@ not_found:
return 36;
}
+int cpuid_query_maxguestphyaddr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *best;
+
+ best = kvm_find_cpuid_entry(vcpu, 0x80000000);
+ if (!best || best->eax < 0x80000008)
+ goto not_found;
+ best = kvm_find_cpuid_entry(vcpu, 0x80000008);
+ if (best)
+ return (best->eax >> 16) & 0xff;
+not_found:
+ return 0;
+}
+
/*
* This "raw" version returns the reserved GPA bits without any adjustments for
* encryption technologies that usurp bits. The raw mask should be used if and
@@ -992,6 +978,7 @@ void kvm_set_cpu_caps(void)
F(FZRM),
F(FSRS),
F(FSRC),
+ F(WRMSRNS),
F(AMX_FP16),
F(AVX_IFMA),
F(LAM),
@@ -1107,6 +1094,7 @@ void kvm_set_cpu_caps(void)
F(AMD_SSB_NO),
F(AMD_STIBP),
F(AMD_STIBP_ALWAYS_ON),
+ F(AMD_IBRS_SAME_MODE),
F(AMD_PSFD),
F(AMD_IBPB_RET),
);
@@ -1164,6 +1152,7 @@ void kvm_set_cpu_caps(void)
kvm_cpu_cap_init(CPUID_8000_0021_EAX,
F(NO_NESTED_DATA_BP),
+ F(WRMSR_XX_BASE_NS),
/*
* Synthesize "LFENCE is serializing" into the AMD-defined entry
* in KVM's supported CPUID, i.e. if the feature is reported as
@@ -1177,10 +1166,13 @@ void kvm_set_cpu_caps(void)
SYNTHESIZED_F(LFENCE_RDTSC),
/* SmmPgCfgLock */
F(NULL_SEL_CLR_BASE),
+ /* UpperAddressIgnore */
F(AUTOIBRS),
+ F(PREFETCHI),
EMULATED_F(NO_SMM_CTL_MSR),
/* PrefetchCtlMsr */
- F(WRMSR_XX_BASE_NS),
+ /* GpOnUserCpuid */
+ /* EPSF */
SYNTHESIZED_F(SBPB),
SYNTHESIZED_F(IBPB_BRTYPE),
SYNTHESIZED_F(SRSO_NO),
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h
index d2884162a46a..d3f5ae15a7ca 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h
@@ -11,10 +11,34 @@ extern u32 kvm_cpu_caps[NR_KVM_CPU_CAPS] __read_mostly;
void kvm_set_cpu_caps(void);
void kvm_vcpu_after_set_cpuid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
-struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *kvm_find_cpuid_entry_index(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
- u32 function, u32 index);
-struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *kvm_find_cpuid_entry(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
- u32 function);
+struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *kvm_find_cpuid_entry2(struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *entries,
+ int nent, u32 function, u64 index);
+/*
+ * Magic value used by KVM when querying userspace-provided CPUID entries and
+ * doesn't care about the CPIUD index because the index of the function in
+ * question is not significant. Note, this magic value must have at least one
+ * bit set in bits[63:32] and must be consumed as a u64 by kvm_find_cpuid_entry2()
+ * to avoid false positives when processing guest CPUID input.
+ *
+ * KVM_CPUID_INDEX_NOT_SIGNIFICANT should never be used directly outside of
+ * kvm_find_cpuid_entry2() and kvm_find_cpuid_entry().
+ */
+#define KVM_CPUID_INDEX_NOT_SIGNIFICANT -1ull
+
+static inline struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *kvm_find_cpuid_entry_index(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+ u32 function, u32 index)
+{
+ return kvm_find_cpuid_entry2(vcpu->arch.cpuid_entries, vcpu->arch.cpuid_nent,
+ function, index);
+}
+
+static inline struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *kvm_find_cpuid_entry(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+ u32 function)
+{
+ return kvm_find_cpuid_entry2(vcpu->arch.cpuid_entries, vcpu->arch.cpuid_nent,
+ function, KVM_CPUID_INDEX_NOT_SIGNIFICANT);
+}
+
int kvm_dev_ioctl_get_cpuid(struct kvm_cpuid2 *cpuid,
struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 __user *entries,
unsigned int type);
@@ -34,6 +58,7 @@ void __init kvm_init_xstate_sizes(void);
u32 xstate_required_size(u64 xstate_bv, bool compacted);
int cpuid_query_maxphyaddr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+int cpuid_query_maxguestphyaddr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
u64 kvm_vcpu_reserved_gpa_bits_raw(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
static inline int cpuid_maxphyaddr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/ioapic.c b/arch/x86/kvm/ioapic.c
index 995eb5054360..45dae2d5d2f1 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/ioapic.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/ioapic.c
@@ -296,11 +296,8 @@ void kvm_ioapic_scan_entry(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, ulong *ioapic_handled_vectors)
index == RTC_GSI) {
u16 dm = kvm_lapic_irq_dest_mode(!!e->fields.dest_mode);
- if (kvm_apic_match_dest(vcpu, NULL, APIC_DEST_NOSHORT,
- e->fields.dest_id, dm) ||
- kvm_apic_pending_eoi(vcpu, e->fields.vector))
- __set_bit(e->fields.vector,
- ioapic_handled_vectors);
+ kvm_scan_ioapic_irq(vcpu, e->fields.dest_id, dm,
+ e->fields.vector, ioapic_handled_vectors);
}
}
spin_unlock(&ioapic->lock);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/ioapic.h b/arch/x86/kvm/ioapic.h
index 539333ac4b38..aa8cb4ac0479 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/ioapic.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/ioapic.h
@@ -120,4 +120,6 @@ void kvm_ioapic_scan_entry(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
ulong *ioapic_handled_vectors);
void kvm_scan_ioapic_routes(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
ulong *ioapic_handled_vectors);
+void kvm_scan_ioapic_irq(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 dest_id, u16 dest_mode,
+ u8 vector, unsigned long *ioapic_handled_vectors);
#endif
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/irq.c b/arch/x86/kvm/irq.c
index 63f66c51975a..97d68d837929 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/irq.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/irq.c
@@ -100,6 +100,9 @@ int kvm_cpu_has_interrupt(struct kvm_vcpu *v)
if (kvm_cpu_has_extint(v))
return 1;
+ if (lapic_in_kernel(v) && v->arch.apic->guest_apic_protected)
+ return kvm_x86_call(protected_apic_has_interrupt)(v);
+
return kvm_apic_has_interrupt(v) != -1; /* LAPIC */
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_cpu_has_interrupt);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/irq_comm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/irq_comm.c
index 8136695f7b96..d6d792b5d1bd 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/irq_comm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/irq_comm.c
@@ -402,6 +402,33 @@ void kvm_arch_post_irq_routing_update(struct kvm *kvm)
kvm_make_scan_ioapic_request(kvm);
}
+void kvm_scan_ioapic_irq(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 dest_id, u16 dest_mode,
+ u8 vector, unsigned long *ioapic_handled_vectors)
+{
+ /*
+ * Intercept EOI if the vCPU is the target of the new IRQ routing, or
+ * the vCPU has a pending IRQ from the old routing, i.e. if the vCPU
+ * may receive a level-triggered IRQ in the future, or already received
+ * level-triggered IRQ. The EOI needs to be intercepted and forwarded
+ * to I/O APIC emulation so that the IRQ can be de-asserted.
+ */
+ if (kvm_apic_match_dest(vcpu, NULL, APIC_DEST_NOSHORT, dest_id, dest_mode)) {
+ __set_bit(vector, ioapic_handled_vectors);
+ } else if (kvm_apic_pending_eoi(vcpu, vector)) {
+ __set_bit(vector, ioapic_handled_vectors);
+
+ /*
+ * Track the highest pending EOI for which the vCPU is NOT the
+ * target in the new routing. Only the EOI for the IRQ that is
+ * in-flight (for the old routing) needs to be intercepted, any
+ * future IRQs that arrive on this vCPU will be coincidental to
+ * the level-triggered routing and don't need to be intercepted.
+ */
+ if ((int)vector > vcpu->arch.highest_stale_pending_ioapic_eoi)
+ vcpu->arch.highest_stale_pending_ioapic_eoi = vector;
+ }
+}
+
void kvm_scan_ioapic_routes(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
ulong *ioapic_handled_vectors)
{
@@ -424,11 +451,11 @@ void kvm_scan_ioapic_routes(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
kvm_set_msi_irq(vcpu->kvm, entry, &irq);
- if (irq.trig_mode &&
- (kvm_apic_match_dest(vcpu, NULL, APIC_DEST_NOSHORT,
- irq.dest_id, irq.dest_mode) ||
- kvm_apic_pending_eoi(vcpu, irq.vector)))
- __set_bit(irq.vector, ioapic_handled_vectors);
+ if (!irq.trig_mode)
+ continue;
+
+ kvm_scan_ioapic_irq(vcpu, irq.dest_id, irq.dest_mode,
+ irq.vector, ioapic_handled_vectors);
}
}
srcu_read_unlock(&kvm->irq_srcu, idx);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c b/arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c
index 28e3317124fd..73418dc0ebb2 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c
@@ -655,27 +655,29 @@ static u8 count_vectors(void *bitmap)
return count;
}
-bool __kvm_apic_update_irr(u32 *pir, void *regs, int *max_irr)
+bool __kvm_apic_update_irr(unsigned long *pir, void *regs, int *max_irr)
{
+ unsigned long pir_vals[NR_PIR_WORDS];
+ u32 *__pir = (void *)pir_vals;
u32 i, vec;
- u32 pir_val, irr_val, prev_irr_val;
+ u32 irr_val, prev_irr_val;
int max_updated_irr;
max_updated_irr = -1;
*max_irr = -1;
+ if (!pi_harvest_pir(pir, pir_vals))
+ return false;
+
for (i = vec = 0; i <= 7; i++, vec += 32) {
u32 *p_irr = (u32 *)(regs + APIC_IRR + i * 0x10);
- irr_val = *p_irr;
- pir_val = READ_ONCE(pir[i]);
-
- if (pir_val) {
- pir_val = xchg(&pir[i], 0);
+ irr_val = READ_ONCE(*p_irr);
+ if (__pir[i]) {
prev_irr_val = irr_val;
do {
- irr_val = prev_irr_val | pir_val;
+ irr_val = prev_irr_val | __pir[i];
} while (prev_irr_val != irr_val &&
!try_cmpxchg(p_irr, &prev_irr_val, irr_val));
@@ -691,7 +693,7 @@ bool __kvm_apic_update_irr(u32 *pir, void *regs, int *max_irr)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__kvm_apic_update_irr);
-bool kvm_apic_update_irr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 *pir, int *max_irr)
+bool kvm_apic_update_irr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long *pir, int *max_irr)
{
struct kvm_lapic *apic = vcpu->arch.apic;
bool irr_updated = __kvm_apic_update_irr(pir, apic->regs, max_irr);
@@ -1459,6 +1461,14 @@ static void kvm_ioapic_send_eoi(struct kvm_lapic *apic, int vector)
if (!kvm_ioapic_handles_vector(apic, vector))
return;
+ /*
+ * If the intercepted EOI is for an IRQ that was pending from previous
+ * routing, then re-scan the I/O APIC routes as EOIs for the IRQ likely
+ * no longer need to be intercepted.
+ */
+ if (apic->vcpu->arch.highest_stale_pending_ioapic_eoi == vector)
+ kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_SCAN_IOAPIC, apic->vcpu);
+
/* Request a KVM exit to inform the userspace IOAPIC. */
if (irqchip_split(apic->vcpu->kvm)) {
apic->vcpu->arch.pending_ioapic_eoi = vector;
@@ -1790,8 +1800,17 @@ static void apic_update_lvtt(struct kvm_lapic *apic)
static bool lapic_timer_int_injected(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
struct kvm_lapic *apic = vcpu->arch.apic;
- u32 reg = kvm_lapic_get_reg(apic, APIC_LVTT);
+ u32 reg;
+ /*
+ * Assume a timer IRQ was "injected" if the APIC is protected. KVM's
+ * copy of the vIRR is bogus, it's the responsibility of the caller to
+ * precisely check whether or not a timer IRQ is pending.
+ */
+ if (apic->guest_apic_protected)
+ return true;
+
+ reg = kvm_lapic_get_reg(apic, APIC_LVTT);
if (kvm_apic_hw_enabled(apic)) {
int vec = reg & APIC_VECTOR_MASK;
void *bitmap = apic->regs + APIC_ISR;
@@ -2650,6 +2669,7 @@ int kvm_apic_set_base(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 value, bool host_initiated)
kvm_recalculate_apic_map(vcpu->kvm);
return 0;
}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_apic_set_base);
void kvm_apic_update_apicv(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
@@ -2958,6 +2978,9 @@ int kvm_apic_has_interrupt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
if (!kvm_apic_present(vcpu))
return -1;
+ if (apic->guest_apic_protected)
+ return -1;
+
__apic_update_ppr(apic, &ppr);
return apic_has_interrupt_for_ppr(apic, ppr);
}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/lapic.h b/arch/x86/kvm/lapic.h
index 1a8553ebdb42..4ce30db65828 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/lapic.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/lapic.h
@@ -65,6 +65,8 @@ struct kvm_lapic {
bool sw_enabled;
bool irr_pending;
bool lvt0_in_nmi_mode;
+ /* Select registers in the vAPIC cannot be read/written. */
+ bool guest_apic_protected;
/* Number of bits set in ISR. */
s16 isr_count;
/* The highest vector set in ISR; if -1 - invalid, must scan ISR. */
@@ -101,8 +103,8 @@ bool kvm_apic_match_dest(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_lapic *source,
int shorthand, unsigned int dest, int dest_mode);
int kvm_apic_compare_prio(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu1, struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu2);
void kvm_apic_clear_irr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int vec);
-bool __kvm_apic_update_irr(u32 *pir, void *regs, int *max_irr);
-bool kvm_apic_update_irr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 *pir, int *max_irr);
+bool __kvm_apic_update_irr(unsigned long *pir, void *regs, int *max_irr);
+bool kvm_apic_update_irr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long *pir, int *max_irr);
void kvm_apic_update_ppr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
int kvm_apic_set_irq(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_lapic_irq *irq,
struct dest_map *dest_map);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.h b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.h
index f2b36d32ef40..b4b6860ab971 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.h
@@ -79,6 +79,7 @@ static inline gfn_t kvm_mmu_max_gfn(void)
u8 kvm_mmu_get_max_tdp_level(void);
void kvm_mmu_set_mmio_spte_mask(u64 mmio_value, u64 mmio_mask, u64 access_mask);
+void kvm_mmu_set_mmio_spte_value(struct kvm *kvm, u64 mmio_value);
void kvm_mmu_set_me_spte_mask(u64 me_value, u64 me_mask);
void kvm_mmu_set_ept_masks(bool has_ad_bits, bool has_exec_only);
@@ -234,7 +235,7 @@ static inline u8 permission_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_mmu *mmu,
return -(u32)fault & errcode;
}
-bool kvm_mmu_may_ignore_guest_pat(void);
+bool kvm_mmu_may_ignore_guest_pat(struct kvm *kvm);
int kvm_mmu_post_init_vm(struct kvm *kvm);
void kvm_mmu_pre_destroy_vm(struct kvm *kvm);
@@ -256,6 +257,9 @@ extern bool tdp_mmu_enabled;
#define tdp_mmu_enabled false
#endif
+bool kvm_tdp_mmu_gpa_is_mapped(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 gpa);
+int kvm_tdp_map_page(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t gpa, u64 error_code, u8 *level);
+
static inline bool kvm_memslots_have_rmaps(struct kvm *kvm)
{
return !tdp_mmu_enabled || kvm_shadow_root_allocated(kvm);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
index 8d1b632e33d2..4e06e2e89a8f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
@@ -110,6 +110,7 @@ static bool __ro_after_init tdp_mmu_allowed;
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
bool __read_mostly tdp_mmu_enabled = true;
module_param_named(tdp_mmu, tdp_mmu_enabled, bool, 0444);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tdp_mmu_enabled);
#endif
static int max_huge_page_level __read_mostly;
@@ -1456,15 +1457,15 @@ void kvm_arch_mmu_enable_log_dirty_pt_masked(struct kvm *kvm,
* enabled but it chooses between clearing the Dirty bit and Writeable
* bit based on the context.
*/
- if (kvm_x86_ops.cpu_dirty_log_size)
+ if (kvm->arch.cpu_dirty_log_size)
kvm_mmu_clear_dirty_pt_masked(kvm, slot, gfn_offset, mask);
else
kvm_mmu_write_protect_pt_masked(kvm, slot, gfn_offset, mask);
}
-int kvm_cpu_dirty_log_size(void)
+int kvm_cpu_dirty_log_size(struct kvm *kvm)
{
- return kvm_x86_ops.cpu_dirty_log_size;
+ return kvm->arch.cpu_dirty_log_size;
}
bool kvm_mmu_slot_gfn_write_protect(struct kvm *kvm,
@@ -3019,7 +3020,8 @@ static int mmu_set_spte(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_memory_slot *slot,
}
if (is_shadow_present_pte(*sptep)) {
- if (prefetch)
+ if (prefetch && is_last_spte(*sptep, level) &&
+ pfn == spte_to_pfn(*sptep))
return RET_PF_SPURIOUS;
/*
@@ -3033,7 +3035,7 @@ static int mmu_set_spte(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_memory_slot *slot,
child = spte_to_child_sp(pte);
drop_parent_pte(vcpu->kvm, child, sptep);
flush = true;
- } else if (pfn != spte_to_pfn(*sptep)) {
+ } else if (WARN_ON_ONCE(pfn != spte_to_pfn(*sptep))) {
drop_spte(vcpu->kvm, sptep);
flush = true;
} else
@@ -4835,19 +4837,6 @@ out_unlock:
}
#endif
-bool kvm_mmu_may_ignore_guest_pat(void)
-{
- /*
- * When EPT is enabled (shadow_memtype_mask is non-zero), and the VM
- * has non-coherent DMA (DMA doesn't snoop CPU caches), KVM's ABI is to
- * honor the memtype from the guest's PAT so that guest accesses to
- * memory that is DMA'd aren't cached against the guest's wishes. As a
- * result, KVM _may_ ignore guest PAT, whereas without non-coherent DMA,
- * KVM _always_ ignores guest PAT (when EPT is enabled).
- */
- return shadow_memtype_mask;
-}
-
int kvm_tdp_page_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_page_fault *fault)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
@@ -4858,8 +4847,7 @@ int kvm_tdp_page_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_page_fault *fault)
return direct_page_fault(vcpu, fault);
}
-static int kvm_tdp_map_page(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t gpa, u64 error_code,
- u8 *level)
+int kvm_tdp_map_page(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t gpa, u64 error_code, u8 *level)
{
int r;
@@ -4873,6 +4861,10 @@ static int kvm_tdp_map_page(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t gpa, u64 error_code,
do {
if (signal_pending(current))
return -EINTR;
+
+ if (kvm_check_request(KVM_REQ_VM_DEAD, vcpu))
+ return -EIO;
+
cond_resched();
r = kvm_mmu_do_page_fault(vcpu, gpa, error_code, true, NULL, level);
} while (r == RET_PF_RETRY);
@@ -4897,18 +4889,23 @@ static int kvm_tdp_map_page(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t gpa, u64 error_code,
return -EIO;
}
}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_tdp_map_page);
long kvm_arch_vcpu_pre_fault_memory(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
struct kvm_pre_fault_memory *range)
{
u64 error_code = PFERR_GUEST_FINAL_MASK;
u8 level = PG_LEVEL_4K;
+ u64 direct_bits;
u64 end;
int r;
if (!vcpu->kvm->arch.pre_fault_allowed)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+ if (kvm_is_gfn_alias(vcpu->kvm, gpa_to_gfn(range->gpa)))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
/*
* reload is efficient when called repeatedly, so we can do it on
* every iteration.
@@ -4917,15 +4914,18 @@ long kvm_arch_vcpu_pre_fault_memory(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
if (r)
return r;
+ direct_bits = 0;
if (kvm_arch_has_private_mem(vcpu->kvm) &&
kvm_mem_is_private(vcpu->kvm, gpa_to_gfn(range->gpa)))
error_code |= PFERR_PRIVATE_ACCESS;
+ else
+ direct_bits = gfn_to_gpa(kvm_gfn_direct_bits(vcpu->kvm));
/*
* Shadow paging uses GVA for kvm page fault, so restrict to
* two-dimensional paging.
*/
- r = kvm_tdp_map_page(vcpu, range->gpa, error_code, &level);
+ r = kvm_tdp_map_page(vcpu, range->gpa | direct_bits, error_code, &level);
if (r < 0)
return r;
@@ -5589,12 +5589,19 @@ void __kvm_mmu_refresh_passthrough_bits(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
static inline int kvm_mmu_get_tdp_level(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
+ int maxpa;
+
+ if (vcpu->kvm->arch.vm_type == KVM_X86_TDX_VM)
+ maxpa = cpuid_query_maxguestphyaddr(vcpu);
+ else
+ maxpa = cpuid_maxphyaddr(vcpu);
+
/* tdp_root_level is architecture forced level, use it if nonzero */
if (tdp_root_level)
return tdp_root_level;
/* Use 5-level TDP if and only if it's useful/necessary. */
- if (max_tdp_level == 5 && cpuid_maxphyaddr(vcpu) <= 48)
+ if (max_tdp_level == 5 && maxpa <= 48)
return 4;
return max_tdp_level;
@@ -5913,6 +5920,7 @@ int kvm_mmu_load(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
out:
return r;
}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_mmu_load);
void kvm_mmu_unload(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
@@ -7239,6 +7247,7 @@ static void kvm_mmu_zap_memslot(struct kvm *kvm,
.start = slot->base_gfn,
.end = slot->base_gfn + slot->npages,
.may_block = true,
+ .attr_filter = KVM_FILTER_PRIVATE | KVM_FILTER_SHARED,
};
bool flush;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu_internal.h b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu_internal.h
index 75f00598289d..db8f33e4de62 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu_internal.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu_internal.h
@@ -187,7 +187,8 @@ static inline gfn_t kvm_gfn_root_bits(const struct kvm *kvm, const struct kvm_mm
return kvm_gfn_direct_bits(kvm);
}
-static inline bool kvm_mmu_page_ad_need_write_protect(struct kvm_mmu_page *sp)
+static inline bool kvm_mmu_page_ad_need_write_protect(struct kvm *kvm,
+ struct kvm_mmu_page *sp)
{
/*
* When using the EPT page-modification log, the GPAs in the CPU dirty
@@ -197,7 +198,7 @@ static inline bool kvm_mmu_page_ad_need_write_protect(struct kvm_mmu_page *sp)
* being enabled is mandatory as the bits used to denote WP-only SPTEs
* are reserved for PAE paging (32-bit KVM).
*/
- return kvm_x86_ops.cpu_dirty_log_size && sp->role.guest_mode;
+ return kvm->arch.cpu_dirty_log_size && sp->role.guest_mode;
}
static inline gfn_t gfn_round_for_level(gfn_t gfn, int level)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/page_track.c b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/page_track.c
index 561c331fd6ec..1b17b12393a8 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/page_track.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/page_track.c
@@ -172,6 +172,9 @@ static int kvm_enable_external_write_tracking(struct kvm *kvm)
struct kvm_memory_slot *slot;
int r = 0, i, bkt;
+ if (kvm->arch.vm_type == KVM_X86_TDX_VM)
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
mutex_lock(&kvm->slots_arch_lock);
/*
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.c b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.c
index 0f9f47b4ab0e..cfce03d8f123 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.c
@@ -37,7 +37,6 @@ u64 __read_mostly shadow_mmio_value;
u64 __read_mostly shadow_mmio_mask;
u64 __read_mostly shadow_mmio_access_mask;
u64 __read_mostly shadow_present_mask;
-u64 __read_mostly shadow_memtype_mask;
u64 __read_mostly shadow_me_value;
u64 __read_mostly shadow_me_mask;
u64 __read_mostly shadow_acc_track_mask;
@@ -96,8 +95,6 @@ u64 make_mmio_spte(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 gfn, unsigned int access)
u64 spte = generation_mmio_spte_mask(gen);
u64 gpa = gfn << PAGE_SHIFT;
- WARN_ON_ONCE(!vcpu->kvm->arch.shadow_mmio_value);
-
access &= shadow_mmio_access_mask;
spte |= vcpu->kvm->arch.shadow_mmio_value | access;
spte |= gpa | shadow_nonpresent_or_rsvd_mask;
@@ -177,7 +174,7 @@ bool make_spte(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_mmu_page *sp,
if (sp->role.ad_disabled)
spte |= SPTE_TDP_AD_DISABLED;
- else if (kvm_mmu_page_ad_need_write_protect(sp))
+ else if (kvm_mmu_page_ad_need_write_protect(vcpu->kvm, sp))
spte |= SPTE_TDP_AD_WRPROT_ONLY;
spte |= shadow_present_mask;
@@ -212,9 +209,7 @@ bool make_spte(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_mmu_page *sp,
if (level > PG_LEVEL_4K)
spte |= PT_PAGE_SIZE_MASK;
- if (shadow_memtype_mask)
- spte |= kvm_x86_call(get_mt_mask)(vcpu, gfn,
- kvm_is_mmio_pfn(pfn));
+ spte |= kvm_x86_call(get_mt_mask)(vcpu, gfn, kvm_is_mmio_pfn(pfn));
if (host_writable)
spte |= shadow_host_writable_mask;
else
@@ -440,6 +435,12 @@ void kvm_mmu_set_mmio_spte_mask(u64 mmio_value, u64 mmio_mask, u64 access_mask)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_mmu_set_mmio_spte_mask);
+void kvm_mmu_set_mmio_spte_value(struct kvm *kvm, u64 mmio_value)
+{
+ kvm->arch.shadow_mmio_value = mmio_value;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_mmu_set_mmio_spte_value);
+
void kvm_mmu_set_me_spte_mask(u64 me_value, u64 me_mask)
{
/* shadow_me_value must be a subset of shadow_me_mask */
@@ -463,13 +464,7 @@ void kvm_mmu_set_ept_masks(bool has_ad_bits, bool has_exec_only)
/* VMX_EPT_SUPPRESS_VE_BIT is needed for W or X violation. */
shadow_present_mask =
(has_exec_only ? 0ull : VMX_EPT_READABLE_MASK) | VMX_EPT_SUPPRESS_VE_BIT;
- /*
- * EPT overrides the host MTRRs, and so KVM must program the desired
- * memtype directly into the SPTEs. Note, this mask is just the mask
- * of all bits that factor into the memtype, the actual memtype must be
- * dynamically calculated, e.g. to ensure host MMIO is mapped UC.
- */
- shadow_memtype_mask = VMX_EPT_MT_MASK | VMX_EPT_IPAT_BIT;
+
shadow_acc_track_mask = VMX_EPT_RWX_MASK;
shadow_host_writable_mask = EPT_SPTE_HOST_WRITABLE;
shadow_mmu_writable_mask = EPT_SPTE_MMU_WRITABLE;
@@ -521,12 +516,6 @@ void kvm_mmu_reset_all_pte_masks(void)
shadow_x_mask = 0;
shadow_present_mask = PT_PRESENT_MASK;
- /*
- * For shadow paging and NPT, KVM uses PAT entry '0' to encode WB
- * memtype in the SPTEs, i.e. relies on host MTRRs to provide the
- * correct memtype (WB is the "weakest" memtype).
- */
- shadow_memtype_mask = 0;
shadow_acc_track_mask = 0;
shadow_me_mask = 0;
shadow_me_value = 0;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.h b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.h
index 79cdceba9857..1e94f081bdaf 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.h
@@ -187,7 +187,6 @@ extern u64 __read_mostly shadow_mmio_value;
extern u64 __read_mostly shadow_mmio_mask;
extern u64 __read_mostly shadow_mmio_access_mask;
extern u64 __read_mostly shadow_present_mask;
-extern u64 __read_mostly shadow_memtype_mask;
extern u64 __read_mostly shadow_me_value;
extern u64 __read_mostly shadow_me_mask;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c
index 21a3b8166242..7f3d7229b2c1 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c
@@ -378,7 +378,7 @@ static void remove_external_spte(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t gfn, u64 old_spte,
/* Zapping leaf spte is allowed only when write lock is held. */
lockdep_assert_held_write(&kvm->mmu_lock);
/* Because write lock is held, operation should success. */
- ret = static_call(kvm_x86_remove_external_spte)(kvm, gfn, level, old_pfn);
+ ret = kvm_x86_call(remove_external_spte)(kvm, gfn, level, old_pfn);
KVM_BUG_ON(ret, kvm);
}
@@ -485,8 +485,8 @@ static void handle_removed_pt(struct kvm *kvm, tdp_ptep_t pt, bool shared)
}
if (is_mirror_sp(sp) &&
- WARN_ON(static_call(kvm_x86_free_external_spt)(kvm, base_gfn, sp->role.level,
- sp->external_spt))) {
+ WARN_ON(kvm_x86_call(free_external_spt)(kvm, base_gfn, sp->role.level,
+ sp->external_spt))) {
/*
* Failed to free page table page in mirror page table and
* there is nothing to do further.
@@ -538,12 +538,12 @@ static int __must_check set_external_spte_present(struct kvm *kvm, tdp_ptep_t sp
* external page table, or leaf.
*/
if (is_leaf) {
- ret = static_call(kvm_x86_set_external_spte)(kvm, gfn, level, new_pfn);
+ ret = kvm_x86_call(set_external_spte)(kvm, gfn, level, new_pfn);
} else {
void *external_spt = get_external_spt(gfn, new_spte, level);
KVM_BUG_ON(!external_spt, kvm);
- ret = static_call(kvm_x86_link_external_spt)(kvm, gfn, level, external_spt);
+ ret = kvm_x86_call(link_external_spt)(kvm, gfn, level, external_spt);
}
if (ret)
__kvm_tdp_mmu_write_spte(sptep, old_spte);
@@ -1153,13 +1153,12 @@ static int tdp_mmu_map_handle_target_level(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(sp->role.level != fault->goal_level))
return RET_PF_RETRY;
- if (fault->prefetch && is_shadow_present_pte(iter->old_spte))
- return RET_PF_SPURIOUS;
-
if (is_shadow_present_pte(iter->old_spte) &&
- is_access_allowed(fault, iter->old_spte) &&
- is_last_spte(iter->old_spte, iter->level))
+ (fault->prefetch || is_access_allowed(fault, iter->old_spte)) &&
+ is_last_spte(iter->old_spte, iter->level)) {
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(fault->pfn != spte_to_pfn(iter->old_spte));
return RET_PF_SPURIOUS;
+ }
if (unlikely(!fault->slot))
new_spte = make_mmio_spte(vcpu, iter->gfn, ACC_ALL);
@@ -1630,21 +1629,21 @@ void kvm_tdp_mmu_try_split_huge_pages(struct kvm *kvm,
}
}
-static bool tdp_mmu_need_write_protect(struct kvm_mmu_page *sp)
+static bool tdp_mmu_need_write_protect(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_mmu_page *sp)
{
/*
* All TDP MMU shadow pages share the same role as their root, aside
* from level, so it is valid to key off any shadow page to determine if
* write protection is needed for an entire tree.
*/
- return kvm_mmu_page_ad_need_write_protect(sp) || !kvm_ad_enabled;
+ return kvm_mmu_page_ad_need_write_protect(kvm, sp) || !kvm_ad_enabled;
}
static void clear_dirty_gfn_range(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_mmu_page *root,
gfn_t start, gfn_t end)
{
- const u64 dbit = tdp_mmu_need_write_protect(root) ? PT_WRITABLE_MASK :
- shadow_dirty_mask;
+ const u64 dbit = tdp_mmu_need_write_protect(kvm, root) ?
+ PT_WRITABLE_MASK : shadow_dirty_mask;
struct tdp_iter iter;
rcu_read_lock();
@@ -1689,8 +1688,8 @@ void kvm_tdp_mmu_clear_dirty_slot(struct kvm *kvm,
static void clear_dirty_pt_masked(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_mmu_page *root,
gfn_t gfn, unsigned long mask, bool wrprot)
{
- const u64 dbit = (wrprot || tdp_mmu_need_write_protect(root)) ? PT_WRITABLE_MASK :
- shadow_dirty_mask;
+ const u64 dbit = (wrprot || tdp_mmu_need_write_protect(kvm, root)) ?
+ PT_WRITABLE_MASK : shadow_dirty_mask;
struct tdp_iter iter;
lockdep_assert_held_write(&kvm->mmu_lock);
@@ -1911,16 +1910,13 @@ bool kvm_tdp_mmu_write_protect_gfn(struct kvm *kvm,
*
* Must be called between kvm_tdp_mmu_walk_lockless_{begin,end}.
*/
-int kvm_tdp_mmu_get_walk(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 addr, u64 *sptes,
- int *root_level)
+static int __kvm_tdp_mmu_get_walk(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 addr, u64 *sptes,
+ struct kvm_mmu_page *root)
{
- struct kvm_mmu_page *root = root_to_sp(vcpu->arch.mmu->root.hpa);
struct tdp_iter iter;
gfn_t gfn = addr >> PAGE_SHIFT;
int leaf = -1;
- *root_level = vcpu->arch.mmu->root_role.level;
-
for_each_tdp_pte(iter, vcpu->kvm, root, gfn, gfn + 1) {
leaf = iter.level;
sptes[leaf] = iter.old_spte;
@@ -1929,6 +1925,36 @@ int kvm_tdp_mmu_get_walk(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 addr, u64 *sptes,
return leaf;
}
+int kvm_tdp_mmu_get_walk(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 addr, u64 *sptes,
+ int *root_level)
+{
+ struct kvm_mmu_page *root = root_to_sp(vcpu->arch.mmu->root.hpa);
+ *root_level = vcpu->arch.mmu->root_role.level;
+
+ return __kvm_tdp_mmu_get_walk(vcpu, addr, sptes, root);
+}
+
+bool kvm_tdp_mmu_gpa_is_mapped(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 gpa)
+{
+ struct kvm *kvm = vcpu->kvm;
+ bool is_direct = kvm_is_addr_direct(kvm, gpa);
+ hpa_t root = is_direct ? vcpu->arch.mmu->root.hpa :
+ vcpu->arch.mmu->mirror_root_hpa;
+ u64 sptes[PT64_ROOT_MAX_LEVEL + 1], spte;
+ int leaf;
+
+ lockdep_assert_held(&kvm->mmu_lock);
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ leaf = __kvm_tdp_mmu_get_walk(vcpu, gpa, sptes, root_to_sp(root));
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ if (leaf < 0)
+ return false;
+
+ spte = sptes[leaf];
+ return is_shadow_present_pte(spte) && is_last_spte(spte, leaf);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_tdp_mmu_gpa_is_mapped);
+
/*
* Returns the last level spte pointer of the shadow page walk for the given
* gpa, and sets *spte to the spte value. This spte may be non-preset. If no
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/smm.h b/arch/x86/kvm/smm.h
index a1cf2ac5bd78..551703fbe200 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/smm.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/smm.h
@@ -142,6 +142,9 @@ union kvm_smram {
static inline int kvm_inject_smi(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
+ if (!kvm_x86_call(has_emulated_msr)(vcpu->kvm, MSR_IA32_SMBASE))
+ return -ENOTTY;
+
kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_SMI, vcpu);
return 0;
}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c
index 834b67672d50..8427a48b8b7a 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c
@@ -678,6 +678,33 @@ static void nested_vmcb02_prepare_control(struct vcpu_svm *svm,
vmcb02->control.iopm_base_pa = vmcb01->control.iopm_base_pa;
vmcb02->control.msrpm_base_pa = vmcb01->control.msrpm_base_pa;
+ /*
+ * Stash vmcb02's counter if the guest hasn't moved past the guilty
+ * instruction; otherwise, reset the counter to '0'.
+ *
+ * In order to detect if L2 has made forward progress or not, track the
+ * RIP at which a bus lock has occurred on a per-vmcb12 basis. If RIP
+ * is changed, guest has clearly made forward progress, bus_lock_counter
+ * still remained '1', so reset bus_lock_counter to '0'. Eg. In the
+ * scenario, where a buslock happened in L1 before VMRUN, the bus lock
+ * firmly happened on an instruction in the past. Even if vmcb01's
+ * counter is still '1', (because the guilty instruction got patched),
+ * the vCPU has clearly made forward progress and so KVM should reset
+ * vmcb02's counter to '0'.
+ *
+ * If the RIP hasn't changed, stash the bus lock counter at nested VMRUN
+ * to prevent the same guilty instruction from triggering a VM-Exit. Eg.
+ * if userspace rate-limits the vCPU, then it's entirely possible that
+ * L1's tick interrupt is pending by the time userspace re-runs the
+ * vCPU. If KVM unconditionally clears the counter on VMRUN, then when
+ * L1 re-enters L2, the same instruction will trigger a VM-Exit and the
+ * entire cycle start over.
+ */
+ if (vmcb02->save.rip && (svm->nested.ctl.bus_lock_rip == vmcb02->save.rip))
+ vmcb02->control.bus_lock_counter = 1;
+ else
+ vmcb02->control.bus_lock_counter = 0;
+
/* Done at vmrun: asid. */
/* Also overwritten later if necessary. */
@@ -1039,8 +1066,17 @@ int nested_svm_vmexit(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
}
+ /*
+ * Invalidate bus_lock_rip unless KVM is still waiting for the guest
+ * to make forward progress before re-enabling bus lock detection.
+ */
+ if (!vmcb02->control.bus_lock_counter)
+ svm->nested.ctl.bus_lock_rip = INVALID_GPA;
+
nested_svm_copy_common_state(svm->nested.vmcb02.ptr, svm->vmcb01.ptr);
+ kvm_nested_vmexit_handle_ibrs(vcpu);
+
svm_switch_vmcb(svm, &svm->vmcb01);
/*
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
index 1aa0f07d3a63..459c3b791fd4 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
@@ -561,6 +561,8 @@ static int sev_launch_start(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
if (copy_from_user(&params, u64_to_user_ptr(argp->data), sizeof(params)))
return -EFAULT;
+ sev->policy = params.policy;
+
memset(&start, 0, sizeof(start));
dh_blob = NULL;
@@ -1593,11 +1595,11 @@ static int sev_send_update_data(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
/* allocate memory for header and transport buffer */
ret = -ENOMEM;
- hdr = kzalloc(params.hdr_len, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
+ hdr = kzalloc(params.hdr_len, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!hdr)
goto e_unpin;
- trans_data = kzalloc(params.trans_len, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
+ trans_data = kzalloc(params.trans_len, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!trans_data)
goto e_free_hdr;
@@ -1883,70 +1885,6 @@ static void sev_unlock_two_vms(struct kvm *dst_kvm, struct kvm *src_kvm)
atomic_set_release(&src_sev->migration_in_progress, 0);
}
-/* vCPU mutex subclasses. */
-enum sev_migration_role {
- SEV_MIGRATION_SOURCE = 0,
- SEV_MIGRATION_TARGET,
- SEV_NR_MIGRATION_ROLES,
-};
-
-static int sev_lock_vcpus_for_migration(struct kvm *kvm,
- enum sev_migration_role role)
-{
- struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu;
- unsigned long i, j;
-
- kvm_for_each_vcpu(i, vcpu, kvm) {
- if (mutex_lock_killable_nested(&vcpu->mutex, role))
- goto out_unlock;
-
-#ifdef CONFIG_PROVE_LOCKING
- if (!i)
- /*
- * Reset the role to one that avoids colliding with
- * the role used for the first vcpu mutex.
- */
- role = SEV_NR_MIGRATION_ROLES;
- else
- mutex_release(&vcpu->mutex.dep_map, _THIS_IP_);
-#endif
- }
-
- return 0;
-
-out_unlock:
-
- kvm_for_each_vcpu(j, vcpu, kvm) {
- if (i == j)
- break;
-
-#ifdef CONFIG_PROVE_LOCKING
- if (j)
- mutex_acquire(&vcpu->mutex.dep_map, role, 0, _THIS_IP_);
-#endif
-
- mutex_unlock(&vcpu->mutex);
- }
- return -EINTR;
-}
-
-static void sev_unlock_vcpus_for_migration(struct kvm *kvm)
-{
- struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu;
- unsigned long i;
- bool first = true;
-
- kvm_for_each_vcpu(i, vcpu, kvm) {
- if (first)
- first = false;
- else
- mutex_acquire(&vcpu->mutex.dep_map,
- SEV_NR_MIGRATION_ROLES, 0, _THIS_IP_);
-
- mutex_unlock(&vcpu->mutex);
- }
-}
-
static void sev_migrate_from(struct kvm *dst_kvm, struct kvm *src_kvm)
{
struct kvm_sev_info *dst = to_kvm_sev_info(dst_kvm);
@@ -2084,10 +2022,10 @@ int sev_vm_move_enc_context_from(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned int source_fd)
charged = true;
}
- ret = sev_lock_vcpus_for_migration(kvm, SEV_MIGRATION_SOURCE);
+ ret = kvm_lock_all_vcpus(kvm);
if (ret)
goto out_dst_cgroup;
- ret = sev_lock_vcpus_for_migration(source_kvm, SEV_MIGRATION_TARGET);
+ ret = kvm_lock_all_vcpus(source_kvm);
if (ret)
goto out_dst_vcpu;
@@ -2101,9 +2039,9 @@ int sev_vm_move_enc_context_from(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned int source_fd)
ret = 0;
out_source_vcpu:
- sev_unlock_vcpus_for_migration(source_kvm);
+ kvm_unlock_all_vcpus(source_kvm);
out_dst_vcpu:
- sev_unlock_vcpus_for_migration(kvm);
+ kvm_unlock_all_vcpus(kvm);
out_dst_cgroup:
/* Operates on the source on success, on the destination on failure. */
if (charged)
@@ -2200,6 +2138,8 @@ static int snp_launch_start(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
if (params.policy & SNP_POLICY_MASK_SINGLE_SOCKET)
return -EINVAL;
+ sev->policy = params.policy;
+
sev->snp_context = snp_context_create(kvm, argp);
if (!sev->snp_context)
return -ENOTTY;
@@ -2931,6 +2871,33 @@ void __init sev_set_cpu_caps(void)
}
}
+static bool is_sev_snp_initialized(void)
+{
+ struct sev_user_data_snp_status *status;
+ struct sev_data_snp_addr buf;
+ bool initialized = false;
+ int ret, error = 0;
+
+ status = snp_alloc_firmware_page(GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO);
+ if (!status)
+ return false;
+
+ buf.address = __psp_pa(status);
+ ret = sev_do_cmd(SEV_CMD_SNP_PLATFORM_STATUS, &buf, &error);
+ if (ret) {
+ pr_err("SEV: SNP_PLATFORM_STATUS failed ret=%d, fw_error=%d (%#x)\n",
+ ret, error, error);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ initialized = !!status->state;
+
+out:
+ snp_free_firmware_page(status);
+
+ return initialized;
+}
+
void __init sev_hardware_setup(void)
{
unsigned int eax, ebx, ecx, edx, sev_asid_count, sev_es_asid_count;
@@ -3035,6 +3002,14 @@ void __init sev_hardware_setup(void)
sev_snp_supported = sev_snp_enabled && cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_HOST_SEV_SNP);
out:
+ if (sev_enabled) {
+ init_args.probe = true;
+ if (sev_platform_init(&init_args))
+ sev_supported = sev_es_supported = sev_snp_supported = false;
+ else if (sev_snp_supported)
+ sev_snp_supported = is_sev_snp_initialized();
+ }
+
if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SEV))
pr_info("SEV %s (ASIDs %u - %u)\n",
sev_supported ? min_sev_asid <= max_sev_asid ? "enabled" :
@@ -3061,15 +3036,6 @@ out:
sev_supported_vmsa_features = 0;
if (sev_es_debug_swap_enabled)
sev_supported_vmsa_features |= SVM_SEV_FEAT_DEBUG_SWAP;
-
- if (!sev_enabled)
- return;
-
- /*
- * Do both SNP and SEV initialization at KVM module load.
- */
- init_args.probe = true;
- sev_platform_init(&init_args);
}
void sev_hardware_unsetup(void)
@@ -4007,10 +3973,8 @@ static int sev_snp_ap_creation(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
* Unless Creation is deferred until INIT, signal the vCPU to update
* its state.
*/
- if (request != SVM_VMGEXIT_AP_CREATE_ON_INIT) {
- kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_UPDATE_PROTECTED_GUEST_STATE, target_vcpu);
- kvm_vcpu_kick(target_vcpu);
- }
+ if (request != SVM_VMGEXIT_AP_CREATE_ON_INIT)
+ kvm_make_request_and_kick(KVM_REQ_UPDATE_PROTECTED_GUEST_STATE, target_vcpu);
return 0;
}
@@ -4468,6 +4432,7 @@ void sev_vcpu_after_set_cpuid(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
static void sev_es_init_vmcb(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
{
+ struct kvm_sev_info *sev = to_kvm_sev_info(svm->vcpu.kvm);
struct vmcb *vmcb = svm->vmcb01.ptr;
struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = &svm->vcpu;
@@ -4483,6 +4448,10 @@ static void sev_es_init_vmcb(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
if (svm->sev_es.vmsa && !svm->sev_es.snp_has_guest_vmsa)
svm->vmcb->control.vmsa_pa = __pa(svm->sev_es.vmsa);
+ if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_ALLOWED_SEV_FEATURES))
+ svm->vmcb->control.allowed_sev_features = sev->vmsa_features |
+ VMCB_ALLOWED_SEV_FEATURES_VALID;
+
/* Can't intercept CR register access, HV can't modify CR registers */
svm_clr_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_CR0_READ);
svm_clr_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_CR4_READ);
@@ -4943,3 +4912,97 @@ int sev_private_max_mapping_level(struct kvm *kvm, kvm_pfn_t pfn)
return level;
}
+
+struct vmcb_save_area *sev_decrypt_vmsa(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+ struct vmcb_save_area *vmsa;
+ struct kvm_sev_info *sev;
+ int error = 0;
+ int ret;
+
+ if (!sev_es_guest(vcpu->kvm))
+ return NULL;
+
+ /*
+ * If the VMSA has not yet been encrypted, return a pointer to the
+ * current un-encrypted VMSA.
+ */
+ if (!vcpu->arch.guest_state_protected)
+ return (struct vmcb_save_area *)svm->sev_es.vmsa;
+
+ sev = to_kvm_sev_info(vcpu->kvm);
+
+ /* Check if the SEV policy allows debugging */
+ if (sev_snp_guest(vcpu->kvm)) {
+ if (!(sev->policy & SNP_POLICY_DEBUG))
+ return NULL;
+ } else {
+ if (sev->policy & SEV_POLICY_NODBG)
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ if (sev_snp_guest(vcpu->kvm)) {
+ struct sev_data_snp_dbg dbg = {0};
+
+ vmsa = snp_alloc_firmware_page(__GFP_ZERO);
+ if (!vmsa)
+ return NULL;
+
+ dbg.gctx_paddr = __psp_pa(sev->snp_context);
+ dbg.src_addr = svm->vmcb->control.vmsa_pa;
+ dbg.dst_addr = __psp_pa(vmsa);
+
+ ret = sev_do_cmd(SEV_CMD_SNP_DBG_DECRYPT, &dbg, &error);
+
+ /*
+ * Return the target page to a hypervisor page no matter what.
+ * If this fails, the page can't be used, so leak it and don't
+ * try to use it.
+ */
+ if (snp_page_reclaim(vcpu->kvm, PHYS_PFN(__pa(vmsa))))
+ return NULL;
+
+ if (ret) {
+ pr_err("SEV: SNP_DBG_DECRYPT failed ret=%d, fw_error=%d (%#x)\n",
+ ret, error, error);
+ free_page((unsigned long)vmsa);
+
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ } else {
+ struct sev_data_dbg dbg = {0};
+ struct page *vmsa_page;
+
+ vmsa_page = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!vmsa_page)
+ return NULL;
+
+ vmsa = page_address(vmsa_page);
+
+ dbg.handle = sev->handle;
+ dbg.src_addr = svm->vmcb->control.vmsa_pa;
+ dbg.dst_addr = __psp_pa(vmsa);
+ dbg.len = PAGE_SIZE;
+
+ ret = sev_do_cmd(SEV_CMD_DBG_DECRYPT, &dbg, &error);
+ if (ret) {
+ pr_err("SEV: SEV_CMD_DBG_DECRYPT failed ret=%d, fw_error=%d (0x%x)\n",
+ ret, error, error);
+ __free_page(vmsa_page);
+
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return vmsa;
+}
+
+void sev_free_decrypted_vmsa(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct vmcb_save_area *vmsa)
+{
+ /* If the VMSA has not yet been encrypted, nothing was allocated */
+ if (!vcpu->arch.guest_state_protected || !vmsa)
+ return;
+
+ free_page((unsigned long)vmsa);
+}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
index 67fee545d42a..ab9b947dbf4f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@
#include <linux/cc_platform.h>
#include <linux/smp.h>
#include <linux/string_choices.h>
+#include <linux/mutex.h>
#include <asm/apic.h>
#include <asm/msr.h>
@@ -232,6 +233,8 @@ module_param(tsc_scaling, int, 0444);
static bool avic;
module_param(avic, bool, 0444);
+module_param(enable_device_posted_irqs, bool, 0444);
+
bool __read_mostly dump_invalid_vmcb;
module_param(dump_invalid_vmcb, bool, 0644);
@@ -250,6 +253,8 @@ static unsigned long iopm_base;
DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct svm_cpu_data, svm_data);
+static DEFINE_MUTEX(vmcb_dump_mutex);
+
/*
* Only MSR_TSC_AUX is switched via the user return hook. EFER is switched via
* the VMCB, and the SYSCALL/SYSENTER MSRs are handled by VMLOAD/VMSAVE.
@@ -1369,6 +1374,9 @@ static void init_vmcb(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
svm->vmcb->control.int_ctl |= V_GIF_ENABLE_MASK;
}
+ if (vcpu->kvm->arch.bus_lock_detection_enabled)
+ svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_BUSLOCK);
+
if (sev_guest(vcpu->kvm))
sev_init_vmcb(svm);
@@ -1478,25 +1486,10 @@ out:
return err;
}
-static void svm_clear_current_vmcb(struct vmcb *vmcb)
-{
- int i;
-
- for_each_online_cpu(i)
- cmpxchg(per_cpu_ptr(&svm_data.current_vmcb, i), vmcb, NULL);
-}
-
static void svm_vcpu_free(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
- /*
- * The vmcb page can be recycled, causing a false negative in
- * svm_vcpu_load(). So, ensure that no logical CPU has this
- * vmcb page recorded as its current vmcb.
