global: run through clang-format

This is the worst commit in the whole repo, making the code much less
readable, but so it goes with upstream maintainers.

We are now woefully wrapped at 80 columns.

1 files changed, 71 insertions, 31 deletions

diff --git a/src/cookie.c b/src/cookie.c
index 9268630..7cf0693 100644
--- a/src/cookie.c
+++ b/src/cookie.c
@@ -15,7 +15,8 @@
 #include <net/ipv6.h>
 #include <crypto/algapi.h>
 
-void cookie_checker_init(struct cookie_checker *checker, struct wireguard_device *wg)
+void cookie_checker_init(struct cookie_checker *checker,
+			 struct wireguard_device *wg)
 {
 	init_rwsem(&checker->secret_lock);
 	checker->secret_birthdate = ktime_get_boot_fast_ns();
@@ -27,7 +28,9 @@ enum { COOKIE_KEY_LABEL_LEN = 8 };
 static const u8 mac1_key_label[COOKIE_KEY_LABEL_LEN] = "mac1----";
 static const u8 cookie_key_label[COOKIE_KEY_LABEL_LEN] = "cookie--";
 
-static void precompute_key(u8 key[NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN], const u8 pubkey[NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN], const u8 label[COOKIE_KEY_LABEL_LEN])
+static void precompute_key(u8 key[NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN],
+			   const u8 pubkey[NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN],
+			   const u8 label[COOKIE_KEY_LABEL_LEN])
 {
 	struct blake2s_state blake;
 
@@ -41,18 +44,25 @@ static void precompute_key(u8 key[NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN], const u8 pubkey[NOIS
 void cookie_checker_precompute_device_keys(struct cookie_checker *checker)
 {
 	if (likely(checker->device->static_identity.has_identity)) {
-		precompute_key(checker->cookie_encryption_key, checker->device->static_identity.static_public, cookie_key_label);
-		precompute_key(checker->message_mac1_key, checker->device->static_identity.static_public, mac1_key_label);
+		precompute_key(checker->cookie_encryption_key,
+			       checker->device->static_identity.static_public,
+			       cookie_key_label);
+		precompute_key(checker->message_mac1_key,
+			       checker->device->static_identity.static_public,
+			       mac1_key_label);
 	} else {
-		memset(checker->cookie_encryption_key, 0, NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN);
+		memset(checker->cookie_encryption_key, 0,
+		       NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN);
 		memset(checker->message_mac1_key, 0, NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN);
 	}
 }
 
 void cookie_checker_precompute_peer_keys(struct wireguard_peer *peer)
 {
-	precompute_key(peer->latest_cookie.cookie_decryption_key, peer->handshake.remote_static, cookie_key_label);
-	precompute_key(peer->latest_cookie.message_mac1_key, peer->handshake.remote_static, mac1_key_label);
+	precompute_key(peer->latest_cookie.cookie_decryption_key,
+		       peer->handshake.remote_static, cookie_key_label);
+	precompute_key(peer->latest_cookie.message_mac1_key,
+		       peer->handshake.remote_static, mac1_key_label);
 }
 
 void cookie_init(struct cookie *cookie)
@@ -61,19 +71,24 @@ void cookie_init(struct cookie *cookie)
 	init_rwsem(&cookie->lock);
 }
 
-static void compute_mac1(u8 mac1[COOKIE_LEN], const void *message, size_t len, const u8 key[NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN])
+static void compute_mac1(u8 mac1[COOKIE_LEN], const void *message, size_t len,
+			 const u8 key[NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN])
 {
-	len = len - sizeof(struct message_macs) + offsetof(struct message_macs, mac1);
+	len = len - sizeof(struct message_macs) +
+	      offsetof(struct message_macs, mac1);
 	blake2s(mac1, message, key, COOKIE_LEN, len, NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN);
 }
 
-static void compute_mac2(u8 mac2[COOKIE_LEN], const void *message, size_t len, const u8 cookie[COOKIE_LEN])
+static void compute_mac2(u8 mac2[COOKIE_LEN], const void *message, size_t len,
+			 const u8 cookie[COOKIE_LEN])
 {
-	len = len - sizeof(struct message_macs) + offsetof(struct message_macs, mac2);
+	len = len - sizeof(struct message_macs) +
+	      offsetof(struct message_macs, mac2);
 	blake2s(mac2, message, cookie, COOKIE_LEN, len, COOKIE_LEN);
 }
 
