diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'security/selinux/hooks.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | security/selinux/hooks.c | 803 |
1 files changed, 481 insertions, 322 deletions
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c index 3448454c82d0..595ceb314aeb 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -65,7 +65,6 @@ #include <net/netlink.h> #include <linux/tcp.h> #include <linux/udp.h> -#include <linux/dccp.h> #include <linux/sctp.h> #include <net/sctp/structs.h> #include <linux/quota.h> @@ -213,8 +212,10 @@ static void cred_init_security(void) { struct task_security_struct *tsec; + /* NOTE: the lsm framework zeros out the buffer on allocation */ + tsec = selinux_cred(unrcu_pointer(current->real_cred)); - tsec->osid = tsec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL; + tsec->osid = tsec->sid = tsec->avdcache.sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL; } /* @@ -278,22 +279,21 @@ static int __inode_security_revalidate(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *dentry, bool may_sleep) { - struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode); - - might_sleep_if(may_sleep); + if (!selinux_initialized()) + return 0; - if (selinux_initialized() && - isec->initialized != LABEL_INITIALIZED) { - if (!may_sleep) - return -ECHILD; + if (may_sleep) + might_sleep(); + else + return -ECHILD; - /* - * Try reloading the inode security label. This will fail if - * @opt_dentry is NULL and no dentry for this inode can be - * found; in that case, continue using the old label. - */ - inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, dentry); - } + /* + * Check to ensure that an inode's SELinux state is valid and try + * reloading the inode security label if necessary. This will fail if + * @dentry is NULL and no dentry for this inode can be found; in that + * case, continue using the old label. + */ + inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, dentry); return 0; } @@ -302,41 +302,53 @@ static struct inode_security_struct *inode_security_novalidate(struct inode *ino return selinux_inode(inode); } -static struct inode_security_struct *inode_security_rcu(struct inode *inode, bool rcu) +static inline struct inode_security_struct *inode_security_rcu(struct inode *inode, + bool rcu) { - int error; + int rc; + struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode); - error = __inode_security_revalidate(inode, NULL, !rcu); - if (error) - return ERR_PTR(error); - return selinux_inode(inode); + /* check below is racy, but revalidate will recheck with lock held */ + if (data_race(likely(isec->initialized == LABEL_INITIALIZED))) + return isec; + rc = __inode_security_revalidate(inode, NULL, !rcu); + if (rc) + return ERR_PTR(rc); + return isec; } /* * Get the security label of an inode. */ -static struct inode_security_struct *inode_security(struct inode *inode) +static inline struct inode_security_struct *inode_security(struct inode *inode) { + struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode); + + /* check below is racy, but revalidate will recheck with lock held */ + if (data_race(likely(isec->initialized == LABEL_INITIALIZED))) + return isec; __inode_security_revalidate(inode, NULL, true); - return selinux_inode(inode); + return isec; } -static struct inode_security_struct *backing_inode_security_novalidate(struct dentry *dentry) +static inline struct inode_security_struct *backing_inode_security_novalidate(struct dentry *dentry) { - struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry); - - return selinux_inode(inode); + return selinux_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry)); } /* * Get the security label of a dentry's backing inode. */ -static struct inode_security_struct *backing_inode_security(struct dentry *dentry) +static inline struct inode_security_struct *backing_inode_security(struct dentry *dentry) { struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry); + struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode); + /* check below is racy, but revalidate will recheck with lock held */ + if (data_race(likely(isec->initialized == LABEL_INITIALIZED))) + return isec; __inode_security_revalidate(inode, dentry, true); - return selinux_inode(inode); + return isec; } static void inode_free_security(struct inode *inode) @@ -402,7 +414,7 @@ static const struct { static int match_opt_prefix(char *s, int l, char **arg) { - int i; + unsigned int i; for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(tokens); i++) { size_t len = tokens[i].len; @@ -1186,8 +1198,6 @@ static inline u16 socket_type_to_security_class(int family, int type, int protoc return SECCLASS_ICMP_SOCKET; else return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET; - case SOCK_DCCP: - return SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET; default: return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET; } @@ -1678,12 +1688,15 @@ static inline int dentry_has_perm(const struct cred *cred, struct dentry *dentry, u32 av) { - struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry); struct common_audit_data ad; + struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry); + struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode); ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY; ad.u.dentry = dentry; - __inode_security_revalidate(inode, dentry, true); + /* check below is racy, but revalidate will recheck with lock held */ + if (data_race(unlikely(isec->initialized != LABEL_INITIALIZED))) + __inode_security_revalidate(inode, dentry, true); return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad); } @@ -1694,12 +1707,15 @@ static inline int path_has_perm(const struct cred *cred, const struct path *path, u32 av) { - struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(path->dentry); struct common_audit_data ad; + struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(path->dentry); + struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode); ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH; ad.u.path = *path; - __inode_security_revalidate(inode, path->dentry, true); + /* check below is racy, but revalidate will recheck with lock held */ + if (data_race(unlikely(isec->initialized != LABEL_INITIALIZED))) + __inode_security_revalidate(inode, path->dentry, true); return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad); } @@ -2202,23 +2218,16 @@ static int selinux_syslog(int type) } /* - * Check that a process has enough memory to allocate a new virtual - * mapping. 