- */
- svm_clear_current_vmcb(svm->vmcb);
-
svm_leave_nested(vcpu);
svm_free_nested(svm);
@@ -1610,19 +1603,9 @@ static void svm_prepare_host_switch(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
static void svm_vcpu_load(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int cpu)
{
- struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
- struct svm_cpu_data *sd = per_cpu_ptr(&svm_data, cpu);
-
if (vcpu->scheduled_out && !kvm_pause_in_guest(vcpu->kvm))
shrink_ple_window(vcpu);
- if (sd->current_vmcb != svm->vmcb) {
- sd->current_vmcb = svm->vmcb;
-
- if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT) &&
- static_branch_likely(&switch_vcpu_ibpb))
- indirect_branch_prediction_barrier();
- }
if (kvm_vcpu_apicv_active(vcpu))
avic_vcpu_load(vcpu, cpu);
}
@@ -3221,17 +3204,6 @@ static int svm_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr)
}
/*
- * AMD changed the architectural behavior of bits 5:2. On CPUs
- * without BusLockTrap, bits 5:2 control "external pins", but
- * on CPUs that support BusLockDetect, bit 2 enables BusLockTrap
- * and bits 5:3 are reserved-to-zero. Sadly, old KVM allowed
- * the guest to set bits 5:2 despite not actually virtualizing
- * Performance-Monitoring/Breakpoint external pins. Drop bits
- * 5:2 for backwards compatibility.
- */
- data &= ~GENMASK(5, 2);
-
- /*
* Suppress BTF as KVM doesn't virtualize BTF, but there's no
* way to communicate lack of support to the guest.
*/
@@ -3361,6 +3333,37 @@ static int invpcid_interception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
return kvm_handle_invpcid(vcpu, type, gva);
}
+static inline int complete_userspace_buslock(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+
+ /*
+ * If userspace has NOT changed RIP, then KVM's ABI is to let the guest
+ * execute the bus-locking instruction. Set the bus lock counter to '1'
+ * to effectively step past the bus lock.
+ */
+ if (kvm_is_linear_rip(vcpu, vcpu->arch.cui_linear_rip))
+ svm->vmcb->control.bus_lock_counter = 1;
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int bus_lock_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+
+ vcpu->run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_X86_BUS_LOCK;
+ vcpu->run->flags |= KVM_RUN_X86_BUS_LOCK;
+
+ vcpu->arch.cui_linear_rip = kvm_get_linear_rip(vcpu);
+ vcpu->arch.complete_userspace_io = complete_userspace_buslock;
+
+ if (is_guest_mode(vcpu))
+ svm->nested.ctl.bus_lock_rip = vcpu->arch.cui_linear_rip;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
static int (*const svm_exit_handlers[])(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) = {
[SVM_EXIT_READ_CR0] = cr_interception,
[SVM_EXIT_READ_CR3] = cr_interception,
@@ -3430,6 +3433,7 @@ static int (*const svm_exit_handlers[])(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) = {
[SVM_EXIT_INVPCID] = invpcid_interception,
[SVM_EXIT_IDLE_HLT] = kvm_emulate_halt,
[SVM_EXIT_NPF] = npf_interception,
+ [SVM_EXIT_BUS_LOCK] = bus_lock_exit,
[SVM_EXIT_RSM] = rsm_interception,
[SVM_EXIT_AVIC_INCOMPLETE_IPI] = avic_incomplete_ipi_interception,
[SVM_EXIT_AVIC_UNACCELERATED_ACCESS] = avic_unaccelerated_access_interception,
@@ -3444,14 +3448,21 @@ static void dump_vmcb(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
struct vmcb_control_area *control = &svm->vmcb->control;
struct vmcb_save_area *save = &svm->vmcb->save;
struct vmcb_save_area *save01 = &svm->vmcb01.ptr->save;
+ char *vm_type;
if (!dump_invalid_vmcb) {
pr_warn_ratelimited("set kvm_amd.dump_invalid_vmcb=1 to dump internal KVM state.\n");
return;
}
- pr_err("VMCB %p, last attempted VMRUN on CPU %d\n",
- svm->current_vmcb->ptr, vcpu->arch.last_vmentry_cpu);
+ guard(mutex)(&vmcb_dump_mutex);
+
+ vm_type = sev_snp_guest(vcpu->kvm) ? "SEV-SNP" :
+ sev_es_guest(vcpu->kvm) ? "SEV-ES" :
+ sev_guest(vcpu->kvm) ? "SEV" : "SVM";
+
+ pr_err("%s vCPU%u VMCB %p, last attempted VMRUN on CPU %d\n",
+ vm_type, vcpu->vcpu_id, svm->current_vmcb->ptr, vcpu->arch.last_vmentry_cpu);
pr_err("VMCB Control Area:\n");
pr_err("%-20s%04x\n", "cr_read:", control->intercepts[INTERCEPT_CR] & 0xffff);
pr_err("%-20s%04x\n", "cr_write:", control->intercepts[INTERCEPT_CR] >> 16);
@@ -3489,6 +3500,17 @@ static void dump_vmcb(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
pr_err("%-20s%016llx\n", "avic_logical_id:", control->avic_logical_id);
pr_err("%-20s%016llx\n", "avic_physical_id:", control->avic_physical_id);
pr_err("%-20s%016llx\n", "vmsa_pa:", control->vmsa_pa);
+ pr_err("%-20s%016llx\n", "allowed_sev_features:", control->allowed_sev_features);
+ pr_err("%-20s%016llx\n", "guest_sev_features:", control->guest_sev_features);
+
+ if (sev_es_guest(vcpu->kvm)) {
+ save = sev_decrypt_vmsa(vcpu);
+ if (!save)
+ goto no_vmsa;
+
+ save01 = save;
+ }
+
pr_err("VMCB State Save Area:\n");
pr_err("%-5s s: %04x a: %04x l: %08x b: %016llx\n",
"es:",
@@ -3559,6 +3581,63 @@ static void dump_vmcb(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
pr_err("%-15s %016llx %-13s %016llx\n",
"excp_from:", save->last_excp_from,
"excp_to:", save->last_excp_to);
+
+ if (sev_es_guest(vcpu->kvm)) {
+ struct sev_es_save_area *vmsa = (struct sev_es_save_area *)save;
+
+ pr_err("%-15s %016llx\n",
+ "sev_features", vmsa->sev_features);
+
+ pr_err("%-15s %016llx %-13s %016llx\n",
+ "rax:", vmsa->rax, "rbx:", vmsa->rbx);
+ pr_err("%-15s %016llx %-13s %016llx\n",
+ "rcx:", vmsa->rcx, "rdx:", vmsa->rdx);
+ pr_err("%-15s %016llx %-13s %016llx\n",
+ "rsi:", vmsa->rsi, "rdi:", vmsa->rdi);
+ pr_err("%-15s %016llx %-13s %016llx\n",
+ "rbp:", vmsa->rbp, "rsp:", vmsa->rsp);
+ pr_err("%-15s %016llx %-13s %016llx\n",
+ "r8:", vmsa->r8, "r9:", vmsa->r9);
+ pr_err("%-15s %016llx %-13s %016llx\n",
+ "r10:", vmsa->r10, "r11:", vmsa->r11);
+ pr_err("%-15s %016llx %-13s %016llx\n",
+ "r12:", vmsa->r12, "r13:", vmsa->r13);
+ pr_err("%-15s %016llx %-13s %016llx\n",
+ "r14:", vmsa->r14, "r15:", vmsa->r15);
+ pr_err("%-15s %016llx %-13s %016llx\n",
+ "xcr0:", vmsa->xcr0, "xss:", vmsa->xss);
+ } else {
+ pr_err("%-15s %016llx %-13s %016lx\n",
+ "rax:", save->rax, "rbx:",
+ vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RBX]);
+ pr_err("%-15s %016lx %-13s %016lx\n",
+ "rcx:", vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RCX],
+ "rdx:", vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RDX]);
+ pr_err("%-15s %016lx %-13s %016lx\n",
+ "rsi:", vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RSI],
+ "rdi:", vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RDI]);
+ pr_err("%-15s %016lx %-13s %016llx\n",
+ "rbp:", vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RBP],
+ "rsp:", save->rsp);
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+ pr_err("%-15s %016lx %-13s %016lx\n",
+ "r8:", vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_R8],
+ "r9:", vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_R9]);
+ pr_err("%-15s %016lx %-13s %016lx\n",
+ "r10:", vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_R10],
+ "r11:", vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_R11]);
+ pr_err("%-15s %016lx %-13s %016lx\n",
+ "r12:", vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_R12],
+ "r13:", vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_R13]);
+ pr_err("%-15s %016lx %-13s %016lx\n",
+ "r14:", vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_R14],
+ "r15:", vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_R15]);
+#endif
+ }
+
+no_vmsa:
+ if (sev_es_guest(vcpu->kvm))
+ sev_free_decrypted_vmsa(vcpu, save);
}
static bool svm_check_exit_valid(u64 exit_code)
@@ -3595,6 +3674,10 @@ int svm_invoke_exit_handler(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 exit_code)
return kvm_emulate_halt(vcpu);
else if (exit_code == SVM_EXIT_NPF)
return npf_interception(vcpu);
+#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV
+ else if (exit_code == SVM_EXIT_VMGEXIT)
+ return sev_handle_vmgexit(vcpu);
+#endif
#endif
return svm_exit_handlers[exit_code](vcpu);
}
@@ -5356,6 +5439,9 @@ static __init void svm_set_cpu_caps(void)
kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_SVME_ADDR_CHK);
}
+ if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_BUS_LOCK_THRESHOLD))
+ kvm_caps.has_bus_lock_exit = true;
+
/* CPUID 0x80000008 */
if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_LS_CFG_SSBD) ||
boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSBD))
@@ -5551,6 +5637,7 @@ static __init int svm_hardware_setup(void)
*/
allow_smaller_maxphyaddr = !npt_enabled;
+ kvm_caps.inapplicable_quirks &= ~KVM_X86_QUIRK_CD_NW_CLEARED;
return 0;
err:
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
index f16b068c4228..e6f3c6a153a0 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
@@ -98,6 +98,7 @@ struct kvm_sev_info {
unsigned int asid; /* ASID used for this guest */
unsigned int handle; /* SEV firmware handle */
int fd; /* SEV device fd */
+ unsigned long policy;
unsigned long pages_locked; /* Number of pages locked */
struct list_head regions_list; /* List of registered regions */
u64 ap_jump_table; /* SEV-ES AP Jump Table address */
@@ -114,6 +115,9 @@ struct kvm_sev_info {
struct mutex guest_req_mutex; /* Must acquire before using bounce buffers */
};
+#define SEV_POLICY_NODBG BIT_ULL(0)
+#define SNP_POLICY_DEBUG BIT_ULL(19)
+
struct kvm_svm {
struct kvm kvm;
@@ -169,6 +173,7 @@ struct vmcb_ctrl_area_cached {
u64 nested_cr3;
u64 virt_ext;
u32 clean;
+ u64 bus_lock_rip;
union {
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HYPERV) || IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KVM_HYPERV)
struct hv_vmcb_enlightenments hv_enlightenments;
@@ -340,8 +345,6 @@ struct svm_cpu_data {
struct vmcb *save_area;
unsigned long save_area_pa;
- struct vmcb *current_vmcb;
-
/* index = sev_asid, value = vmcb pointer */
struct vmcb **sev_vmcbs;
};
@@ -785,6 +788,8 @@ void sev_snp_init_protected_guest_state(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
int sev_gmem_prepare(struct kvm *kvm, kvm_pfn_t pfn, gfn_t gfn, int max_order);
void sev_gmem_invalidate(kvm_pfn_t start, kvm_pfn_t end);
int sev_private_max_mapping_level(struct kvm *kvm, kvm_pfn_t pfn);
+struct vmcb_save_area *sev_decrypt_vmsa(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+void sev_free_decrypted_vmsa(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct vmcb_save_area *vmsa);
#else
static inline struct page *snp_safe_alloc_page_node(int node, gfp_t gfp)
{
@@ -816,6 +821,11 @@ static inline int sev_private_max_mapping_level(struct kvm *kvm, kvm_pfn_t pfn)
return 0;
}
+static inline struct vmcb_save_area *sev_decrypt_vmsa(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ return NULL;
+}
+static inline void sev_free_decrypted_vmsa(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct vmcb_save_area *vmsa) {}
#endif
/* vmenter.S */
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/common.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/common.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..a0c5e8781c33
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/common.h
@@ -0,0 +1,182 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */
+#ifndef __KVM_X86_VMX_COMMON_H
+#define __KVM_X86_VMX_COMMON_H
+
+#include <linux/kvm_host.h>
+#include <asm/posted_intr.h>
+
+#include "mmu.h"
+
+union vmx_exit_reason {
+ struct {
+ u32 basic : 16;
+ u32 reserved16 : 1;
+ u32 reserved17 : 1;
+ u32 reserved18 : 1;
+ u32 reserved19 : 1;
+ u32 reserved20 : 1;
+ u32 reserved21 : 1;
+ u32 reserved22 : 1;
+ u32 reserved23 : 1;
+ u32 reserved24 : 1;
+ u32 reserved25 : 1;
+ u32 bus_lock_detected : 1;
+ u32 enclave_mode : 1;
+ u32 smi_pending_mtf : 1;
+ u32 smi_from_vmx_root : 1;
+ u32 reserved30 : 1;
+ u32 failed_vmentry : 1;
+ };
+ u32 full;
+};
+
+struct vcpu_vt {
+ /* Posted interrupt descriptor */
+ struct pi_desc pi_desc;
+
+ /* Used if this vCPU is waiting for PI notification wakeup. */
+ struct list_head pi_wakeup_list;
+
+ union vmx_exit_reason exit_reason;
+
+ unsigned long exit_qualification;
+ u32 exit_intr_info;
+
+ /*
+ * If true, guest state has been loaded into hardware, and host state
+ * saved into vcpu_{vt,vmx,tdx}. If false, host state is loaded into
+ * hardware.
+ */
+ bool guest_state_loaded;
+ bool emulation_required;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+ u64 msr_host_kernel_gs_base;
+#endif
+
+ unsigned long host_debugctlmsr;
+};
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_INTEL_TDX
+
+static __always_inline bool is_td(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+ return kvm->arch.vm_type == KVM_X86_TDX_VM;
+}
+
+static __always_inline bool is_td_vcpu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ return is_td(vcpu->kvm);
+}
+
+#else
+
+static __always_inline bool is_td(struct kvm *kvm) { return false; }
+static __always_inline bool is_td_vcpu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) { return false; }
+
+#endif
+
+static inline bool vt_is_tdx_private_gpa(struct kvm *kvm, gpa_t gpa)
+{
+ /* For TDX the direct mask is the shared mask. */
+ return !kvm_is_addr_direct(kvm, gpa);
+}
+
+static inline int __vmx_handle_ept_violation(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t gpa,
+ unsigned long exit_qualification)
+{
+ u64 error_code;
+
+ /* Is it a read fault? */
+ error_code = (exit_qualification & EPT_VIOLATION_ACC_READ)
+ ? PFERR_USER_MASK : 0;
+ /* Is it a write fault? */
+ error_code |= (exit_qualification & EPT_VIOLATION_ACC_WRITE)
+ ? PFERR_WRITE_MASK : 0;
+ /* Is it a fetch fault? */
+ error_code |= (exit_qualification & EPT_VIOLATION_ACC_INSTR)
+ ? PFERR_FETCH_MASK : 0;
+ /* ept page table entry is present? */
+ error_code |= (exit_qualification & EPT_VIOLATION_PROT_MASK)
+ ? PFERR_PRESENT_MASK : 0;
+
+ if (error_code & EPT_VIOLATION_GVA_IS_VALID)
+ error_code |= (exit_qualification & EPT_VIOLATION_GVA_TRANSLATED) ?
+ PFERR_GUEST_FINAL_MASK : PFERR_GUEST_PAGE_MASK;
+
+ if (vt_is_tdx_private_gpa(vcpu->kvm, gpa))
+ error_code |= PFERR_PRIVATE_ACCESS;
+
+ return kvm_mmu_page_fault(vcpu, gpa, error_code, NULL, 0);
+}
+
+static inline void kvm_vcpu_trigger_posted_interrupt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+ int pi_vec)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
+ if (vcpu->mode == IN_GUEST_MODE) {
+ /*
+ * The vector of the virtual has already been set in the PIR.
+ * Send a notification event to deliver the virtual interrupt
+ * unless the vCPU is the currently running vCPU, i.e. the
+ * event is being sent from a fastpath VM-Exit handler, in
+ * which case the PIR will be synced to the vIRR before
+ * re-entering the guest.
+ *
+ * When the target is not the running vCPU, the following
+ * possibilities emerge:
+ *
+ * Case 1: vCPU stays in non-root mode. Sending a notification
+ * event posts the interrupt to the vCPU.
+ *
+ * Case 2: vCPU exits to root mode and is still runnable. The
+ * PIR will be synced to the vIRR before re-entering the guest.
+ * Sending a notification event is ok as the host IRQ handler
+ * will ignore the spurious event.
+ *
+ * Case 3: vCPU exits to root mode and is blocked. vcpu_block()
+ * has already synced PIR to vIRR and never blocks the vCPU if
+ * the vIRR is not empty. Therefore, a blocked vCPU here does
+ * not wait for any requested interrupts in PIR, and sending a
+ * notification event also results in a benign, spurious event.
+ */
+
+ if (vcpu != kvm_get_running_vcpu())
+ __apic_send_IPI_mask(get_cpu_mask(vcpu->cpu), pi_vec);
+ return;
+ }
+#endif
+ /*
+ * The vCPU isn't in the guest; wake the vCPU in case it is blocking,
+ * otherwise do nothing as KVM will grab the highest priority pending
+ * IRQ via ->sync_pir_to_irr() in vcpu_enter_guest().
+ */
+ kvm_vcpu_wake_up(vcpu);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Post an interrupt to a vCPU's PIR and trigger the vCPU to process the
+ * interrupt if necessary.
+ */
+static inline void __vmx_deliver_posted_interrupt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+ struct pi_desc *pi_desc, int vector)
+{
+ if (pi_test_and_set_pir(vector, pi_desc))
+ return;
+
+ /* If a previous notification has sent the IPI, nothing to do. */
+ if (pi_test_and_set_on(pi_desc))
+ return;
+
+ /*
+ * The implied barrier in pi_test_and_set_on() pairs with the smp_mb_*()
+ * after setting vcpu->mode in vcpu_enter_guest(), thus the vCPU is
+ * guaranteed to see PID.ON=1 and sync the PIR to IRR if triggering a
+ * posted interrupt "fails" because vcpu->mode != IN_GUEST_MODE.
+ */
+ kvm_vcpu_trigger_posted_interrupt(vcpu, POSTED_INTR_VECTOR);
+}
+
+noinstr void vmx_handle_nmi(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+
+#endif /* __KVM_X86_VMX_COMMON_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c
index 43ee9ed11291..d1e02e567b57 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c
@@ -3,9 +3,888 @@
#include "x86_ops.h"
#include "vmx.h"
+#include "mmu.h"
#include "nested.h"
#include "pmu.h"
#include "posted_intr.h"
+#include "tdx.h"
+#include "tdx_arch.h"
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_INTEL_TDX
+static_assert(offsetof(struct vcpu_vmx, vt) == offsetof(struct vcpu_tdx, vt));
+
+static void vt_disable_virtualization_cpu(void)
+{
+ /* Note, TDX *and* VMX need to be disabled if TDX is enabled. */
+ if (enable_tdx)
+ tdx_disable_virtualization_cpu();
+ vmx_disable_virtualization_cpu();
+}
+
+static __init int vt_hardware_setup(void)
+{
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = vmx_hardware_setup();
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+
+ /*
+ * Update vt_x86_ops::vm_size here so it is ready before
+ * kvm_ops_update() is called in kvm_x86_vendor_init().
+ *
+ * Note, the actual bringing up of TDX must be done after
+ * kvm_ops_update() because enabling TDX requires enabling
+ * hardware virtualization first, i.e., all online CPUs must
+ * be in post-VMXON state. This means the @vm_size here
+ * may be updated to TDX's size but TDX may fail to enable
+ * at later time.
+ *
+ * The VMX/VT code could update kvm_x86_ops::vm_size again
+ * after bringing up TDX, but this would require exporting
+ * either kvm_x86_ops or kvm_ops_update() from the base KVM
+ * module, which looks overkill. Anyway, the worst case here
+ * is KVM may allocate couple of more bytes than needed for
+ * each VM.
+ */
+ if (enable_tdx) {
+ vt_x86_ops.vm_size = max_t(unsigned int, vt_x86_ops.vm_size,
+ sizeof(struct kvm_tdx));
+ /*
+ * Note, TDX may fail to initialize in a later time in
+ * vt_init(), in which case it is not necessary to setup
+ * those callbacks. But making them valid here even
+ * when TDX fails to init later is fine because those
+ * callbacks won't be called if the VM isn't TDX guest.
+ */
+ vt_x86_ops.link_external_spt = tdx_sept_link_private_spt;
+ vt_x86_ops.set_external_spte = tdx_sept_set_private_spte;
+ vt_x86_ops.free_external_spt = tdx_sept_free_private_spt;
+ vt_x86_ops.remove_external_spte = tdx_sept_remove_private_spte;
+ vt_x86_ops.protected_apic_has_interrupt = tdx_protected_apic_has_interrupt;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int vt_vm_init(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+ if (is_td(kvm))
+ return tdx_vm_init(kvm);
+
+ return vmx_vm_init(kvm);
+}
+
+static void vt_vm_pre_destroy(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+ if (is_td(kvm))
+ return tdx_mmu_release_hkid(kvm);
+}
+
+static void vt_vm_destroy(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+ if (is_td(kvm))
+ return tdx_vm_destroy(kvm);
+
+ vmx_vm_destroy(kvm);
+}
+
+static int vt_vcpu_precreate(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+ if (is_td(kvm))
+ return 0;
+
+ return vmx_vcpu_precreate(kvm);
+}
+
+static int vt_vcpu_create(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu))
+ return tdx_vcpu_create(vcpu);
+
+ return vmx_vcpu_create(vcpu);
+}
+
+static void vt_vcpu_free(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu)) {
+ tdx_vcpu_free(vcpu);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ vmx_vcpu_free(vcpu);
+}
+
+static void vt_vcpu_reset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool init_event)
+{
+ if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu)) {
+ tdx_vcpu_reset(vcpu, init_event);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ vmx_vcpu_reset(vcpu, init_event);
+}
+
+static void vt_vcpu_load(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int cpu)
+{
+ if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu)) {
+ tdx_vcpu_load(vcpu, cpu);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ vmx_vcpu_load(vcpu, cpu);
+}
+
+static void vt_update_cpu_dirty_logging(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ /*
+ * Basic TDX does not support feature PML. KVM does not enable PML in
+ * TD's VMCS, nor does it allocate or flush PML buffer for TDX.
+ */
+ if (WARN_ON_ONCE(is_td_vcpu(vcpu)))
+ return;
+
+ vmx_update_cpu_dirty_logging(vcpu);
+}
+
+static void vt_prepare_switch_to_guest(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu)) {
+ tdx_prepare_switch_to_guest(vcpu);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ vmx_prepare_switch_to_guest(vcpu);
+}
+
+static void vt_vcpu_put(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu)) {
+ tdx_vcpu_put(vcpu);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ vmx_vcpu_put(vcpu);
+}
+
+static int vt_vcpu_pre_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu))
+ return tdx_vcpu_pre_run(vcpu);
+
+ return vmx_vcpu_pre_run(vcpu);
+}
+
+static fastpath_t vt_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool force_immediate_exit)
+{
+ if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu))
+ return tdx_vcpu_run(vcpu, force_immediate_exit);
+
+ return vmx_vcpu_run(vcpu, force_immediate_exit);
+}
+
+static int vt_handle_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+ enum exit_fastpath_completion fastpath)
+{
+ if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu))
+ return tdx_handle_exit(vcpu, fastpath);
+
+ return vmx_handle_exit(vcpu, fastpath);
+}
+
+static int vt_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
+{
+ if (unlikely(is_td_vcpu(vcpu)))
+ return tdx_set_msr(vcpu, msr_info);
+
+ return vmx_set_msr(vcpu, msr_info);
+}
+
+/*
+ * The kvm parameter can be NULL (module initialization, or invocation before
+ * VM creation). Be sure to check the kvm parameter before using it.
+ */
+static bool vt_has_emulated_msr(struct kvm *kvm, u32 index)
+{
+ if (kvm && is_td(kvm))
+ return tdx_has_emulated_msr(index);
+
+ return vmx_has_emulated_msr(kvm, index);
+}
+
+static int vt_get_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
+{
+ if (unlikely(is_td_vcpu(vcpu)))
+ return tdx_get_msr(vcpu, msr_info);
+
+ return vmx_get_msr(vcpu, msr_info);
+}
+
+static void vt_msr_filter_changed(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ /*
+ * TDX doesn't allow VMM to configure interception of MSR accesses.
+ * TDX guest requests MSR accesses by calling TDVMCALL. The MSR
+ * filters will be applied when handling the TDVMCALL for RDMSR/WRMSR
+ * if the userspace has set any.
+ */
+ if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu))
+ return;
+
+ vmx_msr_filter_changed(vcpu);
+}
+
+static int vt_complete_emulated_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int err)
+{
+ if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu))
+ return tdx_complete_emulated_msr(vcpu, err);
+
+ return vmx_complete_emulated_msr(vcpu, err);
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_SMM
+static int vt_smi_allowed(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool for_injection)
+{
+ if (KVM_BUG_ON(is_td_vcpu(vcpu), vcpu->kvm))
+ return 0;
+
+ return vmx_smi_allowed(vcpu, for_injection);
+}
+
+static int vt_enter_smm(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, union kvm_smram *smram)
+{
+ if (KVM_BUG_ON(is_td_vcpu(vcpu), vcpu->kvm))
+ return 0;
+
+ return vmx_enter_smm(vcpu, smram);
+}
+
+static int vt_leave_smm(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, const union kvm_smram *smram)
+{
+ if (KVM_BUG_ON(is_td_vcpu(vcpu), vcpu->kvm))
+ return 0;
+
+ return vmx_leave_smm(vcpu, smram);
+}
+
+static void vt_enable_smi_window(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ if (KVM_BUG_ON(is_td_vcpu(vcpu), vcpu->kvm))
+ return;
+
+ /* RSM will cause a vmexit anyway. */
+ vmx_enable_smi_window(vcpu);
+}
+#endif
+
+static int vt_check_emulate_instruction(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int emul_type,
+ void *insn, int insn_len)
+{
+ /*
+ * For TDX, this can only be triggered for MMIO emulation. Let the
+ * guest retry after installing the SPTE with suppress #VE bit cleared,
+ * so that the guest will receive #VE when retry. The guest is expected
+ * to call TDG.VP.VMCALL<MMIO> to request VMM to do MMIO emulation on
+ * #VE.
+ */
+ if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu))
+ return X86EMUL_RETRY_INSTR;
+
+ return vmx_check_emulate_instruction(vcpu, emul_type, insn, insn_len);
+}
+
+static bool vt_apic_init_signal_blocked(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ /*
+ * INIT and SIPI are always blocked for TDX, i.e., INIT handling and
+ * the OP vcpu_deliver_sipi_vector() won't be called.
+ */
+ if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu))
+ return true;
+
+ return vmx_apic_init_signal_blocked(vcpu);
+}
+
+static void vt_set_virtual_apic_mode(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ /* Only x2APIC mode is supported for TD. */
+ if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu))
+ return;
+
+ return vmx_set_virtual_apic_mode(vcpu);
+}
+
+static void vt_hwapic_isr_update(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int max_isr)
+{
+ if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu))
+ return;
+
+ return vmx_hwapic_isr_update(vcpu, max_isr);
+}
+
+static int vt_sync_pir_to_irr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu))
+ return -1;
+
+ return vmx_sync_pir_to_irr(vcpu);
+}
+
+static void vt_deliver_interrupt(struct kvm_lapic *apic, int delivery_mode,
+ int trig_mode, int vector)
+{
+ if (is_td_vcpu(apic->vcpu)) {
+ tdx_deliver_interrupt(apic, delivery_mode, trig_mode,
+ vector);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ vmx_deliver_interrupt(apic, delivery_mode, trig_mode, vector);
+}
+
+static void vt_vcpu_after_set_cpuid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu))
+ return;
+
+ vmx_vcpu_after_set_cpuid(vcpu);
+}
+
+static void vt_update_exception_bitmap(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu))
+ return;
+
+ vmx_update_exception_bitmap(vcpu);
+}
+
+static u64 vt_get_segment_base(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int seg)
+{
+ if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu))
+ return 0;
+
+ return vmx_get_segment_base(vcpu, seg);
+}
+
+static void vt_get_segment(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_segment *var,
+ int seg)
+{
+ if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu)) {
+ memset(var, 0, sizeof(*var));
+ return;
+ }
+
+ vmx_get_segment(vcpu, var, seg);
+}
+
+static void vt_set_segment(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_segment *var,
+ int seg)
+{
+ if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu))
+ return;
+
+ vmx_set_segment(vcpu, var, seg);
+}
+
+static int vt_get_cpl(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu))
+ return 0;
+
+ return vmx_get_cpl(vcpu);
+}
+
+static int vt_get_cpl_no_cache(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu))
+ return 0;
+
+ return vmx_get_cpl_no_cache(vcpu);
+}
+
+static void vt_get_cs_db_l_bits(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int *db, int *l)
+{
+ if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu)) {
+ *db = 0;
+ *l = 0;
+ return;
+ }
+
+ vmx_get_cs_db_l_bits(vcpu, db, l);
+}
+
+static bool vt_is_valid_cr0(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long cr0)
+{
+ if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu))
+ return true;
+
+ return vmx_is_valid_cr0(vcpu, cr0);
+}
+
+static void vt_set_cr0(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long cr0)
+{
+ if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu))
+ return;
+
+ vmx_set_cr0(vcpu, cr0);
+}
+
+static bool vt_is_valid_cr4(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long cr4)
+{
+ if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu))
+ return true;
+
+ return vmx_is_valid_cr4(vcpu, cr4);
+}
+
+static void vt_set_cr4(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long cr4)
+{
+ if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu))
+ return;
+
+ vmx_set_cr4(vcpu, cr4);
+}
+
+static int vt_set_efer(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 efer)
+{
+ if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu))
+ return 0;
+
+ return vmx_set_efer(vcpu, efer);
+}
+
+static void vt_get_idt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct desc_ptr *dt)
+{
+ if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu)) {
+ memset(dt, 0, sizeof(*dt));
+ return;
+ }
+
+ vmx_get_idt(vcpu, dt);
+}
+
+static void vt_set_idt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct desc_ptr *dt)
+{
+ if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu))
+ return;
+
+ vmx_set_idt(vcpu, dt);
+}
+
+static void vt_get_gdt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct desc_ptr *dt)
+{
+ if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu)) {
+ memset(dt, 0, sizeof(*dt));
+ return;
+ }
+
+ vmx_get_gdt(vcpu, dt);
+}
+
+static void vt_set_gdt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct desc_ptr *dt)
+{
+ if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu))
+ return;
+
+ vmx_set_gdt(vcpu, dt);
+}
+
+static void vt_set_dr6(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long val)
+{
+ if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu))
+ return;
+
+ vmx_set_dr6(vcpu, val);
+}
+
+static void vt_set_dr7(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long val)
+{
+ if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu))
+ return;
+
+ vmx_set_dr7(vcpu, val);
+}
+
+static void vt_sync_dirty_debug_regs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ /*
+ * MOV-DR exiting is always cleared for TD guest, even in debug mode.
+ * Thus KVM_DEBUGREG_WONT_EXIT can never be set and it should never
+ * reach here for TD vcpu.
+ */
+ if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu))
+ return;
+
+ vmx_sync_dirty_debug_regs(vcpu);
+}
+
+static void vt_cache_reg(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, enum kvm_reg reg)
+{
+ if (WARN_ON_ONCE(is_td_vcpu(vcpu)))
+ return;
+
+ vmx_cache_reg(vcpu, reg);
+}
+
+static unsigned long vt_get_rflags(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu))
+ return 0;
+
+ return vmx_get_rflags(vcpu);
+}
+
+static void vt_set_rflags(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long rflags)
+{
+ if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu))
+ return;
+
+ vmx_set_rflags(vcpu, rflags);
+}
+
+static bool vt_get_if_flag(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu))
+ return false;
+
+ return vmx_get_if_flag(vcpu);
+}
+
+static void vt_flush_tlb_all(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu)) {
+ tdx_flush_tlb_all(vcpu);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ vmx_flush_tlb_all(vcpu);
+}
+
+static void vt_flush_tlb_current(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu)) {
+ tdx_flush_tlb_current(vcpu);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ vmx_flush_tlb_current(vcpu);
+}
+
+static void vt_flush_tlb_gva(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gva_t addr)
+{
+ if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu))
+ return;
+
+ vmx_flush_tlb_gva(vcpu, addr);
+}
+
+static void vt_flush_tlb_guest(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu))
+ return;
+
+ vmx_flush_tlb_guest(vcpu);
+}
+
+static void vt_inject_nmi(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu)) {
+ tdx_inject_nmi(vcpu);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ vmx_inject_nmi(vcpu);
+}
+
+static int vt_nmi_allowed(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool for_injection)
+{
+ /*
+ * The TDX module manages NMI windows and NMI reinjection, and hides NMI
+ * blocking, all KVM can do is throw an NMI over the wall.
+ */
+ if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu))
+ return true;
+
+ return vmx_nmi_allowed(vcpu, for_injection);
+}
+
+static bool vt_get_nmi_mask(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ /*
+ * KVM can't get NMI blocking status for TDX guest, assume NMIs are
+ * always unmasked.
+ */
+ if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu))
+ return false;
+
+ return vmx_get_nmi_mask(vcpu);
+}
+
+static void vt_set_nmi_mask(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool masked)
+{
+ if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu))
+ return;
+
+ vmx_set_nmi_mask(vcpu, masked);
+}
+
+static void vt_enable_nmi_window(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ /* Refer to the comments in tdx_inject_nmi(). */
+ if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu))
+ return;
+
+ vmx_enable_nmi_window(vcpu);
+}
+
+static void vt_load_mmu_pgd(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, hpa_t root_hpa,
+ int pgd_level)
+{
+ if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu)) {
+ tdx_load_mmu_pgd(vcpu, root_hpa, pgd_level);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ vmx_load_mmu_pgd(vcpu, root_hpa, pgd_level);
+}
+
+static void vt_set_interrupt_shadow(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int mask)
+{
+ if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu))
+ return;
+
+ vmx_set_interrupt_shadow(vcpu, mask);
+}
+
+static u32 vt_get_interrupt_shadow(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu))
+ return 0;
+
+ return vmx_get_interrupt_shadow(vcpu);
+}
+
+static void vt_patch_hypercall(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+ unsigned char *hypercall)
+{
+ /*
+ * Because guest memory is protected, guest can't be patched. TD kernel
+ * is modified to use TDG.VP.VMCALL for hypercall.
+ */
+ if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu))
+ return;
+
+ vmx_patch_hypercall(vcpu, hypercall);
+}
+
+static void vt_inject_irq(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool reinjected)
+{
+ if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu))
+ return;
+
+ vmx_inject_irq(vcpu, reinjected);
+}
+
+static void vt_inject_exception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu))
+ return;
+
+ vmx_inject_exception(vcpu);
+}
+
+static void vt_cancel_injection(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu))
+ return;
+
+ vmx_cancel_injection(vcpu);
+}
+
+static int vt_interrupt_allowed(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool for_injection)
+{
+ if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu))
+ return tdx_interrupt_allowed(vcpu);
+
+ return vmx_interrupt_allowed(vcpu, for_injection);
+}
+
+static void vt_enable_irq_window(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu))
+ return;
+
+ vmx_enable_irq_window(vcpu);
+}
+
+static void vt_get_entry_info(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 *intr_info, u32 *error_code)
+{
+ *intr_info = 0;
+ *error_code = 0;
+
+ if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu))
+ return;
+
+ vmx_get_entry_info(vcpu, intr_info, error_code);
+}
+
+static void vt_get_exit_info(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 *reason,
+ u64 *info1, u64 *info2, u32 *intr_info, u32 *error_code)
+{
+ if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu)) {
+ tdx_get_exit_info(vcpu, reason, info1, info2, intr_info,
+ error_code);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ vmx_get_exit_info(vcpu, reason, info1, info2, intr_info, error_code);
+}
+
+static void vt_update_cr8_intercept(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int tpr, int irr)
+{
+ if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu))
+ return;
+
+ vmx_update_cr8_intercept(vcpu, tpr, irr);
+}
+
+static void vt_set_apic_access_page_addr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu))
+ return;
+
+ vmx_set_apic_access_page_addr(vcpu);
+}
+
+static void vt_refresh_apicv_exec_ctrl(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu)) {
+ KVM_BUG_ON(!kvm_vcpu_apicv_active(vcpu), vcpu->kvm);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ vmx_refresh_apicv_exec_ctrl(vcpu);
+}
+
+static void vt_load_eoi_exitmap(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 *eoi_exit_bitmap)
+{
+ if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu))
+ return;
+
+ vmx_load_eoi_exitmap(vcpu, eoi_exit_bitmap);
+}
+
+static int vt_set_tss_addr(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned int addr)
+{
+ if (is_td(kvm))
+ return 0;
+
+ return vmx_set_tss_addr(kvm, addr);
+}
+
+static int vt_set_identity_map_addr(struct kvm *kvm, u64 ident_addr)
+{
+ if (is_td(kvm))
+ return 0;
+
+ return vmx_set_identity_map_addr(kvm, ident_addr);
+}
+
+static u64 vt_get_l2_tsc_offset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ /* TDX doesn't support L2 guest at the moment. */
+ if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu))
+ return 0;
+
+ return vmx_get_l2_tsc_offset(vcpu);
+}
+
+static u64 vt_get_l2_tsc_multiplier(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ /* TDX doesn't support L2 guest at the moment. */
+ if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu))
+ return 0;
+
+ return vmx_get_l2_tsc_multiplier(vcpu);
+}
+
+static void vt_write_tsc_offset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ /* In TDX, tsc offset can't be changed. */
+ if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu))
+ return;
+
+ vmx_write_tsc_offset(vcpu);
+}
+
+static void vt_write_tsc_multiplier(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ /* In TDX, tsc multiplier can't be changed. */
+ if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu))
+ return;
+
+ vmx_write_tsc_multiplier(vcpu);
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+static int vt_set_hv_timer(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 guest_deadline_tsc,
+ bool *expired)
+{
+ /* VMX-preemption timer isn't available for TDX. */
+ if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ return vmx_set_hv_timer(vcpu, guest_deadline_tsc, expired);
+}
+
+static void vt_cancel_hv_timer(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ /* VMX-preemption timer can't be set. See vt_set_hv_timer(). */
+ if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu))
+ return;
+
+ vmx_cancel_hv_timer(vcpu);
+}
+#endif
+
+static void vt_setup_mce(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu))
+ return;
+
+ vmx_setup_mce(vcpu);
+}
+
+static int vt_mem_enc_ioctl(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp)
+{
+ if (!is_td(kvm))
+ return -ENOTTY;
+
+ return tdx_vm_ioctl(kvm, argp);
+}
+
+static int vt_vcpu_mem_enc_ioctl(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, void __user *argp)
+{
+ if (!is_td_vcpu(vcpu))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ return tdx_vcpu_ioctl(vcpu, argp);
+}
+
+static int vt_gmem_private_max_mapping_level(struct kvm *kvm, kvm_pfn_t pfn)
+{
+ if (is_td(kvm))
+ return tdx_gmem_private_max_mapping_level(kvm, pfn);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+#define vt_op(name) vt_##name
+#define vt_op_tdx_only(name) vt_##name
+#else /* CONFIG_KVM_INTEL_TDX */
+#define vt_op(name) vmx_##name
+#define vt_op_tdx_only(name) NULL
+#endif /* CONFIG_KVM_INTEL_TDX */
#define VMX_REQUIRED_APICV_INHIBITS \
(BIT(APICV_INHIBIT_REASON_DISABLED) | \
@@ -24,111 +903,113 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops vt_x86_ops __initdata = {
.hardware_unsetup = vmx_hardware_unsetup,
.enable_virtualization_cpu = vmx_enable_virtualization_cpu,
- .disable_virtualization_cpu = vmx_disable_virtualization_cpu,
+ .disable_virtualization_cpu = vt_op(disable_virtualization_cpu),
.emergency_disable_virtualization_cpu = vmx_emergency_disable_virtualization_cpu,
- .has_emulated_msr = vmx_has_emulated_msr,
+ .has_emulated_msr = vt_op(has_emulated_msr),
.vm_size = sizeof(struct kvm_vmx),
- .vm_init = vmx_vm_init,
- .vm_destroy = vmx_vm_destroy,
- .vcpu_precreate = vmx_vcpu_precreate,
- .vcpu_create = vmx_vcpu_create,
- .vcpu_free = vmx_vcpu_free,
- .vcpu_reset = vmx_vcpu_reset,
+ .vm_init = vt_op(vm_init),
+ .vm_destroy = vt_op(vm_destroy),
+ .vm_pre_destroy = vt_op_tdx_only(vm_pre_destroy),
+
+ .vcpu_precreate = vt_op(vcpu_precreate),
+ .vcpu_create = vt_op(vcpu_create),
+ .vcpu_free = vt_op(vcpu_free),
+ .vcpu_reset = vt_op(vcpu_reset),
- .prepare_switch_to_guest = vmx_prepare_switch_to_guest,
- .vcpu_load = vmx_vcpu_load,
- .vcpu_put = vmx_vcpu_put,
+ .prepare_switch_to_guest = vt_op(prepare_switch_to_guest),
+ .vcpu_load = vt_op(vcpu_load),
+ .vcpu_put = vt_op(vcpu_put),
- .update_exception_bitmap = vmx_update_exception_bitmap,
+ .update_exception_bitmap = vt_op(update_exception_bitmap),
.get_feature_msr = vmx_get_feature_msr,
- .get_msr = vmx_get_msr,
- .set_msr = vmx_set_msr,
- .get_segment_base = vmx_get_segment_base,
- .get_segment = vmx_get_segment,
- .set_segment = vmx_set_segment,
- .get_cpl = vmx_get_cpl,
- .get_cpl_no_cache = vmx_get_cpl_no_cache,
- .get_cs_db_l_bits = vmx_get_cs_db_l_bits,
- .is_valid_cr0 = vmx_is_valid_cr0,
- .set_cr0 = vmx_set_cr0,
- .is_valid_cr4 = vmx_is_valid_cr4,
- .set_cr4 = vmx_set_cr4,
- .set_efer = vmx_set_efer,
- .get_idt = vmx_get_idt,
- .set_idt = vmx_set_idt,
- .get_gdt = vmx_get_gdt,
- .set_gdt = vmx_set_gdt,
- .set_dr6 = vmx_set_dr6,
- .set_dr7 = vmx_set_dr7,
- .sync_dirty_debug_regs = vmx_sync_dirty_debug_regs,
- .cache_reg = vmx_cache_reg,
- .get_rflags = vmx_get_rflags,
- .set_rflags = vmx_set_rflags,
- .get_if_flag = vmx_get_if_flag,
-
- .flush_tlb_all = vmx_flush_tlb_all,
- .flush_tlb_current = vmx_flush_tlb_current,
- .flush_tlb_gva = vmx_flush_tlb_gva,
- .flush_tlb_guest = vmx_flush_tlb_guest,
-
- .vcpu_pre_run = vmx_vcpu_pre_run,
- .vcpu_run = vmx_vcpu_run,
- .handle_exit = vmx_handle_exit,
+ .get_msr = vt_op(get_msr),
+ .set_msr = vt_op(set_msr),
+
+ .get_segment_base = vt_op(get_segment_base),
+ .get_segment = vt_op(get_segment),
+ .set_segment = vt_op(set_segment),
+ .get_cpl = vt_op(get_cpl),
+ .get_cpl_no_cache = vt_op(get_cpl_no_cache),
+ .get_cs_db_l_bits = vt_op(get_cs_db_l_bits),
+ .is_valid_cr0 = vt_op(is_valid_cr0),
+ .set_cr0 = vt_op(set_cr0),
+ .is_valid_cr4 = vt_op(is_valid_cr4),
+ .set_cr4 = vt_op(set_cr4),
+ .set_efer = vt_op(set_efer),
+ .get_idt = vt_op(get_idt),
+ .set_idt = vt_op(set_idt),
+ .get_gdt = vt_op(get_gdt),
+ .set_gdt = vt_op(set_gdt),
+ .set_dr6 = vt_op(set_dr6),
+ .set_dr7 = vt_op(set_dr7),
+ .sync_dirty_debug_regs = vt_op(sync_dirty_debug_regs),
+ .cache_reg = vt_op(cache_reg),
+ .get_rflags = vt_op(get_rflags),
+ .set_rflags = vt_op(set_rflags),
+ .get_if_flag = vt_op(get_if_flag),
+
+ .flush_tlb_all = vt_op(flush_tlb_all),
+ .flush_tlb_current = vt_op(flush_tlb_current),
+ .flush_tlb_gva = vt_op(flush_tlb_gva),
+ .flush_tlb_guest = vt_op(flush_tlb_guest),
+
+ .vcpu_pre_run = vt_op(vcpu_pre_run),
+ .vcpu_run = vt_op(vcpu_run),
+ .handle_exit = vt_op(handle_exit),
.skip_emulated_instruction = vmx_skip_emulated_instruction,
.update_emulated_instruction = vmx_update_emulated_instruction,
- .set_interrupt_shadow = vmx_set_interrupt_shadow,
- .get_interrupt_shadow = vmx_get_interrupt_shadow,
- .patch_hypercall = vmx_patch_hypercall,
- .inject_irq = vmx_inject_irq,
- .inject_nmi = vmx_inject_nmi,
- .inject_exception = vmx_inject_exception,
- .cancel_injection = vmx_cancel_injection,
- .interrupt_allowed = vmx_interrupt_allowed,
- .nmi_allowed = vmx_nmi_allowed,
- .get_nmi_mask = vmx_get_nmi_mask,
- .set_nmi_mask = vmx_set_nmi_mask,
- .enable_nmi_window = vmx_enable_nmi_window,
- .enable_irq_window = vmx_enable_irq_window,
- .update_cr8_intercept = vmx_update_cr8_intercept,
+ .set_interrupt_shadow = vt_op(set_interrupt_shadow),
+ .get_interrupt_shadow = vt_op(get_interrupt_shadow),
+ .patch_hypercall = vt_op(patch_hypercall),
+ .inject_irq = vt_op(inject_irq),
+ .inject_nmi = vt_op(inject_nmi),
+ .inject_exception = vt_op(inject_exception),
+ .cancel_injection = vt_op(cancel_injection),
+ .interrupt_allowed = vt_op(interrupt_allowed),
+ .nmi_allowed = vt_op(nmi_allowed),
+ .get_nmi_mask = vt_op(get_nmi_mask),
+ .set_nmi_mask = vt_op(set_nmi_mask),
+ .enable_nmi_window = vt_op(enable_nmi_window),
+ .enable_irq_window = vt_op(enable_irq_window),
+ .update_cr8_intercept = vt_op(update_cr8_intercept),
.x2apic_icr_is_split = false,
- .set_virtual_apic_mode = vmx_set_virtual_apic_mode,
- .set_apic_access_page_addr = vmx_set_apic_access_page_addr,
- .refresh_apicv_exec_ctrl = vmx_refresh_apicv_exec_ctrl,
- .load_eoi_exitmap = vmx_load_eoi_exitmap,
- .apicv_pre_state_restore = vmx_apicv_pre_state_restore,
+ .set_virtual_apic_mode = vt_op(set_virtual_apic_mode),
+ .set_apic_access_page_addr = vt_op(set_apic_access_page_addr),
+ .refresh_apicv_exec_ctrl = vt_op(refresh_apicv_exec_ctrl),
+ .load_eoi_exitmap = vt_op(load_eoi_exitmap),
+ .apicv_pre_state_restore = pi_apicv_pre_state_restore,
.required_apicv_inhibits = VMX_REQUIRED_APICV_INHIBITS,
- .hwapic_isr_update = vmx_hwapic_isr_update,
- .sync_pir_to_irr = vmx_sync_pir_to_irr,
- .deliver_interrupt = vmx_deliver_interrupt,
+ .hwapic_isr_update = vt_op(hwapic_isr_update),
+ .sync_pir_to_irr = vt_op(sync_pir_to_irr),
+ .deliver_interrupt = vt_op(deliver_interrupt),
.dy_apicv_has_pending_interrupt = pi_has_pending_interrupt,
- .set_tss_addr = vmx_set_tss_addr,
- .set_identity_map_addr = vmx_set_identity_map_addr,
+ .set_tss_addr = vt_op(set_tss_addr),
+ .set_identity_map_addr = vt_op(set_identity_map_addr),
.get_mt_mask = vmx_get_mt_mask,
- .get_exit_info = vmx_get_exit_info,
- .get_entry_info = vmx_get_entry_info,
+ .get_exit_info = vt_op(get_exit_info),
+ .get_entry_info = vt_op(get_entry_info),
- .vcpu_after_set_cpuid = vmx_vcpu_after_set_cpuid,
+ .vcpu_after_set_cpuid = vt_op(vcpu_after_set_cpuid),
.has_wbinvd_exit = cpu_has_vmx_wbinvd_exit,
- .get_l2_tsc_offset = vmx_get_l2_tsc_offset,
- .get_l2_tsc_multiplier = vmx_get_l2_tsc_multiplier,
- .write_tsc_offset = vmx_write_tsc_offset,
- .write_tsc_multiplier = vmx_write_tsc_multiplier,
+ .get_l2_tsc_offset = vt_op(get_l2_tsc_offset),
+ .get_l2_tsc_multiplier = vt_op(get_l2_tsc_multiplier),
+ .write_tsc_offset = vt_op(write_tsc_offset),
+ .write_tsc_multiplier = vt_op(write_tsc_multiplier),
- .load_mmu_pgd = vmx_load_mmu_pgd,
+ .load_mmu_pgd = vt_op(load_mmu_pgd),
.check_intercept = vmx_check_intercept,
.handle_exit_irqoff = vmx_handle_exit_irqoff,
- .cpu_dirty_log_size = PML_LOG_NR_ENTRIES,
- .update_cpu_dirty_logging = vmx_update_cpu_dirty_logging,
+ .update_cpu_dirty_logging = vt_op(update_cpu_dirty_logging),
.nested_ops = &vmx_nested_ops,
@@ -136,35 +1017,95 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops vt_x86_ops __initdata = {
.pi_start_assignment = vmx_pi_start_assignment,
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
- .set_hv_timer = vmx_set_hv_timer,
- .cancel_hv_timer = vmx_cancel_hv_timer,
+ .set_hv_timer = vt_op(set_hv_timer),
+ .cancel_hv_timer = vt_op(cancel_hv_timer),
#endif
- .setup_mce = vmx_setup_mce,
+ .setup_mce = vt_op(setup_mce),
#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_SMM
- .smi_allowed = vmx_smi_allowed,
- .enter_smm = vmx_enter_smm,
- .leave_smm = vmx_leave_smm,
- .enable_smi_window = vmx_enable_smi_window,
+ .smi_allowed = vt_op(smi_allowed),
+ .enter_smm = vt_op(enter_smm),
+ .leave_smm = vt_op(leave_smm),
+ .enable_smi_window = vt_op(enable_smi_window),
#endif
- .check_emulate_instruction = vmx_check_emulate_instruction,
- .apic_init_signal_blocked = vmx_apic_init_signal_blocked,
+ .check_emulate_instruction = vt_op(check_emulate_instruction),
+ .apic_init_signal_blocked = vt_op(apic_init_signal_blocked),
.migrate_timers = vmx_migrate_timers,
- .msr_filter_changed = vmx_msr_filter_changed,
- .complete_emulated_msr = kvm_complete_insn_gp,
+ .msr_filter_changed = vt_op(msr_filter_changed),
+ .complete_emulated_msr = vt_op(complete_emulated_msr),
.vcpu_deliver_sipi_vector = kvm_vcpu_deliver_sipi_vector,
.get_untagged_addr = vmx_get_untagged_addr,
+
+ .mem_enc_ioctl = vt_op_tdx_only(mem_enc_ioctl),
+ .vcpu_mem_enc_ioctl = vt_op_tdx_only(vcpu_mem_enc_ioctl),
+
+ .private_max_mapping_level = vt_op_tdx_only(gmem_private_max_mapping_level)
};
struct kvm_x86_init_ops vt_init_ops __initdata = {
- .hardware_setup = vmx_hardware_setup,
+ .hardware_setup = vt_op(hardware_setup),
.handle_intel_pt_intr = NULL,
.runtime_ops = &vt_x86_ops,
.pmu_ops = &intel_pmu_ops,
};
+
+static void __exit vt_exit(void)
+{
+ kvm_exit();
+ tdx_cleanup();
+ vmx_exit();
+}
+module_exit(vt_exit);
+
+static int __init vt_init(void)
+{
+ unsigned vcpu_size, vcpu_align;
+ int r;
+
+ r = vmx_init();
+ if (r)
+ return r;
+
+ /* tdx_init() has been taken */
+ r = tdx_bringup();
+ if (r)
+ goto err_tdx_bringup;
+
+ /*
+ * TDX and VMX have different vCPU structures. Calculate the
+ * maximum size/align so that kvm_init() can use the larger
+ * values to create the kmem_vcpu_cache.