-static void make_cookie(u8 cookie[COOKIE_LEN], struct sk_buff *skb, struct cookie_checker *checker)
+static void make_cookie(u8 cookie[COOKIE_LEN], struct sk_buff *skb,
+			struct cookie_checker *checker)
 {
 	struct blake2s_state state;
 
@@ -88,24 +103,30 @@ static void make_cookie(u8 cookie[COOKIE_LEN], struct sk_buff *skb, struct cooki
 
 	blake2s_init_key(&state, COOKIE_LEN, checker->secret, NOISE_HASH_LEN);
 	if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
-		blake2s_update(&state, (u8 *)&ip_hdr(skb)->saddr, sizeof(struct in_addr));
+		blake2s_update(&state, (u8 *)&ip_hdr(skb)->saddr,
+			       sizeof(struct in_addr));
 	else if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IPV6))
-		blake2s_update(&state, (u8 *)&ipv6_hdr(skb)->saddr, sizeof(struct in6_addr));
+		blake2s_update(&state, (u8 *)&ipv6_hdr(skb)->saddr,
+			       sizeof(struct in6_addr));
 	blake2s_update(&state, (u8 *)&udp_hdr(skb)->source, sizeof(__be16));
 	blake2s_final(&state, cookie, COOKIE_LEN);
 
 	up_read(&checker->secret_lock);
 }
 
-enum cookie_mac_state cookie_validate_packet(struct cookie_checker *checker, struct sk_buff *skb, bool check_cookie)
+enum cookie_mac_state cookie_validate_packet(struct cookie_checker *checker,
+					     struct sk_buff *skb,
+					     bool check_cookie)
 {
+	struct message_macs *macs = (struct message_macs *)
+		(skb->data + skb->len - sizeof(struct message_macs));
+	enum cookie_mac_state ret;
 	u8 computed_mac[COOKIE_LEN];
 	u8 cookie[COOKIE_LEN];
-	enum cookie_mac_state ret;
-	struct message_macs *macs = (struct message_macs *)(skb->data + skb->len - sizeof(struct message_macs));
 
 	ret = INVALID_MAC;
-	compute_mac1(computed_mac, skb->data, skb->len, checker->message_mac1_key);
+	compute_mac1(computed_mac, skb->data, skb->len,
+		     checker->message_mac1_key);
 	if (crypto_memneq(computed_mac, macs->mac1, COOKIE_LEN))
 		goto out;
 
@@ -130,27 +151,36 @@ out:
 	return ret;
 }
 
-void cookie_add_mac_to_packet(void *message, size_t len, struct wireguard_peer *peer)
+void cookie_add_mac_to_packet(void *message, size_t len,
+			      struct wireguard_peer *peer)
 {
-	struct message_macs *macs = (struct message_macs *)((u8 *)message + len - sizeof(struct message_macs));
+	struct message_macs *macs = (struct message_macs *)
+		((u8 *)message + len - sizeof(struct message_macs));
 
 	down_write(&peer->latest_cookie.lock);
-	compute_mac1(macs->mac1, message, len, peer->latest_cookie.message_mac1_key);
+	compute_mac1(macs->mac1, message, len,
+		     peer->latest_cookie.message_mac1_key);
 	memcpy(peer->latest_cookie.last_mac1_sent, macs->mac1, COOKIE_LEN);
 	peer->latest_cookie.have_sent_mac1 = true;
 	up_write(&peer->latest_cookie.lock);
 
 	down_read(&peer->latest_cookie.lock);
-	if (peer->latest_cookie.is_valid && !has_expired(peer->latest_cookie.birthdate, COOKIE_SECRET_MAX_AGE - COOKIE_SECRET_LATENCY))
-		compute_mac2(macs->mac2, message, len, peer->latest_cookie.cookie);
+	if (peer->latest_cookie.is_valid &&
+	    !has_expired(peer->latest_cookie.birthdate,
+			 COOKIE_SECRET_MAX_AGE - COOKIE_SECRET_LATENCY))
+		compute_mac2(macs->mac2, message, len,
+			     peer->latest_cookie.cookie);
 	else
 		memset(macs->mac2, 0, COOKIE_LEN);
 	up_read(&peer->latest_cookie.lock);
 }
 