0 means there is enough memory for the allocation to - * succeed and -ENOMEM implies there is not. + * Check permission for allocating a new virtual mapping. Returns + * 0 if permission is granted, negative error code if not. * * Do not audit the selinux permission check, as this is applied to all * processes that allocate mappings. */ static int selinux_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages) { - int rc, cap_sys_admin = 0; - - rc = cred_has_capability(current_cred(), CAP_SYS_ADMIN, - CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT, true); - if (rc == 0) - cap_sys_admin = 1; - - return cap_sys_admin; + return cred_has_capability(current_cred(), CAP_SYS_ADMIN, + CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT, true); } /* binprm security operations */ @@ -2871,8 +2880,8 @@ static void selinux_inode_free_security(struct inode *inode) static int selinux_dentry_init_security(struct dentry *dentry, int mode, const struct qstr *name, - const char **xattr_name, void **ctx, - u32 *ctxlen) + const char **xattr_name, + struct lsm_context *cp) { u32 newsid; int rc; @@ -2887,8 +2896,8 @@ static int selinux_dentry_init_security(struct dentry *dentry, int mode, if (xattr_name) *xattr_name = XATTR_NAME_SELINUX; - return security_sid_to_context(newsid, (char **)ctx, - ctxlen); + cp->id = LSM_ID_SELINUX; + return security_sid_to_context(newsid, &cp->context, &cp->len); } static int selinux_dentry_create_files_as(struct dentry *dentry, int mode, @@ -2961,7 +2970,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_init_security_anon(struct inode *inode, const struct qstr *name, const struct inode *context_inode) { - const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred()); + u32 sid = current_sid(); struct common_audit_data ad; struct inode_security_struct *isec; int rc; @@ -2990,7 +2999,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_init_security_anon(struct inode *inode, } else { isec->sclass = SECCLASS_ANON_INODE; rc = security_transition_sid( - tsec->sid, tsec->sid, + sid, sid, isec->sclass, name, &isec->sid); if (rc) return rc; @@ -3005,7 +3014,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_init_security_anon(struct inode *inode, ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_ANONINODE; ad.u.anonclass = name ? (const char *)name->name : "?"; - return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, + return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, FILE__CREATE, @@ -3063,14 +3072,12 @@ static int selinux_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry) static int selinux_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode, bool rcu) { - const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); struct common_audit_data ad; struct inode_security_struct *isec; - u32 sid; + u32 sid = current_sid(); ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY; ad.u.dentry = dentry; - sid = cred_sid(cred); isec = inode_security_rcu(inode, rcu); if (IS_ERR(isec)) return PTR_ERR(isec); @@ -3092,46 +3099,147 @@ static noinline int audit_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, audited, denied, result, &ad); } -static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask) +/** + * task_avdcache_reset - Reset the task's AVD cache + * @tsec: the task's security state + * + * Clear the task's AVD cache in @tsec and reset it to the current policy's + * and task's info. + */ +static inline void task_avdcache_reset(struct task_security_struct *tsec) { - const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); + memset(&tsec->avdcache.dir, 0, sizeof(tsec->avdcache.dir)); + tsec->avdcache.sid = tsec->sid; + tsec->avdcache.seqno = avc_policy_seqno(); + tsec->avdcache.dir_spot = TSEC_AVDC_DIR_SIZE - 1; +} + +/** + * task_avdcache_search - Search the task's AVD cache + * @tsec: the task's security state + * @isec: the inode to search for in the cache + * @avdc: matching avd cache entry returned to the caller + * + * Search @tsec for a AVD cache entry that matches @isec and return it to the + * caller via @avdc. Returns 0 if a match is found, negative values otherwise. + */ +static inline int task_avdcache_search(struct task_security_struct *tsec, + struct inode_security_struct *isec, + struct avdc_entry **avdc) +{ + int orig, iter; + + /* focused on path walk optimization, only cache directories */ + if (isec->sclass != SECCLASS_DIR) + return -ENOENT; + + if (unlikely(tsec->sid != tsec->avdcache.sid || + tsec->avdcache.seqno != avc_policy_seqno())) { + task_avdcache_reset(tsec); + return -ENOENT; + } + + orig = iter = tsec->avdcache.dir_spot; + do { + if (tsec->avdcache.dir[iter].isid == isec->sid) { + /* cache hit */ + tsec->avdcache.dir_spot = iter; + *avdc = &tsec->avdcache.dir[iter]; + return 0; + } + iter = (iter - 1) & (TSEC_AVDC_DIR_SIZE - 1); + } while (iter != orig); + + return -ENOENT; +} + +/** + * task_avdcache_update - Update the task's AVD cache + * @tsec: the task's security state + * @isec: the inode associated with the cache entry + * @avd: the AVD to cache + * @audited: the permission audit bitmask to cache + * + * Update the AVD cache in @tsec with the @avdc and @audited info associated + * with @isec. + */ +static inline void task_avdcache_update(struct task_security_struct *tsec, + struct inode_security_struct *isec, + struct av_decision *avd, + u32 audited) +{ + int spot; + + /* focused on path walk optimization, only cache directories */ + if (isec->sclass != SECCLASS_DIR) + return; + + /* update cache */ + spot = (tsec->avdcache.dir_spot + 1) & (TSEC_AVDC_DIR_SIZE - 1); + tsec->avdcache.dir_spot = spot; + tsec->avdcache.dir[spot].isid = isec->sid; + tsec->avdcache.dir[spot].audited = audited; + tsec->avdcache.dir[spot].allowed = avd->allowed; + tsec->avdcache.dir[spot].permissive = avd->flags & AVD_FLAGS_PERMISSIVE; +} + +/** + * selinux_inode_permission - Check if the current task can access an inode + * @inode: the inode that is being accessed + * @requested: the accesses being requested + * + * Check if the current task is allowed to access @inode according to + * @requested. Returns 0 if allowed, negative values otherwise. + */ +static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int requested) +{ + int mask; u32 perms; - bool from_access; - bool no_block = mask & MAY_NOT_BLOCK; + struct task_security_struct *tsec; struct inode_security_struct *isec; - u32 sid; - struct av_decision avd; + struct avdc_entry *avdc; int rc, rc2; u32 audited, denied; - from_access = mask & MAY_ACCESS; - mask &= (MAY_READ|MAY_WRITE|MAY_EXEC|MAY_APPEND); + mask = requested & (MAY_READ|MAY_WRITE|MAY_EXEC|MAY_APPEND); /* No permission to check. Existence test. */ if (!mask) return 0; - if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode))) - return 0; - - perms = file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask); - - sid = cred_sid(cred); - isec = inode_security_rcu(inode, no_block); + isec = inode_security_rcu(inode, requested & MAY_NOT_BLOCK); if (IS_ERR(isec)) return PTR_ERR(isec); + tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred()); + perms = file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask); + + rc = task_avdcache_search(tsec, isec, &avdc); + if (likely(!rc)) { + /* Cache hit. */ + audited = perms & avdc->audited; + denied = perms & ~avdc->allowed; + if (unlikely(denied && enforcing_enabled() && + !avdc->permissive)) + rc = -EACCES; + } else { + struct av_decision avd; + + /* Cache miss. */ + rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, + perms, 0, &avd); + audited = avc_audit_required(perms, &avd, rc, + (requested & MAY_ACCESS) ? FILE__AUDIT_ACCESS : 0, + &denied); + task_avdcache_update(tsec, isec, &avd, audited); + } - rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, 0, - &avd); - audited = avc_audit_required(perms, &avd, rc, - from_access ? FILE__AUDIT_ACCESS : 0, - &denied); if (likely(!audited)) return rc; rc2 = audit_inode_permission(inode, perms, audited, denied, rc); if (rc2) return rc2; + return rc; } @@ -3141,7 +3249,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry); unsigned int ia_valid = iattr->ia_valid; - __u32 av = FILE__WRITE; + u32 av = FILE__WRITE; /* ATTR_FORCE is just used for ATTR_KILL_S[UG]ID. */ if (ia_valid & ATTR_FORCE) { @@ -3181,6 +3289,23 @@ static bool has_cap_mac_admin(bool audit) return true; } +/** + * selinux_inode_xattr_skipcap - Skip the xattr capability checks? + * @name: name of the xattr + * + * Returns 1 to indicate that SELinux "owns" the access control rights to xattrs + * named @name; the LSM layer should avoid enforcing any traditional + * capability based access controls on this xattr. Returns 0 to indicate that + * SELinux does not "own" the access control rights to xattrs named @name and is + * deferring to the LSM layer for further access controls, including capability + * based controls. + */ +static int selinux_inode_xattr_skipcap(const char *name) +{ + /* require capability check if not a selinux xattr */ + return !strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX); +} + static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, const void *value, size_t size, int flags) @@ -3192,15 +3317,9 @@ static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, u32 newsid, sid = current_sid(); int rc = 0; - if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) { - rc = cap_inode_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size, flags); - if (rc) - return rc; - - /* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the - ordinary setattr permission. */ + /* if not a selinux xattr, only check the ordinary setattr perm */ + if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) return dentry_has_perm(current_cred(), dentry, FILE__SETATTR); - } if (!selinux_initialized()) return (inode_owner_or_capable(idmap, inode) ? 