+ */
+ vcpu_size = sizeof(struct vcpu_vmx);
+ vcpu_align = __alignof__(struct vcpu_vmx);
+ if (enable_tdx) {
+ vcpu_size = max_t(unsigned, vcpu_size,
+ sizeof(struct vcpu_tdx));
+ vcpu_align = max_t(unsigned, vcpu_align,
+ __alignof__(struct vcpu_tdx));
+ kvm_caps.supported_vm_types |= BIT(KVM_X86_TDX_VM);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Common KVM initialization _must_ come last, after this, /dev/kvm is
+ * exposed to userspace!
+ */
+ r = kvm_init(vcpu_size, vcpu_align, THIS_MODULE);
+ if (r)
+ goto err_kvm_init;
+
+ return 0;
+
+err_kvm_init:
+ tdx_cleanup();
+err_tdx_bringup:
+ vmx_exit();
+ return r;
+}
+module_init(vt_init);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c
index d268224227f0..7211c71d4241 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c
@@ -276,7 +276,7 @@ static void vmx_sync_vmcs_host_state(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx,
{
struct vmcs_host_state *dest, *src;
- if (unlikely(!vmx->guest_state_loaded))
+ if (unlikely(!vmx->vt.guest_state_loaded))
return;
src = &prev->host_state;
@@ -302,7 +302,7 @@ static void vmx_switch_vmcs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct loaded_vmcs *vmcs)
cpu = get_cpu();
prev = vmx->loaded_vmcs;
vmx->loaded_vmcs = vmcs;
- vmx_vcpu_load_vmcs(vcpu, cpu, prev);
+ vmx_vcpu_load_vmcs(vcpu, cpu);
vmx_sync_vmcs_host_state(vmx, prev);
put_cpu();
@@ -426,7 +426,7 @@ static void nested_ept_inject_page_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
* tables also changed, but KVM should not treat EPT Misconfig
* VM-Exits as writes.
*/
- WARN_ON_ONCE(vmx->exit_reason.basic != EXIT_REASON_EPT_VIOLATION);
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(vmx->vt.exit_reason.basic != EXIT_REASON_EPT_VIOLATION);
/*
* PML Full and EPT Violation VM-Exits both use bit 12 to report
@@ -825,12 +825,30 @@ static int nested_vmx_check_apicv_controls(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
return 0;
}
+static u32 nested_vmx_max_atomic_switch_msrs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+ u64 vmx_misc = vmx_control_msr(vmx->nested.msrs.misc_low,
+ vmx->nested.msrs.misc_high);
+
+ return (vmx_misc_max_msr(vmx_misc) + 1) * VMX_MISC_MSR_LIST_MULTIPLIER;
+}
+
static int nested_vmx_check_msr_switch(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
u32 count, u64 addr)
{
if (count == 0)
return 0;
+ /*
+ * Exceeding the limit results in architecturally _undefined_ behavior,
+ * i.e. KVM is allowed to do literally anything in response to a bad
+ * limit. Immediately generate a consistency check so that code that
+ * consumes the count doesn't need to worry about extreme edge cases.
+ */
+ if (count > nested_vmx_max_atomic_switch_msrs(vcpu))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
if (!kvm_vcpu_is_legal_aligned_gpa(vcpu, addr, 16) ||
!kvm_vcpu_is_legal_gpa(vcpu, (addr + count * sizeof(struct vmx_msr_entry) - 1)))
return -EINVAL;
@@ -941,15 +959,6 @@ static int nested_vmx_store_msr_check(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
return 0;
}
-static u32 nested_vmx_max_atomic_switch_msrs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
-{
- struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
- u64 vmx_misc = vmx_control_msr(vmx->nested.msrs.misc_low,
- vmx->nested.msrs.misc_high);
-
- return (vmx_misc_max_msr(vmx_misc) + 1) * VMX_MISC_MSR_LIST_MULTIPLIER;
-}
-
/*
* Load guest's/host's msr at nested entry/exit.
* return 0 for success, entry index for failure.
@@ -966,7 +975,7 @@ static u32 nested_vmx_load_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 gpa, u32 count)
u32 max_msr_list_size = nested_vmx_max_atomic_switch_msrs(vcpu);
for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
- if (unlikely(i >= max_msr_list_size))
+ if (WARN_ON_ONCE(i >= max_msr_list_size))
goto fail;
if (kvm_vcpu_read_guest(vcpu, gpa + i * sizeof(e),
@@ -1054,7 +1063,7 @@ static int nested_vmx_store_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 gpa, u32 count)
u32 max_msr_list_size = nested_vmx_max_atomic_switch_msrs(vcpu);
for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
- if (unlikely(i >= max_msr_list_size))
+ if (WARN_ON_ONCE(i >= max_msr_list_size))
return -EINVAL;
if (!read_and_check_msr_entry(vcpu, gpa, i, &e))
@@ -4521,12 +4530,12 @@ static void copy_vmcs02_to_vmcs12_rare(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
cpu = get_cpu();
vmx->loaded_vmcs = &vmx->nested.vmcs02;
- vmx_vcpu_load_vmcs(vcpu, cpu, &vmx->vmcs01);
+ vmx_vcpu_load_vmcs(vcpu, cpu);
sync_vmcs02_to_vmcs12_rare(vcpu, vmcs12);
vmx->loaded_vmcs = &vmx->vmcs01;
- vmx_vcpu_load_vmcs(vcpu, cpu, &vmx->nested.vmcs02);
+ vmx_vcpu_load_vmcs(vcpu, cpu);
put_cpu();
}
@@ -4623,7 +4632,7 @@ static void prepare_vmcs12(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct vmcs12 *vmcs12,
{
/* update exit information fields: */
vmcs12->vm_exit_reason = vm_exit_reason;
- if (to_vmx(vcpu)->exit_reason.enclave_mode)
+ if (vmx_get_exit_reason(vcpu).enclave_mode)
vmcs12->vm_exit_reason |= VMX_EXIT_REASONS_SGX_ENCLAVE_MODE;
vmcs12->exit_qualification = exit_qualification;
@@ -4795,7 +4804,7 @@ static void load_vmcs12_host_state(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
vmcs12->vm_exit_msr_load_count))
nested_vmx_abort(vcpu, VMX_ABORT_LOAD_HOST_MSR_FAIL);
- to_vmx(vcpu)->emulation_required = vmx_emulation_required(vcpu);
+ to_vt(vcpu)->emulation_required = vmx_emulation_required(vcpu);
}
static inline u64 nested_vmx_get_vmcs01_guest_efer(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
@@ -5021,16 +5030,7 @@ void __nested_vmx_vmexit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 vm_exit_reason,
vmx_switch_vmcs(vcpu, &vmx->vmcs01);
- /*
- * If IBRS is advertised to the vCPU, KVM must flush the indirect
- * branch predictors when transitioning from L2 to L1, as L1 expects
- * hardware (KVM in this case) to provide separate predictor modes.
- * Bare metal isolates VMX root (host) from VMX non-root (guest), but
- * doesn't isolate different VMCSs, i.e. in this case, doesn't provide
- * separate modes for L2 vs L1.
- */
- if (guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL))
- indirect_branch_prediction_barrier();
+ kvm_nested_vmexit_handle_ibrs(vcpu);
/* Update any VMCS fields that might have changed while L2 ran */
vmcs_write32(VM_EXIT_MSR_LOAD_COUNT, vmx->msr_autoload.host.nr);
@@ -6128,7 +6128,7 @@ fail:
* nested VM-Exit. Pass the original exit reason, i.e. don't hardcode
* EXIT_REASON_VMFUNC as the exit reason.
*/
- nested_vmx_vmexit(vcpu, vmx->exit_reason.full,
+ nested_vmx_vmexit(vcpu, vmx->vt.exit_reason.full,
vmx_get_intr_info(vcpu),
vmx_get_exit_qual(vcpu));
return 1;
@@ -6573,7 +6573,7 @@ static bool nested_vmx_l1_wants_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
bool nested_vmx_reflect_vmexit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
- union vmx_exit_reason exit_reason = vmx->exit_reason;
+ union vmx_exit_reason exit_reason = vmx->vt.exit_reason;
unsigned long exit_qual;
u32 exit_intr_info;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/pmu_intel.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/pmu_intel.c
index 231a9633359c..bbf4509f32d0 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/pmu_intel.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/pmu_intel.c
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@
#include "lapic.h"
#include "nested.h"
#include "pmu.h"
+#include "tdx.h"
/*
* Perf's "BASE" is wildly misleading, architectural PMUs use bits 31:16 of ECX
@@ -35,6 +36,24 @@
#define MSR_PMC_FULL_WIDTH_BIT (MSR_IA32_PMC0 - MSR_IA32_PERFCTR0)
+static struct lbr_desc *vcpu_to_lbr_desc(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu))
+ return NULL;
+
+ return &to_vmx(vcpu)->lbr_desc;
+}
+
+static struct x86_pmu_lbr *vcpu_to_lbr_records(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu))
+ return NULL;
+
+ return &to_vmx(vcpu)->lbr_desc.records;
+}
+
+#pragma GCC poison to_vmx
+
static void reprogram_fixed_counters(struct kvm_pmu *pmu, u64 data)
{
struct kvm_pmc *pmc;
@@ -130,6 +149,22 @@ static inline struct kvm_pmc *get_fw_gp_pmc(struct kvm_pmu *pmu, u32 msr)
return get_gp_pmc(pmu, msr, MSR_IA32_PMC0);
}
+static bool intel_pmu_lbr_is_compatible(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu))
+ return false;
+
+ return cpuid_model_is_consistent(vcpu);
+}
+
+bool intel_pmu_lbr_is_enabled(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu))
+ return false;
+
+ return !!vcpu_to_lbr_records(vcpu)->nr;
+}
+
static bool intel_pmu_is_valid_lbr_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 index)
{
struct x86_pmu_lbr *records = vcpu_to_lbr_records(vcpu);
@@ -195,6 +230,9 @@ static inline void intel_pmu_release_guest_lbr_event(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
struct lbr_desc *lbr_desc = vcpu_to_lbr_desc(vcpu);
+ if (!lbr_desc)
+ return;
+
if (lbr_desc->event) {
perf_event_release_kernel(lbr_desc->event);
lbr_desc->event = NULL;
@@ -236,6 +274,9 @@ int intel_pmu_create_guest_lbr_event(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_USER,
};
+ if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!lbr_desc))
+ return 0;
+
if (unlikely(lbr_desc->event)) {
__set_bit(INTEL_PMC_IDX_FIXED_VLBR, pmu->pmc_in_use);
return 0;
@@ -467,6 +508,9 @@ static void intel_pmu_refresh(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
u64 perf_capabilities;
u64 counter_rsvd;
+ if (!lbr_desc)
+ return;
+
memset(&lbr_desc->records, 0, sizeof(lbr_desc->records));
/*
@@ -543,7 +587,7 @@ static void intel_pmu_refresh(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
INTEL_PMC_MAX_GENERIC, pmu->nr_arch_fixed_counters);
perf_capabilities = vcpu_get_perf_capabilities(vcpu);
- if (cpuid_model_is_consistent(vcpu) &&
+ if (intel_pmu_lbr_is_compatible(vcpu) &&
(perf_capabilities & PMU_CAP_LBR_FMT))
memcpy(&lbr_desc->records, &vmx_lbr_caps, sizeof(vmx_lbr_caps));
else
@@ -571,6 +615,9 @@ static void intel_pmu_init(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
struct kvm_pmu *pmu = vcpu_to_pmu(vcpu);
struct lbr_desc *lbr_desc = vcpu_to_lbr_desc(vcpu);
+ if (!lbr_desc)
+ return;
+
for (i = 0; i < KVM_MAX_NR_INTEL_GP_COUNTERS; i++) {
pmu->gp_counters[i].type = KVM_PMC_GP;
pmu->gp_counters[i].vcpu = vcpu;
@@ -678,6 +725,9 @@ void vmx_passthrough_lbr_msrs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
struct kvm_pmu *pmu = vcpu_to_pmu(vcpu);
struct lbr_desc *lbr_desc = vcpu_to_lbr_desc(vcpu);
+ if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!lbr_desc))
+ return;
+
if (!lbr_desc->event) {
vmx_disable_lbr_msrs_passthrough(vcpu);
if (vmcs_read64(GUEST_IA32_DEBUGCTL) & DEBUGCTLMSR_LBR)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/pmu_intel.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/pmu_intel.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..5620d0882cdc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/pmu_intel.h
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+#ifndef __KVM_X86_VMX_PMU_INTEL_H
+#define __KVM_X86_VMX_PMU_INTEL_H
+
+#include <linux/kvm_host.h>
+
+bool intel_pmu_lbr_is_enabled(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+int intel_pmu_create_guest_lbr_event(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+
+struct lbr_desc {
+ /* Basic info about guest LBR records. */
+ struct x86_pmu_lbr records;
+
+ /*
+ * Emulate LBR feature via passthrough LBR registers when the
+ * per-vcpu guest LBR event is scheduled on the current pcpu.
+ *
+ * The records may be inaccurate if the host reclaims the LBR.
+ */
+ struct perf_event *event;
+
+ /* True if LBRs are marked as not intercepted in the MSR bitmap */
+ bool msr_passthrough;
+};
+
+extern struct x86_pmu_lbr vmx_lbr_caps;
+
+#endif /* __KVM_X86_VMX_PMU_INTEL_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/posted_intr.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/posted_intr.c
index d70e5b90087d..5c615e5845bf 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/posted_intr.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/posted_intr.c
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
#include "posted_intr.h"
#include "trace.h"
#include "vmx.h"
+#include "tdx.h"
/*
* Maintain a per-CPU list of vCPUs that need to be awakened by wakeup_handler()
@@ -33,9 +34,9 @@ static DEFINE_PER_CPU(raw_spinlock_t, wakeup_vcpus_on_cpu_lock);
#define PI_LOCK_SCHED_OUT SINGLE_DEPTH_NESTING
-static inline struct pi_desc *vcpu_to_pi_desc(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+static struct pi_desc *vcpu_to_pi_desc(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
- return &(to_vmx(vcpu)->pi_desc);
+ return &(to_vt(vcpu)->pi_desc);
}
static int pi_try_set_control(struct pi_desc *pi_desc, u64 *pold, u64 new)
@@ -55,7 +56,7 @@ static int pi_try_set_control(struct pi_desc *pi_desc, u64 *pold, u64 new)
void vmx_vcpu_pi_load(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int cpu)
{
struct pi_desc *pi_desc = vcpu_to_pi_desc(vcpu);
- struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+ struct vcpu_vt *vt = to_vt(vcpu);
struct pi_desc old, new;
unsigned long flags;
unsigned int dest;
@@ -102,7 +103,7 @@ void vmx_vcpu_pi_load(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int cpu)
*/
raw_spin_lock(spinlock);
spin_acquire(&spinlock->dep_map, PI_LOCK_SCHED_OUT, 0, _RET_IP_);
- list_del(&vmx->pi_wakeup_list);
+ list_del(&vt->pi_wakeup_list);
spin_release(&spinlock->dep_map, _RET_IP_);
raw_spin_unlock(spinlock);
}
@@ -147,9 +148,8 @@ after_clear_sn:
static bool vmx_can_use_vtd_pi(struct kvm *kvm)
{
- return irqchip_in_kernel(kvm) && enable_apicv &&
- kvm_arch_has_assigned_device(kvm) &&
- irq_remapping_cap(IRQ_POSTING_CAP);
+ return irqchip_in_kernel(kvm) && kvm_arch_has_irq_bypass() &&
+ kvm_arch_has_assigned_device(kvm);
}
/*
@@ -159,7 +159,7 @@ static bool vmx_can_use_vtd_pi(struct kvm *kvm)
static void pi_enable_wakeup_handler(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
struct pi_desc *pi_desc = vcpu_to_pi_desc(vcpu);
- struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+ struct vcpu_vt *vt = to_vt(vcpu);
struct pi_desc old, new;
lockdep_assert_irqs_disabled();
@@ -178,7 +178,7 @@ static void pi_enable_wakeup_handler(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
*/
raw_spin_lock_nested(&per_cpu(wakeup_vcpus_on_cpu_lock, vcpu->cpu),
PI_LOCK_SCHED_OUT);
- list_add_tail(&vmx->pi_wakeup_list,
+ list_add_tail(&vt->pi_wakeup_list,
&per_cpu(wakeup_vcpus_on_cpu, vcpu->cpu));
raw_spin_unlock(&per_cpu(wakeup_vcpus_on_cpu_lock, vcpu->cpu));
@@ -213,7 +213,8 @@ static bool vmx_needs_pi_wakeup(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
* notification vector is switched to the one that calls
* back to the pi_wakeup_handler() function.
*/
- return vmx_can_use_ipiv(vcpu) || vmx_can_use_vtd_pi(vcpu->kvm);
+ return (vmx_can_use_ipiv(vcpu) && !is_td_vcpu(vcpu)) ||
+ vmx_can_use_vtd_pi(vcpu->kvm);
}
void vmx_vcpu_pi_put(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
@@ -223,7 +224,9 @@ void vmx_vcpu_pi_put(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
if (!vmx_needs_pi_wakeup(vcpu))
return;
- if (kvm_vcpu_is_blocking(vcpu) && !vmx_interrupt_blocked(vcpu))
+ if (kvm_vcpu_is_blocking(vcpu) &&
+ ((is_td_vcpu(vcpu) && tdx_interrupt_allowed(vcpu)) ||
+ (!is_td_vcpu(vcpu) && !vmx_interrupt_blocked(vcpu))))
pi_enable_wakeup_handler(vcpu);
/*
@@ -243,13 +246,13 @@ void pi_wakeup_handler(void)
int cpu = smp_processor_id();
struct list_head *wakeup_list = &per_cpu(wakeup_vcpus_on_cpu, cpu);
raw_spinlock_t *spinlock = &per_cpu(wakeup_vcpus_on_cpu_lock, cpu);
- struct vcpu_vmx *vmx;
+ struct vcpu_vt *vt;
raw_spin_lock(spinlock);
- list_for_each_entry(vmx, wakeup_list, pi_wakeup_list) {
+ list_for_each_entry(vt, wakeup_list, pi_wakeup_list) {
- if (pi_test_on(&vmx->pi_desc))
- kvm_vcpu_wake_up(&vmx->vcpu);
+ if (pi_test_on(&vt->pi_desc))
+ kvm_vcpu_wake_up(vt_to_vcpu(vt));
}
raw_spin_unlock(spinlock);
}
@@ -260,6 +263,14 @@ void __init pi_init_cpu(int cpu)
raw_spin_lock_init(&per_cpu(wakeup_vcpus_on_cpu_lock, cpu));
}
+void pi_apicv_pre_state_restore(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ struct pi_desc *pi = vcpu_to_pi_desc(vcpu);
+
+ pi_clear_on(pi);
+ memset(pi->pir, 0, sizeof(pi->pir));
+}
+
bool pi_has_pending_interrupt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
struct pi_desc *pi_desc = vcpu_to_pi_desc(vcpu);
@@ -277,7 +288,7 @@ bool pi_has_pending_interrupt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
*/
void vmx_pi_start_assignment(struct kvm *kvm)
{
- if (!irq_remapping_cap(IRQ_POSTING_CAP))
+ if (!kvm_arch_has_irq_bypass())
return;
kvm_make_all_cpus_request(kvm, KVM_REQ_UNBLOCK);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/posted_intr.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/posted_intr.h
index ad9116a99bcc..80499ea0e674 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/posted_intr.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/posted_intr.h
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ void vmx_vcpu_pi_load(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int cpu);
void vmx_vcpu_pi_put(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
void pi_wakeup_handler(void);
void __init pi_init_cpu(int cpu);
+void pi_apicv_pre_state_restore(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
bool pi_has_pending_interrupt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
int vmx_pi_update_irte(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned int host_irq,
uint32_t guest_irq, bool set);
@@ -18,7 +19,7 @@ static inline int pi_find_highest_vector(struct pi_desc *pi_desc)
{
int vec;
- vec = find_last_bit((unsigned long *)pi_desc->pir, 256);
+ vec = find_last_bit(pi_desc->pir, 256);
return vec < 256 ? vec : -1;
}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..1ad20c273f3b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
@@ -0,0 +1,3595 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+#include <linux/cleanup.h>
+#include <linux/cpu.h>
+#include <asm/cpufeature.h>
+#include <asm/fpu/xcr.h>
+#include <linux/misc_cgroup.h>
+#include <linux/mmu_context.h>
+#include <asm/tdx.h>
+#include "capabilities.h"
+#include "mmu.h"
+#include "x86_ops.h"
+#include "lapic.h"
+#include "tdx.h"
+#include "vmx.h"
+#include "mmu/spte.h"
+#include "common.h"
+#include "posted_intr.h"
+#include "irq.h"
+#include <trace/events/kvm.h>
+#include "trace.h"
+
+#pragma GCC poison to_vmx
+
+#undef pr_fmt
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
+
+#define pr_tdx_error(__fn, __err) \
+ pr_err_ratelimited("SEAMCALL %s failed: 0x%llx\n", #__fn, __err)
+
+#define __pr_tdx_error_N(__fn_str, __err, __fmt, ...) \
+ pr_err_ratelimited("SEAMCALL " __fn_str " failed: 0x%llx, " __fmt, __err, __VA_ARGS__)
+
+#define pr_tdx_error_1(__fn, __err, __rcx) \
+ __pr_tdx_error_N(#__fn, __err, "rcx 0x%llx\n", __rcx)
+
+#define pr_tdx_error_2(__fn, __err, __rcx, __rdx) \
+ __pr_tdx_error_N(#__fn, __err, "rcx 0x%llx, rdx 0x%llx\n", __rcx, __rdx)
+
+#define pr_tdx_error_3(__fn, __err, __rcx, __rdx, __r8) \
+ __pr_tdx_error_N(#__fn, __err, "rcx 0x%llx, rdx 0x%llx, r8 0x%llx\n", __rcx, __rdx, __r8)
+
+bool enable_tdx __ro_after_init;
+module_param_named(tdx, enable_tdx, bool, 0444);
+
+#define TDX_SHARED_BIT_PWL_5 gpa_to_gfn(BIT_ULL(51))
+#define TDX_SHARED_BIT_PWL_4 gpa_to_gfn(BIT_ULL(47))
+
+static enum cpuhp_state tdx_cpuhp_state;
+
+static const struct tdx_sys_info *tdx_sysinfo;
+
+void tdh_vp_rd_failed(struct vcpu_tdx *tdx, char *uclass, u32 field, u64 err)
+{
+ KVM_BUG_ON(1, tdx->vcpu.kvm);
+ pr_err("TDH_VP_RD[%s.0x%x] failed 0x%llx\n", uclass, field, err);
+}
+
+void tdh_vp_wr_failed(struct vcpu_tdx *tdx, char *uclass, char *op, u32 field,
+ u64 val, u64 err)
+{
+ KVM_BUG_ON(1, tdx->vcpu.kvm);
+ pr_err("TDH_VP_WR[%s.0x%x]%s0x%llx failed: 0x%llx\n", uclass, field, op, val, err);
+}
+
+#define KVM_SUPPORTED_TD_ATTRS (TDX_TD_ATTR_SEPT_VE_DISABLE)
+
+static __always_inline struct kvm_tdx *to_kvm_tdx(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+ return container_of(kvm, struct kvm_tdx, kvm);
+}
+
+static __always_inline struct vcpu_tdx *to_tdx(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ return container_of(vcpu, struct vcpu_tdx, vcpu);
+}
+
+static u64 tdx_get_supported_attrs(const struct tdx_sys_info_td_conf *td_conf)
+{
+ u64 val = KVM_SUPPORTED_TD_ATTRS;
+
+ if ((val & td_conf->attributes_fixed1) != td_conf->attributes_fixed1)
+ return 0;
+
+ val &= td_conf->attributes_fixed0;
+
+ return val;
+}
+
+static u64 tdx_get_supported_xfam(const struct tdx_sys_info_td_conf *td_conf)
+{
+ u64 val = kvm_caps.supported_xcr0 | kvm_caps.supported_xss;
+
+ if ((val & td_conf->xfam_fixed1) != td_conf->xfam_fixed1)
+ return 0;
+
+ val &= td_conf->xfam_fixed0;
+
+ return val;
+}
+
+static int tdx_get_guest_phys_addr_bits(const u32 eax)
+{
+ return (eax & GENMASK(23, 16)) >> 16;
+}
+
+static u32 tdx_set_guest_phys_addr_bits(const u32 eax, int addr_bits)
+{
+ return (eax & ~GENMASK(23, 16)) | (addr_bits & 0xff) << 16;
+}
+
+#define TDX_FEATURE_TSX (__feature_bit(X86_FEATURE_HLE) | __feature_bit(X86_FEATURE_RTM))
+
+static bool has_tsx(const struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *entry)
+{
+ return entry->function == 7 && entry->index == 0 &&
+ (entry->ebx & TDX_FEATURE_TSX);
+}
+
+static void clear_tsx(struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *entry)
+{
+ entry->ebx &= ~TDX_FEATURE_TSX;
+}
+
+static bool has_waitpkg(const struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *entry)
+{
+ return entry->function == 7 && entry->index == 0 &&
+ (entry->ecx & __feature_bit(X86_FEATURE_WAITPKG));
+}
+
+static void clear_waitpkg(struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *entry)
+{
+ entry->ecx &= ~__feature_bit(X86_FEATURE_WAITPKG);
+}
+
+static void tdx_clear_unsupported_cpuid(struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *entry)
+{
+ if (has_tsx(entry))
+ clear_tsx(entry);
+
+ if (has_waitpkg(entry))
+ clear_waitpkg(entry);
+}
+
+static bool tdx_unsupported_cpuid(const struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *entry)
+{
+ return has_tsx(entry) || has_waitpkg(entry);
+}
+
+#define KVM_TDX_CPUID_NO_SUBLEAF ((__u32)-1)
+
+static void td_init_cpuid_entry2(struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *entry, unsigned char idx)
+{
+ const struct tdx_sys_info_td_conf *td_conf = &tdx_sysinfo->td_conf;
+
+ entry->function = (u32)td_conf->cpuid_config_leaves[idx];
+ entry->index = td_conf->cpuid_config_leaves[idx] >> 32;
+ entry->eax = (u32)td_conf->cpuid_config_values[idx][0];
+ entry->ebx = td_conf->cpuid_config_values[idx][0] >> 32;
+ entry->ecx = (u32)td_conf->cpuid_config_values[idx][1];
+ entry->edx = td_conf->cpuid_config_values[idx][1] >> 32;
+
+ if (entry->index == KVM_TDX_CPUID_NO_SUBLEAF)
+ entry->index = 0;
+
+ /*
+ * The TDX module doesn't allow configuring the guest phys addr bits
+ * (EAX[23:16]). However, KVM uses it as an interface to the userspace
+ * to configure the GPAW. Report these bits as configurable.
+ */
+ if (entry->function == 0x80000008)
+ entry->eax = tdx_set_guest_phys_addr_bits(entry->eax, 0xff);
+
+ tdx_clear_unsupported_cpuid(entry);
+}
+
+static int init_kvm_tdx_caps(const struct tdx_sys_info_td_conf *td_conf,
+ struct kvm_tdx_capabilities *caps)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ caps->supported_attrs = tdx_get_supported_attrs(td_conf);
+ if (!caps->supported_attrs)
+ return -EIO;
+
+ caps->supported_xfam = tdx_get_supported_xfam(td_conf);
+ if (!caps->supported_xfam)
+ return -EIO;
+
+ caps->cpuid.nent = td_conf->num_cpuid_config;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < td_conf->num_cpuid_config; i++)
+ td_init_cpuid_entry2(&caps->cpuid.entries[i], i);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Some SEAMCALLs acquire the TDX module globally, and can fail with
+ * TDX_OPERAND_BUSY. Use a global mutex to serialize these SEAMCALLs.
+ */
+static DEFINE_MUTEX(tdx_lock);
+
+static atomic_t nr_configured_hkid;
+
+static bool tdx_operand_busy(u64 err)
+{
+ return (err & TDX_SEAMCALL_STATUS_MASK) == TDX_OPERAND_BUSY;
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * A per-CPU list of TD vCPUs associated with a given CPU.
+ * Protected by interrupt mask. Only manipulated by the CPU owning this per-CPU
+ * list.
+ * - When a vCPU is loaded onto a CPU, it is removed from the per-CPU list of
+ * the old CPU during the IPI callback running on the old CPU, and then added
+ * to the per-CPU list of the new CPU.
+ * - When a TD is tearing down, all vCPUs are disassociated from their current
+ * running CPUs and removed from the per-CPU list during the IPI callback
+ * running on those CPUs.
+ * - When a CPU is brought down, traverse the per-CPU list to disassociate all
+ * associated TD vCPUs and remove them from the per-CPU list.
+ */
+static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct list_head, associated_tdvcpus);
+
+static __always_inline unsigned long tdvmcall_exit_type(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ return to_tdx(vcpu)->vp_enter_args.r10;
+}
+
+static __always_inline unsigned long tdvmcall_leaf(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ return to_tdx(vcpu)->vp_enter_args.r11;
+}
+
+static __always_inline void tdvmcall_set_return_code(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+ long val)
+{
+ to_tdx(vcpu)->vp_enter_args.r10 = val;
+}
+
+static __always_inline void tdvmcall_set_return_val(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+ unsigned long val)
+{
+ to_tdx(vcpu)->vp_enter_args.r11 = val;
+}
+
+static inline void tdx_hkid_free(struct kvm_tdx *kvm_tdx)
+{
+ tdx_guest_keyid_free(kvm_tdx->hkid);
+ kvm_tdx->hkid = -1;
+ atomic_dec(&nr_configured_hkid);
+ misc_cg_uncharge(MISC_CG_RES_TDX, kvm_tdx->misc_cg, 1);
+ put_misc_cg(kvm_tdx->misc_cg);
+ kvm_tdx->misc_cg = NULL;
+}
+
+static inline bool is_hkid_assigned(struct kvm_tdx *kvm_tdx)
+{
+ return kvm_tdx->hkid > 0;
+}
+
+static inline void tdx_disassociate_vp(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ lockdep_assert_irqs_disabled();
+
+ list_del(&to_tdx(vcpu)->cpu_list);
+
+ /*
+ * Ensure tdx->cpu_list is updated before setting vcpu->cpu to -1,
+ * otherwise, a different CPU can see vcpu->cpu = -1 and add the vCPU
+ * to its list before it's deleted from this CPU's list.
+ */
+ smp_wmb();
+
+ vcpu->cpu = -1;
+}
+
+static void tdx_clear_page(struct page *page)
+{
+ const void *zero_page = (const void *) page_to_virt(ZERO_PAGE(0));
+ void *dest = page_to_virt(page);
+ unsigned long i;
+
+ /*
+ * The page could have been poisoned. MOVDIR64B also clears
+ * the poison bit so the kernel can safely use the page again.
+ */
+ for (i = 0; i < PAGE_SIZE; i += 64)
+ movdir64b(dest + i, zero_page);
+ /*
+ * MOVDIR64B store uses WC buffer. Prevent following memory reads
+ * from seeing potentially poisoned cache.
+ */
+ __mb();
+}
+
+static void tdx_no_vcpus_enter_start(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+ struct kvm_tdx *kvm_tdx = to_kvm_tdx(kvm);
+
+ lockdep_assert_held_write(&kvm->mmu_lock);
+
+ WRITE_ONCE(kvm_tdx->wait_for_sept_zap, true);
+
+ kvm_make_all_cpus_request(kvm, KVM_REQ_OUTSIDE_GUEST_MODE);
+}
+
+static void tdx_no_vcpus_enter_stop(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+ struct kvm_tdx *kvm_tdx = to_kvm_tdx(kvm);
+
+ lockdep_assert_held_write(&kvm->mmu_lock);
+
+ WRITE_ONCE(kvm_tdx->wait_for_sept_zap, false);
+}
+
+/* TDH.PHYMEM.PAGE.RECLAIM is allowed only when destroying the TD. */
+static int __tdx_reclaim_page(struct page *page)
+{
+ u64 err, rcx, rdx, r8;
+
+ err = tdh_phymem_page_reclaim(page, &rcx, &rdx, &r8);
+
+ /*
+ * No need to check for TDX_OPERAND_BUSY; all TD pages are freed
+ * before the HKID is released and control pages have also been
+ * released at this point, so there is no possibility of contention.
+ */
+ if (WARN_ON_ONCE(err)) {
+ pr_tdx_error_3(TDH_PHYMEM_PAGE_RECLAIM, err, rcx, rdx, r8);
+ return -EIO;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int tdx_reclaim_page(struct page *page)
+{
+ int r;
+
+ r = __tdx_reclaim_page(page);
+ if (!r)
+ tdx_clear_page(page);
+ return r;
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * Reclaim the TD control page(s) which are crypto-protected by TDX guest's
+ * private KeyID. Assume the cache associated with the TDX private KeyID has
+ * been flushed.
+ */
+static void tdx_reclaim_control_page(struct page *ctrl_page)
+{
+ /*
+ * Leak the page if the kernel failed to reclaim the page.
+ * The kernel cannot use it safely anymore.
+ */
+ if (tdx_reclaim_page(ctrl_page))
+ return;
+
+ __free_page(ctrl_page);
+}
+
+struct tdx_flush_vp_arg {
+ struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu;
+ u64 err;
+};
+
+static void tdx_flush_vp(void *_arg)
+{
+ struct tdx_flush_vp_arg *arg = _arg;
+ struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = arg->vcpu;
+ u64 err;
+
+ arg->err = 0;
+ lockdep_assert_irqs_disabled();
+
+ /* Task migration can race with CPU offlining. */
+ if (unlikely(vcpu->cpu != raw_smp_processor_id()))
+ return;
+
+ /*
+ * No need to do TDH_VP_FLUSH if the vCPU hasn't been initialized. The
+ * list tracking still needs to be updated so that it's correct if/when
+ * the vCPU does get initialized.
+ */
+ if (to_tdx(vcpu)->state != VCPU_TD_STATE_UNINITIALIZED) {
+ /*
+ * No need to retry. TDX Resources needed for TDH.VP.FLUSH are:
+ * TDVPR as exclusive, TDR as shared, and TDCS as shared. This
+ * vp flush function is called when destructing vCPU/TD or vCPU
+ * migration. No other thread uses TDVPR in those cases.
+ */
+ err = tdh_vp_flush(&to_tdx(vcpu)->vp);
+ if (unlikely(err && err != TDX_VCPU_NOT_ASSOCIATED)) {
+ /*
+ * This function is called in IPI context. Do not use
+ * printk to avoid console semaphore.
+ * The caller prints out the error message, instead.
+ */
+ if (err)
+ arg->err = err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ tdx_disassociate_vp(vcpu);
+}
+
+static void tdx_flush_vp_on_cpu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ struct tdx_flush_vp_arg arg = {
+ .vcpu = vcpu,
+ };
+ int cpu = vcpu->cpu;
+
+ if (unlikely(cpu == -1))
+ return;
+
+ smp_call_function_single(cpu, tdx_flush_vp, &arg, 1);
+ if (KVM_BUG_ON(arg.err, vcpu->kvm))
+ pr_tdx_error(TDH_VP_FLUSH, arg.err);
+}
+
+void tdx_disable_virtualization_cpu(void)
+{
+ int cpu = raw_smp_processor_id();
+ struct list_head *tdvcpus = &per_cpu(associated_tdvcpus, cpu);
+ struct tdx_flush_vp_arg arg;
+ struct vcpu_tdx *tdx, *tmp;
+ unsigned long flags;
+
+ local_irq_save(flags);
+ /* Safe variant needed as tdx_disassociate_vp() deletes the entry. */
+ list_for_each_entry_safe(tdx, tmp, tdvcpus, cpu_list) {
+ arg.vcpu = &tdx->vcpu;
+ tdx_flush_vp(&arg);
+ }
+ local_irq_restore(flags);
+}
+
+#define TDX_SEAMCALL_RETRIES 10000
+
+static void smp_func_do_phymem_cache_wb(void *unused)
+{
+ u64 err = 0;
+ bool resume;
+ int i;
+
+ /*
+ * TDH.PHYMEM.CACHE.WB flushes caches associated with any TDX private
+ * KeyID on the package or core. The TDX module may not finish the
+ * cache flush but return TDX_INTERRUPTED_RESUMEABLE instead. The
+ * kernel should retry it until it returns success w/o rescheduling.
+ */
+ for (i = TDX_SEAMCALL_RETRIES; i > 0; i--) {
+ resume = !!err;
+ err = tdh_phymem_cache_wb(resume);
+ switch (err) {
+ case TDX_INTERRUPTED_RESUMABLE:
+ continue;
+ case TDX_NO_HKID_READY_TO_WBCACHE:
+ err = TDX_SUCCESS; /* Already done by other thread */
+ fallthrough;
+ default:
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
+
+out:
+ if (WARN_ON_ONCE(err))
+ pr_tdx_error(TDH_PHYMEM_CACHE_WB, err);
+}
+
+void tdx_mmu_release_hkid(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+ bool packages_allocated, targets_allocated;
+ struct kvm_tdx *kvm_tdx = to_kvm_tdx(kvm);
+ cpumask_var_t packages, targets;
+ struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu;
+ unsigned long j;
+ int i;
+ u64 err;
+
+ if (!is_hkid_assigned(kvm_tdx))
+ return;
+
+ packages_allocated = zalloc_cpumask_var(&packages, GFP_KERNEL);
+ targets_allocated = zalloc_cpumask_var(&targets, GFP_KERNEL);
+ cpus_read_lock();
+
+ kvm_for_each_vcpu(j, vcpu, kvm)
+ tdx_flush_vp_on_cpu(vcpu);
+
+ /*
+ * TDH.PHYMEM.CACHE.WB tries to acquire the TDX module global lock
+ * and can fail with TDX_OPERAND_BUSY when it fails to get the lock.
+ * Multiple TDX guests can be destroyed simultaneously. Take the
+ * mutex to prevent it from getting error.
+ */
+ mutex_lock(&tdx_lock);
+
+ /*
+ * Releasing HKID is in vm_destroy().
+ * After the above flushing vps, there should be no more vCPU
+ * associations, as all vCPU fds have been released at this stage.
+ */
+ err = tdh_mng_vpflushdone(&kvm_tdx->td);
+ if (err == TDX_FLUSHVP_NOT_DONE)
+ goto out;
+ if (KVM_BUG_ON(err, kvm)) {
+ pr_tdx_error(TDH_MNG_VPFLUSHDONE, err);
+ pr_err("tdh_mng_vpflushdone() failed. HKID %d is leaked.\n",
+ kvm_tdx->hkid);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ for_each_online_cpu(i) {
+ if (packages_allocated &&
+ cpumask_test_and_set_cpu(topology_physical_package_id(i),
+ packages))
+ continue;
+ if (targets_allocated)
+ cpumask_set_cpu(i, targets);
+ }
+ if (targets_allocated)
+ on_each_cpu_mask(targets, smp_func_do_phymem_cache_wb, NULL, true);
+ else
+ on_each_cpu(smp_func_do_phymem_cache_wb, NULL, true);
+ /*
+ * In the case of error in smp_func_do_phymem_cache_wb(), the following
+ * tdh_mng_key_freeid() will fail.
+ */
+ err = tdh_mng_key_freeid(&kvm_tdx->td);
+ if (KVM_BUG_ON(err, kvm)) {
+ pr_tdx_error(TDH_MNG_KEY_FREEID, err);
+ pr_err("tdh_mng_key_freeid() failed. HKID %d is leaked.\n",
+ kvm_tdx->hkid);
+ } else {
+ tdx_hkid_free(kvm_tdx);
+ }
+
+out:
+ mutex_unlock(&tdx_lock);
+ cpus_read_unlock();
+ free_cpumask_var(targets);
+ free_cpumask_var(packages);
+}
+
+static void tdx_reclaim_td_control_pages(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+ struct kvm_tdx *kvm_tdx = to_kvm_tdx(kvm);
+ u64 err;
+ int i;
+
+ /*
+ * tdx_mmu_release_hkid() failed to reclaim HKID. Something went wrong
+ * heavily with TDX module. Give up freeing TD pages. As the function
+ * already warned, don't warn it again.
+ */
+ if (is_hkid_assigned(kvm_tdx))
+ return;
+
+ if (kvm_tdx->td.tdcs_pages) {
+ for (i = 0; i < kvm_tdx->td.tdcs_nr_pages; i++) {
+ if (!kvm_tdx->td.tdcs_pages[i])
+ continue;
+
+ tdx_reclaim_control_page(kvm_tdx->td.tdcs_pages[i]);
+ }
+ kfree(kvm_tdx->td.tdcs_pages);
+ kvm_tdx->td.tdcs_pages = NULL;
+ }
+
+ if (!kvm_tdx->td.tdr_page)
+ return;
+
+ if (__tdx_reclaim_page(kvm_tdx->td.tdr_page))
+ return;
+
+ /*
+ * Use a SEAMCALL to ask the TDX module to flush the cache based on the
+ * KeyID. TDX module may access TDR while operating on TD (Especially
+ * when it is reclaiming TDCS).
+ */
+ err = tdh_phymem_page_wbinvd_tdr(&kvm_tdx->td);
+ if (KVM_BUG_ON(err, kvm)) {
+ pr_tdx_error(TDH_PHYMEM_PAGE_WBINVD, err);
+ return;
+ }
+ tdx_clear_page(kvm_tdx->td.tdr_page);
+
+ __free_page(kvm_tdx->td.tdr_page);
+ kvm_tdx->td.tdr_page = NULL;
+}
+
+void tdx_vm_destroy(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+ struct kvm_tdx *kvm_tdx = to_kvm_tdx(kvm);
+
+ tdx_reclaim_td_control_pages(kvm);
+
+ kvm_tdx->state = TD_STATE_UNINITIALIZED;
+}
+
+static int tdx_do_tdh_mng_key_config(void *param)
+{
+ struct kvm_tdx *kvm_tdx = param;
+ u64 err;
+
+ /* TDX_RND_NO_ENTROPY related retries are handled by sc_retry() */
+ err = tdh_mng_key_config(&kvm_tdx->td);
+
+ if (KVM_BUG_ON(err, &kvm_tdx->kvm)) {
+ pr_tdx_error(TDH_MNG_KEY_CONFIG, err);
+ return -EIO;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int tdx_vm_init(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+ struct kvm_tdx *kvm_tdx = to_kvm_tdx(kvm);
+
+ kvm->arch.has_protected_state = true;
+ kvm->arch.has_private_mem = true;
+ kvm->arch.disabled_quirks |= KVM_X86_QUIRK_IGNORE_GUEST_PAT;
+
+ /*
+ * Because guest TD is protected, VMM can't parse the instruction in TD.
+ * Instead, guest uses MMIO hypercall. For unmodified device driver,
+ * #VE needs to be injected for MMIO and #VE handler in TD converts MMIO
+ * instruction into MMIO hypercall.
+ *
+ * SPTE value for MMIO needs to be setup so that #VE is injected into
+ * TD instead of triggering EPT MISCONFIG.
+ * - RWX=0 so that EPT violation is triggered.
+ * - suppress #VE bit is cleared to inject #VE.
+ */
+ kvm_mmu_set_mmio_spte_value(kvm, 0);
+
+ /*
+ * TDX has its own limit of maximum vCPUs it can support for all
+ * TDX guests in addition to KVM_MAX_VCPUS. TDX module reports
+ * such limit via the MAX_VCPU_PER_TD global metadata. In
+ * practice, it reflects the number of logical CPUs that ALL
+ * platforms that the TDX module supports can possibly have.
+ *
+ * Limit TDX guest's maximum vCPUs to the number of logical CPUs
+ * the platform has. Simply forwarding the MAX_VCPU_PER_TD to
+ * userspace would result in an unpredictable ABI.
+ */
+ kvm->max_vcpus = min_t(int, kvm->max_vcpus, num_present_cpus());
+
+ kvm_tdx->state = TD_STATE_UNINITIALIZED;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int tdx_vcpu_create(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ struct kvm_tdx *kvm_tdx = to_kvm_tdx(vcpu->kvm);
+ struct vcpu_tdx *tdx = to_tdx(vcpu);
+
+ if (kvm_tdx->state != TD_STATE_INITIALIZED)
+ return -EIO;
+
+ /*
+ * TDX module mandates APICv, which requires an in-kernel local APIC.
+ * Disallow an in-kernel I/O APIC, because level-triggered interrupts
+ * and thus the I/O APIC as a whole can't be faithfully emulated in KVM.
+ */
+ if (!irqchip_split(vcpu->kvm))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ fpstate_set_confidential(&vcpu->arch.guest_fpu);
+ vcpu->arch.apic->guest_apic_protected = true;
+ INIT_LIST_HEAD(&tdx->vt.pi_wakeup_list);
+
+ vcpu->arch.efer = EFER_SCE | EFER_LME | EFER_LMA | EFER_NX;
+
+ vcpu->arch.switch_db_regs = KVM_DEBUGREG_AUTO_SWITCH;
+ vcpu->arch.cr0_guest_owned_bits = -1ul;
+ vcpu->arch.cr4_guest_owned_bits = -1ul;
+
+ /* KVM can't change TSC offset/multiplier as TDX module manages them. */
+ vcpu->arch.guest_tsc_protected = true;
+ vcpu->arch.tsc_offset = kvm_tdx->tsc_offset;
+ vcpu->arch.l1_tsc_offset = vcpu->arch.tsc_offset;
+ vcpu->arch.tsc_scaling_ratio = kvm_tdx->tsc_multiplier;
+ vcpu->arch.l1_tsc_scaling_ratio = kvm_tdx->tsc_multiplier;
+
+ vcpu->arch.guest_state_protected =
+ !(to_kvm_tdx(vcpu->kvm)->attributes & TDX_TD_ATTR_DEBUG);
+
+ if ((kvm_tdx->xfam & XFEATURE_MASK_XTILE) == XFEATURE_MASK_XTILE)
+ vcpu->arch.xfd_no_write_intercept = true;
+
+ tdx->vt.pi_desc.nv = POSTED_INTR_VECTOR;
+ __pi_set_sn(&tdx->vt.pi_desc);
+
+ tdx->state = VCPU_TD_STATE_UNINITIALIZED;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+void tdx_vcpu_load(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int cpu)
+{
+ struct vcpu_tdx *tdx = to_tdx(vcpu);
+
+ vmx_vcpu_pi_load(vcpu, cpu);
+ if (vcpu->cpu == cpu || !is_hkid_assigned(to_kvm_tdx(vcpu->kvm)))
+ return;
+
+ tdx_flush_vp_on_cpu(vcpu);
+
+ KVM_BUG_ON(cpu != raw_smp_processor_id(), vcpu->kvm);
+ local_irq_disable();
+ /*
+ * Pairs with the smp_wmb() in tdx_disassociate_vp() to ensure
+ * vcpu->cpu is read before tdx->cpu_list.
+ */
+ smp_rmb();
+
+ list_add(&tdx->cpu_list, &per_cpu(associated_tdvcpus, cpu));
+ local_irq_enable();
+}
+
+bool tdx_interrupt_allowed(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ /*
+ * KVM can't get the interrupt status of TDX guest and it assumes
+ * interrupt is always allowed unless TDX guest calls TDVMCALL with HLT,
+ * which passes the interrupt blocked flag.
+ */
+ return vmx_get_exit_reason(vcpu).basic != EXIT_REASON_HLT ||
+ !to_tdx(vcpu)->vp_enter_args.r12;
+}
+
+bool tdx_protected_apic_has_interrupt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ u64 vcpu_state_details;
+
+ if (pi_has_pending_interrupt(vcpu))
+ return true;
+
+ /*
+ * Only check RVI pending for HALTED case with IRQ enabled.
+ * For non-HLT cases, KVM doesn't care about STI/SS shadows. And if the
+ * interrupt was pending before TD exit, then it _must_ be blocked,
+ * otherwise the interrupt would have been serviced at the instruction
+ * boundary.
+ */
+ if (vmx_get_exit_reason(vcpu).basic != EXIT_REASON_HLT ||
+ to_tdx(vcpu)->vp_enter_args.r12)
+ return false;
+
+ vcpu_state_details =
+ td_state_non_arch_read64(to_tdx(vcpu), TD_VCPU_STATE_DETAILS_NON_ARCH);
+
+ return tdx_vcpu_state_details_intr_pending(vcpu_state_details);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Compared to vmx_prepare_switch_to_guest(), there is not much to do
+ * as SEAMCALL/SEAMRET calls take care of most of save and restore.
