1 files changed, 114 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/x86_64/sev.c b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/x86_64/sev.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..e248d3364b9c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/x86_64/sev.c
@@ -0,0 +1,114 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+#define _GNU_SOURCE /* for program_invocation_short_name */
+#include <stdint.h>
+#include <stdbool.h>
+
+#include "sev.h"
+
+/*
+ * sparsebit_next_clear() can return 0 if [x, 2**64-1] are all set, and the
+ * -1 would then cause an underflow back to 2**64 - 1. This is expected and
+ * correct.
+ *
+ * If the last range in the sparsebit is [x, y] and we try to iterate,
+ * sparsebit_next_set() will return 0, and sparsebit_next_clear() will try
+ * and find the first range, but that's correct because the condition
+ * expression would cause us to quit the loop.
+ */
+static void encrypt_region(struct kvm_vm *vm, struct userspace_mem_region *region)
+{
+	const struct sparsebit *protected_phy_pages = region->protected_phy_pages;
+	const vm_paddr_t gpa_base = region->region.guest_phys_addr;
+	const sparsebit_idx_t lowest_page_in_region = gpa_base >> vm->page_shift;
+	sparsebit_idx_t i, j;
+
+	if (!sparsebit_any_set(protected_phy_pages))
+		return;
+
+	sev_register_encrypted_memory(vm, region);
+
+	sparsebit_for_each_set_range(protected_phy_pages, i, j) {
+		const uint64_t size = (j - i + 1) * vm->page_size;
+		const uint64_t offset = (i - lowest_page_in_region) * vm->page_size;
+
+		sev_launch_update_data(vm, gpa_base + offset, size);
+	}
+}
+
+void sev_vm_launch(struct kvm_vm *vm, uint32_t policy)
+{
+	struct kvm_sev_launch_start launch_start = {
+		.policy = policy,
+	};
+	struct userspace_mem_region *region;
+	struct kvm_sev_guest_status status;
+	int ctr;
+
+	vm_sev_ioctl(vm, KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_START, &launch_start);
+	vm_sev_ioctl(vm, KVM_SEV_GUEST_STATUS, &status);
+
+	TEST_ASSERT_EQ(status.policy, policy);
+	TEST_ASSERT_EQ(status.state, SEV_GUEST_STATE_LAUNCH_UPDATE);
+
+	hash_for_each(vm->regions.slot_hash, ctr, region, slot_node)
+		encrypt_region(vm, region);
+
+	if (policy & SEV_POLICY_ES)
+		vm_sev_ioctl(vm, KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_UPDATE_VMSA, NULL);
+
+	vm->arch.is_pt_protected = true;
+}
+
+void sev_vm_launch_measure(struct kvm_vm *vm, uint8_t *measurement)
+{
+	struct kvm_sev_launch_measure launch_measure;
+	struct kvm_sev_guest_status guest_status;
+
+	launch_measure.len = 256;
+	launch_measure.uaddr = (__u64)measurement;
+	vm_sev_ioctl(vm, KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_MEASURE, &launch_measure);
+
+	vm_sev_ioctl(vm, KVM_SEV_GUEST_STATUS, &guest_status);
+	TEST_ASSERT_EQ(guest_status.state, SEV_GUEST_STATE_LAUNCH_SECRET);
+}
+
+void sev_vm_launch_finish(struct kvm_vm *vm)
+{
+	struct kvm_sev_guest_status status;
+
+	vm_sev_ioctl(vm, KVM_SEV_GUEST_STATUS, &status);
+	TEST_ASSERT(status.state == SEV_GUEST_STATE_LAUNCH_UPDATE ||
+		    status.state == SEV_GUEST_STATE_LAUNCH_SECRET,
+		    "Unexpected guest state: %d", status.state);
+
+	vm_sev_ioctl(vm, KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_FINISH, NULL);
+
+	vm_sev_ioctl(vm, KVM_SEV_GUEST_STATUS, &status);
+	TEST_ASSERT_EQ(status.state, SEV_GUEST_STATE_RUNNING);
+}
+
+struct kvm_vm *vm_sev_create_with_one_vcpu(uint32_t policy, void *guest_code,
+					   struct kvm_vcpu **cpu)
+{
+	struct vm_shape shape = {
+		.type = VM_TYPE_DEFAULT,
+		.mode = VM_MODE_DEFAULT,
+		.subtype = policy & SEV_POLICY_ES ? VM_SUBTYPE_SEV_ES :
+						    VM_SUBTYPE_SEV,
+	};
+	struct kvm_vm *vm;
+	struct kvm_vcpu *cpus[1];
+	uint8_t measurement[512];
+
+	vm = __vm_create_with_vcpus(shape, 1, 0, guest_code, cpus);
+	*cpu = cpus[0];
+
+	sev_vm_launch(vm, policy);
+
+	/* TODO: Validate the measurement is as expected. */
+	sev_vm_launch_measure(vm, measurement);
+
+	sev_vm_launch_finish(vm);
+
+	return vm;
+}