-void cookie_message_create(struct message_handshake_cookie *dst, struct sk_buff *skb, __le32 index, struct cookie_checker *checker)
+void cookie_message_create(struct message_handshake_cookie *dst,
+			   struct sk_buff *skb, __le32 index,
+			   struct cookie_checker *checker)
 {
-	struct message_macs *macs = (struct message_macs *)((u8 *)skb->data + skb->len - sizeof(struct message_macs));
+	struct message_macs *macs = (struct message_macs *)
+		((u8 *)skb->data + skb->len - sizeof(struct message_macs));
 	u8 cookie[COOKIE_LEN];
 
 	dst->header.type = cpu_to_le32(MESSAGE_HANDSHAKE_COOKIE);
@@ -158,16 +188,22 @@ void cookie_message_create(struct message_handshake_cookie *dst, struct sk_buff
 	get_random_bytes_wait(dst->nonce, COOKIE_NONCE_LEN);
 
 	make_cookie(cookie, skb, checker);
-	xchacha20poly1305_encrypt(dst->encrypted_cookie, cookie, COOKIE_LEN, macs->mac1, COOKIE_LEN, dst->nonce, checker->cookie_encryption_key);
+	xchacha20poly1305_encrypt(dst->encrypted_cookie, cookie, COOKIE_LEN,
+				  macs->mac1, COOKIE_LEN, dst->nonce,
+				  checker->cookie_encryption_key);
 }
 
-void cookie_message_consume(struct message_handshake_cookie *src, struct wireguard_device *wg)
+void cookie_message_consume(struct message_handshake_cookie *src,
+			    struct wireguard_device *wg)
 {
-	u8 cookie[COOKIE_LEN];
 	struct wireguard_peer *peer = NULL;
+	u8 cookie[COOKIE_LEN];
 	bool ret;
 
-	if (unlikely(!index_hashtable_lookup(&wg->index_hashtable, INDEX_HASHTABLE_HANDSHAKE | INDEX_HASHTABLE_KEYPAIR, src->receiver_index, &peer)))
+	if (unlikely(!index_hashtable_lookup(&wg->index_hashtable,
+					     INDEX_HASHTABLE_HANDSHAKE |
+					     INDEX_HASHTABLE_KEYPAIR,
+					     src->receiver_index, &peer)))
 		return;
 
 	down_read(&peer->latest_cookie.lock);
@@ -175,7 +211,10 @@ void cookie_message_consume(struct message_handshake_cookie *src, struct wiregua
 		up_read(&peer->latest_cookie.lock);
 		goto out;
 	}
-	ret = xchacha20poly1305_decrypt(cookie, src->encrypted_cookie, sizeof(src->encrypted_cookie), peer->latest_cookie.last_mac1_sent, COOKIE_LEN, src->nonce, peer->latest_cookie.cookie_decryption_key);
+	ret = xchacha20poly1305_decrypt(
+		cookie, src->encrypted_cookie, sizeof(src->encrypted_cookie),
+		peer->latest_cookie.last_mac1_sent, COOKIE_LEN, src->nonce,
+		peer->latest_cookie.cookie_decryption_key);
 	up_read(&peer->latest_cookie.lock);
 
 	if (ret) {
@@ -186,7 +225,8 @@ void cookie_message_consume(struct message_handshake_cookie *src, struct wiregua
 		peer->latest_cookie.have_sent_mac1 = false;
 		up_write(&peer->latest_cookie.lock);
 	} else
-		net_dbg_ratelimited("%s: Could not decrypt invalid cookie response\n", wg->dev->name);
+		net_dbg_ratelimited("%s: Could not decrypt invalid cookie response\n",
+				    wg->dev->name);
 
 out:
 	peer_put(peer);