+ */
+void tdx_prepare_switch_to_guest(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ struct vcpu_vt *vt = to_vt(vcpu);
+
+ if (vt->guest_state_loaded)
+ return;
+
+ if (likely(is_64bit_mm(current->mm)))
+ vt->msr_host_kernel_gs_base = current->thread.gsbase;
+ else
+ vt->msr_host_kernel_gs_base = read_msr(MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE);
+
+ vt->host_debugctlmsr = get_debugctlmsr();
+
+ vt->guest_state_loaded = true;
+}
+
+struct tdx_uret_msr {
+ u32 msr;
+ unsigned int slot;
+ u64 defval;
+};
+
+static struct tdx_uret_msr tdx_uret_msrs[] = {
+ {.msr = MSR_SYSCALL_MASK, .defval = 0x20200 },
+ {.msr = MSR_STAR,},
+ {.msr = MSR_LSTAR,},
+ {.msr = MSR_TSC_AUX,},
+};
+
+static void tdx_user_return_msr_update_cache(void)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(tdx_uret_msrs); i++)
+ kvm_user_return_msr_update_cache(tdx_uret_msrs[i].slot,
+ tdx_uret_msrs[i].defval);
+}
+
+static void tdx_prepare_switch_to_host(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ struct vcpu_vt *vt = to_vt(vcpu);
+ struct vcpu_tdx *tdx = to_tdx(vcpu);
+
+ if (!vt->guest_state_loaded)
+ return;
+
+ ++vcpu->stat.host_state_reload;
+ wrmsrl(MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE, vt->msr_host_kernel_gs_base);
+
+ if (tdx->guest_entered) {
+ tdx_user_return_msr_update_cache();
+ tdx->guest_entered = false;
+ }
+
+ vt->guest_state_loaded = false;
+}
+
+void tdx_vcpu_put(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ vmx_vcpu_pi_put(vcpu);
+ tdx_prepare_switch_to_host(vcpu);
+}
+
+void tdx_vcpu_free(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ struct kvm_tdx *kvm_tdx = to_kvm_tdx(vcpu->kvm);
+ struct vcpu_tdx *tdx = to_tdx(vcpu);
+ int i;
+
+ /*
+ * It is not possible to reclaim pages while hkid is assigned. It might
+ * be assigned if:
+ * 1. the TD VM is being destroyed but freeing hkid failed, in which
+ * case the pages are leaked
+ * 2. TD VCPU creation failed and this on the error path, in which case
+ * there is nothing to do anyway
+ */
+ if (is_hkid_assigned(kvm_tdx))
+ return;
+
+ if (tdx->vp.tdcx_pages) {
+ for (i = 0; i < kvm_tdx->td.tdcx_nr_pages; i++) {
+ if (tdx->vp.tdcx_pages[i])
+ tdx_reclaim_control_page(tdx->vp.tdcx_pages[i]);
+ }
+ kfree(tdx->vp.tdcx_pages);
+ tdx->vp.tdcx_pages = NULL;
+ }
+ if (tdx->vp.tdvpr_page) {
+ tdx_reclaim_control_page(tdx->vp.tdvpr_page);
+ tdx->vp.tdvpr_page = 0;
+ }
+
+ tdx->state = VCPU_TD_STATE_UNINITIALIZED;
+}
+
+int tdx_vcpu_pre_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ if (unlikely(to_tdx(vcpu)->state != VCPU_TD_STATE_INITIALIZED ||
+ to_kvm_tdx(vcpu->kvm)->state != TD_STATE_RUNNABLE))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static __always_inline u32 tdcall_to_vmx_exit_reason(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ switch (tdvmcall_leaf(vcpu)) {
+ case EXIT_REASON_CPUID:
+ case EXIT_REASON_HLT:
+ case EXIT_REASON_IO_INSTRUCTION:
+ case EXIT_REASON_MSR_READ:
+ case EXIT_REASON_MSR_WRITE:
+ return tdvmcall_leaf(vcpu);
+ case EXIT_REASON_EPT_VIOLATION:
+ return EXIT_REASON_EPT_MISCONFIG;
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+
+ return EXIT_REASON_TDCALL;
+}
+
+static __always_inline u32 tdx_to_vmx_exit_reason(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ struct vcpu_tdx *tdx = to_tdx(vcpu);
+ u32 exit_reason;
+
+ switch (tdx->vp_enter_ret & TDX_SEAMCALL_STATUS_MASK) {
+ case TDX_SUCCESS:
+ case TDX_NON_RECOVERABLE_VCPU:
+ case TDX_NON_RECOVERABLE_TD:
+ case TDX_NON_RECOVERABLE_TD_NON_ACCESSIBLE:
+ case TDX_NON_RECOVERABLE_TD_WRONG_APIC_MODE:
+ break;
+ default:
+ return -1u;
+ }
+
+ exit_reason = tdx->vp_enter_ret;
+
+ switch (exit_reason) {
+ case EXIT_REASON_TDCALL:
+ if (tdvmcall_exit_type(vcpu))
+ return EXIT_REASON_VMCALL;
+
+ return tdcall_to_vmx_exit_reason(vcpu);
+ case EXIT_REASON_EPT_MISCONFIG:
+ /*
+ * Defer KVM_BUG_ON() until tdx_handle_exit() because this is in
+ * non-instrumentable code with interrupts disabled.
+ */
+ return -1u;
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+
+ return exit_reason;
+}
+
+static noinstr void tdx_vcpu_enter_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ struct vcpu_tdx *tdx = to_tdx(vcpu);
+ struct vcpu_vt *vt = to_vt(vcpu);
+
+ guest_state_enter_irqoff();
+
+ tdx->vp_enter_ret = tdh_vp_enter(&tdx->vp, &tdx->vp_enter_args);
+
+ vt->exit_reason.full = tdx_to_vmx_exit_reason(vcpu);
+
+ vt->exit_qualification = tdx->vp_enter_args.rcx;
+ tdx->ext_exit_qualification = tdx->vp_enter_args.rdx;
+ tdx->exit_gpa = tdx->vp_enter_args.r8;
+ vt->exit_intr_info = tdx->vp_enter_args.r9;
+
+ vmx_handle_nmi(vcpu);
+
+ guest_state_exit_irqoff();
+}
+
+static bool tdx_failed_vmentry(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ return vmx_get_exit_reason(vcpu).failed_vmentry &&
+ vmx_get_exit_reason(vcpu).full != -1u;
+}
+
+static fastpath_t tdx_exit_handlers_fastpath(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ u64 vp_enter_ret = to_tdx(vcpu)->vp_enter_ret;
+
+ /*
+ * TDX_OPERAND_BUSY could be returned for SEPT due to 0-step mitigation
+ * or for TD EPOCH due to contention with TDH.MEM.TRACK on TDH.VP.ENTER.
+ *
+ * When KVM requests KVM_REQ_OUTSIDE_GUEST_MODE, which has both
+ * KVM_REQUEST_WAIT and KVM_REQUEST_NO_ACTION set, it requires target
+ * vCPUs leaving fastpath so that interrupt can be enabled to ensure the
+ * IPIs can be delivered. Return EXIT_FASTPATH_EXIT_HANDLED instead of
+ * EXIT_FASTPATH_REENTER_GUEST to exit fastpath, otherwise, the
+ * requester may be blocked endlessly.
+ */
+ if (unlikely(tdx_operand_busy(vp_enter_ret)))
+ return EXIT_FASTPATH_EXIT_HANDLED;
+
+ return EXIT_FASTPATH_NONE;
+}
+
+#define TDX_REGS_AVAIL_SET (BIT_ULL(VCPU_EXREG_EXIT_INFO_1) | \
+ BIT_ULL(VCPU_EXREG_EXIT_INFO_2) | \
+ BIT_ULL(VCPU_REGS_RAX) | \
+ BIT_ULL(VCPU_REGS_RBX) | \
+ BIT_ULL(VCPU_REGS_RCX) | \
+ BIT_ULL(VCPU_REGS_RDX) | \
+ BIT_ULL(VCPU_REGS_RBP) | \
+ BIT_ULL(VCPU_REGS_RSI) | \
+ BIT_ULL(VCPU_REGS_RDI) | \
+ BIT_ULL(VCPU_REGS_R8) | \
+ BIT_ULL(VCPU_REGS_R9) | \
+ BIT_ULL(VCPU_REGS_R10) | \
+ BIT_ULL(VCPU_REGS_R11) | \
+ BIT_ULL(VCPU_REGS_R12) | \
+ BIT_ULL(VCPU_REGS_R13) | \
+ BIT_ULL(VCPU_REGS_R14) | \
+ BIT_ULL(VCPU_REGS_R15))
+
+static void tdx_load_host_xsave_state(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ struct kvm_tdx *kvm_tdx = to_kvm_tdx(vcpu->kvm);
+
+ /*
+ * All TDX hosts support PKRU; but even if they didn't,
+ * vcpu->arch.host_pkru would be 0 and the wrpkru would be
+ * skipped.
+ */
+ if (vcpu->arch.host_pkru != 0)
+ wrpkru(vcpu->arch.host_pkru);
+
+ if (kvm_host.xcr0 != (kvm_tdx->xfam & kvm_caps.supported_xcr0))
+ xsetbv(XCR_XFEATURE_ENABLED_MASK, kvm_host.xcr0);
+
+ /*
+ * Likewise, even if a TDX hosts didn't support XSS both arms of
+ * the comparison would be 0 and the wrmsrl would be skipped.
+ */
+ if (kvm_host.xss != (kvm_tdx->xfam & kvm_caps.supported_xss))
+ wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_XSS, kvm_host.xss);
+}
+
+#define TDX_DEBUGCTL_PRESERVED (DEBUGCTLMSR_BTF | \
+ DEBUGCTLMSR_FREEZE_PERFMON_ON_PMI | \
+ DEBUGCTLMSR_FREEZE_IN_SMM)
+
+fastpath_t tdx_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool force_immediate_exit)
+{
+ struct vcpu_tdx *tdx = to_tdx(vcpu);
+ struct vcpu_vt *vt = to_vt(vcpu);
+
+ /*
+ * force_immediate_exit requires vCPU entering for events injection with
+ * an immediately exit followed. But The TDX module doesn't guarantee
+ * entry, it's already possible for KVM to _think_ it completely entry
+ * to the guest without actually having done so.
+ * Since KVM never needs to force an immediate exit for TDX, and can't
+ * do direct injection, just warn on force_immediate_exit.
+ */
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(force_immediate_exit);
+
+ /*
+ * Wait until retry of SEPT-zap-related SEAMCALL completes before
+ * allowing vCPU entry to avoid contention with tdh_vp_enter() and
+ * TDCALLs.
+ */
+ if (unlikely(READ_ONCE(to_kvm_tdx(vcpu->kvm)->wait_for_sept_zap)))
+ return EXIT_FASTPATH_EXIT_HANDLED;
+
+ trace_kvm_entry(vcpu, force_immediate_exit);
+
+ if (pi_test_on(&vt->pi_desc)) {
+ apic->send_IPI_self(POSTED_INTR_VECTOR);
+
+ if (pi_test_pir(kvm_lapic_get_reg(vcpu->arch.apic, APIC_LVTT) &
+ APIC_VECTOR_MASK, &vt->pi_desc))
+ kvm_wait_lapic_expire(vcpu);
+ }
+
+ tdx_vcpu_enter_exit(vcpu);
+
+ if (vt->host_debugctlmsr & ~TDX_DEBUGCTL_PRESERVED)
+ update_debugctlmsr(vt->host_debugctlmsr);
+
+ tdx_load_host_xsave_state(vcpu);
+ tdx->guest_entered = true;
+
+ vcpu->arch.regs_avail &= TDX_REGS_AVAIL_SET;
+
+ if (unlikely(tdx->vp_enter_ret == EXIT_REASON_EPT_MISCONFIG))
+ return EXIT_FASTPATH_NONE;
+
+ if (unlikely((tdx->vp_enter_ret & TDX_SW_ERROR) == TDX_SW_ERROR))
+ return EXIT_FASTPATH_NONE;
+
+ if (unlikely(vmx_get_exit_reason(vcpu).basic == EXIT_REASON_MCE_DURING_VMENTRY))
+ kvm_machine_check();
+
+ trace_kvm_exit(vcpu, KVM_ISA_VMX);
+
+ if (unlikely(tdx_failed_vmentry(vcpu)))
+ return EXIT_FASTPATH_NONE;
+
+ return tdx_exit_handlers_fastpath(vcpu);
+}
+
+void tdx_inject_nmi(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ ++vcpu->stat.nmi_injections;
+ td_management_write8(to_tdx(vcpu), TD_VCPU_PEND_NMI, 1);
+ /*
+ * From KVM's perspective, NMI injection is completed right after
+ * writing to PEND_NMI. KVM doesn't care whether an NMI is injected by
+ * the TDX module or not.
+ */
+ vcpu->arch.nmi_injected = false;
+ /*
+ * TDX doesn't support KVM to request NMI window exit. If there is
+ * still a pending vNMI, KVM is not able to inject it along with the
+ * one pending in TDX module in a back-to-back way. Since the previous
+ * vNMI is still pending in TDX module, i.e. it has not been delivered
+ * to TDX guest yet, it's OK to collapse the pending vNMI into the
+ * previous one. The guest is expected to handle all the NMI sources
+ * when handling the first vNMI.
+ */
+ vcpu->arch.nmi_pending = 0;
+}
+
+static int tdx_handle_exception_nmi(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ u32 intr_info = vmx_get_intr_info(vcpu);
+
+ /*
+ * Machine checks are handled by handle_exception_irqoff(), or by
+ * tdx_handle_exit() with TDX_NON_RECOVERABLE set if a #MC occurs on
+ * VM-Entry. NMIs are handled by tdx_vcpu_enter_exit().
+ */
+ if (is_nmi(intr_info) || is_machine_check(intr_info))
+ return 1;
+
+ vcpu->run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_EXCEPTION;
+ vcpu->run->ex.exception = intr_info & INTR_INFO_VECTOR_MASK;
+ vcpu->run->ex.error_code = 0;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int complete_hypercall_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ tdvmcall_set_return_code(vcpu, vcpu->run->hypercall.ret);
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int tdx_emulate_vmcall(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ kvm_rax_write(vcpu, to_tdx(vcpu)->vp_enter_args.r10);
+ kvm_rbx_write(vcpu, to_tdx(vcpu)->vp_enter_args.r11);
+ kvm_rcx_write(vcpu, to_tdx(vcpu)->vp_enter_args.r12);
+ kvm_rdx_write(vcpu, to_tdx(vcpu)->vp_enter_args.r13);
+ kvm_rsi_write(vcpu, to_tdx(vcpu)->vp_enter_args.r14);
+
+ return __kvm_emulate_hypercall(vcpu, 0, complete_hypercall_exit);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Split into chunks and check interrupt pending between chunks. This allows
+ * for timely injection of interrupts to prevent issues with guest lockup
+ * detection.
+ */
+#define TDX_MAP_GPA_MAX_LEN (2 * 1024 * 1024)
+static void __tdx_map_gpa(struct vcpu_tdx *tdx);
+
+static int tdx_complete_vmcall_map_gpa(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ struct vcpu_tdx *tdx = to_tdx(vcpu);
+
+ if (vcpu->run->hypercall.ret) {
+ tdvmcall_set_return_code(vcpu, TDVMCALL_STATUS_INVALID_OPERAND);
+ tdx->vp_enter_args.r11 = tdx->map_gpa_next;
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ tdx->map_gpa_next += TDX_MAP_GPA_MAX_LEN;
+ if (tdx->map_gpa_next >= tdx->map_gpa_end)
+ return 1;
+
+ /*
+ * Stop processing the remaining part if there is a pending interrupt,
+ * which could be qualified to deliver. Skip checking pending RVI for
+ * TDVMCALL_MAP_GPA, see comments in tdx_protected_apic_has_interrupt().
+ */
+ if (kvm_vcpu_has_events(vcpu)) {
+ tdvmcall_set_return_code(vcpu, TDVMCALL_STATUS_RETRY);
+ tdx->vp_enter_args.r11 = tdx->map_gpa_next;
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ __tdx_map_gpa(tdx);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void __tdx_map_gpa(struct vcpu_tdx *tdx)
+{
+ u64 gpa = tdx->map_gpa_next;
+ u64 size = tdx->map_gpa_end - tdx->map_gpa_next;
+
+ if (size > TDX_MAP_GPA_MAX_LEN)
+ size = TDX_MAP_GPA_MAX_LEN;
+
+ tdx->vcpu.run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_HYPERCALL;
+ tdx->vcpu.run->hypercall.nr = KVM_HC_MAP_GPA_RANGE;
+ /*
+ * In principle this should have been -KVM_ENOSYS, but userspace (QEMU <=9.2)
+ * assumed that vcpu->run->hypercall.ret is never changed by KVM and thus that
+ * it was always zero on KVM_EXIT_HYPERCALL. Since KVM is now overwriting
+ * vcpu->run->hypercall.ret, ensuring that it is zero to not break QEMU.
+ */
+ tdx->vcpu.run->hypercall.ret = 0;
+ tdx->vcpu.run->hypercall.args[0] = gpa & ~gfn_to_gpa(kvm_gfn_direct_bits(tdx->vcpu.kvm));
+ tdx->vcpu.run->hypercall.args[1] = size / PAGE_SIZE;
+ tdx->vcpu.run->hypercall.args[2] = vt_is_tdx_private_gpa(tdx->vcpu.kvm, gpa) ?
+ KVM_MAP_GPA_RANGE_ENCRYPTED :
+ KVM_MAP_GPA_RANGE_DECRYPTED;
+ tdx->vcpu.run->hypercall.flags = KVM_EXIT_HYPERCALL_LONG_MODE;
+
+ tdx->vcpu.arch.complete_userspace_io = tdx_complete_vmcall_map_gpa;
+}
+
+static int tdx_map_gpa(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ struct vcpu_tdx *tdx = to_tdx(vcpu);
+ u64 gpa = tdx->vp_enter_args.r12;
+ u64 size = tdx->vp_enter_args.r13;
+ u64 ret;
+
+ /*
+ * Converting TDVMCALL_MAP_GPA to KVM_HC_MAP_GPA_RANGE requires
+ * userspace to enable KVM_CAP_EXIT_HYPERCALL with KVM_HC_MAP_GPA_RANGE
+ * bit set. This is a base call so it should always be supported, but
+ * KVM has no way to ensure that userspace implements the GHCI correctly.
+ * So if KVM_HC_MAP_GPA_RANGE does not cause a VMEXIT, return an error
+ * to the guest.
+ */
+ if (!user_exit_on_hypercall(vcpu->kvm, KVM_HC_MAP_GPA_RANGE)) {
+ ret = TDVMCALL_STATUS_SUBFUNC_UNSUPPORTED;
+ goto error;
+ }
+
+ if (gpa + size <= gpa || !kvm_vcpu_is_legal_gpa(vcpu, gpa) ||
+ !kvm_vcpu_is_legal_gpa(vcpu, gpa + size - 1) ||
+ (vt_is_tdx_private_gpa(vcpu->kvm, gpa) !=
+ vt_is_tdx_private_gpa(vcpu->kvm, gpa + size - 1))) {
+ ret = TDVMCALL_STATUS_INVALID_OPERAND;
+ goto error;
+ }
+
+ if (!PAGE_ALIGNED(gpa) || !PAGE_ALIGNED(size)) {
+ ret = TDVMCALL_STATUS_ALIGN_ERROR;
+ goto error;
+ }
+
+ tdx->map_gpa_end = gpa + size;
+ tdx->map_gpa_next = gpa;
+
+ __tdx_map_gpa(tdx);
+ return 0;
+
+error:
+ tdvmcall_set_return_code(vcpu, ret);
+ tdx->vp_enter_args.r11 = gpa;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int tdx_report_fatal_error(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ struct vcpu_tdx *tdx = to_tdx(vcpu);
+ u64 *regs = vcpu->run->system_event.data;
+ u64 *module_regs = &tdx->vp_enter_args.r8;
+ int index = VCPU_REGS_RAX;
+
+ vcpu->run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_SYSTEM_EVENT;
+ vcpu->run->system_event.type = KVM_SYSTEM_EVENT_TDX_FATAL;
+ vcpu->run->system_event.ndata = 16;
+
+ /* Dump 16 general-purpose registers to userspace in ascending order. */
+ regs[index++] = tdx->vp_enter_ret;
+ regs[index++] = tdx->vp_enter_args.rcx;
+ regs[index++] = tdx->vp_enter_args.rdx;
+ regs[index++] = tdx->vp_enter_args.rbx;
+ regs[index++] = 0;
+ regs[index++] = 0;
+ regs[index++] = tdx->vp_enter_args.rsi;
+ regs[index] = tdx->vp_enter_args.rdi;
+ for (index = 0; index < 8; index++)
+ regs[VCPU_REGS_R8 + index] = module_regs[index];
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int tdx_emulate_cpuid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ u32 eax, ebx, ecx, edx;
+ struct vcpu_tdx *tdx = to_tdx(vcpu);
+
+ /* EAX and ECX for cpuid is stored in R12 and R13. */
+ eax = tdx->vp_enter_args.r12;
+ ecx = tdx->vp_enter_args.r13;
+
+ kvm_cpuid(vcpu, &eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx, false);
+
+ tdx->vp_enter_args.r12 = eax;
+ tdx->vp_enter_args.r13 = ebx;
+ tdx->vp_enter_args.r14 = ecx;
+ tdx->vp_enter_args.r15 = edx;
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int tdx_complete_pio_out(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ vcpu->arch.pio.count = 0;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int tdx_complete_pio_in(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt = vcpu->arch.emulate_ctxt;
+ unsigned long val = 0;
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = ctxt->ops->pio_in_emulated(ctxt, vcpu->arch.pio.size,
+ vcpu->arch.pio.port, &val, 1);
+
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(!ret);
+
+ tdvmcall_set_return_val(vcpu, val);
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int tdx_emulate_io(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ struct vcpu_tdx *tdx = to_tdx(vcpu);
+ struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt = vcpu->arch.emulate_ctxt;
+ unsigned long val = 0;
+ unsigned int port;
+ u64 size, write;
+ int ret;
+
+ ++vcpu->stat.io_exits;
+
+ size = tdx->vp_enter_args.r12;
+ write = tdx->vp_enter_args.r13;
+ port = tdx->vp_enter_args.r14;
+
+ if ((write != 0 && write != 1) || (size != 1 && size != 2 && size != 4)) {
+ tdvmcall_set_return_code(vcpu, TDVMCALL_STATUS_INVALID_OPERAND);
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ if (write) {
+ val = tdx->vp_enter_args.r15;
+ ret = ctxt->ops->pio_out_emulated(ctxt, size, port, &val, 1);
+ } else {
+ ret = ctxt->ops->pio_in_emulated(ctxt, size, port, &val, 1);
+ }
+
+ if (!ret)
+ vcpu->arch.complete_userspace_io = write ? tdx_complete_pio_out :
+ tdx_complete_pio_in;
+ else if (!write)
+ tdvmcall_set_return_val(vcpu, val);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int tdx_complete_mmio_read(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ unsigned long val = 0;
+ gpa_t gpa;
+ int size;
+
+ gpa = vcpu->mmio_fragments[0].gpa;
+ size = vcpu->mmio_fragments[0].len;
+
+ memcpy(&val, vcpu->run->mmio.data, size);
+ tdvmcall_set_return_val(vcpu, val);
+ trace_kvm_mmio(KVM_TRACE_MMIO_READ, size, gpa, &val);
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static inline int tdx_mmio_write(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t gpa, int size,
+ unsigned long val)
+{
+ if (!kvm_io_bus_write(vcpu, KVM_FAST_MMIO_BUS, gpa, 0, NULL)) {
+ trace_kvm_fast_mmio(gpa);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ trace_kvm_mmio(KVM_TRACE_MMIO_WRITE, size, gpa, &val);
+ if (kvm_io_bus_write(vcpu, KVM_MMIO_BUS, gpa, size, &val))
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static inline int tdx_mmio_read(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t gpa, int size)
+{
+ unsigned long val;
+
+ if (kvm_io_bus_read(vcpu, KVM_MMIO_BUS, gpa, size, &val))
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+ tdvmcall_set_return_val(vcpu, val);
+ trace_kvm_mmio(KVM_TRACE_MMIO_READ, size, gpa, &val);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int tdx_emulate_mmio(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ struct vcpu_tdx *tdx = to_tdx(vcpu);
+ int size, write, r;
+ unsigned long val;
+ gpa_t gpa;
+
+ size = tdx->vp_enter_args.r12;
+ write = tdx->vp_enter_args.r13;
+ gpa = tdx->vp_enter_args.r14;
+ val = write ? tdx->vp_enter_args.r15 : 0;
+
+ if (size != 1 && size != 2 && size != 4 && size != 8)
+ goto error;
+ if (write != 0 && write != 1)
+ goto error;
+
+ /*
+ * TDG.VP.VMCALL<MMIO> allows only shared GPA, it makes no sense to
+ * do MMIO emulation for private GPA.
+ */
+ if (vt_is_tdx_private_gpa(vcpu->kvm, gpa) ||
+ vt_is_tdx_private_gpa(vcpu->kvm, gpa + size - 1))
+ goto error;
+
+ gpa = gpa & ~gfn_to_gpa(kvm_gfn_direct_bits(vcpu->kvm));
+
+ if (write)
+ r = tdx_mmio_write(vcpu, gpa, size, val);
+ else
+ r = tdx_mmio_read(vcpu, gpa, size);
+ if (!r)
+ /* Kernel completed device emulation. */
+ return 1;
+
+ /* Request the device emulation to userspace device model. */
+ vcpu->mmio_is_write = write;
+ if (!write)
+ vcpu->arch.complete_userspace_io = tdx_complete_mmio_read;
+
+ vcpu->run->mmio.phys_addr = gpa;
+ vcpu->run->mmio.len = size;
+ vcpu->run->mmio.is_write = write;
+ vcpu->run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_MMIO;
+
+ if (write) {
+ memcpy(vcpu->run->mmio.data, &val, size);
+ } else {
+ vcpu->mmio_fragments[0].gpa = gpa;
+ vcpu->mmio_fragments[0].len = size;
+ trace_kvm_mmio(KVM_TRACE_MMIO_READ_UNSATISFIED, size, gpa, NULL);
+ }
+ return 0;
+
+error:
+ tdvmcall_set_return_code(vcpu, TDVMCALL_STATUS_INVALID_OPERAND);
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int tdx_complete_get_td_vm_call_info(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ struct vcpu_tdx *tdx = to_tdx(vcpu);
+
+ tdvmcall_set_return_code(vcpu, vcpu->run->tdx.get_tdvmcall_info.ret);
+
+ /*
+ * For now, there is no TDVMCALL beyond GHCI base API supported by KVM
+ * directly without the support from userspace, just set the value
+ * returned from userspace.
+ */
+ tdx->vp_enter_args.r11 = vcpu->run->tdx.get_tdvmcall_info.r11;
+ tdx->vp_enter_args.r12 = vcpu->run->tdx.get_tdvmcall_info.r12;
+ tdx->vp_enter_args.r13 = vcpu->run->tdx.get_tdvmcall_info.r13;
+ tdx->vp_enter_args.r14 = vcpu->run->tdx.get_tdvmcall_info.r14;
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int tdx_get_td_vm_call_info(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ struct vcpu_tdx *tdx = to_tdx(vcpu);
+
+ switch (tdx->vp_enter_args.r12) {
+ case 0:
+ tdx->vp_enter_args.r11 = 0;
+ tdx->vp_enter_args.r12 = 0;
+ tdx->vp_enter_args.r13 = 0;
+ tdx->vp_enter_args.r14 = 0;
+ tdvmcall_set_return_code(vcpu, TDVMCALL_STATUS_SUCCESS);
+ return 1;
+ case 1:
+ vcpu->run->tdx.get_tdvmcall_info.leaf = tdx->vp_enter_args.r12;
+ vcpu->run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_TDX;
+ vcpu->run->tdx.flags = 0;
+ vcpu->run->tdx.nr = TDVMCALL_GET_TD_VM_CALL_INFO;
+ vcpu->run->tdx.get_tdvmcall_info.ret = TDVMCALL_STATUS_SUCCESS;
+ vcpu->run->tdx.get_tdvmcall_info.r11 = 0;
+ vcpu->run->tdx.get_tdvmcall_info.r12 = 0;
+ vcpu->run->tdx.get_tdvmcall_info.r13 = 0;
+ vcpu->run->tdx.get_tdvmcall_info.r14 = 0;
+ vcpu->arch.complete_userspace_io = tdx_complete_get_td_vm_call_info;
+ return 0;
+ default:
+ tdvmcall_set_return_code(vcpu, TDVMCALL_STATUS_INVALID_OPERAND);
+ return 1;
+ }
+}
+
+static int tdx_complete_simple(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ tdvmcall_set_return_code(vcpu, vcpu->run->tdx.unknown.ret);
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int tdx_get_quote(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ struct vcpu_tdx *tdx = to_tdx(vcpu);
+ u64 gpa = tdx->vp_enter_args.r12;
+ u64 size = tdx->vp_enter_args.r13;
+
+ /* The gpa of buffer must have shared bit set. */
+ if (vt_is_tdx_private_gpa(vcpu->kvm, gpa)) {
+ tdvmcall_set_return_code(vcpu, TDVMCALL_STATUS_INVALID_OPERAND);
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ vcpu->run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_TDX;
+ vcpu->run->tdx.flags = 0;
+ vcpu->run->tdx.nr = TDVMCALL_GET_QUOTE;
+ vcpu->run->tdx.get_quote.ret = TDVMCALL_STATUS_SUBFUNC_UNSUPPORTED;
+ vcpu->run->tdx.get_quote.gpa = gpa & ~gfn_to_gpa(kvm_gfn_direct_bits(tdx->vcpu.kvm));
+ vcpu->run->tdx.get_quote.size = size;
+
+ vcpu->arch.complete_userspace_io = tdx_complete_simple;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int handle_tdvmcall(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ switch (tdvmcall_leaf(vcpu)) {
+ case TDVMCALL_MAP_GPA:
+ return tdx_map_gpa(vcpu);
+ case TDVMCALL_REPORT_FATAL_ERROR:
+ return tdx_report_fatal_error(vcpu);
+ case TDVMCALL_GET_TD_VM_CALL_INFO:
+ return tdx_get_td_vm_call_info(vcpu);
+ case TDVMCALL_GET_QUOTE:
+ return tdx_get_quote(vcpu);
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+
+ tdvmcall_set_return_code(vcpu, TDVMCALL_STATUS_SUBFUNC_UNSUPPORTED);
+ return 1;
+}
+
+void tdx_load_mmu_pgd(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, hpa_t root_hpa, int pgd_level)
+{
+ u64 shared_bit = (pgd_level == 5) ? TDX_SHARED_BIT_PWL_5 :
+ TDX_SHARED_BIT_PWL_4;
+
+ if (KVM_BUG_ON(shared_bit != kvm_gfn_direct_bits(vcpu->kvm), vcpu->kvm))
+ return;
+
+ td_vmcs_write64(to_tdx(vcpu), SHARED_EPT_POINTER, root_hpa);
+}
+
+static void tdx_unpin(struct kvm *kvm, struct page *page)
+{
+ put_page(page);
+}
+
+static int tdx_mem_page_aug(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t gfn,
+ enum pg_level level, struct page *page)
+{
+ int tdx_level = pg_level_to_tdx_sept_level(level);
+ struct kvm_tdx *kvm_tdx = to_kvm_tdx(kvm);
+ gpa_t gpa = gfn_to_gpa(gfn);
+ u64 entry, level_state;
+ u64 err;
+
+ err = tdh_mem_page_aug(&kvm_tdx->td, gpa, tdx_level, page, &entry, &level_state);
+ if (unlikely(tdx_operand_busy(err))) {
+ tdx_unpin(kvm, page);
+ return -EBUSY;
+ }
+
+ if (KVM_BUG_ON(err, kvm)) {
+ pr_tdx_error_2(TDH_MEM_PAGE_AUG, err, entry, level_state);
+ tdx_unpin(kvm, page);
+ return -EIO;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * KVM_TDX_INIT_MEM_REGION calls kvm_gmem_populate() to map guest pages; the
+ * callback tdx_gmem_post_populate() then maps pages into private memory.
+ * through the a seamcall TDH.MEM.PAGE.ADD(). The SEAMCALL also requires the
+ * private EPT structures for the page to have been built before, which is
+ * done via kvm_tdp_map_page(). nr_premapped counts the number of pages that
+ * were added to the EPT structures but not added with TDH.MEM.PAGE.ADD().
+ * The counter has to be zero on KVM_TDX_FINALIZE_VM, to ensure that there
+ * are no half-initialized shared EPT pages.
+ */
+static int tdx_mem_page_record_premap_cnt(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t gfn,
+ enum pg_level level, kvm_pfn_t pfn)
+{
+ struct kvm_tdx *kvm_tdx = to_kvm_tdx(kvm);
+
+ if (KVM_BUG_ON(kvm->arch.pre_fault_allowed, kvm))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ /* nr_premapped will be decreased when tdh_mem_page_add() is called. */
+ atomic64_inc(&kvm_tdx->nr_premapped);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int tdx_sept_set_private_spte(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t gfn,
+ enum pg_level level, kvm_pfn_t pfn)
+{
+ struct kvm_tdx *kvm_tdx = to_kvm_tdx(kvm);
+ struct page *page = pfn_to_page(pfn);
+
+ /* TODO: handle large pages. */
+ if (KVM_BUG_ON(level != PG_LEVEL_4K, kvm))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ /*
+ * Because guest_memfd doesn't support page migration with
+ * a_ops->migrate_folio (yet), no callback is triggered for KVM on page
+ * migration. Until guest_memfd supports page migration, prevent page
+ * migration.
+ * TODO: Once guest_memfd introduces callback on page migration,
+ * implement it and remove get_page/put_page().
+ */
+ get_page(page);
+
+ /*
+ * Read 'pre_fault_allowed' before 'kvm_tdx->state'; see matching
+ * barrier in tdx_td_finalize().
+ */
+ smp_rmb();
+ if (likely(kvm_tdx->state == TD_STATE_RUNNABLE))
+ return tdx_mem_page_aug(kvm, gfn, level, page);
+
+ return tdx_mem_page_record_premap_cnt(kvm, gfn, level, pfn);
+}
+
+static int tdx_sept_drop_private_spte(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t gfn,
+ enum pg_level level, struct page *page)
+{
+ int tdx_level = pg_level_to_tdx_sept_level(level);
+ struct kvm_tdx *kvm_tdx = to_kvm_tdx(kvm);
+ gpa_t gpa = gfn_to_gpa(gfn);
+ u64 err, entry, level_state;
+
+ /* TODO: handle large pages. */
+ if (KVM_BUG_ON(level != PG_LEVEL_4K, kvm))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (KVM_BUG_ON(!is_hkid_assigned(kvm_tdx), kvm))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ /*
+ * When zapping private page, write lock is held. So no race condition
+ * with other vcpu sept operation.
+ * Race with TDH.VP.ENTER due to (0-step mitigation) and Guest TDCALLs.
+ */
+ err = tdh_mem_page_remove(&kvm_tdx->td, gpa, tdx_level, &entry,
+ &level_state);
+
+ if (unlikely(tdx_operand_busy(err))) {
+ /*
+ * The second retry is expected to succeed after kicking off all
+ * other vCPUs and prevent them from invoking TDH.VP.ENTER.
+ */
+ tdx_no_vcpus_enter_start(kvm);
+ err = tdh_mem_page_remove(&kvm_tdx->td, gpa, tdx_level, &entry,
+ &level_state);
+ tdx_no_vcpus_enter_stop(kvm);
+ }
+
+ if (KVM_BUG_ON(err, kvm)) {
+ pr_tdx_error_2(TDH_MEM_PAGE_REMOVE, err, entry, level_state);
+ return -EIO;
+ }
+
+ err = tdh_phymem_page_wbinvd_hkid((u16)kvm_tdx->hkid, page);
+
+ if (KVM_BUG_ON(err, kvm)) {
+ pr_tdx_error(TDH_PHYMEM_PAGE_WBINVD, err);
+ return -EIO;
+ }
+ tdx_clear_page(page);
+ tdx_unpin(kvm, page);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int tdx_sept_link_private_spt(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t gfn,
+ enum pg_level level, void *private_spt)
+{
+ int tdx_level = pg_level_to_tdx_sept_level(level);
+ gpa_t gpa = gfn_to_gpa(gfn);
+ struct page *page = virt_to_page(private_spt);
+ u64 err, entry, level_state;
+
+ err = tdh_mem_sept_add(&to_kvm_tdx(kvm)->td, gpa, tdx_level, page, &entry,
+ &level_state);
+ if (unlikely(tdx_operand_busy(err)))
+ return -EBUSY;
+
+ if (KVM_BUG_ON(err, kvm)) {
+ pr_tdx_error_2(TDH_MEM_SEPT_ADD, err, entry, level_state);
+ return -EIO;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check if the error returned from a SEPT zap SEAMCALL is due to that a page is
+ * mapped by KVM_TDX_INIT_MEM_REGION without tdh_mem_page_add() being called
+ * successfully.
+ *
+ * Since tdh_mem_sept_add() must have been invoked successfully before a
+ * non-leaf entry present in the mirrored page table, the SEPT ZAP related
+ * SEAMCALLs should not encounter err TDX_EPT_WALK_FAILED. They should instead
+ * find TDX_EPT_ENTRY_STATE_INCORRECT due to an empty leaf entry found in the
+ * SEPT.
+ *
+ * Further check if the returned entry from SEPT walking is with RWX permissions
+ * to filter out anything unexpected.
+ *
+ * Note: @level is pg_level, not the tdx_level. The tdx_level extracted from
+ * level_state returned from a SEAMCALL error is the same as that passed into
+ * the SEAMCALL.
+ */
+static int tdx_is_sept_zap_err_due_to_premap(struct kvm_tdx *kvm_tdx, u64 err,
+ u64 entry, int level)
+{
+ if (!err || kvm_tdx->state == TD_STATE_RUNNABLE)
+ return false;
+
+ if (err != (TDX_EPT_ENTRY_STATE_INCORRECT | TDX_OPERAND_ID_RCX))
+ return false;
+
+ if ((is_last_spte(entry, level) && (entry & VMX_EPT_RWX_MASK)))
+ return false;
+
+ return true;
+}
+
+static int tdx_sept_zap_private_spte(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t gfn,
+ enum pg_level level, struct page *page)
+{
+ int tdx_level = pg_level_to_tdx_sept_level(level);
+ struct kvm_tdx *kvm_tdx = to_kvm_tdx(kvm);
+ gpa_t gpa = gfn_to_gpa(gfn) & KVM_HPAGE_MASK(level);
+ u64 err, entry, level_state;
+
+ /* For now large page isn't supported yet. */
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(level != PG_LEVEL_4K);
+
+ err = tdh_mem_range_block(&kvm_tdx->td, gpa, tdx_level, &entry, &level_state);
+
+ if (unlikely(tdx_operand_busy(err))) {
+ /* After no vCPUs enter, the second retry is expected to succeed */
+ tdx_no_vcpus_enter_start(kvm);
+ err = tdh_mem_range_block(&kvm_tdx->td, gpa, tdx_level, &entry, &level_state);
+ tdx_no_vcpus_enter_stop(kvm);
+ }
+ if (tdx_is_sept_zap_err_due_to_premap(kvm_tdx, err, entry, level) &&
+ !KVM_BUG_ON(!atomic64_read(&kvm_tdx->nr_premapped), kvm)) {
+ atomic64_dec(&kvm_tdx->nr_premapped);
+ tdx_unpin(kvm, page);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (KVM_BUG_ON(err, kvm)) {
+ pr_tdx_error_2(TDH_MEM_RANGE_BLOCK, err, entry, level_state);
+ return -EIO;
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Ensure shared and private EPTs to be flushed on all vCPUs.
+ * tdh_mem_track() is the only caller that increases TD epoch. An increase in
+ * the TD epoch (e.g., to value "N + 1") is successful only if no vCPUs are
+ * running in guest mode with the value "N - 1".
+ *
+ * A successful execution of tdh_mem_track() ensures that vCPUs can only run in
+ * guest mode with TD epoch value "N" if no TD exit occurs after the TD epoch
+ * being increased to "N + 1".
+ *
+ * Kicking off all vCPUs after that further results in no vCPUs can run in guest
+ * mode with TD epoch value "N", which unblocks the next tdh_mem_track() (e.g.
+ * to increase TD epoch to "N + 2").
+ *
+ * TDX module will flush EPT on the next TD enter and make vCPUs to run in
+ * guest mode with TD epoch value "N + 1".
+ *
+ * kvm_make_all_cpus_request() guarantees all vCPUs are out of guest mode by
+ * waiting empty IPI handler ack_kick().
+ *
+ * No action is required to the vCPUs being kicked off since the kicking off
+ * occurs certainly after TD epoch increment and before the next
+ * tdh_mem_track().
+ */
+static void tdx_track(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+ struct kvm_tdx *kvm_tdx = to_kvm_tdx(kvm);
+ u64 err;
+
+ /* If TD isn't finalized, it's before any vcpu running. */
+ if (unlikely(kvm_tdx->state != TD_STATE_RUNNABLE))
+ return;
+
+ lockdep_assert_held_write(&kvm->mmu_lock);
+
+ err = tdh_mem_track(&kvm_tdx->td);
+ if (unlikely(tdx_operand_busy(err))) {
+ /* After no vCPUs enter, the second retry is expected to succeed */
+ tdx_no_vcpus_enter_start(kvm);
+ err = tdh_mem_track(&kvm_tdx->td);
+ tdx_no_vcpus_enter_stop(kvm);
+ }
+
+ if (KVM_BUG_ON(err, kvm))
+ pr_tdx_error(TDH_MEM_TRACK, err);
+
+ kvm_make_all_cpus_request(kvm, KVM_REQ_OUTSIDE_GUEST_MODE);
+}
+
+int tdx_sept_free_private_spt(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t gfn,
+ enum pg_level level, void *private_spt)
+{
+ struct kvm_tdx *kvm_tdx = to_kvm_tdx(kvm);
+
+ /*
+ * free_external_spt() is only called after hkid is freed when TD is
+ * tearing down.
+ * KVM doesn't (yet) zap page table pages in mirror page table while
+ * TD is active, though guest pages mapped in mirror page table could be
+ * zapped during TD is active, e.g. for shared <-> private conversion
+ * and slot move/deletion.
+ */
+ if (KVM_BUG_ON(is_hkid_assigned(kvm_tdx), kvm))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ /*
+ * The HKID assigned to this TD was already freed and cache was
+ * already flushed. We don't have to flush again.
+ */
+ return tdx_reclaim_page(virt_to_page(private_spt));
+}
+
+int tdx_sept_remove_private_spte(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t gfn,
+ enum pg_level level, kvm_pfn_t pfn)
+{
+ struct page *page = pfn_to_page(pfn);
+ int ret;
+
+ /*
+ * HKID is released after all private pages have been removed, and set
+ * before any might be populated. Warn if zapping is attempted when
+ * there can't be anything populated in the private EPT.
+ */
+ if (KVM_BUG_ON(!is_hkid_assigned(to_kvm_tdx(kvm)), kvm))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ ret = tdx_sept_zap_private_spte(kvm, gfn, level, page);
+ if (ret <= 0)
+ return ret;
+
+ /*
+ * TDX requires TLB tracking before dropping private page. Do
+ * it here, although it is also done later.
+ */
+ tdx_track(kvm);
+
+ return tdx_sept_drop_private_spte(kvm, gfn, level, page);
+}
+
+void tdx_deliver_interrupt(struct kvm_lapic *apic, int delivery_mode,
+ int trig_mode, int vector)
+{
+ struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = apic->vcpu;
+ struct vcpu_tdx *tdx = to_tdx(vcpu);
+
+ /* TDX supports only posted interrupt. No lapic emulation. */
+ __vmx_deliver_posted_interrupt(vcpu, &tdx->vt.pi_desc, vector);
+
+ trace_kvm_apicv_accept_irq(vcpu->vcpu_id, delivery_mode, trig_mode, vector);
+}
+
+static inline bool tdx_is_sept_violation_unexpected_pending(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ u64 eeq_type = to_tdx(vcpu)->ext_exit_qualification & TDX_EXT_EXIT_QUAL_TYPE_MASK;
+ u64 eq = vmx_get_exit_qual(vcpu);
+
+ if (eeq_type != TDX_EXT_EXIT_QUAL_TYPE_PENDING_EPT_VIOLATION)
+ return false;
+
+ return !(eq & EPT_VIOLATION_PROT_MASK) && !(eq & EPT_VIOLATION_EXEC_FOR_RING3_LIN);
+}
+
+static int tdx_handle_ept_violation(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ unsigned long exit_qual;
+ gpa_t gpa = to_tdx(vcpu)->exit_gpa;
+ bool local_retry = false;
+ int ret;
+
+ if (vt_is_tdx_private_gpa(vcpu->kvm, gpa)) {
+ if (tdx_is_sept_violation_unexpected_pending(vcpu)) {
+ pr_warn("Guest access before accepting 0x%llx on vCPU %d\n",
+ gpa, vcpu->vcpu_id);
+ kvm_vm_dead(vcpu->kvm);
+ return -EIO;
+ }
+ /*
+ * Always treat SEPT violations as write faults. Ignore the
+ * EXIT_QUALIFICATION reported by TDX-SEAM for SEPT violations.
+ * TD private pages are always RWX in the SEPT tables,
+ * i.e. they're always mapped writable. Just as importantly,
+ * treating SEPT violations as write faults is necessary to
+ * avoid COW allocations, which will cause TDAUGPAGE failures
+ * due to aliasing a single HPA to multiple GPAs.
+ */
+ exit_qual = EPT_VIOLATION_ACC_WRITE;
+
+ /* Only private GPA triggers zero-step mitigation */
+ local_retry = true;
+ } else {
+ exit_qual = vmx_get_exit_qual(vcpu);
+ /*
+ * EPT violation due to instruction fetch should never be
+ * triggered from shared memory in TDX guest. If such EPT
+ * violation occurs, treat it as broken hardware.
+ */
+ if (KVM_BUG_ON(exit_qual & EPT_VIOLATION_ACC_INSTR, vcpu->kvm))
+ return -EIO;
+ }
+
+ trace_kvm_page_fault(vcpu, gpa, exit_qual);
+
+ /*
+ * To minimize TDH.VP.ENTER invocations, retry locally for private GPA
+ * mapping in TDX.
+ *
+ * KVM may return RET_PF_RETRY for private GPA due to
+ * - contentions when atomically updating SPTEs of the mirror page table
+ * - in-progress GFN invalidation or memslot removal.
+ * - TDX_OPERAND_BUSY error from TDH.MEM.PAGE.AUG or TDH.MEM.SEPT.ADD,
+ * caused by contentions with TDH.VP.ENTER (with zero-step mitigation)
+ * or certain TDCALLs.
+ *
+ * If TDH.VP.ENTER is invoked more times than the threshold set by the
+ * TDX module before KVM resolves the private GPA mapping, the TDX
+ * module will activate zero-step mitigation during TDH.VP.ENTER. This
+ * process acquires an SEPT tree lock in the TDX module, leading to
+ * further contentions with TDH.MEM.PAGE.AUG or TDH.MEM.SEPT.ADD
+ * operations on other vCPUs.
+ *
+ * Breaking out of local retries for kvm_vcpu_has_events() is for
+ * interrupt injection. kvm_vcpu_has_events() should not see pending
+ * events for TDX. Since KVM can't determine if IRQs (or NMIs) are
+ * blocked by TDs, false positives are inevitable i.e., KVM may re-enter
+ * the guest even if the IRQ/NMI can't be delivered.
+ *
+ * Note: even without breaking out of local retries, zero-step
+ * mitigation may still occur due to
+ * - invoking of TDH.VP.ENTER after KVM_EXIT_MEMORY_FAULT,
+ * - a single RIP causing EPT violations for more GFNs than the
+ * threshold count.
+ * This is safe, as triggering zero-step mitigation only introduces
+ * contentions to page installation SEAMCALLs on other vCPUs, which will
+ * handle retries locally in their EPT violation handlers.
+ */
+ while (1) {
+ ret = __vmx_handle_ept_violation(vcpu, gpa, exit_qual);
+
+ if (ret != RET_PF_RETRY || !local_retry)
+ break;
+
+ if (kvm_vcpu_has_events(vcpu) || signal_pending(current))
+ break;
+
+ if (kvm_check_request(KVM_REQ_VM_DEAD, vcpu)) {
+ ret = -EIO;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ cond_resched();
+ }
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int tdx_complete_emulated_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int err)
+{
+ if (err) {
+ tdvmcall_set_return_code(vcpu, TDVMCALL_STATUS_INVALID_OPERAND);
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ if (vmx_get_exit_reason(vcpu).basic == EXIT_REASON_MSR_READ)
+ tdvmcall_set_return_val(vcpu, kvm_read_edx_eax(vcpu));
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+
+int tdx_handle_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, fastpath_t fastpath)
+{
+ struct vcpu_tdx *tdx = to_tdx(vcpu);
+ u64 vp_enter_ret = tdx->vp_enter_ret;
+ union vmx_exit_reason exit_reason = vmx_get_exit_reason(vcpu);
+
+ if (fastpath != EXIT_FASTPATH_NONE)
+ return 1;
+
+ if (unlikely(vp_enter_ret == EXIT_REASON_EPT_MISCONFIG)) {
+ KVM_BUG_ON(1, vcpu->kvm);
+ return -EIO;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Handle TDX SW errors, including TDX_SEAMCALL_UD, TDX_SEAMCALL_GP and
+ * TDX_SEAMCALL_VMFAILINVALID.
+ */
+ if (unlikely((vp_enter_ret & TDX_SW_ERROR) == TDX_SW_ERROR)) {
+ KVM_BUG_ON(!kvm_rebooting, vcpu->kvm);
+ goto unhandled_exit;
+ }
+
+ if (unlikely(tdx_failed_vmentry(vcpu))) {
+ /*
+ * If the guest state is protected, that means off-TD debug is
+ * not enabled, TDX_NON_RECOVERABLE must be set.
+ */
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(vcpu->arch.guest_state_protected &&
+ !(vp_enter_ret & TDX_NON_RECOVERABLE));
+ vcpu->run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_FAIL_ENTRY;
+ vcpu->run->fail_entry.hardware_entry_failure_reason = exit_reason.full;
+ vcpu->run->fail_entry.cpu = vcpu->arch.last_vmentry_cpu;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (unlikely(vp_enter_ret & (TDX_ERROR | TDX_NON_RECOVERABLE)) &&
+ exit_reason.basic != EXIT_REASON_TRIPLE_FAULT) {
+ kvm_pr_unimpl("TD vp_enter_ret 0x%llx\n", vp_enter_ret);
+ goto unhandled_exit;
+ }
+
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(exit_reason.basic != EXIT_REASON_TRIPLE_FAULT &&
+ (vp_enter_ret & TDX_SEAMCALL_STATUS_MASK) != TDX_SUCCESS);
+
+ switch (exit_reason.basic) {
+ case EXIT_REASON_TRIPLE_FAULT:
+ vcpu->run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_SHUTDOWN;
+ vcpu->mmio_needed = 0;
+ return 0;
+ case EXIT_REASON_EXCEPTION_NMI:
+ return tdx_handle_exception_nmi(vcpu);
+ case EXIT_REASON_EXTERNAL_INTERRUPT:
+ ++vcpu->stat.irq_exits;
+ return 1;
+ case EXIT_REASON_CPUID:
+ return tdx_emulate_cpuid(vcpu);
+ case EXIT_REASON_HLT:
+ return kvm_emulate_halt_noskip(vcpu);
+ case EXIT_REASON_TDCALL:
+ return handle_tdvmcall(vcpu);
+ case EXIT_REASON_VMCALL:
+ return tdx_emulate_vmcall(vcpu);
+ case EXIT_REASON_IO_INSTRUCTION:
+ return tdx_emulate_io(vcpu);
+ case EXIT_REASON_MSR_READ:
+ kvm_rcx_write(vcpu, tdx->vp_enter_args.r12);
+ return kvm_emulate_rdmsr(vcpu);
+ case EXIT_REASON_MSR_WRITE:
+ kvm_rcx_write(vcpu, tdx->vp_enter_args.r12);
+ kvm_rax_write(vcpu, tdx->vp_enter_args.r13 & -1u);
+ kvm_rdx_write(vcpu, tdx->vp_enter_args.r13 >> 32);
+ return kvm_emulate_wrmsr(vcpu);
+ case EXIT_REASON_EPT_MISCONFIG:
+ return tdx_emulate_mmio(vcpu);
+ case EXIT_REASON_EPT_VIOLATION:
+ return tdx_handle_ept_violation(vcpu);
+ case EXIT_REASON_OTHER_SMI:
+ /*
+ * Unlike VMX, SMI in SEAM non-root mode (i.e. when
+ * TD guest vCPU is running) will cause VM exit to TDX module,
+ * then SEAMRET to KVM. Once it exits to KVM, SMI is delivered
+ * and handled by kernel handler right away.