0 : -EPERM); @@ -3349,15 +3468,9 @@ static int selinux_inode_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry) static int selinux_inode_removexattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, const char *name) { - if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) { - int rc = cap_inode_removexattr(idmap, dentry, name); - if (rc) - return rc; - - /* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the - ordinary setattr permission. */ + /* if not a selinux xattr, only check the ordinary setattr perm */ + if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) return dentry_has_perm(current_cred(), dentry, FILE__SETATTR); - } if (!selinux_initialized()) return 0; @@ -3396,6 +3509,9 @@ static int selinux_path_notify(const struct path *path, u64 mask, case FSNOTIFY_OBJ_TYPE_INODE: perm = FILE__WATCH; break; + case FSNOTIFY_OBJ_TYPE_MNTNS: + perm = FILE__WATCH_MOUNTNS; + break; default: return -EINVAL; } @@ -3405,7 +3521,8 @@ static int selinux_path_notify(const struct path *path, u64 mask, perm |= FILE__WATCH_WITH_PERM; /* watches on read-like events need the file:watch_reads permission */ - if (mask & (FS_ACCESS | FS_ACCESS_PERM | FS_CLOSE_NOWRITE)) + if (mask & (FS_ACCESS | FS_ACCESS_PERM | FS_PRE_ACCESS | + FS_CLOSE_NOWRITE)) perm |= FILE__WATCH_READS; return path_has_perm(current_cred(), path, perm); @@ -3504,15 +3621,16 @@ static int selinux_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t return len; } -static void selinux_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, u32 *secid) +static void selinux_inode_getlsmprop(struct inode *inode, struct lsm_prop *prop) { struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode_security_novalidate(inode); - *secid = isec->sid; + + prop->selinux.secid = isec->sid; } static int selinux_inode_copy_up(struct dentry *src, struct cred **new) { - u32 sid; + struct lsm_prop prop; struct task_security_struct *tsec; struct cred *new_creds = *new; @@ -3524,21 +3642,21 @@ static int selinux_inode_copy_up(struct dentry *src, struct cred **new) tsec = selinux_cred(new_creds); /* Get label from overlay inode and set it in create_sid */ - selinux_inode_getsecid(d_inode(src), &sid); - tsec->create_sid = sid; + selinux_inode_getlsmprop(d_inode(src), &prop); + tsec->create_sid = prop.selinux.secid; *new = new_creds; return 0; } -static int selinux_inode_copy_up_xattr(const char *name) +static int selinux_inode_copy_up_xattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name) { /* The copy_up hook above sets the initial context on an inode, but we * don't then want to overwrite it by blindly copying all the lower * xattrs up. Instead, filter out SELinux-related xattrs following * policy load. */ - if (selinux_initialized() && strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX) == 0) - return 1; /* Discard */ + if (selinux_initialized() && !strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) + return -ECANCELED; /* Discard */ /* * Any other attribute apart from SELINUX is not claimed, supported * by selinux. @@ -3583,10 +3701,13 @@ static int selinux_kernfs_init_security(struct kernfs_node *kn_dir, newsid = tsec->create_sid; } else { u16 secclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(kn->mode); + const char *kn_name; struct qstr q; - q.name = kn->name; - q.hash_len = hashlen_string(kn_dir, kn->name); + /* kn is fresh, can't be renamed, name goes not away */ + kn_name = rcu_dereference_check(kn->name, true); + q.name = kn_name; + q.hash_len = hashlen_string(kn_dir, kn_name); rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, parent_sid, secclass, &q, @@ -3688,8 +3809,8 @@ static int ioctl_has_perm(const struct cred *cred, struct file *file, return 0; isec = inode_security(inode); - rc = avc_has_extended_perms(ssid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, - requested, driver, xperm, &ad); + rc = avc_has_extended_perms(ssid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, requested, + driver, AVC_EXT_IOCTL, xperm, &ad); out: return rc; } @@ -3851,7 +3972,17 @@ static int selinux_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, if (default_noexec && (prot & PROT_EXEC) && !(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)) { int rc = 0; - if (vma_is_initial_heap(vma)) { + /* + * We don't use the vma_is_initial_heap() helper as it has + * a history of problems and is currently broken on systems + * where there is no heap, e.g. brk == start_brk. Before + * replacing the conditional below with vma_is_initial_heap(), + * or something similar, please ensure that the logic is the + * same as what we have below or you have tested every possible + * corner case you can think to test. + */ + if (vma->vm_start >= vma->vm_mm->start_brk && + vma->vm_end <= vma->vm_mm->brk) { rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__EXECHEAP, NULL); } else if (!vma->vm_file && (vma_is_initial_stack(vma) || @@ -3939,7 +4070,7 @@ static int selinux_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk, struct file_security_struct *fsec; /* struct fown_struct is never outside the context of a struct file */ - file = container_of(fown, struct file, f_owner); + file = fown->file; fsec = selinux_file(file); @@ -4025,6 +4156,11 @@ static void selinux_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, u32 *secid) *secid = cred_sid(c); } +static void selinux_cred_getlsmprop(const struct cred *c, struct lsm_prop *prop) +{ + prop->selinux.secid = cred_sid(c); +} + /* * set the security data for a kernel service * - all the creation contexts are set to unlabelled @@ -4080,7 +4216,7 @@ static int selinux_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name) SYSTEM__MODULE_REQUEST, &ad); } -static int selinux_kernel_module_from_file(struct file *file) +static int selinux_kernel_load_from_file(struct file *file, u32 requested) { struct common_audit_data ad; struct inode_security_struct *isec; @@ -4088,12 +4224,8 @@ static int selinux_kernel_module_from_file(struct file *file) u32 sid = current_sid(); int rc; - /* init_module */ if (file == NULL) - return avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_SYSTEM, - SYSTEM__MODULE_LOAD, NULL); - - /* finit_module */ + return avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_SYSTEM, requested, NULL); ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE; ad.u.file = file; @@ -4106,8 +4238,7 @@ static int selinux_kernel_module_from_file(struct file *file) } isec = inode_security(file_inode(file)); - return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SYSTEM, - SYSTEM__MODULE_LOAD, &ad); + return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SYSTEM, requested, &ad); } static int selinux_kernel_read_file(struct file *file, @@ -4116,9 +4247,30 @@ static int selinux_kernel_read_file(struct file *file, { int rc = 0; + BUILD_BUG_ON_MSG(READING_MAX_ID > 7, + "New kernel_read_file_id introduced; update SELinux!"); + switch (id) { + case READING_FIRMWARE: + rc = selinux_kernel_load_from_file(file, SYSTEM__FIRMWARE_LOAD); + break; case READING_MODULE: - rc = selinux_kernel_module_from_file(contents ? file : NULL); + rc = selinux_kernel_load_from_file(file, SYSTEM__MODULE_LOAD); + break; + case READING_KEXEC_IMAGE: + rc = selinux_kernel_load_from_file(file, + SYSTEM__KEXEC_IMAGE_LOAD); + break; + case READING_KEXEC_INITRAMFS: + rc = selinux_kernel_load_from_file(file, + SYSTEM__KEXEC_INITRAMFS_LOAD); + break; + case READING_POLICY: + rc = selinux_kernel_load_from_file(file, SYSTEM__POLICY_LOAD); + break; + case READING_X509_CERTIFICATE: + rc = selinux_kernel_load_from_file(file, + SYSTEM__X509_CERTIFICATE_LOAD); break; default: break; @@ -4131,9 +4283,31 @@ static int selinux_kernel_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents) { int rc = 0; + BUILD_BUG_ON_MSG(LOADING_MAX_ID > 7, + "New kernel_load_data_id introduced; update SELinux!"); + switch (id) { + case LOADING_FIRMWARE: + rc = selinux_kernel_load_from_file(NULL, SYSTEM__FIRMWARE_LOAD); + break; case LOADING_MODULE: - rc = selinux_kernel_module_from_file(NULL); + rc = selinux_kernel_load_from_file(NULL, SYSTEM__MODULE_LOAD); + break; + case LOADING_KEXEC_IMAGE: + rc = selinux_kernel_load_from_file(NULL, + SYSTEM__KEXEC_IMAGE_LOAD); + break; + case LOADING_KEXEC_INITRAMFS: + rc = selinux_kernel_load_from_file(NULL, + SYSTEM__KEXEC_INITRAMFS_LOAD); + break; + case LOADING_POLICY: + rc = selinux_kernel_load_from_file(NULL, + SYSTEM__POLICY_LOAD); + break; + case LOADING_X509_CERTIFICATE: + rc = selinux_kernel_load_from_file(NULL, + SYSTEM__X509_CERTIFICATE_LOAD); break; default: break; @@ -4160,14 +4334,15 @@ static int selinux_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p) PROCESS__GETSESSION, NULL); } -static void selinux_current_getsecid_subj(u32 *secid) +static void selinux_current_getlsmprop_subj(struct lsm_prop *prop) { - *secid = current_sid(); + prop->selinux.secid = current_sid(); } -static void selinux_task_getsecid_obj(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid) +static void selinux_task_getlsmprop_obj(struct task_struct *p, + struct lsm_prop *prop) { - *secid = task_sid_obj(p); + prop->selinux.secid = task_sid_obj(p); } static int selinux_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice) @@ -4331,22 +4506,6 @@ static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(struct sk_buff *skb, break; } - case IPPROTO_DCCP: { - struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh; - - if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET) - break; - - offset += ihlen; - dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph); - if (dh == NULL) - break; - - ad->u.net->sport = dh->dccph_sport; - ad->u.net->dport = dh->dccph_dport; - break; - } - #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IP_SCTP) case IPPROTO_SCTP: { struct sctphdr _sctph, *sh; @@ -4425,18 +4584,6 @@ static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb, break; } - case IPPROTO_DCCP: { - struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh; - - dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph); - if (dh == NULL) - break; - - ad->u.net->sport = dh->dccph_sport; - ad->u.net->dport = dh->dccph_dport; - break; - } - #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IP_SCTP) case IPPROTO_SCTP: { struct sctphdr _sctph, *sh; @@ -4581,14 +4728,10 @@ static int socket_sockcreate_sid(const struct task_security_struct *tsec, secclass, NULL, socksid); } -static int sock_has_perm(struct sock *sk, u32 perms) +static bool sock_skip_has_perm(u32 sid) { - struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; - struct common_audit_data ad; - struct lsm_network_audit net; - - if (sksec->sid == SECINITSID_KERNEL) - return 0; + if (sid == SECINITSID_KERNEL) + return true; /* * Before POLICYDB_CAP_USERSPACE_INITIAL_CONTEXT, sockets that @@ -4602,7 +4745,19 @@ static int sock_has_perm(struct sock *sk, u32 perms) * setting. */ if (!selinux_policycap_userspace_initial_context() && - sksec->sid == SECINITSID_INIT) + sid == SECINITSID_INIT) + return true; + return false; +} + + +static int sock_has_perm(struct sock *sk, u32 perms) +{ + struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; + struct common_audit_data ad; + struct lsm_network_audit net; + + if (sock_skip_has_perm(sksec->sid)) return 0; ad_net_init_from_sk(&ad, &net, sk); @@ -4651,7 +4806,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family, isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED; if (sock->sk) { - sksec = sock->sk->sk_security; + sksec = selinux_sock(sock->sk); sksec->sclass = sclass; sksec->sid = sid; /* Allows detection of the first association on this socket */ @@ -4667,8 +4822,8 @@ static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family, static int selinux_socket_socketpair(struct socket *socka, struct socket *sockb) { - struct sk_security_struct *sksec_a = socka->sk->sk_security; - struct sk_security_struct *sksec_b = sockb->sk->sk_security; + struct sk_security_struct *sksec_a = selinux_sock(socka->sk); + struct sk_security_struct *sksec_b = selinux_sock(sockb->sk); sksec_a->peer_sid = sksec_b->sid; sksec_b->peer_sid = sksec_a->sid; @@ -4683,7 +4838,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_socketpair(struct socket *socka, static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen) { struct sock *sk = sock->sk; - struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; + struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk); u16 family; int err; @@ -4780,10 +4935,6 @@ static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, in node_perm = UDP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND; break; - case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET: - node_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND; - break; - case SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET: node_perm = SCTP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND; break; @@ -4811,7 +4962,7 @@ out: return err; err_af: /* Note that SCTP services expect -EINVAL, others -EAFNOSUPPORT. */ - if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET) + if (sk->sk_protocol == IPPROTO_SCTP) return -EINVAL; return -EAFNOSUPPORT; } @@ -4823,7 +4974,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_connect_helper(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen) { struct sock *sk = sock->sk; - struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; + struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk); int err; err = sock_has_perm(sk, SOCKET__CONNECT); @@ -4839,11 +4990,10 @@ static int selinux_socket_connect_helper(struct socket *sock, return 0; /* - * If a TCP, DCCP or SCTP socket, check name_connect permission + * If a TCP or SCTP socket, check name_connect permission * for the port. */ if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET || - sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET || sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET) { struct common_audit_data ad; struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,}; @@ -4888,9 +5038,6 @@ static int selinux_socket_connect_helper(struct socket *sock, case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET: perm = TCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT; break; - case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET: - perm = DCCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT; - break; case SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET: perm = SCTP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT; break; @@ -5001,9 +5148,9 @@ static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock, struct sock *other, struct sock *newsk) { - struct sk_security_struct *sksec_sock = sock->sk_security; - struct sk_security_struct *sksec_other = other->sk_security; - struct sk_security_struct *sksec_new = newsk->sk_security; + struct sk_security_struct *sksec_sock = selinux_sock(sock); + struct sk_security_struct *sksec_other = selinux_sock(other); + struct sk_security_struct *sksec_new = selinux_sock(newsk); struct common_audit_data ad; struct lsm_network_audit net; int err; @@ -5032,8 +5179,8 @@ static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock, static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock, struct socket *other) { - struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sock->sk->sk_security; - struct sk_security_struct *osec = other->sk->sk_security; + struct sk_security_struct *ssec = selinux_sock(sock->sk); + struct sk_security_struct *osec = selinux_sock(other->sk); struct common_audit_data ad; struct lsm_network_audit net; @@ -5070,7 +5217,7 @@ static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, u16 family) { int err = 0; - struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; + struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk); u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid; struct common_audit_data ad; struct lsm_network_audit net; @@ -5099,7 +5246,7 @@ static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) { int err, peerlbl_active, secmark_active; - struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; + struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk); u16 family = sk->sk_family; u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid; struct common_audit_data ad; @@ -5167,7 +5314,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, int err = 0; char *scontext = NULL; u32 scontext_len; - struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sock->sk->sk_security; + struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sock->sk); u32 peer_sid = SECSID_NULL; if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET || @@ -5227,34 +5374,27 @@ static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, static int selinux_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority) { - struct sk_security_struct *sksec; - - sksec = kzalloc(sizeof(*sksec), priority); - if (!sksec) - return -ENOMEM; + struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk); sksec->peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED; sksec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED; sksec->sclass = SECCLASS_SOCKET; selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(sksec); - sk->sk_security = sksec; return 0; } static void selinux_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk) { - struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; + struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk); - sk->sk_security = NULL; selinux_netlbl_sk_security_free(sksec); - kfree(sksec); } static void selinux_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk) { - struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; - struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security; + struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk); + struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = selinux_sock(newsk); newsksec->sid = sksec->sid; newsksec->peer_sid = sksec->peer_sid; @@ -5268,7 +5408,7 @@ static void selinux_sk_getsecid(const struct sock *sk, u32 *secid) if (!sk) *secid = SECINITSID_ANY_SOCKET; else { - const struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; + const struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk); *secid = sksec->sid; } @@ -5278,7 +5418,7 @@ static void selinux_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent) { struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode_security_novalidate(SOCK_INODE(parent)); - struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; + struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk); if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET || sk->sk_family == PF_INET6 || sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX) @@ -5295,7 +5435,7 @@ static int selinux_sctp_process_new_assoc(struct sctp_association *asoc, { struct sock *sk = asoc->base.sk; u16 family = sk->sk_family; - struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; + struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk); struct common_audit_data ad; struct lsm_network_audit net; int err; @@ -5350,7 +5490,7 @@ static int selinux_sctp_process_new_assoc(struct sctp_association *asoc, static int selinux_sctp_assoc_request(struct sctp_association *asoc, struct sk_buff *skb) { - struct sk_security_struct *sksec = asoc->base.sk->sk_security; + struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(asoc->base.sk); u32 conn_sid; int err; @@ -5383,7 +5523,7 @@ static int selinux_sctp_assoc_request(struct sctp_association *asoc, static int selinux_sctp_assoc_established(struct sctp_association *asoc, struct sk_buff *skb) { - struct sk_security_struct *sksec = asoc->base.sk->sk_security; + struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(asoc->base.sk); if (!selinux_policycap_extsockclass()) return 0; @@ -5482,8 +5622,8 @@ static int selinux_sctp_bind_connect(struct sock *sk, int optname, static void selinux_sctp_sk_clone(struct sctp_association *asoc, struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk) { - struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; - struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security; + struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk); + struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = selinux_sock(newsk); /* If policy does not support SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET then call * the non-sctp clone version. @@ -5499,8 +5639,8 @@ static void selinux_sctp_sk_clone(struct sctp_association *asoc, struct sock *sk static int selinux_mptcp_add_subflow(struct sock *sk, struct sock *ssk) { - struct sk_security_struct *ssksec = ssk->sk_security; - struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; + struct sk_security_struct *ssksec = selinux_sock(ssk); + struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk); ssksec->sclass = sksec->sclass; ssksec->sid = sksec->sid; @@ -5515,7 +5655,7 @@ static int selinux_mptcp_add_subflow(struct sock *sk, struct sock *ssk) static int selinux_inet_conn_request(const struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, struct request_sock *req) { - struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; + struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk); int err; u16 family = req->rsk_ops->family; u32 connsid; @@ -5536,7 +5676,7 @@ static int selinux_inet_conn_request(const struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, static void selinux_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk, const struct request_sock *req) { - struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security; + struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = selinux_sock(newsk); newsksec->sid = req->secid; newsksec->peer_sid = req->peer_secid; @@ -5553,7 +5693,7 @@ static void