+ *
+ * The Other SMI exit can also be caused by the SEAM non-root
+ * machine check delivered via Machine Check System Management
+ * Interrupt (MSMI), but it has already been handled by the
+ * kernel machine check handler, i.e., the memory page has been
+ * marked as poisoned and it won't be freed to the free list
+ * when the TDX guest is terminated (the TDX module marks the
+ * guest as dead and prevent it from further running when
+ * machine check happens in SEAM non-root).
+ *
+ * - A MSMI will not reach here, it's handled as non_recoverable
+ * case above.
+ * - If it's not an MSMI, no need to do anything here.
+ */
+ return 1;
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+
+unhandled_exit:
+ vcpu->run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ vcpu->run->internal.suberror = KVM_INTERNAL_ERROR_UNEXPECTED_EXIT_REASON;
+ vcpu->run->internal.ndata = 2;
+ vcpu->run->internal.data[0] = vp_enter_ret;
+ vcpu->run->internal.data[1] = vcpu->arch.last_vmentry_cpu;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+void tdx_get_exit_info(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 *reason,
+ u64 *info1, u64 *info2, u32 *intr_info, u32 *error_code)
+{
+ struct vcpu_tdx *tdx = to_tdx(vcpu);
+
+ *reason = tdx->vt.exit_reason.full;
+ if (*reason != -1u) {
+ *info1 = vmx_get_exit_qual(vcpu);
+ *info2 = tdx->ext_exit_qualification;
+ *intr_info = vmx_get_intr_info(vcpu);
+ } else {
+ *info1 = 0;
+ *info2 = 0;
+ *intr_info = 0;
+ }
+
+ *error_code = 0;
+}
+
+bool tdx_has_emulated_msr(u32 index)
+{
+ switch (index) {
+ case MSR_IA32_UCODE_REV:
+ case MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES:
+ case MSR_IA32_POWER_CTL:
+ case MSR_IA32_CR_PAT:
+ case MSR_MTRRcap:
+ case MTRRphysBase_MSR(0) ... MSR_MTRRfix4K_F8000:
+ case MSR_MTRRdefType:
+ case MSR_IA32_TSC_DEADLINE:
+ case MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE:
+ case MSR_PLATFORM_INFO:
+ case MSR_MISC_FEATURES_ENABLES:
+ case MSR_IA32_APICBASE:
+ case MSR_EFER:
+ case MSR_IA32_FEAT_CTL:
+ case MSR_IA32_MCG_CAP:
+ case MSR_IA32_MCG_STATUS:
+ case MSR_IA32_MCG_CTL:
+ case MSR_IA32_MCG_EXT_CTL:
+ case MSR_IA32_MC0_CTL ... MSR_IA32_MCx_CTL(KVM_MAX_MCE_BANKS) - 1:
+ case MSR_IA32_MC0_CTL2 ... MSR_IA32_MCx_CTL2(KVM_MAX_MCE_BANKS) - 1:
+ /* MSR_IA32_MCx_{CTL, STATUS, ADDR, MISC, CTL2} */
+ case MSR_KVM_POLL_CONTROL:
+ return true;
+ case APIC_BASE_MSR ... APIC_BASE_MSR + 0xff:
+ /*
+ * x2APIC registers that are virtualized by the CPU can't be
+ * emulated, KVM doesn't have access to the virtual APIC page.
+ */
+ switch (index) {
+ case X2APIC_MSR(APIC_TASKPRI):
+ case X2APIC_MSR(APIC_PROCPRI):
+ case X2APIC_MSR(APIC_EOI):
+ case X2APIC_MSR(APIC_ISR) ... X2APIC_MSR(APIC_ISR + APIC_ISR_NR):
+ case X2APIC_MSR(APIC_TMR) ... X2APIC_MSR(APIC_TMR + APIC_ISR_NR):
+ case X2APIC_MSR(APIC_IRR) ... X2APIC_MSR(APIC_IRR + APIC_ISR_NR):
+ return false;
+ default:
+ return true;
+ }
+ default:
+ return false;
+ }
+}
+
+static bool tdx_is_read_only_msr(u32 index)
+{
+ return index == MSR_IA32_APICBASE || index == MSR_EFER ||
+ index == MSR_IA32_FEAT_CTL;
+}
+
+int tdx_get_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr)
+{
+ switch (msr->index) {
+ case MSR_IA32_FEAT_CTL:
+ /*
+ * MCE and MCA are advertised via cpuid. Guest kernel could
+ * check if LMCE is enabled or not.
+ */
+ msr->data = FEAT_CTL_LOCKED;
+ if (vcpu->arch.mcg_cap & MCG_LMCE_P)
+ msr->data |= FEAT_CTL_LMCE_ENABLED;
+ return 0;
+ case MSR_IA32_MCG_EXT_CTL:
+ if (!msr->host_initiated && !(vcpu->arch.mcg_cap & MCG_LMCE_P))
+ return 1;
+ msr->data = vcpu->arch.mcg_ext_ctl;
+ return 0;
+ default:
+ if (!tdx_has_emulated_msr(msr->index))
+ return 1;
+
+ return kvm_get_msr_common(vcpu, msr);
+ }
+}
+
+int tdx_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr)
+{
+ switch (msr->index) {
+ case MSR_IA32_MCG_EXT_CTL:
+ if ((!msr->host_initiated && !(vcpu->arch.mcg_cap & MCG_LMCE_P)) ||
+ (msr->data & ~MCG_EXT_CTL_LMCE_EN))
+ return 1;
+ vcpu->arch.mcg_ext_ctl = msr->data;
+ return 0;
+ default:
+ if (tdx_is_read_only_msr(msr->index))
+ return 1;
+
+ if (!tdx_has_emulated_msr(msr->index))
+ return 1;
+
+ return kvm_set_msr_common(vcpu, msr);
+ }
+}
+
+static int tdx_get_capabilities(struct kvm_tdx_cmd *cmd)
+{
+ const struct tdx_sys_info_td_conf *td_conf = &tdx_sysinfo->td_conf;
+ struct kvm_tdx_capabilities __user *user_caps;
+ struct kvm_tdx_capabilities *caps = NULL;
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ /* flags is reserved for future use */
+ if (cmd->flags)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ caps = kmalloc(sizeof(*caps) +
+ sizeof(struct kvm_cpuid_entry2) * td_conf->num_cpuid_config,
+ GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!caps)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ user_caps = u64_to_user_ptr(cmd->data);
+ if (copy_from_user(caps, user_caps, sizeof(*caps))) {
+ ret = -EFAULT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (caps->cpuid.nent < td_conf->num_cpuid_config) {
+ ret = -E2BIG;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ ret = init_kvm_tdx_caps(td_conf, caps);
+ if (ret)
+ goto out;
+
+ if (copy_to_user(user_caps, caps, sizeof(*caps))) {
+ ret = -EFAULT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (copy_to_user(user_caps->cpuid.entries, caps->cpuid.entries,
+ caps->cpuid.nent *
+ sizeof(caps->cpuid.entries[0])))
+ ret = -EFAULT;
+
+out:
+ /* kfree() accepts NULL. */
+ kfree(caps);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * KVM reports guest physical address in CPUID.0x800000008.EAX[23:16], which is
+ * similar to TDX's GPAW. Use this field as the interface for userspace to
+ * configure the GPAW and EPT level for TDs.
+ *
+ * Only values 48 and 52 are supported. Value 52 means GPAW-52 and EPT level
+ * 5, Value 48 means GPAW-48 and EPT level 4. For value 48, GPAW-48 is always
+ * supported. Value 52 is only supported when the platform supports 5 level
+ * EPT.
+ */
+static int setup_tdparams_eptp_controls(struct kvm_cpuid2 *cpuid,
+ struct td_params *td_params)
+{
+ const struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *entry;
+ int guest_pa;
+
+ entry = kvm_find_cpuid_entry2(cpuid->entries, cpuid->nent, 0x80000008, 0);
+ if (!entry)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ guest_pa = tdx_get_guest_phys_addr_bits(entry->eax);
+
+ if (guest_pa != 48 && guest_pa != 52)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (guest_pa == 52 && !cpu_has_vmx_ept_5levels())
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ td_params->eptp_controls = VMX_EPTP_MT_WB;
+ if (guest_pa == 52) {
+ td_params->eptp_controls |= VMX_EPTP_PWL_5;
+ td_params->config_flags |= TDX_CONFIG_FLAGS_MAX_GPAW;
+ } else {
+ td_params->eptp_controls |= VMX_EPTP_PWL_4;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int setup_tdparams_cpuids(struct kvm_cpuid2 *cpuid,
+ struct td_params *td_params)
+{
+ const struct tdx_sys_info_td_conf *td_conf = &tdx_sysinfo->td_conf;
+ const struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *entry;
+ struct tdx_cpuid_value *value;
+ int i, copy_cnt = 0;
+
+ /*
+ * td_params.cpuid_values: The number and the order of cpuid_value must
+ * be same to the one of struct tdsysinfo.{num_cpuid_config, cpuid_configs}
+ * It's assumed that td_params was zeroed.
+ */
+ for (i = 0; i < td_conf->num_cpuid_config; i++) {
+ struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 tmp;
+
+ td_init_cpuid_entry2(&tmp, i);
+
+ entry = kvm_find_cpuid_entry2(cpuid->entries, cpuid->nent,
+ tmp.function, tmp.index);
+ if (!entry)
+ continue;
+
+ if (tdx_unsupported_cpuid(entry))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ copy_cnt++;
+
+ value = &td_params->cpuid_values[i];
+ value->eax = entry->eax;
+ value->ebx = entry->ebx;
+ value->ecx = entry->ecx;
+ value->edx = entry->edx;
+
+ /*
+ * TDX module does not accept nonzero bits 16..23 for the
+ * CPUID[0x80000008].EAX, see setup_tdparams_eptp_controls().
+ */
+ if (tmp.function == 0x80000008)
+ value->eax = tdx_set_guest_phys_addr_bits(value->eax, 0);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Rely on the TDX module to reject invalid configuration, but it can't
+ * check of leafs that don't have a proper slot in td_params->cpuid_values
+ * to stick then. So fail if there were entries that didn't get copied to
+ * td_params.
+ */
+ if (copy_cnt != cpuid->nent)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int setup_tdparams(struct kvm *kvm, struct td_params *td_params,
+ struct kvm_tdx_init_vm *init_vm)
+{
+ const struct tdx_sys_info_td_conf *td_conf = &tdx_sysinfo->td_conf;
+ struct kvm_cpuid2 *cpuid = &init_vm->cpuid;
+ int ret;
+
+ if (kvm->created_vcpus)
+ return -EBUSY;
+
+ if (init_vm->attributes & ~tdx_get_supported_attrs(td_conf))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (init_vm->xfam & ~tdx_get_supported_xfam(td_conf))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ td_params->max_vcpus = kvm->max_vcpus;
+ td_params->attributes = init_vm->attributes | td_conf->attributes_fixed1;
+ td_params->xfam = init_vm->xfam | td_conf->xfam_fixed1;
+
+ td_params->config_flags = TDX_CONFIG_FLAGS_NO_RBP_MOD;
+ td_params->tsc_frequency = TDX_TSC_KHZ_TO_25MHZ(kvm->arch.default_tsc_khz);
+
+ ret = setup_tdparams_eptp_controls(cpuid, td_params);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+
+ ret = setup_tdparams_cpuids(cpuid, td_params);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+
+#define MEMCPY_SAME_SIZE(dst, src) \
+ do { \
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(dst) != sizeof(src)); \
+ memcpy((dst), (src), sizeof(dst)); \
+ } while (0)
+
+ MEMCPY_SAME_SIZE(td_params->mrconfigid, init_vm->mrconfigid);
+ MEMCPY_SAME_SIZE(td_params->mrowner, init_vm->mrowner);
+ MEMCPY_SAME_SIZE(td_params->mrownerconfig, init_vm->mrownerconfig);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int __tdx_td_init(struct kvm *kvm, struct td_params *td_params,
+ u64 *seamcall_err)
+{
+ struct kvm_tdx *kvm_tdx = to_kvm_tdx(kvm);
+ cpumask_var_t packages;
+ struct page **tdcs_pages = NULL;
+ struct page *tdr_page;
+ int ret, i;
+ u64 err, rcx;
+
+ *seamcall_err = 0;
+ ret = tdx_guest_keyid_alloc();
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ret;
+ kvm_tdx->hkid = ret;
+ kvm_tdx->misc_cg = get_current_misc_cg();
+ ret = misc_cg_try_charge(MISC_CG_RES_TDX, kvm_tdx->misc_cg, 1);
+ if (ret)
+ goto free_hkid;
+
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
+
+ atomic_inc(&nr_configured_hkid);
+
+ tdr_page = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!tdr_page)
+ goto free_hkid;
+
+ kvm_tdx->td.tdcs_nr_pages = tdx_sysinfo->td_ctrl.tdcs_base_size / PAGE_SIZE;
+ /* TDVPS = TDVPR(4K page) + TDCX(multiple 4K pages), -1 for TDVPR. */
+ kvm_tdx->td.tdcx_nr_pages = tdx_sysinfo->td_ctrl.tdvps_base_size / PAGE_SIZE - 1;
+ tdcs_pages = kcalloc(kvm_tdx->td.tdcs_nr_pages, sizeof(*kvm_tdx->td.tdcs_pages),
+ GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO);
+ if (!tdcs_pages)
+ goto free_tdr;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < kvm_tdx->td.tdcs_nr_pages; i++) {
+ tdcs_pages[i] = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!tdcs_pages[i])
+ goto free_tdcs;
+ }
+
+ if (!zalloc_cpumask_var(&packages, GFP_KERNEL))
+ goto free_tdcs;
+
+ cpus_read_lock();
+
+ /*
+ * Need at least one CPU of the package to be online in order to
+ * program all packages for host key id. Check it.
+ */
+ for_each_present_cpu(i)
+ cpumask_set_cpu(topology_physical_package_id(i), packages);
+ for_each_online_cpu(i)
+ cpumask_clear_cpu(topology_physical_package_id(i), packages);
+ if (!cpumask_empty(packages)) {
+ ret = -EIO;
+ /*
+ * Because it's hard for human operator to figure out the
+ * reason, warn it.
+ */
+#define MSG_ALLPKG "All packages need to have online CPU to create TD. Online CPU and retry.\n"
+ pr_warn_ratelimited(MSG_ALLPKG);
+ goto free_packages;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * TDH.MNG.CREATE tries to grab the global TDX module and fails
+ * with TDX_OPERAND_BUSY when it fails to grab. Take the global
+ * lock to prevent it from failure.
+ */
+ mutex_lock(&tdx_lock);
+ kvm_tdx->td.tdr_page = tdr_page;
+ err = tdh_mng_create(&kvm_tdx->td, kvm_tdx->hkid);
+ mutex_unlock(&tdx_lock);
+
+ if (err == TDX_RND_NO_ENTROPY) {
+ ret = -EAGAIN;
+ goto free_packages;
+ }
+
+ if (WARN_ON_ONCE(err)) {
+ pr_tdx_error(TDH_MNG_CREATE, err);
+ ret = -EIO;
+ goto free_packages;
+ }
+
+ for_each_online_cpu(i) {
+ int pkg = topology_physical_package_id(i);
+
+ if (cpumask_test_and_set_cpu(pkg, packages))
+ continue;
+
+ /*
+ * Program the memory controller in the package with an
+ * encryption key associated to a TDX private host key id
+ * assigned to this TDR. Concurrent operations on same memory
+ * controller results in TDX_OPERAND_BUSY. No locking needed
+ * beyond the cpus_read_lock() above as it serializes against
+ * hotplug and the first online CPU of the package is always
+ * used. We never have two CPUs in the same socket trying to
+ * program the key.
+ */
+ ret = smp_call_on_cpu(i, tdx_do_tdh_mng_key_config,
+ kvm_tdx, true);
+ if (ret)
+ break;
+ }
+ cpus_read_unlock();
+ free_cpumask_var(packages);
+ if (ret) {
+ i = 0;
+ goto teardown;
+ }
+
+ kvm_tdx->td.tdcs_pages = tdcs_pages;
+ for (i = 0; i < kvm_tdx->td.tdcs_nr_pages; i++) {
+ err = tdh_mng_addcx(&kvm_tdx->td, tdcs_pages[i]);
+ if (err == TDX_RND_NO_ENTROPY) {
+ /* Here it's hard to allow userspace to retry. */
+ ret = -EAGAIN;
+ goto teardown;
+ }
+ if (WARN_ON_ONCE(err)) {
+ pr_tdx_error(TDH_MNG_ADDCX, err);
+ ret = -EIO;
+ goto teardown;
+ }
+ }
+
+ err = tdh_mng_init(&kvm_tdx->td, __pa(td_params), &rcx);
+ if ((err & TDX_SEAMCALL_STATUS_MASK) == TDX_OPERAND_INVALID) {
+ /*
+ * Because a user gives operands, don't warn.
+ * Return a hint to the user because it's sometimes hard for the
+ * user to figure out which operand is invalid. SEAMCALL status
+ * code includes which operand caused invalid operand error.
+ */
+ *seamcall_err = err;
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ goto teardown;
+ } else if (WARN_ON_ONCE(err)) {
+ pr_tdx_error_1(TDH_MNG_INIT, err, rcx);
+ ret = -EIO;
+ goto teardown;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+
+ /*
+ * The sequence for freeing resources from a partially initialized TD
+ * varies based on where in the initialization flow failure occurred.
+ * Simply use the full teardown and destroy, which naturally play nice
+ * with partial initialization.
+ */
+teardown:
+ /* Only free pages not yet added, so start at 'i' */
+ for (; i < kvm_tdx->td.tdcs_nr_pages; i++) {
+ if (tdcs_pages[i]) {
+ __free_page(tdcs_pages[i]);
+ tdcs_pages[i] = NULL;
+ }
+ }
+ if (!kvm_tdx->td.tdcs_pages)
+ kfree(tdcs_pages);
+
+ tdx_mmu_release_hkid(kvm);
+ tdx_reclaim_td_control_pages(kvm);
+
+ return ret;
+
+free_packages:
+ cpus_read_unlock();
+ free_cpumask_var(packages);
+
+free_tdcs:
+ for (i = 0; i < kvm_tdx->td.tdcs_nr_pages; i++) {
+ if (tdcs_pages[i])
+ __free_page(tdcs_pages[i]);
+ }
+ kfree(tdcs_pages);
+ kvm_tdx->td.tdcs_pages = NULL;
+
+free_tdr:
+ if (tdr_page)
+ __free_page(tdr_page);
+ kvm_tdx->td.tdr_page = 0;
+
+free_hkid:
+ tdx_hkid_free(kvm_tdx);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static u64 tdx_td_metadata_field_read(struct kvm_tdx *tdx, u64 field_id,
+ u64 *data)
+{
+ u64 err;
+
+ err = tdh_mng_rd(&tdx->td, field_id, data);
+
+ return err;
+}
+
+#define TDX_MD_UNREADABLE_LEAF_MASK GENMASK(30, 7)
+#define TDX_MD_UNREADABLE_SUBLEAF_MASK GENMASK(31, 7)
+
+static int tdx_read_cpuid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 leaf, u32 sub_leaf,
+ bool sub_leaf_set, int *entry_index,
+ struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *out)
+{
+ struct kvm_tdx *kvm_tdx = to_kvm_tdx(vcpu->kvm);
+ u64 field_id = TD_MD_FIELD_ID_CPUID_VALUES;
+ u64 ebx_eax, edx_ecx;
+ u64 err = 0;
+
+ if (sub_leaf > 0b1111111)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (*entry_index >= KVM_MAX_CPUID_ENTRIES)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (leaf & TDX_MD_UNREADABLE_LEAF_MASK ||
+ sub_leaf & TDX_MD_UNREADABLE_SUBLEAF_MASK)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ /*
+ * bit 23:17, REVSERVED: reserved, must be 0;
+ * bit 16, LEAF_31: leaf number bit 31;
+ * bit 15:9, LEAF_6_0: leaf number bits 6:0, leaf bits 30:7 are
+ * implicitly 0;
+ * bit 8, SUBLEAF_NA: sub-leaf not applicable flag;
+ * bit 7:1, SUBLEAF_6_0: sub-leaf number bits 6:0. If SUBLEAF_NA is 1,
+ * the SUBLEAF_6_0 is all-1.
+ * sub-leaf bits 31:7 are implicitly 0;
+ * bit 0, ELEMENT_I: Element index within field;
+ */
+ field_id |= ((leaf & 0x80000000) ? 1 : 0) << 16;
+ field_id |= (leaf & 0x7f) << 9;
+ if (sub_leaf_set)
+ field_id |= (sub_leaf & 0x7f) << 1;
+ else
+ field_id |= 0x1fe;
+
+ err = tdx_td_metadata_field_read(kvm_tdx, field_id, &ebx_eax);
+ if (err) //TODO check for specific errors
+ goto err_out;
+
+ out->eax = (u32) ebx_eax;
+ out->ebx = (u32) (ebx_eax >> 32);
+
+ field_id++;
+ err = tdx_td_metadata_field_read(kvm_tdx, field_id, &edx_ecx);
+ /*
+ * It's weird that reading edx_ecx fails while reading ebx_eax
+ * succeeded.
+ */
+ if (WARN_ON_ONCE(err))
+ goto err_out;
+
+ out->ecx = (u32) edx_ecx;
+ out->edx = (u32) (edx_ecx >> 32);
+
+ out->function = leaf;
+ out->index = sub_leaf;
+ out->flags |= sub_leaf_set ? KVM_CPUID_FLAG_SIGNIFCANT_INDEX : 0;
+
+ /*
+ * Work around missing support on old TDX modules, fetch
+ * guest maxpa from gfn_direct_bits.
+ */
+ if (leaf == 0x80000008) {
+ gpa_t gpa_bits = gfn_to_gpa(kvm_gfn_direct_bits(vcpu->kvm));
+ unsigned int g_maxpa = __ffs(gpa_bits) + 1;
+
+ out->eax = tdx_set_guest_phys_addr_bits(out->eax, g_maxpa);
+ }
+
+ (*entry_index)++;
+
+ return 0;
+
+err_out:
+ out->eax = 0;
+ out->ebx = 0;
+ out->ecx = 0;
+ out->edx = 0;
+
+ return -EIO;
+}
+
+static int tdx_td_init(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_tdx_cmd *cmd)
+{
+ struct kvm_tdx *kvm_tdx = to_kvm_tdx(kvm);
+ struct kvm_tdx_init_vm *init_vm;
+ struct td_params *td_params = NULL;
+ int ret;
+
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(*init_vm) != 256 + sizeof_field(struct kvm_tdx_init_vm, cpuid));
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(struct td_params) != 1024);
+
+ if (kvm_tdx->state != TD_STATE_UNINITIALIZED)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (cmd->flags)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ init_vm = kmalloc(sizeof(*init_vm) +
+ sizeof(init_vm->cpuid.entries[0]) * KVM_MAX_CPUID_ENTRIES,
+ GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!init_vm)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ if (copy_from_user(init_vm, u64_to_user_ptr(cmd->data), sizeof(*init_vm))) {
+ ret = -EFAULT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (init_vm->cpuid.nent > KVM_MAX_CPUID_ENTRIES) {
+ ret = -E2BIG;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (copy_from_user(init_vm->cpuid.entries,
+ u64_to_user_ptr(cmd->data) + sizeof(*init_vm),
+ flex_array_size(init_vm, cpuid.entries, init_vm->cpuid.nent))) {
+ ret = -EFAULT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (memchr_inv(init_vm->reserved, 0, sizeof(init_vm->reserved))) {
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (init_vm->cpuid.padding) {
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ td_params = kzalloc(sizeof(struct td_params), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!td_params) {
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ ret = setup_tdparams(kvm, td_params, init_vm);
+ if (ret)
+ goto out;
+
+ ret = __tdx_td_init(kvm, td_params, &cmd->hw_error);
+ if (ret)
+ goto out;
+
+ kvm_tdx->tsc_offset = td_tdcs_exec_read64(kvm_tdx, TD_TDCS_EXEC_TSC_OFFSET);
+ kvm_tdx->tsc_multiplier = td_tdcs_exec_read64(kvm_tdx, TD_TDCS_EXEC_TSC_MULTIPLIER);
+ kvm_tdx->attributes = td_params->attributes;
+ kvm_tdx->xfam = td_params->xfam;
+
+ if (td_params->config_flags & TDX_CONFIG_FLAGS_MAX_GPAW)
+ kvm->arch.gfn_direct_bits = TDX_SHARED_BIT_PWL_5;
+ else
+ kvm->arch.gfn_direct_bits = TDX_SHARED_BIT_PWL_4;
+
+ kvm_tdx->state = TD_STATE_INITIALIZED;
+out:
+ /* kfree() accepts NULL. */
+ kfree(init_vm);
+ kfree(td_params);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+void tdx_flush_tlb_current(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ /*
+ * flush_tlb_current() is invoked when the first time for the vcpu to
+ * run or when root of shared EPT is invalidated.
+ * KVM only needs to flush shared EPT because the TDX module handles TLB
+ * invalidation for private EPT in tdh_vp_enter();
+ *
+ * A single context invalidation for shared EPT can be performed here.
+ * However, this single context invalidation requires the private EPTP
+ * rather than the shared EPTP to flush shared EPT, as shared EPT uses
+ * private EPTP as its ASID for TLB invalidation.
+ *
+ * To avoid reading back private EPTP, perform a global invalidation for
+ * shared EPT instead to keep this function simple.
+ */
+ ept_sync_global();
+}
+
+void tdx_flush_tlb_all(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ /*
+ * TDX has called tdx_track() in tdx_sept_remove_private_spte() to
+ * ensure that private EPT will be flushed on the next TD enter. No need
+ * to call tdx_track() here again even when this callback is a result of
+ * zapping private EPT.
+ *
+ * Due to the lack of the context to determine which EPT has been
+ * affected by zapping, invoke invept() directly here for both shared
+ * EPT and private EPT for simplicity, though it's not necessary for
+ * private EPT.
+ */
+ ept_sync_global();
+}
+
+static int tdx_td_finalize(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_tdx_cmd *cmd)
+{
+ struct kvm_tdx *kvm_tdx = to_kvm_tdx(kvm);
+
+ guard(mutex)(&kvm->slots_lock);
+
+ if (!is_hkid_assigned(kvm_tdx) || kvm_tdx->state == TD_STATE_RUNNABLE)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ /*
+ * Pages are pending for KVM_TDX_INIT_MEM_REGION to issue
+ * TDH.MEM.PAGE.ADD().
+ */
+ if (atomic64_read(&kvm_tdx->nr_premapped))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ cmd->hw_error = tdh_mr_finalize(&kvm_tdx->td);
+ if (tdx_operand_busy(cmd->hw_error))
+ return -EBUSY;
+ if (KVM_BUG_ON(cmd->hw_error, kvm)) {
+ pr_tdx_error(TDH_MR_FINALIZE, cmd->hw_error);
+ return -EIO;
+ }
+
+ kvm_tdx->state = TD_STATE_RUNNABLE;
+ /* TD_STATE_RUNNABLE must be set before 'pre_fault_allowed' */
+ smp_wmb();
+ kvm->arch.pre_fault_allowed = true;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int tdx_vm_ioctl(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp)
+{
+ struct kvm_tdx_cmd tdx_cmd;
+ int r;
+
+ if (copy_from_user(&tdx_cmd, argp, sizeof(struct kvm_tdx_cmd)))
+ return -EFAULT;
+
+ /*
+ * Userspace should never set hw_error. It is used to fill
+ * hardware-defined error by the kernel.
+ */
+ if (tdx_cmd.hw_error)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ mutex_lock(&kvm->lock);
+
+ switch (tdx_cmd.id) {
+ case KVM_TDX_CAPABILITIES:
+ r = tdx_get_capabilities(&tdx_cmd);
+ break;
+ case KVM_TDX_INIT_VM:
+ r = tdx_td_init(kvm, &tdx_cmd);
+ break;
+ case KVM_TDX_FINALIZE_VM:
+ r = tdx_td_finalize(kvm, &tdx_cmd);
+ break;
+ default:
+ r = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (copy_to_user(argp, &tdx_cmd, sizeof(struct kvm_tdx_cmd)))
+ r = -EFAULT;
+
+out:
+ mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock);
+ return r;
+}
+
+/* VMM can pass one 64bit auxiliary data to vcpu via RCX for guest BIOS. */
+static int tdx_td_vcpu_init(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 vcpu_rcx)
+{
+ struct kvm_tdx *kvm_tdx = to_kvm_tdx(vcpu->kvm);
+ struct vcpu_tdx *tdx = to_tdx(vcpu);
+ struct page *page;
+ int ret, i;
+ u64 err;
+
+ page = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!page)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ tdx->vp.tdvpr_page = page;
+
+ tdx->vp.tdcx_pages = kcalloc(kvm_tdx->td.tdcx_nr_pages, sizeof(*tdx->vp.tdcx_pages),
+ GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!tdx->vp.tdcx_pages) {
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
+ goto free_tdvpr;
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < kvm_tdx->td.tdcx_nr_pages; i++) {
+ page = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!page) {
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
+ goto free_tdcx;
+ }
+ tdx->vp.tdcx_pages[i] = page;
+ }
+
+ err = tdh_vp_create(&kvm_tdx->td, &tdx->vp);
+ if (KVM_BUG_ON(err, vcpu->kvm)) {
+ ret = -EIO;
+ pr_tdx_error(TDH_VP_CREATE, err);
+ goto free_tdcx;
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < kvm_tdx->td.tdcx_nr_pages; i++) {
+ err = tdh_vp_addcx(&tdx->vp, tdx->vp.tdcx_pages[i]);
+ if (KVM_BUG_ON(err, vcpu->kvm)) {
+ pr_tdx_error(TDH_VP_ADDCX, err);
+ /*
+ * Pages already added are reclaimed by the vcpu_free
+ * method, but the rest are freed here.
+ */
+ for (; i < kvm_tdx->td.tdcx_nr_pages; i++) {
+ __free_page(tdx->vp.tdcx_pages[i]);
+ tdx->vp.tdcx_pages[i] = NULL;
+ }
+ return -EIO;
+ }
+ }
+
+ err = tdh_vp_init(&tdx->vp, vcpu_rcx, vcpu->vcpu_id);
+ if (KVM_BUG_ON(err, vcpu->kvm)) {
+ pr_tdx_error(TDH_VP_INIT, err);
+ return -EIO;
+ }
+
+ vcpu->arch.mp_state = KVM_MP_STATE_RUNNABLE;
+
+ return 0;
+
+free_tdcx:
+ for (i = 0; i < kvm_tdx->td.tdcx_nr_pages; i++) {
+ if (tdx->vp.tdcx_pages[i])
+ __free_page(tdx->vp.tdcx_pages[i]);
+ tdx->vp.tdcx_pages[i] = NULL;
+ }
+ kfree(tdx->vp.tdcx_pages);
+ tdx->vp.tdcx_pages = NULL;
+
+free_tdvpr:
+ if (tdx->vp.tdvpr_page)
+ __free_page(tdx->vp.tdvpr_page);
+ tdx->vp.tdvpr_page = 0;
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/* Sometimes reads multipple subleafs. Return how many enties were written. */
+static int tdx_vcpu_get_cpuid_leaf(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 leaf, int *entry_index,
+ struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *output_e)
+{
+ int sub_leaf = 0;
+ int ret;
+
+ /* First try without a subleaf */
+ ret = tdx_read_cpuid(vcpu, leaf, 0, false, entry_index, output_e);
+
+ /* If success, or invalid leaf, just give up */
+ if (ret != -EIO)
+ return ret;
+
+ /*
+ * If the try without a subleaf failed, try reading subleafs until
+ * failure. The TDX module only supports 6 bits of subleaf index.
+ */
+ while (1) {
+ /* Keep reading subleafs until there is a failure. */
+ if (tdx_read_cpuid(vcpu, leaf, sub_leaf, true, entry_index, output_e))
+ return !sub_leaf;
+
+ sub_leaf++;
+ output_e++;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int tdx_vcpu_get_cpuid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_tdx_cmd *cmd)
+{
+ struct kvm_cpuid2 __user *output, *td_cpuid;
+ int r = 0, i = 0, leaf;
+ u32 level;
+
+ output = u64_to_user_ptr(cmd->data);
+ td_cpuid = kzalloc(sizeof(*td_cpuid) +
+ sizeof(output->entries[0]) * KVM_MAX_CPUID_ENTRIES,
+ GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!td_cpuid)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ if (copy_from_user(td_cpuid, output, sizeof(*output))) {
+ r = -EFAULT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* Read max CPUID for normal range */
+ if (tdx_vcpu_get_cpuid_leaf(vcpu, 0, &i, &td_cpuid->entries[i])) {
+ r = -EIO;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ level = td_cpuid->entries[0].eax;
+
+ for (leaf = 1; leaf <= level; leaf++)
+ tdx_vcpu_get_cpuid_leaf(vcpu, leaf, &i, &td_cpuid->entries[i]);
+
+ /* Read max CPUID for extended range */
+ if (tdx_vcpu_get_cpuid_leaf(vcpu, 0x80000000, &i, &td_cpuid->entries[i])) {
+ r = -EIO;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ level = td_cpuid->entries[i - 1].eax;
+
+ for (leaf = 0x80000001; leaf <= level; leaf++)
+ tdx_vcpu_get_cpuid_leaf(vcpu, leaf, &i, &td_cpuid->entries[i]);
+
+ if (td_cpuid->nent < i)
+ r = -E2BIG;
+ td_cpuid->nent = i;
+
+ if (copy_to_user(output, td_cpuid, sizeof(*output))) {
+ r = -EFAULT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (r == -E2BIG)
+ goto out;
+
+ if (copy_to_user(output->entries, td_cpuid->entries,
+ td_cpuid->nent * sizeof(struct kvm_cpuid_entry2)))
+ r = -EFAULT;
+
+out:
+ kfree(td_cpuid);
+
+ return r;
+}
+
+static int tdx_vcpu_init(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_tdx_cmd *cmd)
+{
+ u64 apic_base;
+ struct vcpu_tdx *tdx = to_tdx(vcpu);
+ int ret;
+
+ if (cmd->flags)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (tdx->state != VCPU_TD_STATE_UNINITIALIZED)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ /*
+ * TDX requires X2APIC, userspace is responsible for configuring guest
+ * CPUID accordingly.
+ */
+ apic_base = APIC_DEFAULT_PHYS_BASE | LAPIC_MODE_X2APIC |
+ (kvm_vcpu_is_reset_bsp(vcpu) ? MSR_IA32_APICBASE_BSP : 0);
+ if (kvm_apic_set_base(vcpu, apic_base, true))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ ret = tdx_td_vcpu_init(vcpu, (u64)cmd->data);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+
+ td_vmcs_write16(tdx, POSTED_INTR_NV, POSTED_INTR_VECTOR);
+ td_vmcs_write64(tdx, POSTED_INTR_DESC_ADDR, __pa(&tdx->vt.pi_desc));
+ td_vmcs_setbit32(tdx, PIN_BASED_VM_EXEC_CONTROL, PIN_BASED_POSTED_INTR);
+
+ tdx->state = VCPU_TD_STATE_INITIALIZED;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+void tdx_vcpu_reset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool init_event)
+{
+ /*
+ * Yell on INIT, as TDX doesn't support INIT, i.e. KVM should drop all
+ * INIT events.
+ *
+ * Defer initializing vCPU for RESET state until KVM_TDX_INIT_VCPU, as
+ * userspace needs to define the vCPU model before KVM can initialize
+ * vCPU state, e.g. to enable x2APIC.
+ */
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(init_event);
+}
+
+struct tdx_gmem_post_populate_arg {
+ struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu;
+ __u32 flags;
+};
+
+static int tdx_gmem_post_populate(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t gfn, kvm_pfn_t pfn,
+ void __user *src, int order, void *_arg)
+{
+ u64 error_code = PFERR_GUEST_FINAL_MASK | PFERR_PRIVATE_ACCESS;
+ struct kvm_tdx *kvm_tdx = to_kvm_tdx(kvm);
+ struct tdx_gmem_post_populate_arg *arg = _arg;
+ struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = arg->vcpu;
+ gpa_t gpa = gfn_to_gpa(gfn);
+ u8 level = PG_LEVEL_4K;
+ struct page *src_page;
+ int ret, i;
+ u64 err, entry, level_state;
+
+ /*
+ * Get the source page if it has been faulted in. Return failure if the
+ * source page has been swapped out or unmapped in primary memory.
+ */
+ ret = get_user_pages_fast((unsigned long)src, 1, 0, &src_page);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ret;
+ if (ret != 1)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ ret = kvm_tdp_map_page(vcpu, gpa, error_code, &level);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ /*
+ * The private mem cannot be zapped after kvm_tdp_map_page()
+ * because all paths are covered by slots_lock and the
+ * filemap invalidate lock. Check that they are indeed enough.
+ */
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KVM_PROVE_MMU)) {
+ scoped_guard(read_lock, &kvm->mmu_lock) {
+ if (KVM_BUG_ON(!kvm_tdp_mmu_gpa_is_mapped(vcpu, gpa), kvm)) {
+ ret = -EIO;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ ret = 0;
+ err = tdh_mem_page_add(&kvm_tdx->td, gpa, pfn_to_page(pfn),
+ src_page, &entry, &level_state);
+ if (err) {
+ ret = unlikely(tdx_operand_busy(err)) ? -EBUSY : -EIO;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (!KVM_BUG_ON(!atomic64_read(&kvm_tdx->nr_premapped), kvm))
+ atomic64_dec(&kvm_tdx->nr_premapped);
+
+ if (arg->flags & KVM_TDX_MEASURE_MEMORY_REGION) {
+ for (i = 0; i < PAGE_SIZE; i += TDX_EXTENDMR_CHUNKSIZE) {
+ err = tdh_mr_extend(&kvm_tdx->td, gpa + i, &entry,
+ &level_state);
+ if (err) {
+ ret = -EIO;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+out:
+ put_page(src_page);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int tdx_vcpu_init_mem_region(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_tdx_cmd *cmd)
+{
+ struct vcpu_tdx *tdx = to_tdx(vcpu);
+ struct kvm *kvm = vcpu->kvm;
+ struct kvm_tdx *kvm_tdx = to_kvm_tdx(kvm);
+ struct kvm_tdx_init_mem_region region;
+ struct tdx_gmem_post_populate_arg arg;
+ long gmem_ret;
+ int ret;
+
+ if (tdx->state != VCPU_TD_STATE_INITIALIZED)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ guard(mutex)(&kvm->slots_lock);
+
+ /* Once TD is finalized, the initial guest memory is fixed. */
+ if (kvm_tdx->state == TD_STATE_RUNNABLE)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (cmd->flags & ~KVM_TDX_MEASURE_MEMORY_REGION)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (copy_from_user(&region, u64_to_user_ptr(cmd->data), sizeof(region)))
+ return -EFAULT;
+
+ if (!PAGE_ALIGNED(region.source_addr) || !PAGE_ALIGNED(region.gpa) ||
+ !region.nr_pages ||
+ region.gpa + (region.nr_pages << PAGE_SHIFT) <= region.gpa ||
+ !vt_is_tdx_private_gpa(kvm, region.gpa) ||
+ !vt_is_tdx_private_gpa(kvm, region.gpa + (region.nr_pages << PAGE_SHIFT) - 1))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ kvm_mmu_reload(vcpu);
+ ret = 0;
+ while (region.nr_pages) {
+ if (signal_pending(current)) {
+ ret = -EINTR;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ arg = (struct tdx_gmem_post_populate_arg) {
+ .vcpu = vcpu,
+ .flags = cmd->flags,
+ };
+ gmem_ret = kvm_gmem_populate(kvm, gpa_to_gfn(region.gpa),
+ u64_to_user_ptr(region.source_addr),
+ 1, tdx_gmem_post_populate, &arg);
+ if (gmem_ret < 0) {
+ ret = gmem_ret;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (gmem_ret != 1) {
+ ret = -EIO;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ region.source_addr += PAGE_SIZE;
+ region.gpa += PAGE_SIZE;
+ region.nr_pages--;
+
+ cond_resched();
+ }
+
+ if (copy_to_user(u64_to_user_ptr(cmd->data), &region, sizeof(region)))
+ ret = -EFAULT;
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int tdx_vcpu_ioctl(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, void __user *argp)
+{
+ struct kvm_tdx *kvm_tdx = to_kvm_tdx(vcpu->kvm);
+ struct kvm_tdx_cmd cmd;
+ int ret;
+
+ if (!is_hkid_assigned(kvm_tdx) || kvm_tdx->state == TD_STATE_RUNNABLE)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (copy_from_user(&cmd, argp, sizeof(cmd)))
+ return -EFAULT;
+
+ if (cmd.hw_error)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ switch (cmd.id) {
+ case KVM_TDX_INIT_VCPU:
+ ret = tdx_vcpu_init(vcpu, &cmd);
+ break;
+ case KVM_TDX_INIT_MEM_REGION:
+ ret = tdx_vcpu_init_mem_region(vcpu, &cmd);
+ break;
+ case KVM_TDX_GET_CPUID:
+ ret = tdx_vcpu_get_cpuid(vcpu, &cmd);
+ break;
+ default:
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int tdx_gmem_private_max_mapping_level(struct kvm *kvm, kvm_pfn_t pfn)
+{
+ return PG_LEVEL_4K;
+}
+
+static int tdx_online_cpu(unsigned int cpu)
+{
+ unsigned long flags;
+ int r;
+
+ /* Sanity check CPU is already in post-VMXON */
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(!(cr4_read_shadow() & X86_CR4_VMXE));
+
+ local_irq_save(flags);
+ r = tdx_cpu_enable();
+ local_irq_restore(flags);
+
+ return r;
+}
+
+static int tdx_offline_cpu(unsigned int cpu)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ /* No TD is running. Allow any cpu to be offline. */
+ if (!atomic_read(&nr_configured_hkid))
+ return 0;
+
+ /*
+ * In order to reclaim TDX HKID, (i.e. when deleting guest TD), need to
+ * call TDH.PHYMEM.PAGE.WBINVD on all packages to program all memory
+ * controller with pconfig. If we have active TDX HKID, refuse to
+ * offline the last online cpu.
+ */
+ for_each_online_cpu(i) {
+ /*
+ * Found another online cpu on the same package.
+ * Allow to offline.
+ */
+ if (i != cpu && topology_physical_package_id(i) ==
+ topology_physical_package_id(cpu))
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * This is the last cpu of this package. Don't offline it.
+ *
+ * Because it's hard for human operator to understand the
+ * reason, warn it.
+ */
+#define MSG_ALLPKG_ONLINE \
+ "TDX requires all packages to have an online CPU. Delete all TDs in order to offline all CPUs of a package.\n"
+ pr_warn_ratelimited(MSG_ALLPKG_ONLINE);
+ return -EBUSY;
+}
+
+static void __do_tdx_cleanup(void)
+{
+ /*
+ * Once TDX module is initialized, it cannot be disabled and
+ * re-initialized again w/o runtime update (which isn't
+ * supported by kernel). Only need to remove the cpuhp here.
+ * The TDX host core code tracks TDX status and can handle
+ * 'multiple enabling' scenario.
+ */
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(!tdx_cpuhp_state);
+ cpuhp_remove_state_nocalls_cpuslocked(tdx_cpuhp_state);
+ tdx_cpuhp_state = 0;
+}
+
+static void __tdx_cleanup(void)
+{
+ cpus_read_lock();
+ __do_tdx_cleanup();
+ cpus_read_unlock();
+}
+
+static int __init __do_tdx_bringup(void)
+{
+ int r;
+
+ /*
+ * TDX-specific cpuhp callback to call tdx_cpu_enable() on all
+ * online CPUs before calling tdx_enable(), and on any new
+ * going-online CPU to make sure it is ready for TDX guest.
+ */
+ r = cpuhp_setup_state_cpuslocked(CPUHP_AP_ONLINE_DYN,
+ "kvm/cpu/tdx:online",
+ tdx_online_cpu, tdx_offline_cpu);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+
+ tdx_cpuhp_state = r;
+
+ r = tdx_enable();
+ if (r)
+ __do_tdx_cleanup();
+
+ return r;
+}
+
+static int __init __tdx_bringup(void)
+{
+ const struct tdx_sys_info_td_conf *td_conf;
+ int r, i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(tdx_uret_msrs); i++) {
+ /*
+ * Check if MSRs (tdx_uret_msrs) can be saved/restored
+ * before returning to user space.
+ *
+ * this_cpu_ptr(user_return_msrs)->registered isn't checked
+ * because the registration is done at vcpu runtime by
+ * tdx_user_return_msr_update_cache().
+ */
+ tdx_uret_msrs[i].slot = kvm_find_user_return_msr(tdx_uret_msrs[i].msr);
+ if (tdx_uret_msrs[i].slot == -1) {
+ /* If any MSR isn't supported, it is a KVM bug */
+ pr_err("MSR %x isn't included by kvm_find_user_return_msr\n",
+ tdx_uret_msrs[i].msr);
+ return -EIO;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Enabling TDX requires enabling hardware virtualization first,
+ * as making SEAMCALLs requires CPU being in post-VMXON state.
+ */
+ r = kvm_enable_virtualization();
+ if (r)
+ return r;
+
+ cpus_read_lock();
+ r = __do_tdx_bringup();
+ cpus_read_unlock();
+
+ if (r)
+ goto tdx_bringup_err;
+
+ /* Get TDX global information for later use */
+ tdx_sysinfo = tdx_get_sysinfo();
+ if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!tdx_sysinfo)) {
+ r = -EINVAL;
+ goto get_sysinfo_err;
+ }
+
+ /* Check TDX module and KVM capabilities */
+ if (!tdx_get_supported_attrs(&tdx_sysinfo->td_conf) ||
+ !tdx_get_supported_xfam(&tdx_sysinfo->td_conf))
+ goto get_sysinfo_err;
+
+ if (!(tdx_sysinfo->features.tdx_features0 & MD_FIELD_ID_FEATURES0_TOPOLOGY_ENUM))
+ goto get_sysinfo_err;
+
+ /*
+ * TDX has its own limit of maximum vCPUs it can support for all
+ * TDX guests in addition to KVM_MAX_VCPUS. Userspace needs to
+ * query TDX guest's maximum vCPUs by checking KVM_CAP_MAX_VCPU
+ * extension on per-VM basis.
+ *
+ * TDX module reports such limit via the MAX_VCPU_PER_TD global
+ * metadata. Different modules may report different values.
+ * Some old module may also not support this metadata (in which
+ * case this limit is U16_MAX).
+ *
+ * In practice, the reported value reflects the maximum logical
+ * CPUs that ALL the platforms that the module supports can
+ * possibly have.
+ *
+ * Simply forwarding the MAX_VCPU_PER_TD to userspace could
+ * result in an unpredictable ABI. KVM instead always advertise
+ * the number of logical CPUs the platform has as the maximum
+ * vCPUs for TDX guests.
+ *
+ * Make sure MAX_VCPU_PER_TD reported by TDX module is not
+ * smaller than the number of logical CPUs, otherwise KVM will
+ * report an unsupported value to userspace.
+ *
+ * Note, a platform with TDX enabled in the BIOS cannot support
+ * physical CPU hotplug, and TDX requires the BIOS has marked
+ * all logical CPUs in MADT table as enabled. Just use
+ * num_present_cpus() for the number of logical CPUs.
+ */
+ td_conf = &tdx_sysinfo->td_conf;
+ if (td_conf->max_vcpus_per_td < num_present_cpus()) {
+ pr_err("Disable TDX: MAX_VCPU_PER_TD (%u) smaller than number of logical CPUs (%u).\n",
+ td_conf->max_vcpus_per_td, num_present_cpus());
+ r = -EINVAL;
+ goto get_sysinfo_err;
+ }
+
+ if (misc_cg_set_capacity(MISC_CG_RES_TDX, tdx_get_nr_guest_keyids())) {
+ r = -EINVAL;
+ goto get_sysinfo_err;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Leave hardware virtualization enabled after TDX is enabled
+ * successfully. TDX CPU hotplug depends on this.
+ */
+ return 0;
+
+get_sysinfo_err:
+ __tdx_cleanup();
+tdx_bringup_err:
+ kvm_disable_virtualization();
+ return r;
+}
+
+void tdx_cleanup(void)
+{
+ if (enable_tdx) {
+ misc_cg_set_capacity(MISC_CG_RES_TDX, 0);
+ __tdx_cleanup();
+ kvm_disable_virtualization();
+ }
+}
+
+int __init tdx_bringup(void)
+{
+ int r, i;
+
+ /* tdx_disable_virtualization_cpu() uses associated_tdvcpus. */
+ for_each_possible_cpu(i)
+ INIT_LIST_HEAD(&per_cpu(associated_tdvcpus, i));
+
+ if (!enable_tdx)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (!enable_ept) {
+ pr_err("EPT is required for TDX\n");
+ goto success_disable_tdx;
+ }
+
+ if (!tdp_mmu_enabled || !enable_mmio_caching || !enable_ept_ad_bits) {
+ pr_err("TDP MMU and MMIO caching and EPT A/D bit is required for TDX\n");
+ goto success_disable_tdx;
+ }
+
+ if (!enable_apicv) {
+ pr_err("APICv is required for TDX\n");
+ goto success_disable_tdx;
+ }
+
+ if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_OSXSAVE)) {
+ pr_err("tdx: OSXSAVE is required for TDX\n");
+ goto success_disable_tdx;
+ }
+
+ if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_MOVDIR64B)) {
+ pr_err("tdx: MOVDIR64B is required for TDX\n");
+ goto success_disable_tdx;
+ }
+
+ if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SELFSNOOP)) {
+ pr_err("Self-snoop is required for TDX\n");
+ goto success_disable_tdx;
+ }
+
+ if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_TDX_HOST_PLATFORM)) {
+ pr_err("tdx: no TDX private KeyIDs available\n");
+ goto success_disable_tdx;
+ }
+
+ if (!enable_virt_at_load) {
+ pr_err("tdx: tdx requires kvm.enable_virt_at_load=1\n");
+ goto success_disable_tdx;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Ideally KVM should probe whether TDX module has been loaded
+ * first and then try to bring it up. But TDX needs to use SEAMCALL
+ * to probe whether the module is loaded (there is no CPUID or MSR
+ * for that), and making SEAMCALL requires enabling virtualization
+ * first, just like the rest steps of bringing up TDX module.
+ *
+ * So, for simplicity do everything in __tdx_bringup(); the first
+ * SEAMCALL will return -ENODEV when the module is not loaded. The
+ * only complication is having to make sure that initialization
+ * SEAMCALLs don't return TDX_SEAMCALL_VMFAILINVALID in other
+ * cases.
+ */
+ r = __tdx_bringup();
+ if (r) {
+ /*
+ * Disable TDX only but don't fail to load module if
+ * the TDX module could not be loaded. No need to print
+ * message saying "module is not loaded" because it was
+ * printed when the first SEAMCALL failed.
+ */
+ if (r == -ENODEV)
+ goto success_disable_tdx;
+
+ enable_tdx = 0;
+ }
+
+ return r;
+
+success_disable_tdx:
+ enable_tdx = 0;
+ return 0;
+}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..51f98443e8a2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h
@@ -0,0 +1,204 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+#ifndef __KVM_X86_VMX_TDX_H
+#define __KVM_X86_VMX_TDX_H
+
+#include "tdx_arch.h"
+#include "tdx_errno.h"
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_INTEL_TDX
+#include "common.h"
+
+int tdx_bringup(void);
+void tdx_cleanup(void);
+
+extern bool enable_tdx;
+
+/* TDX module hardware states. These follow the TDX module OP_STATEs. */
+enum kvm_tdx_state {
+ TD_STATE_UNINITIALIZED = 0,
+ TD_STATE_INITIALIZED,
+ TD_STATE_RUNNABLE,
+};
+
+struct kvm_tdx {
+ struct kvm kvm;
+
+ struct misc_cg *misc_cg;
+ int hkid;
+ enum kvm_tdx_state state;
+
+ u64 attributes;
+ u64 xfam;
+
+ u64 tsc_offset;
+ u64 tsc_multiplier;
+
+ struct tdx_td td;
+
+ /* For KVM_TDX_INIT_MEM_REGION. */
+ atomic64_t nr_premapped;
+
+ /*
+ * Prevent vCPUs from TD entry to ensure SEPT zap related SEAMCALLs do
+ * not contend with tdh_vp_enter() and TDCALLs.
+ * Set/unset is protected with kvm->mmu_lock.
+ */
+ bool wait_for_sept_zap;
+};
+
+/* TDX module vCPU states */
+enum vcpu_tdx_state {
+ VCPU_TD_STATE_UNINITIALIZED = 0,
+ VCPU_TD_STATE_INITIALIZED,
+};
+
+struct vcpu_tdx {
+ struct kvm_vcpu vcpu;
+ struct vcpu_vt vt;
+ u64 ext_exit_qualification;
+ gpa_t exit_gpa;
+ struct tdx_module_args vp_enter_args;
+
+ struct tdx_vp vp;
+
+ struct list_head cpu_list;
+
+ u64 vp_enter_ret;
+
+ enum vcpu_tdx_state state;
+ bool guest_entered;
+
+ u64 map_gpa_next;
+ u64 map_gpa_end;
+};
+
+void tdh_vp_rd_failed(struct vcpu_tdx *tdx, char *uclass, u32 field, u64 err);
+void tdh_vp_wr_failed(struct vcpu_tdx *tdx, char *uclass, char *op, u32 field,
+ u64 val, u64 err);
+
+static __always_inline u64 td_tdcs_exec_read64(struct kvm_tdx *kvm_tdx, u32 field)
+{
+ u64 err, data;
+
+ err = tdh_mng_rd(&kvm_tdx->td, TDCS_EXEC(field), &data);
+ if (unlikely(err)) {
+ pr_err("TDH_MNG_RD[EXEC.0x%x] failed: 0x%llx\n", field, err);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return data;
+}
+
+static __always_inline void tdvps_vmcs_check(u32 field, u8 bits)
+{
+#define VMCS_ENC_ACCESS_TYPE_MASK 0x1UL
+#define VMCS_ENC_ACCESS_TYPE_FULL 0x0UL
+#define VMCS_ENC_ACCESS_TYPE_HIGH 0x1UL
+#define VMCS_ENC_ACCESS_TYPE(field) ((field) & VMCS_ENC_ACCESS_TYPE_MASK)
+
+ /* TDX is 64bit only. HIGH field isn't supported. */
+ BUILD_BUG_ON_MSG(__builtin_constant_p(field) &&
+ VMCS_ENC_ACCESS_TYPE(field) == VMCS_ENC_ACCESS_TYPE_HIGH,
+ "Read/Write to TD VMCS *_HIGH fields not supported");
+
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(bits != 16 && bits != 32 && bits != 64);
+
+#define VMCS_ENC_WIDTH_MASK GENMASK(14, 13)
+#define VMCS_ENC_WIDTH_16BIT (0UL << 13)
+#define VMCS_ENC_WIDTH_64BIT (1UL << 13)
+#define VMCS_ENC_WIDTH_32BIT (2UL << 13)
+#define VMCS_ENC_WIDTH_NATURAL (3UL << 13)
+#define VMCS_ENC_WIDTH(field) ((field) & VMCS_ENC_WIDTH_MASK)
+
+ /* TDX is 64bit only. i.e. natural width = 64bit. */
+ BUILD_BUG_ON_MSG(bits != 64 && __builtin_constant_p(field) &&
+ (VMCS_ENC_WIDTH(field) == VMCS_ENC_WIDTH_64BIT ||
+ VMCS_ENC_WIDTH(field) == VMCS_ENC_WIDTH_NATURAL),
+ "Invalid TD VMCS access for 64-bit field");
+ BUILD_BUG_ON_MSG(bits != 32 && __builtin_constant_p(field) &&
+ VMCS_ENC_WIDTH(field) == VMCS_ENC_WIDTH_32BIT,
+ "Invalid TD VMCS access for 32-bit field");
+ BUILD_BUG_ON_MSG(bits != 16 && __builtin_constant_p(field) &&
+ VMCS_ENC_WIDTH(field) == VMCS_ENC_WIDTH_16BIT,
+ "Invalid TD VMCS access for 16-bit field");
+}
+
+static __always_inline void tdvps_management_check(u64 field, u8 bits) {}
+static __always_inline void tdvps_state_non_arch_check(u64 field, u8 bits) {}
+
+#define TDX_BUILD_TDVPS_ACCESSORS(bits, uclass, lclass) \
+static __always_inline u##bits td_##lclass##_read##bits(struct vcpu_tdx *tdx, \
+ u32 field) \
+{ \
+ u64 err, data; \
+ \
+ tdvps_##lclass##_check(field, bits); \
+ err = tdh_vp_rd(&tdx->vp, TDVPS_##uclass(field), &data); \
+ if (unlikely(err)) { \
+ tdh_vp_rd_failed(tdx, #uclass, field, err); \
+ return 0; \
+ } \
+ return (u##bits)data; \
+} \
+static __always_inline void td_##lclass##_write##bits(struct vcpu_tdx *tdx, \
+ u32 field, u##bits val) \
+{ \
+ u64 err; \
+ \
+ tdvps_##lclass##_check(field, bits); \
+ err = tdh_vp_wr(&tdx->vp, TDVPS_##uclass(field), val, \
+ GENMASK_ULL(bits - 1, 0)); \
+ if (unlikely(err)) \
+ tdh_vp_wr_failed(tdx, #uclass, " = ", field, (u64)val, err); \
+} \
+static __always_inline void td_##lclass##_setbit##bits(struct vcpu_tdx *tdx, \
+ u32 field, u64 bit) \
+{ \
+ u64 err; \
+ \
+ tdvps_##lclass##_check(field, bits); \
+ err = tdh_vp_wr(&tdx->vp, TDVPS_##uclass(field), bit, bit); \
+ if (unlikely(err)) \
+ tdh_vp_wr_failed(tdx, #uclass, " |= ", field, bit, err); \
+} \
+static __always_inline void td_##lclass##_clearbit##bits(struct vcpu_tdx *tdx, \
+ u32 field, u64 bit) \
+{ \
+ u64 err; \
+ \
+ tdvps_##lclass##_check(field, bits); \
+ err = tdh_vp_wr(&tdx->vp, TDVPS_##uclass(field), 0, bit); \
+ if (unlikely(err)) \
+ tdh_vp_wr_failed(tdx, #uclass, " &= ~", field, bit, err);\
+}
+
+
+bool tdx_interrupt_allowed(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+int tdx_complete_emulated_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int err);
+
+TDX_BUILD_TDVPS_ACCESSORS(16, VMCS, vmcs);
+TDX_BUILD_TDVPS_ACCESSORS(32, VMCS, vmcs);
+TDX_BUILD_TDVPS_ACCESSORS(64, VMCS, vmcs);
+
+TDX_BUILD_TDVPS_ACCESSORS(8, MANAGEMENT, management);
+TDX_BUILD_TDVPS_ACCESSORS(64, STATE_NON_ARCH, state_non_arch);
+
+#else
+static inline int tdx_bringup(void) { return 0; }
+static inline void tdx_cleanup(void) {}
+
+#define enable_tdx 0
+
+struct kvm_tdx {
+ struct kvm kvm;
+};
+
+struct vcpu_tdx {
+ struct kvm_vcpu vcpu;
+};
+
+static inline bool tdx_interrupt_allowed(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) { return false; }
+static inline int tdx_complete_emulated_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int err) { return 0; }
+
+#endif
+
+#endif
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx_arch.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx_arch.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..a30e880849e3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx_arch.h
@@ -0,0 +1,167 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+/* architectural constants/data definitions for TDX SEAMCALLs */
+
+#ifndef __KVM_X86_TDX_ARCH_H
+#define __KVM_X86_TDX_ARCH_H
+
+#include <linux/types.h>
+
+/* TDX control structure (TDR/TDCS/TDVPS) field access codes */
+#define TDX_NON_ARCH BIT_ULL(63)
+#define TDX_CLASS_SHIFT 56
+#define TDX_FIELD_MASK GENMASK_ULL(31, 0)
+
+#define __BUILD_TDX_FIELD(non_arch, class, field) \
+ (((non_arch) ? TDX_NON_ARCH : 0) | \
+ ((u64)(class) << TDX_CLASS_SHIFT) | \
+ ((u64)(field) & TDX_FIELD_MASK))
+
+#define BUILD_TDX_FIELD(class, field) \
+ __BUILD_TDX_FIELD(false, (class), (field))
+
+#define BUILD_TDX_FIELD_NON_ARCH(class, field) \
+ __BUILD_TDX_FIELD(true, (class), (field))
+
+
+/* Class code for TD */
+#define TD_CLASS_EXECUTION_CONTROLS 17ULL
+
+/* Class code for TDVPS */
+#define TDVPS_CLASS_VMCS 0ULL
+#define TDVPS_CLASS_GUEST_GPR 16ULL
+#define TDVPS_CLASS_OTHER_GUEST 17ULL
+#define TDVPS_CLASS_MANAGEMENT 32ULL
+
+enum tdx_tdcs_execution_control {
+ TD_TDCS_EXEC_TSC_OFFSET = 10,
+ TD_TDCS_EXEC_TSC_MULTIPLIER = 11,
+};
+
+enum tdx_vcpu_guest_other_state {
+ TD_VCPU_STATE_DETAILS_NON_ARCH = 0x100,
+};
+
+#define TDX_VCPU_STATE_DETAILS_INTR_PENDING BIT_ULL(0)
+
+static inline bool tdx_vcpu_state_details_intr_pending(u64 vcpu_state_details)
+{
+ return !!(vcpu_state_details & TDX_VCPU_STATE_DETAILS_INTR_PENDING);
+}
+
+/* @field is any of enum tdx_tdcs_execution_control */
+#define TDCS_EXEC(field) BUILD_TDX_FIELD(TD_CLASS_EXECUTION_CONTROLS, (field))
+
+/* @field is the VMCS field encoding */
+#define TDVPS_VMCS(field) BUILD_TDX_FIELD(TDVPS_CLASS_VMCS, (field))
+
+/* @field is any of enum tdx_guest_other_state */
+#define TDVPS_STATE(field) BUILD_TDX_FIELD(TDVPS_CLASS_OTHER_GUEST, (field))
+#define TDVPS_STATE_NON_ARCH(field) BUILD_TDX_FIELD_NON_ARCH(TDVPS_CLASS_OTHER_GUEST, (field))
+
+/* Management class fields */
+enum tdx_vcpu_guest_management {
+ TD_VCPU_PEND_NMI = 11,
+};
+
+/* @field is any of enum tdx_vcpu_guest_management */
+#define TDVPS_MANAGEMENT(field) BUILD_TDX_FIELD(TDVPS_CLASS_MANAGEMENT, (field))
+
+#define TDX_EXTENDMR_CHUNKSIZE 256
+
+struct tdx_cpuid_value {
+ u32 eax;
+ u32 ebx;
+ u32 ecx;
+ u32 edx;
+} __packed;
+
+#define TDX_TD_ATTR_DEBUG BIT_ULL(0)
+#define TDX_TD_ATTR_SEPT_VE_DISABLE BIT_ULL(28)
+#define TDX_TD_ATTR_PKS BIT_ULL(30)
+#define TDX_TD_ATTR_KL BIT_ULL(31)
+#define TDX_TD_ATTR_PERFMON BIT_ULL(63)
+
+#define TDX_EXT_EXIT_QUAL_TYPE_MASK GENMASK(3, 0)
+#define TDX_EXT_EXIT_QUAL_TYPE_PENDING_EPT_VIOLATION 6
+/*
+ * TD_PARAMS is provided as an input to TDH_MNG_INIT, the size of which is 1024B.
+ */
+struct td_params {
+ u64 attributes;
+ u64 xfam;
+ u16 max_vcpus;
+ u8 reserved0[6];
+
+ u64 eptp_controls;
+ u64 config_flags;
+ u16 tsc_frequency;
+ u8 reserved1[38];
+
+ u64 mrconfigid[6];
+ u64 mrowner[6];
+ u64 mrownerconfig[6];
+ u64 reserved2[4];
+
+ union {
+ DECLARE_FLEX_ARRAY(struct tdx_cpuid_value, cpuid_values);
+ u8 reserved3[768];
+ };
+} __packed __aligned(1024);
+
+/*
+ * Guest uses MAX_PA for GPAW when set.
+ * 0: GPA.SHARED bit is GPA[47]
+ * 1: GPA.SHARED bit is GPA[51]
+ */
+#define TDX_CONFIG_FLAGS_MAX_GPAW BIT_ULL(0)
+
+/*
+ * TDH.VP.ENTER, TDG.VP.VMCALL preserves RBP
+ * 0: RBP can be used for TDG.VP.VMCALL input. RBP is clobbered.
+ * 1: RBP can't be used for TDG.VP.VMCALL input. RBP is preserved.
+ */
+#define TDX_CONFIG_FLAGS_NO_RBP_MOD BIT_ULL(2)
+
+
+/*
+ * TDX requires the frequency to be defined in units of 25MHz, which is the
+ * frequency of the core crystal clock on TDX-capable platforms, i.e. the TDX
+ * module can only program frequencies that are multiples of 25MHz. The
+ * frequency must be between 100mhz and 10ghz (inclusive).
+ */
+#define TDX_TSC_KHZ_TO_25MHZ(tsc_in_khz) ((tsc_in_khz) / (25 * 1000))
+#define TDX_TSC_25MHZ_TO_KHZ(tsc_in_25mhz) ((tsc_in_25mhz) * (25 * 1000))
+#define TDX_MIN_TSC_FREQUENCY_KHZ (100 * 1000)
+#define TDX_MAX_TSC_FREQUENCY_KHZ (10 * 1000 * 1000)
+
+/* Additional Secure EPT entry information */
+#define TDX_SEPT_LEVEL_MASK GENMASK_ULL(2, 0)
+#define TDX_SEPT_STATE_MASK GENMASK_ULL(15, 8)
+#define TDX_SEPT_STATE_SHIFT 8
+
+enum tdx_sept_entry_state {
+ TDX_SEPT_FREE = 0,
+ TDX_SEPT_BLOCKED = 1,
+ TDX_SEPT_PENDING = 2,
+ TDX_SEPT_PENDING_BLOCKED = 3,
+ TDX_SEPT_PRESENT = 4,
+};
+
+static inline u8 tdx_get_sept_level(u64 sept_entry_info)
+{
+ return sept_entry_info & TDX_SEPT_LEVEL_MASK;
+}
+
+static inline u8 tdx_get_sept_state(u64 sept_entry_info)
+{
+ return (sept_entry_info & TDX_SEPT_STATE_MASK) >> TDX_SEPT_STATE_SHIFT;
+}
+
+#define MD_FIELD_ID_FEATURES0_TOPOLOGY_ENUM BIT_ULL(20)
+
+/*
+ * TD scope metadata field ID.
+ */
+#define TD_MD_FIELD_ID_CPUID_VALUES 0x9410000300000000ULL
+
+#endif /* __KVM_X86_TDX_ARCH_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx_errno.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx_errno.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..6ff4672c4181
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx_errno.h
@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+/* architectural status code for SEAMCALL */
+
+#ifndef __KVM_X86_TDX_ERRNO_H
+#define __KVM_X86_TDX_ERRNO_H
+
+#define TDX_SEAMCALL_STATUS_MASK 0xFFFFFFFF00000000ULL
+
+/*
+ * TDX SEAMCALL Status Codes (returned in RAX)
+ */
+#define TDX_NON_RECOVERABLE_VCPU 0x4000000100000000ULL
+#define TDX_NON_RECOVERABLE_TD 0x4000000200000000ULL
+#define TDX_NON_RECOVERABLE_TD_NON_ACCESSIBLE 0x6000000500000000ULL
+#define TDX_NON_RECOVERABLE_TD_WRONG_APIC_MODE 0x6000000700000000ULL
+#define TDX_INTERRUPTED_RESUMABLE 0x8000000300000000ULL
+#define TDX_OPERAND_INVALID 0xC000010000000000ULL
+#define TDX_OPERAND_BUSY 0x8000020000000000ULL
+#define TDX_PREVIOUS_TLB_EPOCH_BUSY 0x8000020100000000ULL
+#define TDX_PAGE_METADATA_INCORRECT 0xC000030000000000ULL
+#define TDX_VCPU_NOT_ASSOCIATED 0x8000070200000000ULL
+#define TDX_KEY_GENERATION_FAILED 0x8000080000000000ULL
+#define TDX_KEY_STATE_INCORRECT 0xC000081100000000ULL
+#define TDX_KEY_CONFIGURED 0x0000081500000000ULL
+#define TDX_NO_HKID_READY_TO_WBCACHE 0x0000082100000000ULL
+#define TDX_FLUSHVP_NOT_DONE 0x8000082400000000ULL
+#define TDX_EPT_WALK_FAILED 0xC0000B0000000000ULL
+#define TDX_EPT_ENTRY_STATE_INCORRECT 0xC0000B0D00000000ULL
+#define TDX_METADATA_FIELD_NOT_READABLE 0xC0000C0200000000ULL
+
+/*
+ * TDX module operand ID, appears in 31:0 part of error code as
+ * detail information
+ */
+#define TDX_OPERAND_ID_RCX 0x01
+#define TDX_OPERAND_ID_TDR 0x80
+#define TDX_OPERAND_ID_SEPT 0x92
+#define TDX_OPERAND_ID_TD_EPOCH 0xa9
+
+#endif /* __KVM_X86_TDX_ERRNO_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S
index f6986dee6f8c..0a6cf5bff2aa 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S
@@ -59,8 +59,7 @@
* without the explicit restore, thinks the stack is getting walloped.
* Using an unwind hint is problematic due to x86-64's dynamic alignment.
*/
- mov %_ASM_BP, %_ASM_SP
- pop %_ASM_BP
+ leave
RET
.endm
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
index 157c23db22be..4953846cb30d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
@@ -54,6 +54,7 @@
#include <trace/events/ipi.h>
#include "capabilities.h"
+#include "common.h"
#include "cpuid.h"
#include "hyperv.h"
#include "kvm_onhyperv.h"
@@ -116,6 +117,8 @@ module_param(enable_apicv, bool, 0444);
bool __read_mostly enable_ipiv = true;
module_param(enable_ipiv, bool, 0444);
+module_param(enable_device_posted_irqs, bool, 0444);
+
/*
* If nested=1, nested virtualization is supported, i.e., guests may use
* VMX and be a hypervisor for its own guests. If nested=0, guests may not
@@ -771,8 +774,11 @@ void vmx_emergency_disable_virtualization_cpu(void)
return;
list_for_each_entry(v, &per_cpu(loaded_vmcss_on_cpu, cpu),
- loaded_vmcss_on_cpu_link)
+ loaded_vmcss_on_cpu_link) {
vmcs_clear(v->vmcs);
+ if (v->shadow_vmcs)
+ vmcs_clear(v->shadow_vmcs);
+ }
kvm_cpu_vmxoff();
}
@@ -1283,6 +1289,7 @@ void vmx_set_host_fs_gs(struct vmcs_host_state *host, u16 fs_sel, u16 gs_sel,
void vmx_prepare_switch_to_guest(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+ struct vcpu_vt *vt = to_vt(vcpu);
struct vmcs_host_state *host_state;
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
int cpu = raw_smp_processor_id();
@@ -1311,7 +1318,7 @@ void vmx_prepare_switch_to_guest(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
if (vmx->nested.need_vmcs12_to_shadow_sync)
nested_sync_vmcs12_to_shadow(vcpu);
- if (vmx->guest_state_loaded)
+ if (vt->guest_state_loaded)
return;
host_state = &vmx->loaded_vmcs->host_state;
@@ -1332,12 +1339,12 @@ void vmx_prepare_switch_to_guest(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
fs_sel = current->thread.fsindex;
gs_sel = current->thread.gsindex;
fs_base = current->thread.fsbase;
- vmx->msr_host_kernel_gs_base = current->thread.gsbase;
+ vt->msr_host_kernel_gs_base = current->thread.gsbase;
} else {
savesegment(fs, fs_sel);
savesegment(gs, gs_sel);
fs_base = read_msr(MSR_FS_BASE);
- vmx->msr_host_kernel_gs_base = read_msr(MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE);
+ vt->msr_host_kernel_gs_base = read_msr(MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE);
}
wrmsrq(MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE, vmx->msr_guest_kernel_gs_base);
@@ -1349,14 +1356,14 @@ void vmx_prepare_switch_to_guest(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
#endif
vmx_set_host_fs_gs(host_state, fs_sel, gs_sel, fs_base, gs_base);
- vmx->guest_state_loaded = true;
+ vt->guest_state_loaded = true;
}
static void vmx_prepare_switch_to_host(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
{
struct vmcs_host_state *host_state;
- if (!vmx->guest_state_loaded)
+ if (!vmx->vt.guest_state_loaded)
return;
host_state = &vmx->loaded_vmcs->host_state;
@@ -1384,10 +1391,10 @@ static void vmx_prepare_switch_to_host(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
#endif
invalidate_tss_limit();
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
- wrmsrq(MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE, vmx->msr_host_kernel_gs_base);
+ wrmsrq(MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE, vmx->vt.msr_host_kernel_gs_base);
#endif
load_fixmap_gdt(raw_smp_processor_id());
- vmx->guest_state_loaded = false;
+ vmx->vt.guest_state_loaded = false;
vmx->guest_uret_msrs_loaded = false;
}
@@ -1395,7 +1402,7 @@ static void vmx_prepare_switch_to_host(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
static u64 vmx_read_guest_kernel_gs_base(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
{
preempt_disable();
- if (vmx->guest_state_loaded)
+ if (vmx->vt.guest_state_loaded)
rdmsrq(MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE, vmx->msr_guest_kernel_gs_base);
preempt_enable();
return vmx->msr_guest_kernel_gs_base;
@@ -1404,7 +1411,7 @@ static u64 vmx_read_guest_kernel_gs_base(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
static void vmx_write_guest_kernel_gs_base(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, u64 data)
{
preempt_disable();
- if (vmx->guest_state_loaded)
+ if (vmx->vt.guest_state_loaded)
wrmsrq(MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE, data);
preempt_enable();
vmx->msr_guest_kernel_gs_base = data;
@@ -1443,8 +1450,7 @@ static void shrink_ple_window(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
}
}
-void vmx_vcpu_load_vmcs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int cpu,
- struct loaded_vmcs *buddy)
+void vmx_vcpu_load_vmcs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int cpu)
{
struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
bool already_loaded = vmx->loaded_vmcs->cpu == cpu;
@@ -1471,17 +1477,6 @@ void vmx_vcpu_load_vmcs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int cpu,
if (prev != vmx->loaded_vmcs->vmcs) {
per_cpu(current_vmcs, cpu) = vmx->loaded_vmcs->vmcs;
vmcs_load(vmx->loaded_vmcs->vmcs);
-
- /*
- * No indirect branch prediction barrier needed when switching
- * the active VMCS within a vCPU, unless IBRS is advertised to
- * the vCPU. To minimize the number of IBPBs executed, KVM
- * performs IBPB on nested VM-Exit (a single nested transition
- * may switch the active VMCS multiple times).
- */
- if (static_branch_likely(&switch_vcpu_ibpb) &&
- (!buddy || WARN_ON_ONCE(buddy->vmcs != prev)))
- indirect_branch_prediction_barrier();
}
if (!already_loaded) {
@@ -1520,7 +1515,7 @@ void vmx_vcpu_load(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int cpu)
if (vcpu->scheduled_out && !kvm_pause_in_guest(vcpu->kvm))
shrink_ple_window(vcpu);
- vmx_vcpu_load_vmcs(vcpu, cpu, NULL);
+ vmx_vcpu_load_vmcs(vcpu, cpu);
vmx_vcpu_pi_load(vcpu, cpu);
}
@@ -1581,7 +1576,7 @@ void vmx_set_rflags(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long rflags)
vmcs_writel(GUEST_RFLAGS, rflags);
if ((old_rflags ^ vmx->rflags) & X86_EFLAGS_VM)
- vmx->emulation_required = vmx_emulation_required(vcpu);
+ vmx->vt.emulation_required = vmx_emulation_required(vcpu);
}
bool vmx_get_if_flag(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
@@ -1701,7 +1696,7 @@ int vmx_check_emulate_instruction(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int emul_type,
* so that guest userspace can't DoS the guest simply by triggering
* emulation (enclaves are CPL3 only).
*/
- if (to_vmx(vcpu)->exit_reason.enclave_mode) {
+ if (vmx_get_exit_reason(vcpu).enclave_mode) {
kvm_queue_exception(vcpu, UD_VECTOR);
return X86EMUL_PROPAGATE_FAULT;
}
@@ -1716,7 +1711,7 @@ int vmx_check_emulate_instruction(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int emul_type,
static int skip_emulated_instruction(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
- union vmx_exit_reason exit_reason = to_vmx(vcpu)->exit_reason;
+ union vmx_exit_reason exit_reason = vmx_get_exit_reason(vcpu);
unsigned long rip, orig_rip;
u32 instr_len;
@@ -1863,7 +1858,7 @@ void vmx_inject_exception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
return;
}
- WARN_ON_ONCE(vmx->emulation_required);
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(vmx->vt.emulation_required);
if (kvm_exception_is_soft(ex->vector)) {
vmcs_write32(VM_ENTRY_INSTRUCTION_LEN,
@@ -3406,7 +3401,7 @@ void vmx_set_cr0(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long cr0)
}
/* depends on vcpu->arch.cr0 to be set to a new value */
- vmx->emulation_required = vmx_emulation_required(vcpu);
+ vmx->vt.emulation_required = vmx_emulation_required(vcpu);
}
static int vmx_get_max_ept_level(void)
@@ -3669,7 +3664,7 @@ void vmx_set_segment(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_segment *var, int seg)
{
__vmx_set_segment(vcpu, var, seg);
- to_vmx(vcpu)->emulation_required = vmx_emulation_required(vcpu);
+ to_vmx(vcpu)->vt.emulation_required = vmx_emulation_required(vcpu);
}
void vmx_get_cs_db_l_bits(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int *db, int *l)
@@ -4197,50 +4192,6 @@ void vmx_msr_filter_changed(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
pt_update_intercept_for_msr(vcpu);
}
-static inline void kvm_vcpu_trigger_posted_interrupt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
- int pi_vec)
-{
-#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
- if (vcpu->mode == IN_GUEST_MODE) {
- /*
- * The vector of the virtual has already been set in the PIR.
- * Send a notification event to deliver the virtual interrupt
- * unless the vCPU is the currently running vCPU, i.e. the
- * event is being sent from a fastpath VM-Exit handler, in
- * which case the PIR will be synced to the vIRR before
- * re-entering the guest.
- *
- * When the target is not the running vCPU, the following
- * possibilities emerge:
- *
- * Case 1: vCPU stays in non-root mode. Sending a notification
- * event posts the interrupt to the vCPU.
- *
- * Case 2: vCPU exits to root mode and is still runnable. The
- * PIR will be synced to the vIRR before re-entering the guest.
- * Sending a notification event is ok as the host IRQ handler
- * will ignore the spurious event.
- *
- * Case 3: vCPU exits to root mode and is blocked. vcpu_block()
- * has already synced PIR to vIRR and never blocks the vCPU if
- * the vIRR is not empty. Therefore, a blocked vCPU here does
- * not wait for any requested interrupts in PIR, and sending a
- * notification event also results in a benign, spurious event.
- */
-
- if (vcpu != kvm_get_running_vcpu())
- __apic_send_IPI_mask(get_cpu_mask(vcpu->cpu), pi_vec);
- return;
- }
-#endif
- /*
- * The vCPU isn't in the guest; wake the vCPU in case it is blocking,
- * otherwise do nothing as KVM will grab the highest priority pending
- * IRQ via ->sync_pir_to_irr() in vcpu_enter_guest().
- */
- kvm_vcpu_wake_up(vcpu);
-}
-
static int vmx_deliver_nested_posted_interrupt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
int vector)
{
@@ -4289,7 +4240,7 @@ static int vmx_deliver_nested_posted_interrupt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
*/
static int vmx_deliver_posted_interrupt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int vector)
{
- struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+ struct vcpu_vt *vt = to_vt(vcpu);
int r;
r = vmx_deliver_nested_posted_interrupt(vcpu, vector);
@@ -4300,20 +4251,7 @@ static int vmx_deliver_posted_interrupt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int vector)
if (!vcpu->arch.apic->apicv_active)
return -1;
- if (pi_test_and_set_pir(vector, &vmx->pi_desc))
- return 0;
-
- /* If a previous notification has sent the IPI, nothing to do. */
- if (pi_test_and_set_on(&vmx->pi_desc))
- return 0;
-
- /*
- * The implied barrier in pi_test_and_set_on() pairs with the smp_mb_*()
- * after setting vcpu->mode in vcpu_enter_guest(), thus the vCPU is
- * guaranteed to see PID.ON=1 and sync the PIR to IRR if triggering a
- * posted interrupt "fails" because vcpu->mode != IN_GUEST_MODE.
- */
- kvm_vcpu_trigger_posted_interrupt(vcpu, POSTED_INTR_VECTOR);
+ __vmx_deliver_posted_interrupt(vcpu, &vt->pi_desc, vector);
return 0;
}
@@ -4780,7 +4718,7 @@ static void init_vmcs(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
vmcs_write16(GUEST_INTR_STATUS, 0);
vmcs_write16(POSTED_INTR_NV, POSTED_INTR_VECTOR);
- vmcs_write64(POSTED_INTR_DESC_ADDR, __pa((&vmx->pi_desc)));
+ vmcs_write64(POSTED_INTR_DESC_ADDR, __pa((&vmx->vt.pi_desc)));
}
if (vmx_can_use_ipiv(&vmx->vcpu)) {
@@ -4893,8 +4831,8 @@ static void __vmx_vcpu_reset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
* Enforce invariant: pi_desc.nv is always either POSTED_INTR_VECTOR
* or POSTED_INTR_WAKEUP_VECTOR.
*/
- vmx->pi_desc.nv = POSTED_INTR_VECTOR;
- __pi_set_sn(&vmx->pi_desc);
+ vmx->vt.pi_desc.nv = POSTED_INTR_VECTOR;
+ __pi_set_sn(&vmx->vt.pi_desc);
}
void vmx_vcpu_reset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool init_event)
@@ -5811,11 +5749,8 @@ static int handle_task_switch(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
static int handle_ept_violation(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
- unsigned long exit_qualification;
+ unsigned long exit_qualification = vmx_get_exit_qual(vcpu);
gpa_t gpa;
- u64 error_code;
-
- exit_qualification = vmx_get_exit_qual(vcpu);
/*
* EPT violation happened while executing iret from NMI,
@@ -5831,23 +5766,6 @@ static int handle_ept_violation(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
gpa = vmcs_read64(GUEST_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS);
trace_kvm_page_fault(vcpu, gpa, exit_qualification);
- /* Is it a read fault? */
- error_code = (exit_qualification & EPT_VIOLATION_ACC_READ)
- ? PFERR_USER_MASK : 0;
- /* Is it a write fault? */
- error_code |= (exit_qualification & EPT_VIOLATION_ACC_WRITE)
- ? PFERR_WRITE_MASK : 0;
- /* Is it a fetch fault? */
- error_code |= (exit_qualification & EPT_VIOLATION_ACC_INSTR)
- ? PFERR_FETCH_MASK : 0;
- /* ept page table entry is present? */
- error_code |= (exit_qualification & EPT_VIOLATION_PROT_MASK)
- ? PFERR_PRESENT_MASK : 0;
-
- if (error_code & EPT_VIOLATION_GVA_IS_VALID)
- error_code |= (exit_qualification & EPT_VIOLATION_GVA_TRANSLATED) ?
- PFERR_GUEST_FINAL_MASK : PFERR_GUEST_PAGE_MASK;
-
/*
* Check that the GPA doesn't exceed physical memory limits, as that is
* a guest page fault. We have to emulate the instruction here, because
@@ -5859,7 +5777,7 @@ static int handle_ept_violation(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
if (unlikely(allow_smaller_maxphyaddr && !kvm_vcpu_is_legal_gpa(vcpu, gpa)))
return kvm_emulate_instruction(vcpu, 0);
- return kvm_mmu_page_fault(vcpu, gpa, error_code, NULL, 0);
+ return __vmx_handle_ept_violation(vcpu, gpa, exit_qualification);
}
static int handle_ept_misconfig(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
@@ -5904,7 +5822,7 @@ static bool vmx_unhandleable_emulation_required(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
- if (!vmx->emulation_required)
+ if (!vmx->vt.emulation_required)
return false;
/*
@@ -5936,7 +5854,7 @@ static int handle_invalid_guest_state(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
intr_window_requested = exec_controls_get(vmx) &
CPU_BASED_INTR_WINDOW_EXITING;
- while (vmx->emulation_required && count-- != 0) {
+ while (vmx->vt.emulation_required && count-- != 0) {
if (intr_window_requested && !vmx_interrupt_blocked(vcpu))
return handle_interrupt_window(&vmx->vcpu);
@@ -6131,7 +6049,7 @@ static int handle_bus_lock_vmexit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
* VM-Exits. Unconditionally set the flag here and leave the handling to
* vmx_handle_exit().
*/
- to_vmx(vcpu)->exit_reason.bus_lock_detected = true;
+ to_vt(vcpu)->exit_reason.bus_lock_detected = true;
return 1;
}
@@ -6229,9 +6147,9 @@ void vmx_get_exit_info(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 *reason,
{
struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
- *reason = vmx->exit_reason.full;
+ *reason = vmx->vt.exit_reason.full;
*info1 = vmx_get_exit_qual(vcpu);
- if (!(vmx->exit_reason.failed_vmentry)) {
+ if (!(vmx->vt.exit_reason.failed_vmentry)) {
*info2 = vmx->idt_vectoring_info;
*intr_info = vmx_get_intr_info(vcpu);
if (is_exception_with_error_code(*intr_info))
@@ -6527,7 +6445,7 @@ void dump_vmcs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
static int __vmx_handle_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, fastpath_t exit_fastpath)
{
struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
- union vmx_exit_reason exit_reason = vmx->exit_reason;
+ union vmx_exit_reason exit_reason = vmx_get_exit_reason(vcpu);
u32 vectoring_info = vmx->idt_vectoring_info;
u16 exit_handler_index;
@@ -6583,7 +6501,7 @@ static int __vmx_handle_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, fastpath_t exit_fastpath)
* the least awful solution for the userspace case without
* risking false positives.
*/
- if (vmx->emulation_required) {
+ if (vmx->vt.emulation_required) {
nested_vmx_vmexit(vcpu, EXIT_REASON_TRIPLE_FAULT, 0, 0);
return 1;
}
@@ -6593,7 +6511,7 @@ static int __vmx_handle_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, fastpath_t exit_fastpath)
}
/* If guest state is invalid, start emulating. L2 is handled above. */
- if (vmx->emulation_required)
+ if (vmx->vt.emulation_required)
return handle_invalid_guest_state(vcpu);
if (exit_reason.failed_vmentry) {
@@ -6693,7 +6611,7 @@ int vmx_handle_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, fastpath_t exit_fastpath)
* Exit to user space when bus lock detected to inform that there is
* a bus lock in guest.
*/
- if (to_vmx(vcpu)->exit_reason.bus_lock_detected) {
+ if (vmx_get_exit_reason(vcpu).bus_lock_detected) {
if (ret > 0)
vcpu->run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_X86_BUS_LOCK;
@@ -6972,22 +6890,22 @@ static void vmx_set_rvi(int vector)
int vmx_sync_pir_to_irr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
- struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+ struct vcpu_vt *vt = to_vt(vcpu);
int max_irr;
bool got_posted_interrupt;
if (KVM_BUG_ON(!enable_apicv, vcpu->kvm))
return -EIO;
- if (pi_test_on(&vmx->pi_desc)) {
- pi_clear_on(&vmx->pi_desc);
+ if (pi_test_on(&vt->pi_desc)) {
+ pi_clear_on(&vt->pi_desc);
/*
* IOMMU can write to PID.ON, so the barrier matters even on UP.
* But on x86 this is just a compiler barrier anyway.
*/
smp_mb__after_atomic();
got_posted_interrupt =
- kvm_apic_update_irr(vcpu, vmx->pi_desc.pir, &max_irr);
+ kvm_apic_update_irr(vcpu, vt->pi_desc.pir, &max_irr);
} else {
max_irr = kvm_lapic_find_highest_irr(vcpu);
got_posted_interrupt = false;
@@ -7027,14 +6945,6 @@ void vmx_load_eoi_exitmap(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 *eoi_exit_bitmap)
vmcs_write64(EOI_EXIT_BITMAP3, eoi_exit_bitmap[3]);
}
-void vmx_apicv_pre_state_restore(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
-{
- struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
-
- pi_clear_on(&vmx->pi_desc);
- memset(vmx->pi_desc.pir, 0, sizeof(vmx->pi_desc.pir));
-}
-
void vmx_do_interrupt_irqoff(unsigned long entry);
void vmx_do_nmi_irqoff(void);
@@ -7091,14 +7001,12 @@ static void handle_external_interrupt_irqoff(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
void vmx_handle_exit_irqoff(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
- struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
-
- if (vmx->emulation_required)
+ if (to_vt(vcpu)->emulation_required)
return;
- if (vmx->exit_reason.basic == EXIT_REASON_EXTERNAL_INTERRUPT)
+ if (vmx_get_exit_reason(vcpu).basic == EXIT_REASON_EXTERNAL_INTERRUPT)
handle_external_interrupt_irqoff(vcpu, vmx_get_intr_info(vcpu));
- else if (vmx->exit_reason.basic == EXIT_REASON_EXCEPTION_NMI)
+ else if (vmx_get_exit_reason(vcpu).basic == EXIT_REASON_EXCEPTION_NMI)
handle_exception_irqoff(vcpu, vmx_get_intr_info(vcpu));
}
@@ -7333,10 +7241,10 @@ static fastpath_t vmx_exit_handlers_fastpath(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
* the fastpath even, all other exits must use the slow path.
*/
if (is_guest_mode(vcpu) &&
- to_vmx(vcpu)->exit_reason.basic != EXIT_REASON_PREEMPTION_TIMER)
+ vmx_get_exit_reason(vcpu).basic != EXIT_REASON_PREEMPTION_TIMER)
return EXIT_FASTPATH_NONE;
- switch (to_vmx(vcpu)->exit_reason.basic) {
+ switch (vmx_get_exit_reason(vcpu).basic) {
case EXIT_REASON_MSR_WRITE:
return handle_fastpath_set_msr_irqoff(vcpu);
case EXIT_REASON_PREEMPTION_TIMER:
@@ -7348,6 +7256,20 @@ static fastpath_t vmx_exit_handlers_fastpath(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
}
}
+noinstr void vmx_handle_nmi(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ if ((u16)vmx_get_exit_reason(vcpu).basic != EXIT_REASON_EXCEPTION_NMI ||
+ !is_nmi(vmx_get_intr_info(vcpu)))
+ return;
+
+ kvm_before_interrupt(vcpu, KVM_HANDLING_NMI);
+ if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_FRED))
+ fred_entry_from_kvm(EVENT_TYPE_NMI, NMI_VECTOR);
+ else
+ vmx_do_nmi_irqoff();
+ kvm_after_interrupt(vcpu);
+}
+
static noinstr void vmx_vcpu_enter_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
unsigned int flags)
{
@@ -7387,23 +7309,15 @@ static noinstr void vmx_vcpu_enter_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
vmx_enable_fb_clear(vmx);
if (unlikely(vmx->fail)) {
- vmx->exit_reason.full = 0xdead;
+ vmx->vt.exit_reason.full = 0xdead;
goto out;
}
- vmx->exit_reason.full = vmcs_read32(VM_EXIT_REASON);
- if (likely(!vmx->exit_reason.failed_vmentry))
+ vmx->vt.exit_reason.full = vmcs_read32(VM_EXIT_REASON);
+ if (likely(!vmx_get_exit_reason(vcpu).failed_vmentry))
vmx->idt_vectoring_info = vmcs_read32(IDT_VECTORING_INFO_FIELD);
- if ((u16)vmx->exit_reason.basic == EXIT_REASON_EXCEPTION_NMI &&
- is_nmi(vmx_get_intr_info(vcpu))) {
- kvm_before_interrupt(vcpu, KVM_HANDLING_NMI);
- if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_FRED))
- fred_entry_from_kvm(EVENT_TYPE_NMI, NMI_VECTOR);
- else
- vmx_do_nmi_irqoff();
- kvm_after_interrupt(vcpu);
- }
+ vmx_handle_nmi(vcpu);
out:
guest_state_exit_irqoff();
@@ -7424,15 +7338,15 @@ fastpath_t vmx_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool force_immediate_exit)
* start emulation until we arrive back to a valid state. Synthesize a
* consistency check VM-Exit due to invalid guest state and bail.
*/
- if (unlikely(vmx->emulation_required)) {
+ if (unlikely(vmx->vt.emulation_required)) {
vmx->fail = 0;
- vmx->exit_reason.full = EXIT_REASON_INVALID_STATE;
- vmx->exit_reason.failed_vmentry = 1;
+ vmx->vt.exit_reason.full = EXIT_REASON_INVALID_STATE;
+ vmx->vt.exit_reason.failed_vmentry = 1;
kvm_register_mark_available(vcpu, VCPU_EXREG_EXIT_INFO_1);
- vmx->exit_qualification = ENTRY_FAIL_DEFAULT;
+ vmx->vt.exit_qualification = ENTRY_FAIL_DEFAULT;
kvm_register_mark_available(vcpu, VCPU_EXREG_EXIT_INFO_2);
- vmx->exit_intr_info = 0;
+ vmx->vt.exit_intr_info = 0;
return EXIT_FASTPATH_NONE;
}
@@ -7535,7 +7449,7 @@ fastpath_t vmx_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool force_immediate_exit)
* checking.
*/
if (vmx->nested.nested_run_pending &&
- !vmx->exit_reason.failed_vmentry)
+ !vmx_get_exit_reason(vcpu).failed_vmentry)
++vcpu->stat.nested_run;
vmx->nested.nested_run_pending = 0;
@@ -7544,12 +7458,12 @@ fastpath_t vmx_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool force_immediate_exit)
if (unlikely(vmx->fail))
return EXIT_FASTPATH_NONE;
- if (unlikely((u16)vmx->exit_reason.basic == EXIT_REASON_MCE_DURING_VMENTRY))
+ if (unlikely((u16)vmx_get_exit_reason(vcpu).basic == EXIT_REASON_MCE_DURING_VMENTRY))
kvm_machine_check();
trace_kvm_exit(vcpu, KVM_ISA_VMX);
- if (unlikely(vmx->exit_reason.failed_vmentry))
+ if (unlikely(vmx_get_exit_reason(vcpu).failed_vmentry))
return EXIT_FASTPATH_NONE;
vmx->loaded_vmcs->launched = 1;
@@ -7581,7 +7495,7 @@ int vmx_vcpu_create(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
BUILD_BUG_ON(offsetof(struct vcpu_vmx, vcpu) != 0);
vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
- INIT_LIST_HEAD(&vmx->pi_wakeup_list);
+ INIT_LIST_HEAD(&vmx->vt.pi_wakeup_list);
err = -ENOMEM;
@@ -7679,7 +7593,7 @@ int vmx_vcpu_create(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
if (vmx_can_use_ipiv(vcpu))
WRITE_ONCE(to_kvm_vmx(vcpu->kvm)->pid_table[vcpu->vcpu_id],
- __pa(&vmx->pi_desc) | PID_TABLE_ENTRY_VALID);
+ __pa(&vmx->vt.pi_desc) | PID_TABLE_ENTRY_VALID);
return 0;
@@ -7724,9 +7638,23 @@ int vmx_vm_init(struct kvm *kvm)
break;
}
}
+
+ if (enable_pml)
+ kvm->arch.cpu_dirty_log_size = PML_LOG_NR_ENTRIES;
return 0;
}
+static inline bool vmx_ignore_guest_pat(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+ /*
+ * Non-coherent DMA devices need the guest to flush CPU properly.
+ * In that case it is not possible to map all guest RAM as WB, so
+ * always trust guest PAT.
+ */
+ return !kvm_arch_has_noncoherent_dma(kvm) &&
+ kvm_check_has_quirk(kvm, KVM_X86_QUIRK_IGNORE_GUEST_PAT);
+}
+
u8 vmx_get_mt_mask(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gfn_t gfn, bool is_mmio)
{
/*
@@ -7736,13 +7664,8 @@ u8 vmx_get_mt_mask(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gfn_t gfn, bool is_mmio)
if (is_mmio)
return MTRR_TYPE_UNCACHABLE << VMX_EPT_MT_EPTE_SHIFT;
- /*
- * Force WB and ignore guest PAT if the VM does NOT have a non-coherent
- * device attached. Letting the guest control memory types on Intel
- * CPUs may result in unexpected behavior, and so KVM's ABI is to trust
- * the guest to behave only as a last resort.
- */
- if (!kvm_arch_has_noncoherent_dma(vcpu->kvm))
+ /* Force WB if ignoring guest PAT */
+ if (vmx_ignore_guest_pat(vcpu->kvm))
return (MTRR_TYPE_WRBACK << VMX_EPT_MT_EPTE_SHIFT) | VMX_EPT_IPAT_BIT;
return (MTRR_TYPE_WRBACK << VMX_EPT_MT_EPTE_SHIFT);
@@ -8604,6 +8527,8 @@ __init int vmx_hardware_setup(void)
if (enable_ept)
kvm_mmu_set_ept_masks(enable_ept_ad_bits,
cpu_has_vmx_ept_execute_only());
+ else
+ vt_x86_ops.get_mt_mask = NULL;
/*
* Setup shadow_me_value/shadow_me_mask to include MKTME KeyID
@@ -8621,9 +8546,6 @@ __init int vmx_hardware_setup(void)
if (!enable_ept || !enable_ept_ad_bits || !cpu_has_vmx_pml())
enable_pml = 0;
- if (!enable_pml)
- vt_x86_ops.cpu_dirty_log_size = 0;
-
if (!cpu_has_vmx_preemption_timer())
enable_preemption_timer = false;
@@ -8681,6 +8603,27 @@ __init int vmx_hardware_setup(void)
kvm_set_posted_intr_wakeup_handler(pi_wakeup_handler);
+ /*
+ * On Intel CPUs that lack self-snoop feature, letting the guest control
+ * memory types may result in unexpected behavior. So always ignore guest
+ * PAT on those CPUs and map VM as writeback, not allowing userspace to
+ * disable the quirk.
+ *
+ * On certain Intel CPUs (e.g. SPR, ICX), though self-snoop feature is
+ * supported, UC is slow enough to cause issues with some older guests (e.g.
+ * an old version of bochs driver uses ioremap() instead of ioremap_wc() to
+ * map the video RAM, causing wayland desktop to fail to get started
+ * correctly). To avoid breaking those older guests that rely on KVM to force
+ * memory type to WB, provide KVM_X86_QUIRK_IGNORE_GUEST_PAT to preserve the
+ * safer (for performance) default behavior.
+ *
+ * On top of this, non-coherent DMA devices need the guest to flush CPU
+ * caches properly. This also requires honoring guest PAT, and is forced
+ * independent of the quirk in vmx_ignore_guest_pat().
+ */
+ if (!static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SELFSNOOP))
+ kvm_caps.supported_quirks &= ~KVM_X86_QUIRK_IGNORE_GUEST_PAT;
+ kvm_caps.inapplicable_quirks &= ~KVM_X86_QUIRK_IGNORE_GUEST_PAT;
return r;
}
@@ -8694,23 +8637,16 @@ static void vmx_cleanup_l1d_flush(void)
l1tf_vmx_mitigation = VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_AUTO;
}
-static void __vmx_exit(void)
+void vmx_exit(void)
{
allow_smaller_maxphyaddr = false;
vmx_cleanup_l1d_flush();
-}
-static void __exit vmx_exit(void)
-{
- kvm_exit();
- __vmx_exit();
kvm_x86_vendor_exit();
-
}
-module_exit(vmx_exit);
-static int __init vmx_init(void)
+int __init vmx_init(void)
{
int r, cpu;
@@ -8754,21 +8690,9 @@ static int __init vmx_init(void)
if (!enable_ept)
allow_smaller_maxphyaddr = true;
- /*
- * Common KVM initialization _must_ come last, after this, /dev/kvm is
- * exposed to userspace!
- */
- r = kvm_init(sizeof(struct vcpu_vmx), __alignof__(struct vcpu_vmx),
- THIS_MODULE);
- if (r)
- goto err_kvm_init;
-
return 0;
-err_kvm_init:
- __vmx_exit();
err_l1d_flush:
kvm_x86_vendor_exit();
return r;
}
-module_init(vmx_init);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h
index 951e44dc9d0e..b5758c33c60f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h
@@ -11,11 +11,13 @@
#include "capabilities.h"
#include "../kvm_cache_regs.h"
+#include "pmu_intel.h"
#include "vmcs.h"
#include "vmx_ops.h"
#include "../cpuid.h"
#include "run_flags.h"
#include "../mmu.h"
+#include "common.h"
#define X2APIC_MSR(r) (APIC_BASE_MSR + ((r) >> 4))
@@ -67,47 +69,6 @@ struct pt_desc {
struct pt_ctx guest;
};
-union vmx_exit_reason {
- struct {
- u32 basic : 16;
- u32 reserved16 : 1;
- u32 reserved17 : 1;
- u32 reserved18 : 1;
- u32 reserved19 : 1;
- u32 reserved20 : 1;
- u32 reserved21 : 1;
- u32 reserved22 : 1;
- u32 reserved23 : 1;
- u32 reserved24 : 1;
- u32 reserved25 : 1;
- u32 bus_lock_detected : 1;
- u32 enclave_mode : 1;
- u32 smi_pending_mtf : 1;
- u32 smi_from_vmx_root : 1;
- u32 reserved30 : 1;
- u32 failed_vmentry : 1;
- };
- u32 full;
-};
-
-struct lbr_desc {
- /* Basic info about guest LBR records. */
- struct x86_pmu_lbr records;
-
- /*
- * Emulate LBR feature via passthrough LBR registers when the
- * per-vcpu guest LBR event is scheduled on the current pcpu.