selinux_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk, static void selinux_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) { u16 family = sk->sk_family; - struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; + struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk); /* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */ if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP)) @@ -5564,13 +5704,7 @@ static void selinux_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) static int selinux_secmark_relabel_packet(u32 sid) { - const struct task_security_struct *tsec; - u32 tsid; - - tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred()); - tsid = tsec->sid; - - return avc_has_perm(tsid, sid, SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__RELABELTO, + return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), sid, SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__RELABELTO, NULL); } @@ -5590,24 +5724,14 @@ static void selinux_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req, flic->flowic_secid = req->secid; } -static int selinux_tun_dev_alloc_security(void **security) +static int selinux_tun_dev_alloc_security(void *security) { - struct tun_security_struct *tunsec; + struct tun_security_struct *tunsec = selinux_tun_dev(security); - tunsec = kzalloc(sizeof(*tunsec), GFP_KERNEL); - if (!tunsec) - return -ENOMEM; tunsec->sid = current_sid(); - - *security = tunsec; return 0; } -static void selinux_tun_dev_free_security(void *security) -{ - kfree(security); -} - static int selinux_tun_dev_create(void) { u32 sid = current_sid(); @@ -5625,7 +5749,7 @@ static int selinux_tun_dev_create(void) static int selinux_tun_dev_attach_queue(void *security) { - struct tun_security_struct *tunsec = security; + struct tun_security_struct *tunsec = selinux_tun_dev(security); return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), tunsec->sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET, TUN_SOCKET__ATTACH_QUEUE, NULL); @@ -5633,8 +5757,8 @@ static int selinux_tun_dev_attach_queue(void *security) static int selinux_tun_dev_attach(struct sock *sk, void *security) { - struct tun_security_struct *tunsec = security; - struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; + struct tun_security_struct *tunsec = selinux_tun_dev(security); + struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk); /* we don't currently perform any NetLabel based labeling here and it * isn't clear that we would want to do so anyway; while we could apply @@ -5651,7 +5775,7 @@ static int selinux_tun_dev_attach(struct sock *sk, void *security) static int selinux_tun_dev_open(void *security) { - struct tun_security_struct *tunsec = security; + struct tun_security_struct *tunsec = selinux_tun_dev(security); u32 sid = current_sid(); int err; @@ -5737,7 +5861,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_output(void *priv, struct sk_buff *skb, /* we do this in the LOCAL_OUT path and not the POST_ROUTING path * because we want to make sure we apply the necessary labeling * before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH protection */ - sk = skb->sk; + sk = sk_to_full_sk(skb->sk); if (sk) { struct sk_security_struct *sksec; @@ -5757,7 +5881,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_output(void *priv, struct sk_buff *skb, return NF_ACCEPT; /* standard practice, label using the parent socket */ - sksec = sk->sk_security; + sksec = selinux_sock(sk); sid = sksec->sid; } else sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL; @@ -5780,7 +5904,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_compat(struct sk_buff *skb, sk = skb_to_full_sk(skb); if (sk == NULL) return NF_ACCEPT; - sksec = sk->sk_security; + sksec = selinux_sock(sk); ad_net_init_from_iif(&ad, &net, state->out->ifindex, state->pf); if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, NULL, 0, &proto)) @@ -5869,7 +5993,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(void *priv, u32 skb_sid; struct sk_security_struct *sksec; - sksec = sk->sk_security; + sksec = selinux_sock(sk); if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &skb_sid)) return NF_DROP; /* At this point, if the returned skb peerlbl is SECSID_NULL @@ -5898,7 +6022,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(void *priv, } else { /* Locally generated packet, fetch the security label from the * associated socket. */ - struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; + struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk); peer_sid = sksec->sid; secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND; } @@ -5934,6 +6058,26 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(void *priv, } #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */ +static int nlmsg_sock_has_extended_perms(struct sock *sk, u32 perms, u16 nlmsg_type) +{ + struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; + struct common_audit_data ad; + u8 driver; + u8 xperm; + + if (sock_skip_has_perm(sksec->sid)) + return 0; + + ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NLMSGTYPE; + ad.u.nlmsg_type = nlmsg_type; + + driver = nlmsg_type >> 8; + xperm = nlmsg_type & 0xff; + + return avc_has_extended_perms(current_sid(), sksec->sid, sksec->sclass, + perms, driver, AVC_EXT_NLMSG, xperm, &ad); +} + static int selinux_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) { int rc = 0; @@ -5941,7 +6085,7 @@ static int selinux_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) unsigned int data_len = skb->len; unsigned char *data = skb->data; struct nlmsghdr *nlh; - struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; + struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk); u16 sclass = sksec->sclass; u32 perm; @@ -5959,7 +6103,12 @@ static int selinux_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) rc = selinux_nlmsg_lookup(sclass, nlh->nlmsg_type, &perm); if (rc == 0) { - rc = sock_has_perm(sk, perm); + if (selinux_policycap_netlink_xperm()) { + rc = nlmsg_sock_has_extended_perms( + sk, perm, nlh->nlmsg_type); + } else { + rc = sock_has_perm(sk, perm); + } if (rc) return rc; } else if (rc == -EINVAL) { @@ -6333,10 +6482,11 @@ static int selinux_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag) return ipc_has_perm(ipcp, av); } -static void selinux_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid) +static void selinux_ipc_getlsmprop(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, + struct lsm_prop *prop) { struct ipc_security_struct *isec = selinux_ipc(ipcp); - *secid = isec->sid; + prop->selinux.secid = isec->sid; } static void selinux_d_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode) @@ -6348,55 +6498,55 @@ static void selinux_d_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode) static int selinux_lsm_getattr(unsigned int attr, struct task_struct *p, char **value) { - const struct task_security_struct *__tsec; - u32 sid; + const struct task_security_struct *tsec; int error; - unsigned len; + u32 sid; + u32 len; rcu_read_lock(); - __tsec = selinux_cred(__task_cred(p)); - - if (current != p) { - error = avc_has_perm(current_sid(), __tsec->sid, + tsec = selinux_cred(__task_cred(p)); + if (p != current) { + error = avc_has_perm(current_sid(), tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__GETATTR, NULL); if (error) - goto bad; + goto err_unlock; } - switch (attr) { case LSM_ATTR_CURRENT: - sid = __tsec->sid; + sid = tsec->sid; break; case LSM_ATTR_PREV: - sid = __tsec->osid; + sid = tsec->osid; break; case LSM_ATTR_EXEC: - sid = __tsec->exec_sid; + sid = tsec->exec_sid; break; case LSM_ATTR_FSCREATE: - sid = __tsec->create_sid; + sid = tsec->create_sid; break; case