- *
- * The records may be inaccurate if the host reclaims the LBR.
- */
- struct perf_event *event;
-
- /* True if LBRs are marked as not intercepted in the MSR bitmap */
- bool msr_passthrough;
-};
-
-extern struct x86_pmu_lbr vmx_lbr_caps;
-
/*
* The nested_vmx structure is part of vcpu_vmx, and holds information we need
* for correct emulation of VMX (i.e., nested VMX) on this vcpu.
@@ -248,20 +209,10 @@ struct nested_vmx {
struct vcpu_vmx {
struct kvm_vcpu vcpu;
+ struct vcpu_vt vt;
u8 fail;
u8 x2apic_msr_bitmap_mode;
- /*
- * If true, host state has been stored in vmx->loaded_vmcs for
- * the CPU registers that only need to be switched when transitioning
- * to/from the kernel, and the registers have been loaded with guest
- * values. If false, host state is loaded in the CPU registers
- * and vmx->loaded_vmcs->host_state is invalid.
- */
- bool guest_state_loaded;
-
- unsigned long exit_qualification;
- u32 exit_intr_info;
u32 idt_vectoring_info;
ulong rflags;
@@ -274,7 +225,6 @@ struct vcpu_vmx {
struct vmx_uret_msr guest_uret_msrs[MAX_NR_USER_RETURN_MSRS];
bool guest_uret_msrs_loaded;
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
- u64 msr_host_kernel_gs_base;
u64 msr_guest_kernel_gs_base;
#endif
@@ -313,15 +263,6 @@ struct vcpu_vmx {
} seg[8];
} segment_cache;
int vpid;
- bool emulation_required;
-
- union vmx_exit_reason exit_reason;
-
- /* Posted interrupt descriptor */
- struct pi_desc pi_desc;
-
- /* Used if this vCPU is waiting for PI notification wakeup. */
- struct list_head pi_wakeup_list;
/* Support for a guest hypervisor (nested VMX) */
struct nested_vmx nested;
@@ -376,8 +317,44 @@ struct kvm_vmx {
u64 *pid_table;
};
-void vmx_vcpu_load_vmcs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int cpu,
- struct loaded_vmcs *buddy);
+static __always_inline struct vcpu_vt *to_vt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ return &(container_of(vcpu, struct vcpu_vmx, vcpu)->vt);
+}
+
+static __always_inline struct kvm_vcpu *vt_to_vcpu(struct vcpu_vt *vt)
+{
+ return &(container_of(vt, struct vcpu_vmx, vt)->vcpu);
+}
+
+static __always_inline union vmx_exit_reason vmx_get_exit_reason(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ return to_vt(vcpu)->exit_reason;
+}
+
+static __always_inline unsigned long vmx_get_exit_qual(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ struct vcpu_vt *vt = to_vt(vcpu);
+
+ if (!kvm_register_test_and_mark_available(vcpu, VCPU_EXREG_EXIT_INFO_1) &&
+ !WARN_ON_ONCE(is_td_vcpu(vcpu)))
+ vt->exit_qualification = vmcs_readl(EXIT_QUALIFICATION);
+
+ return vt->exit_qualification;
+}
+
+static __always_inline u32 vmx_get_intr_info(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ struct vcpu_vt *vt = to_vt(vcpu);
+
+ if (!kvm_register_test_and_mark_available(vcpu, VCPU_EXREG_EXIT_INFO_2) &&
+ !WARN_ON_ONCE(is_td_vcpu(vcpu)))
+ vt->exit_intr_info = vmcs_read32(VM_EXIT_INTR_INFO);
+
+ return vt->exit_intr_info;
+}
+
+void vmx_vcpu_load_vmcs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int cpu);
int allocate_vpid(void);
void free_vpid(int vpid);
void vmx_set_constant_host_state(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx);
@@ -662,45 +639,10 @@ static __always_inline struct vcpu_vmx *to_vmx(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
return container_of(vcpu, struct vcpu_vmx, vcpu);
}
-static inline struct lbr_desc *vcpu_to_lbr_desc(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
-{
- return &to_vmx(vcpu)->lbr_desc;
-}
-
-static inline struct x86_pmu_lbr *vcpu_to_lbr_records(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
-{
- return &vcpu_to_lbr_desc(vcpu)->records;
-}
-
-static inline bool intel_pmu_lbr_is_enabled(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
-{
- return !!vcpu_to_lbr_records(vcpu)->nr;
-}
-
void intel_pmu_cross_mapped_check(struct kvm_pmu *pmu);
int intel_pmu_create_guest_lbr_event(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
void vmx_passthrough_lbr_msrs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
-static __always_inline unsigned long vmx_get_exit_qual(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
-{
- struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
-
- if (!kvm_register_test_and_mark_available(vcpu, VCPU_EXREG_EXIT_INFO_1))
- vmx->exit_qualification = vmcs_readl(EXIT_QUALIFICATION);
-
- return vmx->exit_qualification;
-}
-
-static __always_inline u32 vmx_get_intr_info(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
-{
- struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
-
- if (!kvm_register_test_and_mark_available(vcpu, VCPU_EXREG_EXIT_INFO_2))
- vmx->exit_intr_info = vmcs_read32(VM_EXIT_INTR_INFO);
-
- return vmx->exit_intr_info;
-}
-
struct vmcs *alloc_vmcs_cpu(bool shadow, int cpu, gfp_t flags);
void free_vmcs(struct vmcs *vmcs);
int alloc_loaded_vmcs(struct loaded_vmcs *loaded_vmcs);
@@ -758,4 +700,7 @@ static inline void vmx_segment_cache_clear(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
vmx->segment_cache.bitmask = 0;
}
+int vmx_init(void);
+void vmx_exit(void);
+
#endif /* __KVM_X86_VMX_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h
index 430773a5ef8e..b4596f651232 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h
@@ -46,7 +46,6 @@ int vmx_check_intercept(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
bool vmx_apic_init_signal_blocked(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
void vmx_migrate_timers(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
void vmx_set_virtual_apic_mode(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
-void vmx_apicv_pre_state_restore(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
void vmx_hwapic_isr_update(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int max_isr);
int vmx_sync_pir_to_irr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
void vmx_deliver_interrupt(struct kvm_lapic *apic, int delivery_mode,
@@ -58,6 +57,7 @@ void vmx_prepare_switch_to_guest(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
void vmx_update_exception_bitmap(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
int vmx_get_feature_msr(u32 msr, u64 *data);
int vmx_get_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info);
+#define vmx_complete_emulated_msr kvm_complete_insn_gp
u64 vmx_get_segment_base(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int seg);
void vmx_get_segment(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_segment *var, int seg);
void vmx_set_segment(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_segment *var, int seg);
@@ -121,4 +121,49 @@ void vmx_cancel_hv_timer(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
#endif
void vmx_setup_mce(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_INTEL_TDX
+void tdx_disable_virtualization_cpu(void);
+int tdx_vm_init(struct kvm *kvm);
+void tdx_mmu_release_hkid(struct kvm *kvm);
+void tdx_vm_destroy(struct kvm *kvm);
+int tdx_vm_ioctl(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp);
+
+int tdx_vcpu_create(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+void tdx_vcpu_reset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool init_event);
+void tdx_vcpu_free(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+void tdx_vcpu_load(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int cpu);
+int tdx_vcpu_pre_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+fastpath_t tdx_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool force_immediate_exit);
+void tdx_prepare_switch_to_guest(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+void tdx_vcpu_put(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+bool tdx_protected_apic_has_interrupt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+int tdx_handle_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+ enum exit_fastpath_completion fastpath);
+
+void tdx_deliver_interrupt(struct kvm_lapic *apic, int delivery_mode,
+ int trig_mode, int vector);
+void tdx_inject_nmi(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+void tdx_get_exit_info(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 *reason,
+ u64 *info1, u64 *info2, u32 *intr_info, u32 *error_code);
+bool tdx_has_emulated_msr(u32 index);
+int tdx_get_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr);
+int tdx_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr);
+
+int tdx_vcpu_ioctl(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, void __user *argp);
+
+int tdx_sept_link_private_spt(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t gfn,
+ enum pg_level level, void *private_spt);
+int tdx_sept_free_private_spt(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t gfn,
+ enum pg_level level, void *private_spt);
+int tdx_sept_set_private_spte(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t gfn,
+ enum pg_level level, kvm_pfn_t pfn);
+int tdx_sept_remove_private_spte(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t gfn,
+ enum pg_level level, kvm_pfn_t pfn);
+
+void tdx_flush_tlb_current(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+void tdx_flush_tlb_all(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+void tdx_load_mmu_pgd(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, hpa_t root_hpa, int root_level);
+int tdx_gmem_private_max_mapping_level(struct kvm *kvm, kvm_pfn_t pfn);
+#endif
+
#endif /* __KVM_X86_VMX_X86_OPS_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
index 5bdb5b854924..b58a74c1722d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
@@ -90,7 +90,6 @@
#include "trace.h"
#define MAX_IO_MSRS 256
-#define KVM_MAX_MCE_BANKS 32
/*
* Note, kvm_caps fields should *never* have default values, all fields must be
@@ -227,6 +226,9 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(allow_smaller_maxphyaddr);
bool __read_mostly enable_apicv = true;
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(enable_apicv);
+bool __read_mostly enable_device_posted_irqs = true;
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(enable_device_posted_irqs);
+
const struct _kvm_stats_desc kvm_vm_stats_desc[] = {
KVM_GENERIC_VM_STATS(),
STATS_DESC_COUNTER(VM, mmu_shadow_zapped),
@@ -636,6 +638,15 @@ static void kvm_user_return_msr_cpu_online(void)
}
}
+static void kvm_user_return_register_notifier(struct kvm_user_return_msrs *msrs)
+{
+ if (!msrs->registered) {
+ msrs->urn.on_user_return = kvm_on_user_return;
+ user_return_notifier_register(&msrs->urn);
+ msrs->registered = true;
+ }
+}
+
int kvm_set_user_return_msr(unsigned slot, u64 value, u64 mask)
{
struct kvm_user_return_msrs *msrs = this_cpu_ptr(user_return_msrs);
@@ -649,15 +660,20 @@ int kvm_set_user_return_msr(unsigned slot, u64 value, u64 mask)
return 1;
msrs->values[slot].curr = value;
- if (!msrs->registered) {
- msrs->urn.on_user_return = kvm_on_user_return;
- user_return_notifier_register(&msrs->urn);
- msrs->registered = true;
- }
+ kvm_user_return_register_notifier(msrs);
return 0;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_set_user_return_msr);
+void kvm_user_return_msr_update_cache(unsigned int slot, u64 value)
+{
+ struct kvm_user_return_msrs *msrs = this_cpu_ptr(user_return_msrs);
+
+ msrs->values[slot].curr = value;
+ kvm_user_return_register_notifier(msrs);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_user_return_msr_update_cache);
+
static void drop_user_return_notifiers(void)
{
struct kvm_user_return_msrs *msrs = this_cpu_ptr(user_return_msrs);
@@ -4739,6 +4755,8 @@ int kvm_vm_ioctl_check_extension(struct kvm *kvm, long ext)
break;
case KVM_CAP_MAX_VCPUS:
r = KVM_MAX_VCPUS;
+ if (kvm)
+ r = kvm->max_vcpus;
break;
case KVM_CAP_MAX_VCPU_ID:
r = KVM_MAX_VCPU_IDS;
@@ -4794,7 +4812,7 @@ int kvm_vm_ioctl_check_extension(struct kvm *kvm, long ext)
r = enable_pmu ? KVM_CAP_PMU_VALID_MASK : 0;
break;
case KVM_CAP_DISABLE_QUIRKS2:
- r = KVM_X86_VALID_QUIRKS;
+ r = kvm_caps.supported_quirks;
break;
case KVM_CAP_X86_NOTIFY_VMEXIT:
r = kvm_caps.has_notify_vmexit;
@@ -4975,6 +4993,8 @@ static bool need_emulate_wbinvd(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
return kvm_arch_has_noncoherent_dma(vcpu->kvm);
}
+static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct kvm_vcpu *, last_vcpu);
+
void kvm_arch_vcpu_load(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int cpu)
{
struct kvm_pmu *pmu = vcpu_to_pmu(vcpu);
@@ -4997,6 +5017,19 @@ void kvm_arch_vcpu_load(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int cpu)
kvm_x86_call(vcpu_load)(vcpu, cpu);
+ if (vcpu != per_cpu(last_vcpu, cpu)) {
+ /*
+ * Flush the branch predictor when switching vCPUs on the same
+ * physical CPU, as each vCPU needs its own branch prediction
+ * domain. No IBPB is needed when switching between L1 and L2
+ * on the same vCPU unless IBRS is advertised to the vCPU; that
+ * is handled on the nested VM-Exit path.
+ */
+ if (static_branch_likely(&switch_vcpu_ibpb))
+ indirect_branch_prediction_barrier();
+ per_cpu(last_vcpu, cpu) = vcpu;
+ }
+
/* Save host pkru register if supported */
vcpu->arch.host_pkru = read_pkru();
@@ -5117,6 +5150,9 @@ void kvm_arch_vcpu_put(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
static int kvm_vcpu_ioctl_get_lapic(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
struct kvm_lapic_state *s)
{
+ if (vcpu->arch.apic->guest_apic_protected)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
kvm_x86_call(sync_pir_to_irr)(vcpu);
return kvm_apic_get_state(vcpu, s);
@@ -5127,6 +5163,9 @@ static int kvm_vcpu_ioctl_set_lapic(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
{
int r;
+ if (vcpu->arch.apic->guest_apic_protected)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
r = kvm_apic_set_state(vcpu, s);
if (r)
return r;
@@ -6304,6 +6343,12 @@ long kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl(struct file *filp,
case KVM_SET_DEVICE_ATTR:
r = kvm_vcpu_ioctl_device_attr(vcpu, ioctl, argp);
break;
+ case KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_OP:
+ r = -ENOTTY;
+ if (!kvm_x86_ops.vcpu_mem_enc_ioctl)
+ goto out;
+ r = kvm_x86_ops.vcpu_mem_enc_ioctl(vcpu, argp);
+ break;
default:
r = -EINVAL;
}
@@ -6491,7 +6536,7 @@ void kvm_arch_sync_dirty_log(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_memory_slot *memslot)
struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu;
unsigned long i;
- if (!kvm_x86_ops.cpu_dirty_log_size)
+ if (!kvm->arch.cpu_dirty_log_size)
return;
kvm_for_each_vcpu(i, vcpu, kvm)
@@ -6521,11 +6566,11 @@ int kvm_vm_ioctl_enable_cap(struct kvm *kvm,
switch (cap->cap) {
case KVM_CAP_DISABLE_QUIRKS2:
r = -EINVAL;
- if (cap->args[0] & ~KVM_X86_VALID_QUIRKS)
+ if (cap->args[0] & ~kvm_caps.supported_quirks)
break;
fallthrough;
case KVM_CAP_DISABLE_QUIRKS:
- kvm->arch.disabled_quirks = cap->args[0];
+ kvm->arch.disabled_quirks |= cap->args[0] & kvm_caps.supported_quirks;
r = 0;
break;
case KVM_CAP_SPLIT_IRQCHIP: {
@@ -7299,14 +7344,13 @@ set_pit2_out:
r = READ_ONCE(kvm->arch.default_tsc_khz);
goto out;
}
- case KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_OP: {
+ case KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_OP:
r = -ENOTTY;
if (!kvm_x86_ops.mem_enc_ioctl)
goto out;
r = kvm_x86_call(mem_enc_ioctl)(kvm, argp);
break;
- }
case KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_REG_REGION: {
struct kvm_enc_region region;
@@ -8000,7 +8044,7 @@ static int emulator_read_write(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,
return rc;
if (!vcpu->mmio_nr_fragments)
- return rc;
+ return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
gpa = vcpu->mmio_fragments[0].gpa;
@@ -9338,7 +9382,7 @@ static int complete_fast_pio_out(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
vcpu->arch.pio.count = 0;
- if (unlikely(!kvm_is_linear_rip(vcpu, vcpu->arch.pio.linear_rip)))
+ if (unlikely(!kvm_is_linear_rip(vcpu, vcpu->arch.cui_linear_rip)))
return 1;
return kvm_skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
@@ -9363,7 +9407,7 @@ static int kvm_fast_pio_out(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int size,
complete_fast_pio_out_port_0x7e;
kvm_skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
} else {
- vcpu->arch.pio.linear_rip = kvm_get_linear_rip(vcpu);
+ vcpu->arch.cui_linear_rip = kvm_get_linear_rip(vcpu);
vcpu->arch.complete_userspace_io = complete_fast_pio_out;
}
return 0;
@@ -9376,7 +9420,7 @@ static int complete_fast_pio_in(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
/* We should only ever be called with arch.pio.count equal to 1 */
BUG_ON(vcpu->arch.pio.count != 1);
- if (unlikely(!kvm_is_linear_rip(vcpu, vcpu->arch.pio.linear_rip))) {
+ if (unlikely(!kvm_is_linear_rip(vcpu, vcpu->arch.cui_linear_rip))) {
vcpu->arch.pio.count = 0;
return 1;
}
@@ -9405,7 +9449,7 @@ static int kvm_fast_pio_in(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int size,
return ret;
}
- vcpu->arch.pio.linear_rip = kvm_get_linear_rip(vcpu);
+ vcpu->arch.cui_linear_rip = kvm_get_linear_rip(vcpu);
vcpu->arch.complete_userspace_io = complete_fast_pio_in;
return 0;
@@ -9771,6 +9815,8 @@ int kvm_x86_vendor_init(struct kvm_x86_init_ops *ops)
kvm_host.xcr0 = xgetbv(XCR_XFEATURE_ENABLED_MASK);
kvm_caps.supported_xcr0 = kvm_host.xcr0 & KVM_SUPPORTED_XCR0;
}
+ kvm_caps.supported_quirks = KVM_X86_VALID_QUIRKS;
+ kvm_caps.inapplicable_quirks = KVM_X86_CONDITIONAL_QUIRKS;
rdmsrq_safe(MSR_EFER, &kvm_host.efer);
@@ -9786,6 +9832,9 @@ int kvm_x86_vendor_init(struct kvm_x86_init_ops *ops)
if (r != 0)
goto out_mmu_exit;
+ enable_device_posted_irqs &= enable_apicv &&
+ irq_remapping_cap(IRQ_POSTING_CAP);
+
kvm_ops_update(ops);
for_each_online_cpu(cpu) {
@@ -9815,6 +9864,10 @@ int kvm_x86_vendor_init(struct kvm_x86_init_ops *ops)
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KVM_SW_PROTECTED_VM) && tdp_mmu_enabled)
kvm_caps.supported_vm_types |= BIT(KVM_X86_SW_PROTECTED_VM);
+ /* KVM always ignores guest PAT for shadow paging. */
+ if (!tdp_enabled)
+ kvm_caps.supported_quirks &= ~KVM_X86_QUIRK_IGNORE_GUEST_PAT;
+
if (!kvm_cpu_cap_has(X86_FEATURE_XSAVES))
kvm_caps.supported_xss = 0;
@@ -10023,13 +10076,16 @@ static int complete_hypercall_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
return kvm_skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
}
-int ____kvm_emulate_hypercall(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long nr,
- unsigned long a0, unsigned long a1,
- unsigned long a2, unsigned long a3,
- int op_64_bit, int cpl,
+int ____kvm_emulate_hypercall(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int cpl,
int (*complete_hypercall)(struct kvm_vcpu *))
{
unsigned long ret;
+ unsigned long nr = kvm_rax_read(vcpu);
+ unsigned long a0 = kvm_rbx_read(vcpu);
+ unsigned long a1 = kvm_rcx_read(vcpu);
+ unsigned long a2 = kvm_rdx_read(vcpu);
+ unsigned long a3 = kvm_rsi_read(vcpu);
+ int op_64_bit = is_64_bit_hypercall(vcpu);
++vcpu->stat.hypercalls;
@@ -10132,9 +10188,7 @@ int kvm_emulate_hypercall(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
if (kvm_hv_hypercall_enabled(vcpu))
return kvm_hv_hypercall(vcpu);
- return __kvm_emulate_hypercall(vcpu, rax, rbx, rcx, rdx, rsi,
- is_64_bit_hypercall(vcpu),
- kvm_x86_call(get_cpl)(vcpu),
+ return __kvm_emulate_hypercall(vcpu, kvm_x86_call(get_cpl)(vcpu),
complete_hypercall_exit);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_emulate_hypercall);
@@ -10664,6 +10718,7 @@ static void vcpu_scan_ioapic(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
return;
bitmap_zero(vcpu->arch.ioapic_handled_vectors, 256);
+ vcpu->arch.highest_stale_pending_ioapic_eoi = -1;
kvm_x86_call(sync_pir_to_irr)(vcpu);
@@ -10978,7 +11033,8 @@ static int vcpu_enter_guest(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
if (vcpu->arch.guest_fpu.xfd_err)
wrmsrq(MSR_IA32_XFD_ERR, vcpu->arch.guest_fpu.xfd_err);
- if (unlikely(vcpu->arch.switch_db_regs)) {
+ if (unlikely(vcpu->arch.switch_db_regs &&
+ !(vcpu->arch.switch_db_regs & KVM_DEBUGREG_AUTO_SWITCH))) {
set_debugreg(0, 7);
set_debugreg(vcpu->arch.eff_db[0], 0);
set_debugreg(vcpu->arch.eff_db[1], 1);
@@ -11030,6 +11086,7 @@ static int vcpu_enter_guest(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
*/
if (unlikely(vcpu->arch.switch_db_regs & KVM_DEBUGREG_WONT_EXIT)) {
WARN_ON(vcpu->guest_debug & KVM_GUESTDBG_USE_HW_BP);
+ WARN_ON(vcpu->arch.switch_db_regs & KVM_DEBUGREG_AUTO_SWITCH);
kvm_x86_call(sync_dirty_debug_regs)(vcpu);
kvm_update_dr0123(vcpu);
kvm_update_dr7(vcpu);
@@ -11134,7 +11191,7 @@ static bool kvm_vcpu_running(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
!vcpu->arch.apf.halted);
}
-static bool kvm_vcpu_has_events(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+bool kvm_vcpu_has_events(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
if (!list_empty_careful(&vcpu->async_pf.done))
return true;
@@ -11143,9 +11200,6 @@ static bool kvm_vcpu_has_events(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
kvm_apic_init_sipi_allowed(vcpu))
return true;
- if (vcpu->arch.pv.pv_unhalted)
- return true;
-
if (kvm_is_exception_pending(vcpu))
return true;
@@ -11183,10 +11237,12 @@ static bool kvm_vcpu_has_events(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
return false;
}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_vcpu_has_events);
int kvm_arch_vcpu_runnable(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
- return kvm_vcpu_running(vcpu) || kvm_vcpu_has_events(vcpu);
+ return kvm_vcpu_running(vcpu) || vcpu->arch.pv.pv_unhalted ||
+ kvm_vcpu_has_events(vcpu);
}
/* Called within kvm->srcu read side. */
@@ -11320,7 +11376,7 @@ static int __kvm_emulate_halt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int state, int reason)
*/
++vcpu->stat.halt_exits;
if (lapic_in_kernel(vcpu)) {
- if (kvm_vcpu_has_events(vcpu))
+ if (kvm_vcpu_has_events(vcpu) || vcpu->arch.pv.pv_unhalted)
state = KVM_MP_STATE_RUNNABLE;
kvm_set_mp_state(vcpu, state);
return 1;
@@ -12388,13 +12444,16 @@ void kvm_arch_vcpu_postcreate(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
void kvm_arch_vcpu_destroy(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
- int idx;
+ int idx, cpu;
kvm_clear_async_pf_completion_queue(vcpu);
kvm_mmu_unload(vcpu);
kvmclock_reset(vcpu);
+ for_each_possible_cpu(cpu)
+ cmpxchg(per_cpu_ptr(&last_vcpu, cpu), vcpu, NULL);
+
kvm_x86_call(vcpu_free)(vcpu);
kmem_cache_free(x86_emulator_cache, vcpu->arch.emulate_ctxt);
@@ -12694,6 +12753,7 @@ bool kvm_vcpu_is_reset_bsp(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
return vcpu->kvm->arch.bsp_vcpu_id == vcpu->vcpu_id;
}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_vcpu_is_reset_bsp);
bool kvm_vcpu_is_bsp(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
@@ -12723,6 +12783,7 @@ int kvm_arch_init_vm(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long type)
/* Decided by the vendor code for other VM types. */
kvm->arch.pre_fault_allowed =
type == KVM_X86_DEFAULT_VM || type == KVM_X86_SW_PROTECTED_VM;
+ kvm->arch.disabled_quirks = kvm_caps.inapplicable_quirks & kvm_caps.supported_quirks;
ret = kvm_page_track_init(kvm);
if (ret)
@@ -12876,6 +12937,7 @@ void kvm_arch_pre_destroy_vm(struct kvm *kvm)
kvm_free_pit(kvm);
kvm_mmu_pre_destroy_vm(kvm);
+ static_call_cond(kvm_x86_vm_pre_destroy)(kvm);
}
void kvm_arch_destroy_vm(struct kvm *kvm)
@@ -13073,7 +13135,7 @@ static void kvm_mmu_update_cpu_dirty_logging(struct kvm *kvm, bool enable)
{
int nr_slots;
- if (!kvm_x86_ops.cpu_dirty_log_size)
+ if (!kvm->arch.cpu_dirty_log_size)
return;
nr_slots = atomic_read(&kvm->nr_memslots_dirty_logging);
@@ -13145,7 +13207,7 @@ static void kvm_mmu_slot_apply_flags(struct kvm *kvm,
if (READ_ONCE(eager_page_split))
kvm_mmu_slot_try_split_huge_pages(kvm, new, PG_LEVEL_4K);
- if (kvm_x86_ops.cpu_dirty_log_size) {
+ if (kvm->arch.cpu_dirty_log_size) {
kvm_mmu_slot_leaf_clear_dirty(kvm, new);
kvm_mmu_slot_remove_write_access(kvm, new, PG_LEVEL_2M);
} else {
@@ -13534,8 +13596,10 @@ static void kvm_noncoherent_dma_assignment_start_or_stop(struct kvm *kvm)
* due to toggling the "ignore PAT" bit. Zap all SPTEs when the first
* (or last) non-coherent device is (un)registered to so that new SPTEs
* with the correct "ignore guest PAT" setting are created.
+ *
+ * If KVM always honors guest PAT, however, there is nothing to do.
*/
- if (kvm_mmu_may_ignore_guest_pat())
+ if (kvm_check_has_quirk(kvm, KVM_X86_QUIRK_IGNORE_GUEST_PAT))
kvm_zap_gfn_range(kvm, gpa_to_gfn(0), gpa_to_gfn(~0ULL));
}
@@ -14012,6 +14076,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_sev_es_string_io);
EXPORT_TRACEPOINT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_entry);
EXPORT_TRACEPOINT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_exit);
+EXPORT_TRACEPOINT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_mmio);
EXPORT_TRACEPOINT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_fast_mmio);
EXPORT_TRACEPOINT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_inj_virq);
EXPORT_TRACEPOINT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_page_fault);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h
index 9dc32a409076..832f0faf4779 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h
@@ -10,6 +10,8 @@
#include "kvm_emulate.h"
#include "cpuid.h"
+#define KVM_MAX_MCE_BANKS 32
+
struct kvm_caps {
/* control of guest tsc rate supported? */
bool has_tsc_control;
@@ -32,6 +34,9 @@ struct kvm_caps {
u64 supported_xcr0;
u64 supported_xss;
u64 supported_perf_cap;
+
+ u64 supported_quirks;
+ u64 inapplicable_quirks;
};
struct kvm_host_values {
@@ -116,6 +121,24 @@ static inline void kvm_leave_nested(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
kvm_x86_ops.nested_ops->leave_nested(vcpu);
}
+/*
+ * If IBRS is advertised to the vCPU, KVM must flush the indirect branch
+ * predictors when transitioning from L2 to L1, as L1 expects hardware (KVM in
+ * this case) to provide separate predictor modes. Bare metal isolates the host
+ * from the guest, but doesn't isolate different guests from one another (in
+ * this case L1 and L2). The exception is if bare metal supports same mode IBRS,
+ * which offers protection within the same mode, and hence protects L1 from L2.
+ */
+static inline void kvm_nested_vmexit_handle_ibrs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBRS_SAME_MODE))
+ return;
+
+ if (guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL) ||
+ guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBRS))
+ indirect_branch_prediction_barrier();
+}
+
static inline bool kvm_vcpu_has_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
return vcpu->arch.last_vmentry_cpu != -1;
@@ -629,25 +652,17 @@ static inline bool user_exit_on_hypercall(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long hc_nr)
return kvm->arch.hypercall_exit_enabled & BIT(hc_nr);
}
-int ____kvm_emulate_hypercall(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long nr,
- unsigned long a0, unsigned long a1,
- unsigned long a2, unsigned long a3,
- int op_64_bit, int cpl,
+int ____kvm_emulate_hypercall(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int cpl,
int (*complete_hypercall)(struct kvm_vcpu *));
-#define __kvm_emulate_hypercall(_vcpu, nr, a0, a1, a2, a3, op_64_bit, cpl, complete_hypercall) \
-({ \
- int __ret; \
- \
- __ret = ____kvm_emulate_hypercall(_vcpu, \
- kvm_##nr##_read(_vcpu), kvm_##a0##_read(_vcpu), \
- kvm_##a1##_read(_vcpu), kvm_##a2##_read(_vcpu), \
- kvm_##a3##_read(_vcpu), op_64_bit, cpl, \
- complete_hypercall); \
- \
- if (__ret > 0) \
- __ret = complete_hypercall(_vcpu); \
- __ret; \
+#define __kvm_emulate_hypercall(_vcpu, cpl, complete_hypercall) \
+({ \
+ int __ret; \
+ __ret = ____kvm_emulate_hypercall(_vcpu, cpl, complete_hypercall); \
+ \
+ if (__ret > 0) \
+ __ret = complete_hypercall(_vcpu); \
+ __ret; \
})
int kvm_emulate_hypercall(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/xen.c b/arch/x86/kvm/xen.c
index 38b33cdd4232..9b029bb29a16 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/xen.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/xen.c
@@ -1571,7 +1571,8 @@ out:
static void cancel_evtchn_poll(struct timer_list *t)
{
- struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = from_timer(vcpu, t, arch.xen.poll_timer);
+ struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = timer_container_of(vcpu, t,
+ arch.xen.poll_timer);
kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_UNBLOCK, vcpu);
kvm_vcpu_kick(vcpu);
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/dump_pagetables.c b/arch/x86/mm/dump_pagetables.c
index 89079ea73e65..a4700ef6eb64 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/dump_pagetables.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/dump_pagetables.c
@@ -266,6 +266,32 @@ static void effective_prot(struct ptdump_state *pt_st, int level, u64 val)
st->prot_levels[level] = effective;
}
+static void effective_prot_pte(struct ptdump_state *st, pte_t pte)
+{
+ effective_prot(st, 4, pte_val(pte));
+}
+
+static void effective_prot_pmd(struct ptdump_state *st, pmd_t pmd)
+{
+ effective_prot(st, 3, pmd_val(pmd));
+}
+
+static void effective_prot_pud(struct ptdump_state *st, pud_t pud)
+{
+ effective_prot(st, 2, pud_val(pud));
+}
+
+static void effective_prot_p4d(struct ptdump_state *st, p4d_t p4d)
+{
+ effective_prot(st, 1, p4d_val(p4d));
+}
+
+static void effective_prot_pgd(struct ptdump_state *st, pgd_t pgd)
+{
+ effective_prot(st, 0, pgd_val(pgd));
+}
+
+
/*
* This function gets called on a break in a continuous series
* of PTE entries; the next one is different so we need to
@@ -362,6 +388,38 @@ static void note_page(struct ptdump_state *pt_st, unsigned long addr, int level,
}
}
+static void note_page_pte(struct ptdump_state *pt_st, unsigned long addr, pte_t pte)
+{
+ note_page(pt_st, addr, 4, pte_val(pte));
+}
+
+static void note_page_pmd(struct ptdump_state *pt_st, unsigned long addr, pmd_t pmd)
+{
+ note_page(pt_st, addr, 3, pmd_val(pmd));
+}
+
+static void note_page_pud(struct ptdump_state *pt_st, unsigned long addr, pud_t pud)
+{
+ note_page(pt_st, addr, 2, pud_val(pud));
+}
+
+static void note_page_p4d(struct ptdump_state *pt_st, unsigned long addr, p4d_t p4d)
+{
+ note_page(pt_st, addr, 1, p4d_val(p4d));
+}
+
+static void note_page_pgd(struct ptdump_state *pt_st, unsigned long addr, pgd_t pgd)
+{
+ note_page(pt_st, addr, 0, pgd_val(pgd));
+}
+
+static void note_page_flush(struct ptdump_state *pt_st)
+{
+ pte_t pte_zero = {0};
+
+ note_page(pt_st, 0, -1, pte_val(pte_zero));
+}
+
bool ptdump_walk_pgd_level_core(struct seq_file *m,
struct mm_struct *mm, pgd_t *pgd,
bool checkwx, bool dmesg)
@@ -378,8 +436,17 @@ bool ptdump_walk_pgd_level_core(struct seq_file *m,
struct pg_state st = {
.ptdump = {
- .note_page = note_page,
- .effective_prot = effective_prot,
+ .note_page_pte = note_page_pte,
+ .note_page_pmd = note_page_pmd,
+ .note_page_pud = note_page_pud,
+ .note_page_p4d = note_page_p4d,
+ .note_page_pgd = note_page_pgd,
+ .note_page_flush = note_page_flush,
+ .effective_prot_pte = effective_prot_pte,
+ .effective_prot_pmd = effective_prot_pmd,
+ .effective_prot_pud = effective_prot_pud,
+ .effective_prot_p4d = effective_prot_p4d,
+ .effective_prot_pgd = effective_prot_pgd,
.range = ptdump_ranges
},
.level = -1,
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/init_32.c b/arch/x86/mm/init_32.c
index 607d6a2e66e2..8a34fff6ab2b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/init_32.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/init_32.c
@@ -30,7 +30,6 @@
#include <linux/initrd.h>
#include <linux/cpumask.h>
#include <linux/gfp.h>
-#include <linux/execmem.h>
#include <asm/asm.h>
#include <asm/bios_ebda.h>
@@ -749,8 +748,6 @@ void mark_rodata_ro(void)
pr_info("Write protecting kernel text and read-only data: %luk\n",
size >> 10);
- execmem_cache_make_ro();
-
kernel_set_to_readonly = 1;
#ifdef CONFIG_CPA_DEBUG
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/init_64.c b/arch/x86/mm/init_64.c
index 66330fe4e18c..fdb6cab524f0 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/init_64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/init_64.c
@@ -34,7 +34,6 @@
#include <linux/gfp.h>
#include <linux/kcore.h>
#include <linux/bootmem_info.h>
-#include <linux/execmem.h>
#include <asm/processor.h>
#include <asm/bios_ebda.h>
@@ -1392,8 +1391,6 @@ void mark_rodata_ro(void)
(end - start) >> 10);
set_memory_ro(start, (end - start) >> PAGE_SHIFT);
- execmem_cache_make_ro();
-
kernel_set_to_readonly = 1;
/*
@@ -1467,16 +1464,21 @@ static unsigned long probe_memory_block_size(void)
}
/*
- * Use max block size to minimize overhead on bare metal, where
- * alignment for memory hotplug isn't a concern.
+ * When hotplug alignment is not a concern, maximize blocksize
+ * to minimize overhead. Otherwise, align to the lesser of advice
+ * alignment and end of memory alignment.
*/
- if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR)) {
+ bz = memory_block_advised_max_size();
+ if (!bz) {
bz = MAX_BLOCK_SIZE;
- goto done;
+ if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR))
+ goto done;
+ } else {
+ bz = max(min(bz, MAX_BLOCK_SIZE), MIN_MEMORY_BLOCK_SIZE);
}
/* Find the largest allowed block size that aligns to memory end */
- for (bz = MAX_BLOCK_SIZE; bz > MIN_MEMORY_BLOCK_SIZE; bz >>= 1) {
+ for (; bz > MIN_MEMORY_BLOCK_SIZE; bz >>= 1) {
if (IS_ALIGNED(boot_mem_end, bz))
break;
}
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c b/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c
index 331e101bf801..12c8180ca1ba 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c
@@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ int ioremap_change_attr(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long size,
static unsigned int __ioremap_check_ram(struct resource *res)
{
unsigned long start_pfn, stop_pfn;
- unsigned long i;
+ unsigned long pfn;
if ((res->flags & IORESOURCE_SYSTEM_RAM) != IORESOURCE_SYSTEM_RAM)
return 0;
@@ -79,9 +79,8 @@ static unsigned int __ioremap_check_ram(struct resource *res)
start_pfn = (res->start + PAGE_SIZE - 1) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
stop_pfn = (res->end + 1) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
if (stop_pfn > start_pfn) {
- for (i = 0; i < (stop_pfn - start_pfn); ++i)
- if (pfn_valid(start_pfn + i) &&
- !PageReserved(pfn_to_page(start_pfn + i)))
+ for_each_valid_pfn(pfn, start_pfn, stop_pfn)
+ if (!PageReserved(pfn_to_page(pfn)))
return IORES_MAP_SYSTEM_RAM;
}
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/pat/memtype.c b/arch/x86/mm/pat/memtype.c
index c97b527c66fe..2e7923844afe 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/pat/memtype.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/pat/memtype.c
@@ -775,6 +775,12 @@ pgprot_t phys_mem_access_prot(struct file *file, unsigned long pfn,
return vma_prot;
}
+static inline void pgprot_set_cachemode(pgprot_t *prot, enum page_cache_mode pcm)
+{
+ *prot = __pgprot((pgprot_val(*prot) & ~_PAGE_CACHE_MASK) |
+ cachemode2protval(pcm));
+}
+
int phys_mem_access_prot_allowed(struct file *file, unsigned long pfn,
unsigned long size, pgprot_t *vma_prot)
{
@@ -789,8 +795,7 @@ int phys_mem_access_prot_allowed(struct file *file, unsigned long pfn,
if (file->f_flags & O_DSYNC)
pcm = _PAGE_CACHE_MODE_UC_MINUS;
- *vma_prot = __pgprot((pgprot_val(*vma_prot) & ~_PAGE_CACHE_MASK) |
- cachemode2protval(pcm));
+ pgprot_set_cachemode(vma_prot, pcm);
return 1;
}
@@ -831,8 +836,7 @@ int memtype_kernel_map_sync(u64 base, unsigned long size,
* Reserved non RAM regions only and after successful memtype_reserve,
* this func also keeps identity mapping (if any) in sync with this new prot.
*/
-static int reserve_pfn_range(u64 paddr, unsigned long size, pgprot_t *vma_prot,
- int strict_prot)
+static int reserve_pfn_range(u64 paddr, unsigned long size, pgprot_t *vma_prot)
{
int is_ram = 0;
int ret;
@@ -858,9 +862,7 @@ static int reserve_pfn_range(u64 paddr, unsigned long size, pgprot_t *vma_prot,
(unsigned long long)paddr,
(unsigned long long)(paddr + size - 1),
cattr_name(pcm));
- *vma_prot = __pgprot((pgprot_val(*vma_prot) &
- (~_PAGE_CACHE_MASK)) |
- cachemode2protval(pcm));
+ pgprot_set_cachemode(vma_prot, pcm);
}
return 0;
}
@@ -870,8 +872,7 @@ static int reserve_pfn_range(u64 paddr, unsigned long size, pgprot_t *vma_prot,
return ret;
if (pcm != want_pcm) {
- if (strict_prot ||
- !is_new_memtype_allowed(paddr, size, want_pcm, pcm)) {
+ if (!is_new_memtype_allowed(paddr, size, want_pcm, pcm)) {
memtype_free(paddr, paddr + size);
pr_err("x86/PAT: %s:%d map pfn expected mapping type %s for [mem %#010Lx-%#010Lx], got %s\n",
current->comm, current->pid,
@@ -881,13 +882,7 @@ static int reserve_pfn_range(u64 paddr, unsigned long size, pgprot_t *vma_prot,
cattr_name(pcm));
return -EINVAL;
}
- /*
- * We allow returning different type than the one requested in
- * non strict case.
- */
- *vma_prot = __pgprot((pgprot_val(*vma_prot) &
- (~_PAGE_CACHE_MASK)) |
- cachemode2protval(pcm));
+ pgprot_set_cachemode(vma_prot, pcm);
}
if (memtype_kernel_map_sync(paddr, size, pcm) < 0) {
@@ -910,124 +905,14 @@ static void free_pfn_range(u64 paddr, unsigned long size)
memtype_free(paddr, paddr + size);
}
-static int follow_phys(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long *prot,
- resource_size_t *phys)
-{
- struct follow_pfnmap_args args = { .vma = vma, .address = vma->vm_start };
-
- if (follow_pfnmap_start(&args))
- return -EINVAL;
-
- /* Never return PFNs of anon folios in COW mappings. */
- if (!args.special) {
- follow_pfnmap_end(&args);
- return -EINVAL;
- }
-
- *prot = pgprot_val(args.pgprot);
- *phys = (resource_size_t)args.pfn << PAGE_SHIFT;
- follow_pfnmap_end(&args);
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int get_pat_info(struct vm_area_struct *vma, resource_size_t *paddr,
- pgprot_t *pgprot)
-{
- unsigned long prot;
-
- VM_WARN_ON_ONCE(!(vma->vm_flags & VM_PAT));
-
- /*
- * We need the starting PFN and cachemode used for track_pfn_remap()
- * that covered the whole VMA. For most mappings, we can obtain that
- * information from the page tables. For COW mappings, we might now
- * suddenly have anon folios mapped and follow_phys() will fail.
- *
- * Fallback to using vma->vm_pgoff, see remap_pfn_range_notrack(), to
- * detect the PFN. If we need the cachemode as well, we're out of luck
- * for now and have to fail fork().
- */
- if (!follow_phys(vma, &prot, paddr)) {
- if (pgprot)
- *pgprot = __pgprot(prot);
- return 0;
- }
- if (is_cow_mapping(vma->vm_flags)) {
- if (pgprot)
- return -EINVAL;
- *paddr = (resource_size_t)vma->vm_pgoff << PAGE_SHIFT;
- return 0;
- }
- WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
- return -EINVAL;
-}
-
-int track_pfn_copy(struct vm_area_struct *dst_vma,
- struct vm_area_struct *src_vma, unsigned long *pfn)
-{
- const unsigned long vma_size = src_vma->vm_end - src_vma->vm_start;
- resource_size_t paddr;
- pgprot_t pgprot;
- int rc;
-
- if (!(src_vma->vm_flags & VM_PAT))
- return 0;
-
- /*
- * Duplicate the PAT information for the dst VMA based on the src
- * VMA.
- */
- if (get_pat_info(src_vma, &paddr, &pgprot))
- return -EINVAL;
- rc = reserve_pfn_range(paddr, vma_size, &pgprot, 1);
- if (rc)
- return rc;
-
- /* Reservation for the destination VMA succeeded. */
- vm_flags_set(dst_vma, VM_PAT);
- *pfn = PHYS_PFN(paddr);
- return 0;
-}
-
-void untrack_pfn_copy(struct vm_area_struct *dst_vma, unsigned long pfn)
-{
- untrack_pfn(dst_vma, pfn, dst_vma->vm_end - dst_vma->vm_start, true);
- /*
- * Reservation was freed, any copied page tables will get cleaned
- * up later, but without getting PAT involved again.
- */
-}
-
-/*
- * prot is passed in as a parameter for the new mapping. If the vma has
- * a linear pfn mapping for the entire range, or no vma is provided,
- * reserve the entire pfn + size range with single reserve_pfn_range
- * call.
- */
-int track_pfn_remap(struct vm_area_struct *vma, pgprot_t *prot,
- unsigned long pfn, unsigned long addr, unsigned long size)
+int pfnmap_setup_cachemode(unsigned long pfn, unsigned long size, pgprot_t *prot)
{
resource_size_t paddr = (resource_size_t)pfn << PAGE_SHIFT;
enum page_cache_mode pcm;
- /* reserve the whole chunk starting from paddr */
- if (!vma || (addr == vma->vm_start
- && size == (vma->vm_end - vma->vm_start))) {
- int ret;
-
- ret = reserve_pfn_range(paddr, size, prot, 0);
- if (ret == 0 && vma)
- vm_flags_set(vma, VM_PAT);
- return ret;
- }
-
if (!pat_enabled())
return 0;
- /*
- * For anything smaller than the vma size we set prot based on the
- * lookup.
- */
pcm = lookup_memtype(paddr);
/* Check memtype for the remaining pages */
@@ -1038,70 +923,35 @@ int track_pfn_remap(struct vm_area_struct *vma, pgprot_t *prot,
return -EINVAL;
}
- *prot = __pgprot((pgprot_val(*prot) & (~_PAGE_CACHE_MASK)) |
- cachemode2protval(pcm));
-
+ pgprot_set_cachemode(prot, pcm);
return 0;
}
-void track_pfn_insert(struct vm_area_struct *vma, pgprot_t *prot, pfn_t pfn)
+int pfnmap_track(unsigned long pfn, unsigned long size, pgprot_t *prot)
{
- enum page_cache_mode pcm;
+ const resource_size_t paddr = (resource_size_t)pfn << PAGE_SHIFT;
- if (!pat_enabled())
- return;
-
- /* Set prot based on lookup */
- pcm = lookup_memtype(pfn_t_to_phys(pfn));
- *prot = __pgprot((pgprot_val(*prot) & (~_PAGE_CACHE_MASK)) |
- cachemode2protval(pcm));
+ return reserve_pfn_range(paddr, size, prot);
}
-/*
- * untrack_pfn is called while unmapping a pfnmap for a region.
- * untrack can be called for a specific region indicated by pfn and size or
- * can be for the entire vma (in which case pfn, size are zero).
- */
-void untrack_pfn(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long pfn,
- unsigned long size, bool mm_wr_locked)
+void pfnmap_untrack(unsigned long pfn, unsigned long size)
{
- resource_size_t paddr;
-
- if (vma && !(vma->vm_flags & VM_PAT))
- return;
+ const resource_size_t paddr = (resource_size_t)pfn << PAGE_SHIFT;
- /* free the chunk starting from pfn or the whole chunk */
- paddr = (resource_size_t)pfn << PAGE_SHIFT;
- if (!paddr && !size) {
- if (get_pat_info(vma, &paddr, NULL))
- return;
- size = vma->vm_end - vma->vm_start;
- }
free_pfn_range(paddr, size);
- if (vma) {
- if (mm_wr_locked)
- vm_flags_clear(vma, VM_PAT);
- else
- __vm_flags_mod(vma, 0, VM_PAT);
- }
-}
-
-void untrack_pfn_clear(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
-{
- vm_flags_clear(vma, VM_PAT);
}
pgprot_t pgprot_writecombine(pgprot_t prot)
{
- return __pgprot(pgprot_val(prot) |
- cachemode2protval(_PAGE_CACHE_MODE_WC));
+ pgprot_set_cachemode(&prot, _PAGE_CACHE_MODE_WC);
+ return prot;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(pgprot_writecombine);
pgprot_t pgprot_writethrough(pgprot_t prot)
{
- return __pgprot(pgprot_val(prot) |
- cachemode2protval(_PAGE_CACHE_MODE_WT));
+ pgprot_set_cachemode(&prot, _PAGE_CACHE_MODE_WT);
+ return prot;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(pgprot_writethrough);
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/pat/memtype_interval.c b/arch/x86/mm/pat/memtype_interval.c
index 645613d59942..e5844ed1311e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/pat/memtype_interval.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/pat/memtype_interval.c
@@ -49,32 +49,6 @@ INTERVAL_TREE_DEFINE(struct memtype, rb, u64, subtree_max_end,
static struct rb_root_cached memtype_rbroot = RB_ROOT_CACHED;
-enum {
- MEMTYPE_EXACT_MATCH = 0,
- MEMTYPE_END_MATCH = 1
-};
-
-static struct memtype *memtype_match(u64 start, u64 end, int match_type)
-{
- struct memtype *entry_match;
-
- entry_match = interval_iter_first(&memtype_rbroot, start, end-1);
-
- while (entry_match != NULL && entry_match->start < end) {
- if ((match_type == MEMTYPE_EXACT_MATCH) &&
- (entry_match->start == start) && (entry_match->end == end))
- return entry_match;
-
- if ((match_type == MEMTYPE_END_MATCH) &&
- (entry_match->start < start) && (entry_match->end == end))
- return entry_match;
-
- entry_match = interval_iter_next(entry_match, start, end-1);
- }
-
- return NULL; /* Returns NULL if there is no match */
-}
-
static int memtype_check_conflict(u64 start, u64 end,
enum page_cache_mode reqtype,
enum page_cache_mode *newtype)
@@ -130,35 +104,16 @@ int memtype_check_insert(struct memtype *entry_new, enum page_cache_mode *ret_ty
struct memtype *memtype_erase(u64 start, u64 end)
{
- struct memtype *entry_old;
-
- /*
- * Since the memtype_rbroot tree allows overlapping ranges,
- * memtype_erase() checks with EXACT_MATCH first, i.e. free
- * a whole node for the munmap case. If no such entry is found,
- * it then checks with END_MATCH, i.e. shrink the size of a node
- * from the end for the mremap case.
- */
- entry_old = memtype_match(start, end, MEMTYPE_EXACT_MATCH);
- if (!entry_old) {
- entry_old = memtype_match(start, end, MEMTYPE_END_MATCH);
- if (!entry_old)
- return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+ struct memtype *entry = interval_iter_first(&memtype_rbroot, start, end - 1);
+
+ while (entry && entry->start < end) {
+ if (entry->start == start && entry->end == end) {
+ interval_remove(entry, &memtype_rbroot);
+ return entry;
+ }
+ entry = interval_iter_next(entry, start, end - 1);
}
-
- if (entry_old->start == start) {
- /* munmap: erase this node */
- interval_remove(entry_old, &memtype_rbroot);
- } else {
- /* mremap: update the end value of this node */
- interval_remove(entry_old, &memtype_rbroot);
- entry_old->end = start;
- interval_insert(entry_old, &memtype_rbroot);
-
- return NULL;
- }
-
- return entry_old;
+ return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
}
struct memtype *memtype_lookup(u64 addr)
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c b/arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c
index 30ab4aced761..8834c76f91c9 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c
@@ -1257,6 +1257,9 @@ static int collapse_pmd_page(pmd_t *pmd, unsigned long addr,
pgprot_t pgprot;
int i = 0;
+ if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_PSE))
+ return 0;
+
addr &= PMD_MASK;
pte = pte_offset_kernel(pmd, addr);
first = *pte;
@@ -2148,6 +2151,19 @@ static inline int cpa_clear_pages_array(struct page **pages, int numpages,
CPA_PAGES_ARRAY, pages);
}
+/*
+ * __set_memory_prot is an internal helper for callers that have been passed
+ * a pgprot_t value from upper layers and a reservation has already been taken.