LSM_ATTR_KEYCREATE: - sid = __tsec->keycreate_sid; + sid = tsec->keycreate_sid; break; case LSM_ATTR_SOCKCREATE: - sid = __tsec->sockcreate_sid; + sid = tsec->sockcreate_sid; break; default: error = -EOPNOTSUPP; - goto bad; + goto err_unlock; } rcu_read_unlock(); - if (!sid) + if (sid == SECSID_NULL) { + *value = NULL; return 0; + } error = security_sid_to_context(sid, value, &len); if (error) return error; return len; -bad: +err_unlock: rcu_read_unlock(); return error; } @@ -6613,10 +6763,28 @@ static int selinux_ismaclabel(const char *name) return (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX) == 0); } -static int selinux_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen) +static int selinux_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, struct lsm_context *cp) { - return security_sid_to_context(secid, - secdata, seclen); + u32 seclen; + int ret; + + if (cp) { + cp->id = LSM_ID_SELINUX; + ret = security_sid_to_context(secid, &cp->context, &cp->len); + if (ret < 0) + return ret; + return cp->len; + } + ret = security_sid_to_context(secid, NULL, &seclen); + if (ret < 0) + return ret; + return seclen; +} + +static int selinux_lsmprop_to_secctx(struct lsm_prop *prop, + struct lsm_context *cp) +{ + return selinux_secid_to_secctx(prop->selinux.secid, cp); } static int selinux_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid) @@ -6625,9 +6793,13 @@ static int selinux_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid) secid, GFP_KERNEL); } -static void selinux_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen) +static void selinux_release_secctx(struct lsm_context *cp) { - kfree(secdata); + if (cp->id == LSM_ID_SELINUX) { + kfree(cp->context); + cp->context = NULL; + cp->id = LSM_ID_UNDEF; + } } static void selinux_inode_invalidate_secctx(struct inode *inode) @@ -6655,18 +6827,20 @@ static int selinux_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen */ static int selinux_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen) { - return __vfs_setxattr_noperm(&nop_mnt_idmap, dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, - ctx, ctxlen, 0); + return __vfs_setxattr_locked(&nop_mnt_idmap, dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, + ctx, ctxlen, 0, NULL); } -static int selinux_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen) +static int selinux_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, struct lsm_context *cp) { - int len = 0; + int len; len = selinux_inode_getsecurity(&nop_mnt_idmap, inode, - XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX, ctx, true); + XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX, + (void **)&cp->context, true); if (len < 0) return len; - *ctxlen = len; + cp->len = len; + cp->id = LSM_ID_SELINUX; return 0; } #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS @@ -6675,11 +6849,7 @@ static int selinux_key_alloc(struct key *k, const struct cred *cred, unsigned long flags) { const struct task_security_struct *tsec; - struct key_security_struct *ksec; - - ksec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct key_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL); - if (!ksec) - return -ENOMEM; + struct key_security_struct *ksec = selinux_key(k); tsec = selinux_cred(cred); if (tsec->keycreate_sid) @@ -6687,18 +6857,9 @@ static int selinux_key_alloc(struct key *k, const struct cred *cred, else ksec->sid = tsec->sid; - k->security = ksec; return 0; } -static void selinux_key_free(struct key *k) -{ - struct key_security_struct *ksec = k->security; - - k->security = NULL; - kfree(ksec); -} - static int selinux_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref, const struct cred *cred, enum key_need_perm need_perm) @@ -6739,14 +6900,14 @@ static int selinux_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref, sid = cred_sid(cred); key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref); - ksec = key->security; + ksec = selinux_key(key); return avc_has_perm(sid, ksec->sid, SECCLASS_KEY, perm, NULL); } static int selinux_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer) { - struct key_security_struct *ksec = key->security; + struct key_security_struct *ksec = selinux_key(key); char *context = NULL; unsigned len; int rc; @@ -6762,7 +6923,7 @@ static int selinux_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer) #ifdef CONFIG_KEY_NOTIFICATIONS static int selinux_watch_key(struct key *key) { - struct key_security_struct *ksec = key->security; + struct key_security_struct *ksec = selinux_key(key); u32 sid = current_sid(); return avc_has_perm(sid, ksec->sid, SECCLASS_KEY, KEY__VIEW, NULL); @@ -6816,28 +6977,18 @@ static int selinux_ib_endport_manage_subnet(void *ib_sec, const char *dev_name, INFINIBAND_ENDPORT__MANAGE_SUBNET, &ad); } -static int selinux_ib_alloc_security(void **ib_sec) +static int selinux_ib_alloc_security(void *ib_sec) { - struct ib_security_struct *sec; + struct ib_security_struct *sec = selinux_ib(ib_sec); - sec = kzalloc(sizeof(*sec), GFP_KERNEL); - if (!sec) - return -ENOMEM; sec->sid = current_sid(); - - *ib_sec = sec; return 0; } - -static void selinux_ib_free_security(void *ib_sec) -{ - kfree(ib_sec); -} #endif #ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL static int selinux_bpf(int cmd, union bpf_attr *attr, - unsigned int size) + unsigned int size, bool kernel) { u32 sid = current_sid(); int ret; @@ -6924,7 +7075,7 @@ static int selinux_bpf_prog(struct bpf_prog *prog) } static int selinux_bpf_map_create(struct bpf_map *map, union bpf_attr *attr, - struct bpf_token *token) + struct bpf_token *token, bool kernel) { struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec; @@ -6947,7 +7098,7 @@ static void selinux_bpf_map_free(struct bpf_map *map) } static int selinux_bpf_prog_load(struct bpf_prog *prog, union bpf_attr *attr, - struct bpf_token *token) + struct bpf_token *token, bool kernel) { struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec; @@ -6970,7 +7121,7 @@ static void selinux_bpf_prog_free(struct bpf_prog *prog) } static int selinux_bpf_token_create(struct bpf_token *token, union bpf_attr *attr, - struct path *path) + const struct path *path) { struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec; @@ -6998,13 +7149,20 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes selinux_blob_sizes __ro_after_init = { .lbs_file = sizeof(struct file_security_struct), .lbs_inode = sizeof(struct inode_security_struct), .lbs_ipc = sizeof(struct ipc_security_struct), + .lbs_key = sizeof(struct key_security_struct), .lbs_msg_msg = sizeof(struct msg_security_struct), +#ifdef CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS + .lbs_perf_event = sizeof(struct perf_event_security_struct), +#endif + .lbs_sock = sizeof(struct sk_security_struct), .lbs_superblock = sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct), .lbs_xattr_count = SELINUX_INODE_INIT_XATTRS, + .lbs_tun_dev = sizeof(struct tun_security_struct), + .lbs_ib = sizeof(struct ib_security_struct), }; #ifdef CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS -static int selinux_perf_event_open(struct perf_event_attr *attr, int type) +static int selinux_perf_event_open(int type) { u32 requested, sid = current_sid(); @@ -7027,24 +7185,12 @@ static int selinux_perf_event_alloc(struct perf_event *event) { struct perf_event_security_struct *perfsec; - perfsec = kzalloc(sizeof(*perfsec), GFP_KERNEL); - if (!perfsec) - return -ENOMEM; - + perfsec = selinux_perf_event(event->security); perfsec->sid = current_sid(); - event->security = perfsec; return 0; } -static void selinux_perf_event_free(struct perf_event *event) -{ - struct perf_event_security_struct *perfsec = event->security; - - event->security = NULL; - kfree(perfsec); -} - static int selinux_perf_event_read(struct perf_event *event) { struct perf_event_security_struct *perfsec = event->security; @@ -7113,6 +7259,19 @@ static int selinux_uring_cmd(struct io_uring_cmd *ioucmd) return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), isec->sid, SECCLASS_IO_URING, IO_URING__CMD, &ad); } + +/** + * selinux_uring_allowed - check if io_uring_setup() can be called + * + * Check to see if the current task is allowed to call io_uring_setup(). + */ +static int selinux_uring_allowed(void) +{ + u32 sid = current_sid(); + + return avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_IO_URING, IO_URING__ALLOWED, + NULL); +} #endif /* CONFIG_IO_URING */ static const struct lsm_id selinux_lsmid = { @@ -7185,6 +7344,7 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __ro_after_init = { LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_permission, selinux_inode_permission), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setattr, selinux_inode_setattr), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getattr, selinux_inode_getattr), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_xattr_skipcap, selinux_inode_xattr_skipcap), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setxattr, selinux_inode_setxattr), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_post_setxattr, selinux_inode_post_setxattr), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getxattr, selinux_inode_getxattr), @@ -7196,7 +7356,7 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __ro_after_init = { LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecurity, selinux_inode_getsecurity), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setsecurity, selinux_inode_setsecurity), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_listsecurity, selinux_inode_listsecurity), - LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecid, selinux_inode_getsecid), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getlsmprop, selinux_inode_getlsmprop), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_copy_up, selinux_inode_copy_up), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_copy_up_xattr, selinux_inode_copy_up_xattr), LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_notify, selinux_path_notify), @@ -7222,6 +7382,7 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __ro_after_init = { LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_prepare, selinux_cred_prepare), LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_transfer, selinux_cred_transfer), LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_getsecid, selinux_cred_getsecid), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_getlsmprop, selinux_cred_getlsmprop), LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_act_as, selinux_kernel_act_as), LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_create_files_as, selinux_kernel_create_files_as), LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_module_request, selinux_kernel_module_request), @@ -7230,8 +7391,8 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __ro_after_init = { LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setpgid, selinux_task_setpgid), LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getpgid, selinux_task_getpgid), LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsid, selinux_task_getsid), - LSM_HOOK_INIT(current_getsecid_subj, selinux_current_getsecid_subj), - LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsecid_obj, selinux_task_getsecid_obj), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(current_getlsmprop_subj, selinux_current_getlsmprop_subj), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getlsmprop_obj, selinux_task_getlsmprop_obj), LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setnice, selinux_task_setnice), LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setioprio, selinux_task_setioprio), LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getioprio, selinux_task_getioprio), @@ -7245,7 +7406,7 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __ro_after_init = { LSM_HOOK_INIT(userns_create, selinux_userns_create), LSM_HOOK_INIT(ipc_permission, selinux_ipc_permission), - LSM_HOOK_INIT(ipc_getsecid, selinux_ipc_getsecid), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(ipc_getlsmprop, selinux_ipc_getlsmprop), LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_associate, selinux_msg_queue_associate), LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_msgctl, selinux_msg_queue_msgctl), @@ -7311,7 +7472,6 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __ro_after_init = { LSM_HOOK_INIT(secmark_refcount_inc, selinux_secmark_refcount_inc), LSM_HOOK_INIT(secmark_refcount_dec, selinux_secmark_refcount_dec), LSM_HOOK_INIT(req_classify_flow, selinux_req_classify_flow), - LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_free_security, selinux_tun_dev_free_security), LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_create, selinux_tun_dev_create), LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_attach_queue, selinux_tun_dev_attach_queue), LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_attach, selinux_tun_dev_attach), @@ -7320,7 +7480,6 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __ro_after_init = { LSM_HOOK_INIT(ib_pkey_access, selinux_ib_pkey_access), LSM_HOOK_INIT(ib_endport_manage_subnet, selinux_ib_endport_manage_subnet), - LSM_HOOK_INIT(ib_free_security, selinux_ib_free_security), #endif #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_free_security, selinux_xfrm_policy_free), @@ -7334,7 +7493,6 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __ro_after_init = { #endif #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS - LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_free, selinux_key_free), LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_permission, selinux_key_permission), LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_getsecurity, selinux_key_getsecurity), #ifdef CONFIG_KEY_NOTIFICATIONS @@ -7359,7 +7517,6 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __ro_after_init = { #ifdef CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS LSM_HOOK_INIT(perf_event_open, selinux_perf_event_open), - LSM_HOOK_INIT(perf_event_free, selinux_perf_event_free), LSM_HOOK_INIT(perf_event_read, selinux_perf_event_read), LSM_HOOK_INIT(perf_event_write, selinux_perf_event_write), #endif @@ -7368,6 +7525,7 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __ro_after_init = { LSM_HOOK_INIT(uring_override_creds, selinux_uring_override_creds), LSM_HOOK_INIT(uring_sqpoll, selinux_uring_sqpoll), LSM_HOOK_INIT(uring_cmd, selinux_uring_cmd), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(uring_allowed, selinux_uring_allowed), #endif /* @@ -7392,6 +7550,7 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __ro_after_init = { LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_alloc_security, selinux_inode_alloc_security), LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_alloc_security, selinux_sem_alloc_security), LSM_HOOK_INIT(secid_to_secctx, selinux_secid_to_secctx), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(lsmprop_to_secctx, selinux_lsmprop_to_secctx), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecctx, selinux_inode_getsecctx), LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_alloc_security, selinux_sk_alloc_security), LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_alloc_security, selinux_tun_dev_alloc_security), |