+ * If you want to set the pgprot to a specific page protocol, use the
+ * set_memory_xx() functions.
+ */
+int __set_memory_prot(unsigned long addr, int numpages, pgprot_t prot)
+{
+ return change_page_attr_set_clr(&addr, numpages, prot,
+ __pgprot(~pgprot_val(prot)), 0, 0,
+ NULL);
+}
+
int _set_memory_uc(unsigned long addr, int numpages)
{
/*
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c b/arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c
index 62777ba4de1a..ddf248c3ee7d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c
@@ -189,7 +189,7 @@ static int preallocate_pmds(struct mm_struct *mm, pmd_t *pmds[], int count)
if (!ptdesc)
failed = true;
- if (ptdesc && !pagetable_pmd_ctor(ptdesc)) {
+ if (ptdesc && !pagetable_pmd_ctor(mm, ptdesc)) {
pagetable_free(ptdesc);
ptdesc = NULL;
failed = true;
@@ -751,14 +751,13 @@ int pud_free_pmd_page(pud_t *pud, unsigned long addr)
for (i = 0; i < PTRS_PER_PMD; i++) {
if (!pmd_none(pmd_sv[i])) {
pte = (pte_t *)pmd_page_vaddr(pmd_sv[i]);
- free_page((unsigned long)pte);
+ pte_free_kernel(&init_mm, pte);
}
}
free_page((unsigned long)pmd_sv);
- pagetable_dtor(virt_to_ptdesc(pmd));
- free_page((unsigned long)pmd);
+ pmd_free(&init_mm, pmd);
return 1;
}
@@ -781,7 +780,7 @@ int pmd_free_pte_page(pmd_t *pmd, unsigned long addr)
/* INVLPG to clear all paging-structure caches */
flush_tlb_kernel_range(addr, addr + PAGE_SIZE-1);
- free_page((unsigned long)pte);
+ pte_free_kernel(&init_mm, pte);
return 1;
}
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/pti.c b/arch/x86/mm/pti.c
index 190299834011..c0c40b67524e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/pti.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/pti.c
@@ -98,6 +98,11 @@ void __init pti_check_boottime_disable(void)
return;
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_PTI);
+
+ if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_INVLPGB)) {
+ pr_debug("PTI enabled, disabling INVLPGB\n");
+ setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_INVLPGB);
+ }
}
static int __init pti_parse_cmdline(char *arg)
diff --git a/arch/x86/pci/Makefile b/arch/x86/pci/Makefile
index 4933fb337983..c1efd5b0d198 100644
--- a/arch/x86/pci/Makefile
+++ b/arch/x86/pci/Makefile
@@ -8,13 +8,13 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_PCI_OLPC) += olpc.o
obj-$(CONFIG_PCI_XEN) += xen.o
obj-y += fixup.o
-obj-$(CONFIG_X86_INTEL_CE) += ce4100.o
obj-$(CONFIG_ACPI) += acpi.o
obj-y += legacy.o irq.o
-obj-$(CONFIG_X86_NUMACHIP) += numachip.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_X86_INTEL_CE) += ce4100.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_X86_INTEL_MID) += intel_mid.o
-obj-$(CONFIG_X86_INTEL_MID) += intel_mid_pci.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_X86_NUMACHIP) += numachip.o
obj-y += common.o early.o
obj-y += bus_numa.o
diff --git a/arch/x86/pci/intel_mid_pci.c b/arch/x86/pci/intel_mid.c
index b433b1753016..b433b1753016 100644
--- a/arch/x86/pci/intel_mid_pci.c
+++ b/arch/x86/pci/intel_mid.c
diff --git a/arch/x86/power/hibernate.c b/arch/x86/power/hibernate.c
index a7c23f2a58c9..a2294c1649f6 100644
--- a/arch/x86/power/hibernate.c
+++ b/arch/x86/power/hibernate.c
@@ -192,7 +192,8 @@ out:
int arch_resume_nosmt(void)
{
- int ret = 0;
+ int ret;
+
/*
* We reached this while coming out of hibernation. This means
* that SMT siblings are sleeping in hlt, as mwait is not safe
@@ -206,18 +207,10 @@ int arch_resume_nosmt(void)
* Called with hotplug disabled.
*/
cpu_hotplug_enable();
- if (cpu_smt_control == CPU_SMT_DISABLED ||
- cpu_smt_control == CPU_SMT_FORCE_DISABLED) {
- enum cpuhp_smt_control old = cpu_smt_control;
-
- ret = cpuhp_smt_enable();
- if (ret)
- goto out;
- ret = cpuhp_smt_disable(old);
- if (ret)
- goto out;
- }
-out:
+
+ ret = arch_cpu_rescan_dead_smt_siblings();
+
cpu_hotplug_disable();
+
return ret;
}
diff --git a/arch/x86/realmode/init.c b/arch/x86/realmode/init.c
index ed5c63c0b4e5..88be32026768 100644
--- a/arch/x86/realmode/init.c
+++ b/arch/x86/realmode/init.c
@@ -66,6 +66,8 @@ void __init reserve_real_mode(void)
* setup_arch().
*/
memblock_reserve(0, SZ_1M);
+
+ memblock_clear_kho_scratch(0, SZ_1M);
}
static void __init sme_sev_setup_real_mode(struct trampoline_header *th)
diff --git a/arch/x86/um/asm/checksum.h b/arch/x86/um/asm/checksum.h
index b07824500363..ddc144657efa 100644
--- a/arch/x86/um/asm/checksum.h
+++ b/arch/x86/um/asm/checksum.h
@@ -20,6 +20,9 @@
*/
extern __wsum csum_partial(const void *buff, int len, __wsum sum);
+/* Do not call this directly. Declared for export type visibility. */
+extern __visible __wsum csum_partial_copy_generic(const void *src, void *dst, int len);
+
/**
* csum_fold - Fold and invert a 32bit checksum.
* sum: 32bit unfolded sum
diff --git a/arch/x86/um/asm/processor.h b/arch/x86/um/asm/processor.h
index 478710384b34..e222d2ae28fd 100644
--- a/arch/x86/um/asm/processor.h
+++ b/arch/x86/um/asm/processor.h
@@ -21,10 +21,10 @@
#include <asm/user.h>
-/* REP NOP (PAUSE) is a good thing to insert into busy-wait loops. */
-static __always_inline void rep_nop(void)
+/* PAUSE is a good thing to insert into busy-wait loops. */
+static __always_inline void native_pause(void)
{
- __asm__ __volatile__("rep;nop": : :"memory");
+ __asm__ __volatile__("pause": : :"memory");
}
static __always_inline void cpu_relax(void)
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ static __always_inline void cpu_relax(void)
time_travel_mode == TT_MODE_EXTERNAL)
time_travel_ndelay(1);
else
- rep_nop();
+ native_pause();
}
#define task_pt_regs(t) (&(t)->thread.regs)
diff --git a/arch/x86/um/os-Linux/mcontext.c b/arch/x86/um/os-Linux/mcontext.c
index 37decaa74761..a21403df6663 100644
--- a/arch/x86/um/os-Linux/mcontext.c
+++ b/arch/x86/um/os-Linux/mcontext.c
@@ -1,7 +1,10 @@
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
-#include <sys/ucontext.h>
#define __FRAME_OFFSETS
+#include <linux/errno.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
+#include <sys/ucontext.h>
#include <asm/ptrace.h>
+#include <asm/sigcontext.h>
#include <sysdep/ptrace.h>
#include <sysdep/mcontext.h>
#include <arch.h>
@@ -18,6 +21,10 @@ void get_regs_from_mc(struct uml_pt_regs *regs, mcontext_t *mc)
COPY2(UESP, ESP); /* sic */
COPY(EBX); COPY(EDX); COPY(ECX); COPY(EAX);
COPY(EIP); COPY_SEG_CPL3(CS); COPY(EFL); COPY_SEG_CPL3(SS);
+#undef COPY2
+#undef COPY
+#undef COPY_SEG
+#undef COPY_SEG_CPL3
#else
#define COPY2(X,Y) regs->gp[X/sizeof(unsigned long)] = mc->gregs[REG_##Y]
#define COPY(X) regs->gp[X/sizeof(unsigned long)] = mc->gregs[REG_##X]
@@ -29,6 +36,8 @@ void get_regs_from_mc(struct uml_pt_regs *regs, mcontext_t *mc)
COPY2(EFLAGS, EFL);
COPY2(CS, CSGSFS);
regs->gp[SS / sizeof(unsigned long)] = mc->gregs[REG_CSGSFS] >> 48;
+#undef COPY2
+#undef COPY
#endif
}
@@ -42,3 +51,210 @@ void mc_set_rip(void *_mc, void *target)
mc->gregs[REG_RIP] = (unsigned long)target;
#endif
}
+
+/* Same thing, but the copy macros are turned around. */
+void get_mc_from_regs(struct uml_pt_regs *regs, mcontext_t *mc, int single_stepping)
+{
+#ifdef __i386__
+#define COPY2(X,Y) mc->gregs[REG_##Y] = regs->gp[X]
+#define COPY(X) mc->gregs[REG_##X] = regs->gp[X]
+#define COPY_SEG(X) mc->gregs[REG_##X] = regs->gp[X] & 0xffff;
+#define COPY_SEG_CPL3(X) mc->gregs[REG_##X] = (regs->gp[X] & 0xffff) | 3;
+ COPY_SEG(GS); COPY_SEG(FS); COPY_SEG(ES); COPY_SEG(DS);
+ COPY(EDI); COPY(ESI); COPY(EBP);
+ COPY2(UESP, ESP); /* sic */
+ COPY(EBX); COPY(EDX); COPY(ECX); COPY(EAX);
+ COPY(EIP); COPY_SEG_CPL3(CS); COPY(EFL); COPY_SEG_CPL3(SS);
+#else
+#define COPY2(X,Y) mc->gregs[REG_##Y] = regs->gp[X/sizeof(unsigned long)]
+#define COPY(X) mc->gregs[REG_##X] = regs->gp[X/sizeof(unsigned long)]
+ COPY(R8); COPY(R9); COPY(R10); COPY(R11);
+ COPY(R12); COPY(R13); COPY(R14); COPY(R15);
+ COPY(RDI); COPY(RSI); COPY(RBP); COPY(RBX);
+ COPY(RDX); COPY(RAX); COPY(RCX); COPY(RSP);
+ COPY(RIP);
+ COPY2(EFLAGS, EFL);
+ mc->gregs[REG_CSGSFS] = mc->gregs[REG_CSGSFS] & 0xffffffffffffl;
+ mc->gregs[REG_CSGSFS] |= (regs->gp[SS / sizeof(unsigned long)] & 0xffff) << 48;
+#endif
+
+ if (single_stepping)
+ mc->gregs[REG_EFL] |= X86_EFLAGS_TF;
+ else
+ mc->gregs[REG_EFL] &= ~X86_EFLAGS_TF;
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
+struct _xstate_64 {
+ struct _fpstate_64 fpstate;
+ struct _header xstate_hdr;
+ struct _ymmh_state ymmh;
+ /* New processor state extensions go here: */
+};
+
+/* Not quite the right structures as these contain more information */
+int um_i387_from_fxsr(struct _fpstate_32 *i387,
+ const struct _fpstate_64 *fxsave);
+int um_fxsr_from_i387(struct _fpstate_64 *fxsave,
+ const struct _fpstate_32 *from);
+#else
+#define _xstate_64 _xstate
+#endif
+
+static struct _fpstate *get_fpstate(struct stub_data *data,
+ mcontext_t *mcontext,
+ int *fp_size)
+{
+ struct _fpstate *res;
+
+ /* Assume floating point registers are on the same page */
+ res = (void *)(((unsigned long)mcontext->fpregs &
+ (UM_KERN_PAGE_SIZE - 1)) +
+ (unsigned long)&data->sigstack[0]);
+
+ if ((void *)res + sizeof(struct _fpstate) >
+ (void *)data->sigstack + sizeof(data->sigstack))
+ return NULL;
+
+ if (res->sw_reserved.magic1 != FP_XSTATE_MAGIC1) {
+ *fp_size = sizeof(struct _fpstate);
+ } else {
+ char *magic2_addr;
+
+ magic2_addr = (void *)res;
+ magic2_addr += res->sw_reserved.extended_size;
+ magic2_addr -= FP_XSTATE_MAGIC2_SIZE;
+
+ /* We still need to be within our stack */
+ if ((void *)magic2_addr >
+ (void *)data->sigstack + sizeof(data->sigstack))
+ return NULL;
+
+ /* If we do not read MAGIC2, then we did something wrong */
+ if (*(__u32 *)magic2_addr != FP_XSTATE_MAGIC2)
+ return NULL;
+
+ /* Remove MAGIC2 from the size, we do not save/restore it */
+ *fp_size = res->sw_reserved.extended_size -
+ FP_XSTATE_MAGIC2_SIZE;
+ }
+
+ return res;
+}
+
+int get_stub_state(struct uml_pt_regs *regs, struct stub_data *data,
+ unsigned long *fp_size_out)
+{
+ mcontext_t *mcontext;
+ struct _fpstate *fpstate_stub;
+ struct _xstate_64 *xstate_stub;
+ int fp_size, xstate_size;
+
+ /* mctx_offset is verified by wait_stub_done_seccomp */
+ mcontext = (void *)&data->sigstack[data->mctx_offset];
+
+ get_regs_from_mc(regs, mcontext);
+
+ fpstate_stub = get_fpstate(data, mcontext, &fp_size);
+ if (!fpstate_stub)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
+ xstate_stub = (void *)&fpstate_stub->_fxsr_env;
+ xstate_size = fp_size - offsetof(struct _fpstate_32, _fxsr_env);
+#else
+ xstate_stub = (void *)fpstate_stub;
+ xstate_size = fp_size;
+#endif
+
+ if (fp_size_out)
+ *fp_size_out = xstate_size;
+
+ if (xstate_size > host_fp_size)
+ return -ENOSPC;
+
+ memcpy(&regs->fp, xstate_stub, xstate_size);
+
+ /* We do not need to read the x86_64 FS_BASE/GS_BASE registers as
+ * we do not permit userspace to set them directly.
+ */
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
+ /* Read the i387 legacy FP registers */
+ if (um_fxsr_from_i387((void *)&regs->fp, fpstate_stub))
+ return -EINVAL;
+#endif
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* Copied because we cannot include regset.h here. */
+struct task_struct;
+struct user_regset;
+struct membuf {
+ void *p;
+ size_t left;
+};
+
+int fpregs_legacy_get(struct task_struct *target,
+ const struct user_regset *regset,
+ struct membuf to);
+
+int set_stub_state(struct uml_pt_regs *regs, struct stub_data *data,
+ int single_stepping)
+{
+ mcontext_t *mcontext;
+ struct _fpstate *fpstate_stub;
+ struct _xstate_64 *xstate_stub;
+ int fp_size, xstate_size;
+
+ /* mctx_offset is verified by wait_stub_done_seccomp */
+ mcontext = (void *)&data->sigstack[data->mctx_offset];
+
+ if ((unsigned long)mcontext < (unsigned long)data->sigstack ||
+ (unsigned long)mcontext >
+ (unsigned long) data->sigstack +
+ sizeof(data->sigstack) - sizeof(*mcontext))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ get_mc_from_regs(regs, mcontext, single_stepping);
+
+ fpstate_stub = get_fpstate(data, mcontext, &fp_size);
+ if (!fpstate_stub)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
+ xstate_stub = (void *)&fpstate_stub->_fxsr_env;
+ xstate_size = fp_size - offsetof(struct _fpstate_32, _fxsr_env);
+#else
+ xstate_stub = (void *)fpstate_stub;
+ xstate_size = fp_size;
+#endif
+
+ memcpy(xstate_stub, &regs->fp, xstate_size);
+
+#ifdef __i386__
+ /*
+ * On x86, the GDT entries are updated by arch_set_tls.
+ */
+
+ /* Store the i387 legacy FP registers which the host will use */
+ if (um_i387_from_fxsr(fpstate_stub, (void *)&regs->fp))
+ return -EINVAL;
+#else
+ /*
+ * On x86_64, we need to sync the FS_BASE/GS_BASE registers using the
+ * arch specific data.
+ */
+ if (data->arch_data.fs_base != regs->gp[FS_BASE / sizeof(unsigned long)]) {
+ data->arch_data.fs_base = regs->gp[FS_BASE / sizeof(unsigned long)];
+ data->arch_data.sync |= STUB_SYNC_FS_BASE;
+ }
+ if (data->arch_data.gs_base != regs->gp[GS_BASE / sizeof(unsigned long)]) {
+ data->arch_data.gs_base = regs->gp[GS_BASE / sizeof(unsigned long)];
+ data->arch_data.sync |= STUB_SYNC_GS_BASE;
+ }
+#endif
+
+ return 0;
+}
diff --git a/arch/x86/um/ptrace.c b/arch/x86/um/ptrace.c
index 57c504fd5626..fae8aabad10f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/um/ptrace.c
+++ b/arch/x86/um/ptrace.c
@@ -25,7 +25,8 @@ static inline unsigned short twd_i387_to_fxsr(unsigned short twd)
return tmp;
}
-static inline unsigned long twd_fxsr_to_i387(struct user_fxsr_struct *fxsave)
+static inline unsigned long
+twd_fxsr_to_i387(const struct user_fxsr_struct *fxsave)
{
struct _fpxreg *st = NULL;
unsigned long twd = (unsigned long) fxsave->twd;
@@ -69,12 +70,16 @@ static inline unsigned long twd_fxsr_to_i387(struct user_fxsr_struct *fxsave)
return ret;
}
-/* Get/set the old 32bit i387 registers (pre-FPX) */
-static int fpregs_legacy_get(struct task_struct *target,
- const struct user_regset *regset,
- struct membuf to)
+/*
+ * Get/set the old 32bit i387 registers (pre-FPX)
+ *
+ * We provide simple wrappers for mcontext.c, they are only defined locally
+ * because mcontext.c is userspace facing and needs to a different definition
+ * of the structures.
+ */
+static int _um_i387_from_fxsr(struct membuf to,
+ const struct user_fxsr_struct *fxsave)
{
- struct user_fxsr_struct *fxsave = (void *)target->thread.regs.regs.fp;
int i;
membuf_store(&to, (unsigned long)fxsave->cwd | 0xffff0000ul);
@@ -91,23 +96,36 @@ static int fpregs_legacy_get(struct task_struct *target,
return 0;
}
-static int fpregs_legacy_set(struct task_struct *target,
+int um_i387_from_fxsr(struct user_i387_struct *i387,
+ const struct user_fxsr_struct *fxsave);
+
+int um_i387_from_fxsr(struct user_i387_struct *i387,
+ const struct user_fxsr_struct *fxsave)
+{
+ struct membuf to = {
+ .p = i387,
+ .left = sizeof(*i387),
+ };
+
+ return _um_i387_from_fxsr(to, fxsave);
+}
+
+static int fpregs_legacy_get(struct task_struct *target,
const struct user_regset *regset,
- unsigned int pos, unsigned int count,
- const void *kbuf, const void __user *ubuf)
+ struct membuf to)
{
struct user_fxsr_struct *fxsave = (void *)target->thread.regs.regs.fp;
- const struct user_i387_struct *from;
- struct user_i387_struct buf;
- int i;
- if (ubuf) {
- if (copy_from_user(&buf, ubuf, sizeof(buf)))
- return -EFAULT;
- from = &buf;
- } else {
- from = kbuf;
- }
+ return _um_i387_from_fxsr(to, fxsave);
+}
+
+int um_fxsr_from_i387(struct user_fxsr_struct *fxsave,
+ const struct user_i387_struct *from);
+
+int um_fxsr_from_i387(struct user_fxsr_struct *fxsave,
+ const struct user_i387_struct *from)
+{
+ int i;
fxsave->cwd = (unsigned short)(from->cwd & 0xffff);
fxsave->swd = (unsigned short)(from->swd & 0xffff);
@@ -125,6 +143,26 @@ static int fpregs_legacy_set(struct task_struct *target,
return 0;
}
+
+static int fpregs_legacy_set(struct task_struct *target,
+ const struct user_regset *regset,
+ unsigned int pos, unsigned int count,
+ const void *kbuf, const void __user *ubuf)
+{
+ struct user_fxsr_struct *fxsave = (void *)target->thread.regs.regs.fp;
+ const struct user_i387_struct *from;
+ struct user_i387_struct buf;
+
+ if (ubuf) {
+ if (copy_from_user(&buf, ubuf, sizeof(buf)))
+ return -EFAULT;
+ from = &buf;
+ } else {
+ from = kbuf;
+ }
+
+ return um_fxsr_from_i387(fxsave, from);
+}
#endif
static int genregs_get(struct task_struct *target,
diff --git a/arch/x86/um/shared/sysdep/kernel-offsets.h b/arch/x86/um/shared/sysdep/kernel-offsets.h
index 48de3a71f845..6fd1ed400399 100644
--- a/arch/x86/um/shared/sysdep/kernel-offsets.h
+++ b/arch/x86/um/shared/sysdep/kernel-offsets.h
@@ -4,7 +4,9 @@
#include <linux/elf.h>
#include <linux/crypto.h>
#include <linux/kbuild.h>
+#include <linux/audit.h>
#include <asm/mman.h>
+#include <asm/seccomp.h>
/* workaround for a warning with -Wmissing-prototypes */
void foo(void);
diff --git a/arch/x86/um/shared/sysdep/mcontext.h b/arch/x86/um/shared/sysdep/mcontext.h
index b724c54da316..6fe490cc5b98 100644
--- a/arch/x86/um/shared/sysdep/mcontext.h
+++ b/arch/x86/um/shared/sysdep/mcontext.h
@@ -6,7 +6,16 @@
#ifndef __SYS_SIGCONTEXT_X86_H
#define __SYS_SIGCONTEXT_X86_H
+#include <stub-data.h>
+
extern void get_regs_from_mc(struct uml_pt_regs *, mcontext_t *);
+extern void get_mc_from_regs(struct uml_pt_regs *regs, mcontext_t *mc,
+ int single_stepping);
+
+extern int get_stub_state(struct uml_pt_regs *regs, struct stub_data *data,
+ unsigned long *fp_size_out);
+extern int set_stub_state(struct uml_pt_regs *regs, struct stub_data *data,
+ int single_stepping);
#ifdef __i386__
diff --git a/arch/x86/um/shared/sysdep/stub-data.h b/arch/x86/um/shared/sysdep/stub-data.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..82b1b7f8ac3d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/um/shared/sysdep/stub-data.h
@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+#ifndef __ARCH_STUB_DATA_H
+#define __ARCH_STUB_DATA_H
+
+#ifdef __i386__
+#include <generated/asm-offsets.h>
+#include <asm/ldt.h>
+
+struct stub_data_arch {
+ int sync;
+ struct user_desc tls[UM_KERN_GDT_ENTRY_TLS_ENTRIES];
+};
+#else
+#define STUB_SYNC_FS_BASE (1 << 0)
+#define STUB_SYNC_GS_BASE (1 << 1)
+struct stub_data_arch {
+ int sync;
+ unsigned long fs_base;
+ unsigned long gs_base;
+};
+#endif
+
+#endif /* __ARCH_STUB_DATA_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/um/shared/sysdep/stub.h b/arch/x86/um/shared/sysdep/stub.h
index dc89f4423454..4fa58f5b4fca 100644
--- a/arch/x86/um/shared/sysdep/stub.h
+++ b/arch/x86/um/shared/sysdep/stub.h
@@ -13,3 +13,5 @@
extern void stub_segv_handler(int, siginfo_t *, void *);
extern void stub_syscall_handler(void);
+extern void stub_signal_interrupt(int, siginfo_t *, void *);
+extern void stub_signal_restorer(void);
diff --git a/arch/x86/um/shared/sysdep/stub_32.h b/arch/x86/um/shared/sysdep/stub_32.h
index 390988132c0a..df568fc3ceb4 100644
--- a/arch/x86/um/shared/sysdep/stub_32.h
+++ b/arch/x86/um/shared/sysdep/stub_32.h
@@ -131,4 +131,17 @@ static __always_inline void *get_stub_data(void)
"call *%%eax ;" \
:: "i" ((1 + STUB_DATA_PAGES) * UM_KERN_PAGE_SIZE), \
"i" (&fn))
+
+static __always_inline void
+stub_seccomp_restore_state(struct stub_data_arch *arch)
+{
+ for (int i = 0; i < sizeof(arch->tls) / sizeof(arch->tls[0]); i++) {
+ if (arch->sync & (1 << i))
+ stub_syscall1(__NR_set_thread_area,
+ (unsigned long) &arch->tls[i]);
+ }
+
+ arch->sync = 0;
+}
+
#endif
diff --git a/arch/x86/um/shared/sysdep/stub_64.h b/arch/x86/um/shared/sysdep/stub_64.h
index 294affbec742..9cfd31afa769 100644
--- a/arch/x86/um/shared/sysdep/stub_64.h
+++ b/arch/x86/um/shared/sysdep/stub_64.h
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@
#include <sysdep/ptrace_user.h>
#include <generated/asm-offsets.h>
#include <linux/stddef.h>
+#include <asm/prctl.h>
#define STUB_MMAP_NR __NR_mmap
#define MMAP_OFFSET(o) (o)
@@ -134,4 +135,20 @@ static __always_inline void *get_stub_data(void)
"call *%%rax ;" \
:: "i" ((1 + STUB_DATA_PAGES) * UM_KERN_PAGE_SIZE), \
"i" (&fn))
+
+static __always_inline void
+stub_seccomp_restore_state(struct stub_data_arch *arch)
+{
+ /*
+ * We could use _writefsbase_u64/_writegsbase_u64 if the host reports
+ * support in the hwcaps (HWCAP2_FSGSBASE).
+ */
+ if (arch->sync & STUB_SYNC_FS_BASE)
+ stub_syscall2(__NR_arch_prctl, ARCH_SET_FS, arch->fs_base);
+ if (arch->sync & STUB_SYNC_GS_BASE)
+ stub_syscall2(__NR_arch_prctl, ARCH_SET_GS, arch->gs_base);
+
+ arch->sync = 0;
+}
+
#endif
diff --git a/arch/x86/um/tls_32.c b/arch/x86/um/tls_32.c
index fbb129023080..cb3f17627d16 100644
--- a/arch/x86/um/tls_32.c
+++ b/arch/x86/um/tls_32.c
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
#include <skas.h>
#include <sysdep/tls.h>
#include <asm/desc.h>
+#include <stub-data.h>
/*
* If needed we can detect when it's uninitialized.
@@ -21,14 +22,25 @@
static int host_supports_tls = -1;
int host_gdt_entry_tls_min;
-static int do_set_thread_area(struct user_desc *info)
+static int do_set_thread_area(struct task_struct* task, struct user_desc *info)
{
int ret;
- u32 cpu;
- cpu = get_cpu();
- ret = os_set_thread_area(info, userspace_pid[cpu]);
- put_cpu();
+ if (info->entry_number < host_gdt_entry_tls_min ||
+ info->entry_number >= host_gdt_entry_tls_min + GDT_ENTRY_TLS_ENTRIES)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (using_seccomp) {
+ int idx = info->entry_number - host_gdt_entry_tls_min;
+ struct stub_data *data = (void *)task->mm->context.id.stack;
+
+ data->arch_data.tls[idx] = *info;
+ data->arch_data.sync |= BIT(idx);
+
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ ret = os_set_thread_area(info, task->mm->context.id.pid);
if (ret)
printk(KERN_ERR "PTRACE_SET_THREAD_AREA failed, err = %d, "
@@ -97,7 +109,7 @@ static int load_TLS(int flags, struct task_struct *to)
if (!(flags & O_FORCE) && curr->flushed)
continue;
- ret = do_set_thread_area(&curr->tls);
+ ret = do_set_thread_area(current, &curr->tls);
if (ret)
goto out;
@@ -275,7 +287,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE1(set_thread_area, struct user_desc __user *, user_desc)
return -EFAULT;
}
- ret = do_set_thread_area(&info);
+ ret = do_set_thread_area(current, &info);
if (ret)
return ret;
return set_tls_entry(current, &info, idx, 1);
diff --git a/arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/seamcall.S b/arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/seamcall.S
index 5b1f2286aea9..6854c52c374b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/seamcall.S
+++ b/arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/seamcall.S
@@ -41,6 +41,9 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(__seamcall_ret)
TDX_MODULE_CALL host=1 ret=1
SYM_FUNC_END(__seamcall_ret)
+/* KVM requires non-instrumentable __seamcall_saved_ret() for TDH.VP.ENTER */
+.section .noinstr.text, "ax"
+
/*
* __seamcall_saved_ret() - Host-side interface functions to SEAM software
* (the P-SEAMLDR or the TDX module), with saving output registers to the
diff --git a/arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c b/arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c
index 7fdb37387886..c7a9a087ccaf 100644
--- a/arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c
@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@
* Intel Trusted Domain Extensions (TDX) support
*/
+#include "asm/page_types.h"
#define pr_fmt(fmt) "virt/tdx: " fmt
#include <linux/types.h>
@@ -27,6 +28,7 @@
#include <linux/log2.h>
#include <linux/acpi.h>
#include <linux/suspend.h>
+#include <linux/idr.h>
#include <asm/page.h>
#include <asm/special_insns.h>
#include <asm/msr-index.h>
@@ -42,6 +44,8 @@ static u32 tdx_global_keyid __ro_after_init;
static u32 tdx_guest_keyid_start __ro_after_init;
static u32 tdx_nr_guest_keyids __ro_after_init;
+static DEFINE_IDA(tdx_guest_keyid_pool);
+
static DEFINE_PER_CPU(bool, tdx_lp_initialized);
static struct tdmr_info_list tdx_tdmr_list;
@@ -52,6 +56,8 @@ static DEFINE_MUTEX(tdx_module_lock);
/* All TDX-usable memory regions. Protected by mem_hotplug_lock. */
static LIST_HEAD(tdx_memlist);
+static struct tdx_sys_info tdx_sysinfo;
+
typedef void (*sc_err_func_t)(u64 fn, u64 err, struct tdx_module_args *args);
static inline void seamcall_err(u64 fn, u64 err, struct tdx_module_args *args)
@@ -69,8 +75,9 @@ static inline void seamcall_err_ret(u64 fn, u64 err,
args->r9, args->r10, args->r11);
}
-static inline int sc_retry_prerr(sc_func_t func, sc_err_func_t err_func,
- u64 fn, struct tdx_module_args *args)
+static __always_inline int sc_retry_prerr(sc_func_t func,
+ sc_err_func_t err_func,
+ u64 fn, struct tdx_module_args *args)
{
u64 sret = sc_retry(func, fn, args);
@@ -1060,15 +1067,14 @@ static int init_tdmrs(struct tdmr_info_list *tdmr_list)
static int init_tdx_module(void)
{
- struct tdx_sys_info sysinfo;
int ret;
- ret = get_tdx_sys_info(&sysinfo);
+ ret = get_tdx_sys_info(&tdx_sysinfo);
if (ret)
return ret;
/* Check whether the kernel can support this module */
- ret = check_features(&sysinfo);
+ ret = check_features(&tdx_sysinfo);
if (ret)
return ret;
@@ -1089,12 +1095,12 @@ static int init_tdx_module(void)
goto out_put_tdxmem;
/* Allocate enough space for constructing TDMRs */
- ret = alloc_tdmr_list(&tdx_tdmr_list, &sysinfo.tdmr);
+ ret = alloc_tdmr_list(&tdx_tdmr_list, &tdx_sysinfo.tdmr);
if (ret)
goto err_free_tdxmem;
/* Cover all TDX-usable memory regions in TDMRs */
- ret = construct_tdmrs(&tdx_memlist, &tdx_tdmr_list, &sysinfo.tdmr);
+ ret = construct_tdmrs(&tdx_memlist, &tdx_tdmr_list, &tdx_sysinfo.tdmr);
if (ret)
goto err_free_tdmrs;
@@ -1456,3 +1462,411 @@ void __init tdx_init(void)
check_tdx_erratum();
}
+
+const struct tdx_sys_info *tdx_get_sysinfo(void)
+{
+ const struct tdx_sys_info *p = NULL;
+
+ /* Make sure all fields in @tdx_sysinfo have been populated */
+ mutex_lock(&tdx_module_lock);
+ if (tdx_module_status == TDX_MODULE_INITIALIZED)
+ p = (const struct tdx_sys_info *)&tdx_sysinfo;
+ mutex_unlock(&tdx_module_lock);
+
+ return p;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tdx_get_sysinfo);
+
+u32 tdx_get_nr_guest_keyids(void)
+{
+ return tdx_nr_guest_keyids;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tdx_get_nr_guest_keyids);
+
+int tdx_guest_keyid_alloc(void)
+{
+ return ida_alloc_range(&tdx_guest_keyid_pool, tdx_guest_keyid_start,
+ tdx_guest_keyid_start + tdx_nr_guest_keyids - 1,
+ GFP_KERNEL);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tdx_guest_keyid_alloc);
+
+void tdx_guest_keyid_free(unsigned int keyid)
+{
+ ida_free(&tdx_guest_keyid_pool, keyid);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tdx_guest_keyid_free);
+
+static inline u64 tdx_tdr_pa(struct tdx_td *td)
+{
+ return page_to_phys(td->tdr_page);
+}
+
+static inline u64 tdx_tdvpr_pa(struct tdx_vp *td)
+{
+ return page_to_phys(td->tdvpr_page);
+}
+
+/*
+ * The TDX module exposes a CLFLUSH_BEFORE_ALLOC bit to specify whether
+ * a CLFLUSH of pages is required before handing them to the TDX module.
+ * Be conservative and make the code simpler by doing the CLFLUSH
+ * unconditionally.
+ */
+static void tdx_clflush_page(struct page *page)
+{
+ clflush_cache_range(page_to_virt(page), PAGE_SIZE);
+}
+
+noinstr __flatten u64 tdh_vp_enter(struct tdx_vp *td, struct tdx_module_args *args)
+{
+ args->rcx = tdx_tdvpr_pa(td);
+
+ return __seamcall_saved_ret(TDH_VP_ENTER, args);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tdh_vp_enter);
+
+u64 tdh_mng_addcx(struct tdx_td *td, struct page *tdcs_page)
+{
+ struct tdx_module_args args = {
+ .rcx = page_to_phys(tdcs_page),
+ .rdx = tdx_tdr_pa(td),
+ };
+
+ tdx_clflush_page(tdcs_page);
+ return seamcall(TDH_MNG_ADDCX, &args);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tdh_mng_addcx);
+
+u64 tdh_mem_page_add(struct tdx_td *td, u64 gpa, struct page *page, struct page *source, u64 *ext_err1, u64 *ext_err2)
+{
+ struct tdx_module_args args = {
+ .rcx = gpa,
+ .rdx = tdx_tdr_pa(td),
+ .r8 = page_to_phys(page),
+ .r9 = page_to_phys(source),
+ };
+ u64 ret;
+
+ tdx_clflush_page(page);
+ ret = seamcall_ret(TDH_MEM_PAGE_ADD, &args);
+
+ *ext_err1 = args.rcx;
+ *ext_err2 = args.rdx;
+
+ return ret;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tdh_mem_page_add);
+
+u64 tdh_mem_sept_add(struct tdx_td *td, u64 gpa, int level, struct page *page, u64 *ext_err1, u64 *ext_err2)
+{
+ struct tdx_module_args args = {
+ .rcx = gpa | level,
+ .rdx = tdx_tdr_pa(td),
+ .r8 = page_to_phys(page),
+ };
+ u64 ret;
+
+ tdx_clflush_page(page);
+ ret = seamcall_ret(TDH_MEM_SEPT_ADD, &args);
+
+ *ext_err1 = args.rcx;
+ *ext_err2 = args.rdx;
+
+ return ret;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tdh_mem_sept_add);
+
+u64 tdh_vp_addcx(struct tdx_vp *vp, struct page *tdcx_page)
+{
+ struct tdx_module_args args = {
+ .rcx = page_to_phys(tdcx_page),
+ .rdx = tdx_tdvpr_pa(vp),
+ };
+
+ tdx_clflush_page(tdcx_page);
+ return seamcall(TDH_VP_ADDCX, &args);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tdh_vp_addcx);
+
+u64 tdh_mem_page_aug(struct tdx_td *td, u64 gpa, int level, struct page *page, u64 *ext_err1, u64 *ext_err2)
+{
+ struct tdx_module_args args = {
+ .rcx = gpa | level,
+ .rdx = tdx_tdr_pa(td),
+ .r8 = page_to_phys(page),
+ };
+ u64 ret;
+
+ tdx_clflush_page(page);
+ ret = seamcall_ret(TDH_MEM_PAGE_AUG, &args);
+
+ *ext_err1 = args.rcx;
+ *ext_err2 = args.rdx;
+
+ return ret;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tdh_mem_page_aug);
+
+u64 tdh_mem_range_block(struct tdx_td *td, u64 gpa, int level, u64 *ext_err1, u64 *ext_err2)
+{
+ struct tdx_module_args args = {
+ .rcx = gpa | level,
+ .rdx = tdx_tdr_pa(td),
+ };
+ u64 ret;
+
+ ret = seamcall_ret(TDH_MEM_RANGE_BLOCK, &args);
+
+ *ext_err1 = args.rcx;
+ *ext_err2 = args.rdx;
+
+ return ret;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tdh_mem_range_block);
+
+u64 tdh_mng_key_config(struct tdx_td *td)
+{
+ struct tdx_module_args args = {
+ .rcx = tdx_tdr_pa(td),
+ };
+
+ return seamcall(TDH_MNG_KEY_CONFIG, &args);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tdh_mng_key_config);
+
+u64 tdh_mng_create(struct tdx_td *td, u16 hkid)
+{
+ struct tdx_module_args args = {
+ .rcx = tdx_tdr_pa(td),
+ .rdx = hkid,
+ };
+
+ tdx_clflush_page(td->tdr_page);
+ return seamcall(TDH_MNG_CREATE, &args);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tdh_mng_create);
+
+u64 tdh_vp_create(struct tdx_td *td, struct tdx_vp *vp)
+{
+ struct tdx_module_args args = {
+ .rcx = tdx_tdvpr_pa(vp),
+ .rdx = tdx_tdr_pa(td),
+ };
+
+ tdx_clflush_page(vp->tdvpr_page);
+ return seamcall(TDH_VP_CREATE, &args);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tdh_vp_create);
+
+u64 tdh_mng_rd(struct tdx_td *td, u64 field, u64 *data)
+{
+ struct tdx_module_args args = {
+ .rcx = tdx_tdr_pa(td),
+ .rdx = field,
+ };
+ u64 ret;
+
+ ret = seamcall_ret(TDH_MNG_RD, &args);
+
+ /* R8: Content of the field, or 0 in case of error. */
+ *data = args.r8;
+
+ return ret;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tdh_mng_rd);
+
+u64 tdh_mr_extend(struct tdx_td *td, u64 gpa, u64 *ext_err1, u64 *ext_err2)
+{
+ struct tdx_module_args args = {
+ .rcx = gpa,
+ .rdx = tdx_tdr_pa(td),
+ };
+ u64 ret;
+
+ ret = seamcall_ret(TDH_MR_EXTEND, &args);
+
+ *ext_err1 = args.rcx;
+ *ext_err2 = args.rdx;
+
+ return ret;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tdh_mr_extend);
+
+u64 tdh_mr_finalize(struct tdx_td *td)
+{
+ struct tdx_module_args args = {
+ .rcx = tdx_tdr_pa(td),
+ };
+
+ return seamcall(TDH_MR_FINALIZE, &args);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tdh_mr_finalize);
+
+u64 tdh_vp_flush(struct tdx_vp *vp)
+{
+ struct tdx_module_args args = {
+ .rcx = tdx_tdvpr_pa(vp),
+ };
+
+ return seamcall(TDH_VP_FLUSH, &args);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tdh_vp_flush);
+
+u64 tdh_mng_vpflushdone(struct tdx_td *td)
+{
+ struct tdx_module_args args = {
+ .rcx = tdx_tdr_pa(td),
+ };
+
+ return seamcall(TDH_MNG_VPFLUSHDONE, &args);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tdh_mng_vpflushdone);
+
+u64 tdh_mng_key_freeid(struct tdx_td *td)
+{
+ struct tdx_module_args args = {
+ .rcx = tdx_tdr_pa(td),
+ };
+
+ return seamcall(TDH_MNG_KEY_FREEID, &args);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tdh_mng_key_freeid);
+
+u64 tdh_mng_init(struct tdx_td *td, u64 td_params, u64 *extended_err)
+{
+ struct tdx_module_args args = {
+ .rcx = tdx_tdr_pa(td),
+ .rdx = td_params,
+ };
+ u64 ret;
+
+ ret = seamcall_ret(TDH_MNG_INIT, &args);
+
+ *extended_err = args.rcx;
+
+ return ret;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tdh_mng_init);
+
+u64 tdh_vp_rd(struct tdx_vp *vp, u64 field, u64 *data)
+{
+ struct tdx_module_args args = {
+ .rcx = tdx_tdvpr_pa(vp),
+ .rdx = field,
+ };
+ u64 ret;
+
+ ret = seamcall_ret(TDH_VP_RD, &args);
+
+ /* R8: Content of the field, or 0 in case of error. */
+ *data = args.r8;
+
+ return ret;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tdh_vp_rd);
+
+u64 tdh_vp_wr(struct tdx_vp *vp, u64 field, u64 data, u64 mask)
+{
+ struct tdx_module_args args = {
+ .rcx = tdx_tdvpr_pa(vp),
+ .rdx = field,
+ .r8 = data,
+ .r9 = mask,
+ };
+
+ return seamcall(TDH_VP_WR, &args);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tdh_vp_wr);
+
+u64 tdh_vp_init(struct tdx_vp *vp, u64 initial_rcx, u32 x2apicid)
+{
+ struct tdx_module_args args = {
+ .rcx = tdx_tdvpr_pa(vp),
+ .rdx = initial_rcx,
+ .r8 = x2apicid,
+ };
+
+ /* apicid requires version == 1. */
+ return seamcall(TDH_VP_INIT | (1ULL << TDX_VERSION_SHIFT), &args);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tdh_vp_init);
+
+/*
+ * TDX ABI defines output operands as PT, OWNER and SIZE. These are TDX defined fomats.
+ * So despite the names, they must be interpted specially as described by the spec. Return
+ * them only for error reporting purposes.
+ */
+u64 tdh_phymem_page_reclaim(struct page *page, u64 *tdx_pt, u64 *tdx_owner, u64 *tdx_size)
+{
+ struct tdx_module_args args = {
+ .rcx = page_to_phys(page),
+ };
+ u64 ret;
+
+ ret = seamcall_ret(TDH_PHYMEM_PAGE_RECLAIM, &args);
+
+ *tdx_pt = args.rcx;
+ *tdx_owner = args.rdx;
+ *tdx_size = args.r8;
+
+ return ret;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tdh_phymem_page_reclaim);
+
+u64 tdh_mem_track(struct tdx_td *td)
+{
+ struct tdx_module_args args = {
+ .rcx = tdx_tdr_pa(td),
+ };
+
+ return seamcall(TDH_MEM_TRACK, &args);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tdh_mem_track);
+
+u64 tdh_mem_page_remove(struct tdx_td *td, u64 gpa, u64 level, u64 *ext_err1, u64 *ext_err2)
+{
+ struct tdx_module_args args = {
+ .rcx = gpa | level,
+ .rdx = tdx_tdr_pa(td),
+ };
+ u64 ret;
+
+ ret = seamcall_ret(TDH_MEM_PAGE_REMOVE, &args);
+
+ *ext_err1 = args.rcx;
+ *ext_err2 = args.rdx;
+
+ return ret;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tdh_mem_page_remove);
+
+u64 tdh_phymem_cache_wb(bool resume)
+{
+ struct tdx_module_args args = {
+ .rcx = resume ? 1 : 0,
+ };
+
+ return seamcall(TDH_PHYMEM_CACHE_WB, &args);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tdh_phymem_cache_wb);
+
+u64 tdh_phymem_page_wbinvd_tdr(struct tdx_td *td)
+{
+ struct tdx_module_args args = {};
+
+ args.rcx = mk_keyed_paddr(tdx_global_keyid, td->tdr_page);
+
+ return seamcall(TDH_PHYMEM_PAGE_WBINVD, &args);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tdh_phymem_page_wbinvd_tdr);
+
+u64 tdh_phymem_page_wbinvd_hkid(u64 hkid, struct page *page)
+{
+ struct tdx_module_args args = {};
+
+ args.rcx = mk_keyed_paddr(hkid, page);
+
+ return seamcall(TDH_PHYMEM_PAGE_WBINVD, &args);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tdh_phymem_page_wbinvd_hkid);
diff --git a/arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.h b/arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.h
index 4e3d533cdd61..82bb82be8567 100644
--- a/arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.h
+++ b/arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.h
@@ -3,7 +3,6 @@
#define _X86_VIRT_TDX_H
#include <linux/bits.h>
-#include "tdx_global_metadata.h"
/*
* This file contains both macros and data structures defined by the TDX
@@ -15,13 +14,46 @@
/*
* TDX module SEAMCALL leaf functions
*/
-#define TDH_PHYMEM_PAGE_RDMD 24
-#define TDH_SYS_KEY_CONFIG 31
-#define TDH_SYS_INIT 33
-#define TDH_SYS_RD 34
-#define TDH_SYS_LP_INIT 35
-#define TDH_SYS_TDMR_INIT 36
-#define TDH_SYS_CONFIG 45
+#define TDH_VP_ENTER 0
+#define TDH_MNG_ADDCX 1
+#define TDH_MEM_PAGE_ADD 2
+#define TDH_MEM_SEPT_ADD 3
+#define TDH_VP_ADDCX 4
+#define TDH_MEM_PAGE_AUG 6
+#define TDH_MEM_RANGE_BLOCK 7
+#define TDH_MNG_KEY_CONFIG 8
+#define TDH_MNG_CREATE 9
+#define TDH_MNG_RD 11
+#define TDH_MR_EXTEND 16
+#define TDH_MR_FINALIZE 17
+#define TDH_VP_FLUSH 18
+#define TDH_MNG_VPFLUSHDONE 19
+#define TDH_VP_CREATE 10
+#define TDH_MNG_KEY_FREEID 20
+#define TDH_MNG_INIT 21
+#define TDH_VP_INIT 22
+#define TDH_PHYMEM_PAGE_RDMD 24
+#define TDH_VP_RD 26
+#define TDH_PHYMEM_PAGE_RECLAIM 28
+#define TDH_MEM_PAGE_REMOVE 29
+#define TDH_SYS_KEY_CONFIG 31
+#define TDH_SYS_INIT 33
+#define TDH_SYS_RD 34
+#define TDH_SYS_LP_INIT 35
+#define TDH_SYS_TDMR_INIT 36
+#define TDH_MEM_TRACK 38
+#define TDH_PHYMEM_CACHE_WB 40
+#define TDH_PHYMEM_PAGE_WBINVD 41
+#define TDH_VP_WR 43
+#define TDH_SYS_CONFIG 45
+
+/*
+ * SEAMCALL leaf:
+ *
+ * Bit 15:0 Leaf number
+ * Bit 23:16 Version number
+ */
+#define TDX_VERSION_SHIFT 16
/* TDX page types */
#define PT_NDA 0x0
diff --git a/arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx_global_metadata.c b/arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx_global_metadata.c
index 8027a24d1c6e..13ad2663488b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx_global_metadata.c
+++ b/arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx_global_metadata.c
@@ -37,12 +37,62 @@ static int get_tdx_sys_info_tdmr(struct tdx_sys_info_tdmr *sysinfo_tdmr)
return ret;
}
+static int get_tdx_sys_info_td_ctrl(struct tdx_sys_info_td_ctrl *sysinfo_td_ctrl)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+ u64 val;
+
+ if (!ret && !(ret = read_sys_metadata_field(0x9800000100000000, &val)))
+ sysinfo_td_ctrl->tdr_base_size = val;
+ if (!ret && !(ret = read_sys_metadata_field(0x9800000100000100, &val)))
+ sysinfo_td_ctrl->tdcs_base_size = val;
+ if (!ret && !(ret = read_sys_metadata_field(0x9800000100000200, &val)))
+ sysinfo_td_ctrl->tdvps_base_size = val;
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int get_tdx_sys_info_td_conf(struct tdx_sys_info_td_conf *sysinfo_td_conf)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+ u64 val;
+ int i, j;
+
+ if (!ret && !(ret = read_sys_metadata_field(0x1900000300000000, &val)))
+ sysinfo_td_conf->attributes_fixed0 = val;
+ if (!ret && !(ret = read_sys_metadata_field(0x1900000300000001, &val)))
+ sysinfo_td_conf->attributes_fixed1 = val;
+ if (!ret && !(ret = read_sys_metadata_field(0x1900000300000002, &val)))
+ sysinfo_td_conf->xfam_fixed0 = val;
+ if (!ret && !(ret = read_sys_metadata_field(0x1900000300000003, &val)))
+ sysinfo_td_conf->xfam_fixed1 = val;
+ if (!ret && !(ret = read_sys_metadata_field(0x9900000100000004, &val)))
+ sysinfo_td_conf->num_cpuid_config = val;
+ if (!ret && !(ret = read_sys_metadata_field(0x9900000100000008, &val)))
+ sysinfo_td_conf->max_vcpus_per_td = val;
+ if (sysinfo_td_conf->num_cpuid_config > ARRAY_SIZE(sysinfo_td_conf->cpuid_config_leaves))
+ return -EINVAL;
+ for (i = 0; i < sysinfo_td_conf->num_cpuid_config; i++)
+ if (!ret && !(ret = read_sys_metadata_field(0x9900000300000400 + i, &val)))
+ sysinfo_td_conf->cpuid_config_leaves[i] = val;
+ if (sysinfo_td_conf->num_cpuid_config > ARRAY_SIZE(sysinfo_td_conf->cpuid_config_values))
+ return -EINVAL;
+ for (i = 0; i < sysinfo_td_conf->num_cpuid_config; i++)
+ for (j = 0; j < 2; j++)
+ if (!ret && !(ret = read_sys_metadata_field(0x9900000300000500 + i * 2 + j, &val)))
+ sysinfo_td_conf->cpuid_config_values[i][j] = val;
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
static int get_tdx_sys_info(struct tdx_sys_info *sysinfo)
{
int ret = 0;
ret = ret ?: get_tdx_sys_info_features(&sysinfo->features);
ret = ret ?: get_tdx_sys_info_tdmr(&sysinfo->tdmr);
+ ret = ret ?: get_tdx_sys_info_td_ctrl(&sysinfo->td_ctrl);
+ ret = ret ?: get_tdx_sys_info_td_conf(&sysinfo->td_conf);
return ret;
}