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-rw-r--r--src/noise.c543
1 files changed, 362 insertions, 181 deletions
diff --git a/src/noise.c b/src/noise.c
index b3e5f8f..269b69f 100644
--- a/src/noise.c
+++ b/src/noise.c
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
-/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
- *
- * Copyright (C) 2015-2018 Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>. All Rights Reserved.
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2015-2019 Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>. All Rights Reserved.
*/
#include "noise.h"
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@
#include "peer.h"
#include "messages.h"
#include "queueing.h"
-#include "hashtables.h"
+#include "peerlookup.h"
#include <linux/rcupdate.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
@@ -31,42 +31,53 @@ static u8 handshake_init_hash[NOISE_HASH_LEN] __ro_after_init;
static u8 handshake_init_chaining_key[NOISE_HASH_LEN] __ro_after_init;
static atomic64_t keypair_counter = ATOMIC64_INIT(0);
-void __init noise_init(void)
+void __init wg_noise_init(void)
{
struct blake2s_state blake;
- blake2s(handshake_init_chaining_key, handshake_name, NULL, NOISE_HASH_LEN, sizeof(handshake_name), 0);
+ blake2s(handshake_init_chaining_key, handshake_name, NULL,
+ NOISE_HASH_LEN, sizeof(handshake_name), 0);
blake2s_init(&blake, NOISE_HASH_LEN);
blake2s_update(&blake, handshake_init_chaining_key, NOISE_HASH_LEN);
blake2s_update(&blake, identifier_name, sizeof(identifier_name));
- blake2s_final(&blake, handshake_init_hash, NOISE_HASH_LEN);
+ blake2s_final(&blake, handshake_init_hash);
}
/* Must hold peer->handshake.static_identity->lock */
-bool noise_precompute_static_static(struct wireguard_peer *peer)
+bool wg_noise_precompute_static_static(struct wg_peer *peer)
{
bool ret = true;
+
down_write(&peer->handshake.lock);
if (peer->handshake.static_identity->has_identity)
- ret = curve25519(peer->handshake.precomputed_static_static, peer->handshake.static_identity->static_private, peer->handshake.remote_static);
+ ret = curve25519(
+ peer->handshake.precomputed_static_static,
+ peer->handshake.static_identity->static_private,
+ peer->handshake.remote_static);
else
- memset(peer->handshake.precomputed_static_static, 0, NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN);
+ memset(peer->handshake.precomputed_static_static, 0,
+ NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN);
up_write(&peer->handshake.lock);
return ret;
}
-bool noise_handshake_init(struct noise_handshake *handshake, struct noise_static_identity *static_identity, const u8 peer_public_key[NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN], const u8 peer_preshared_key[NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN], struct wireguard_peer *peer)
+bool wg_noise_handshake_init(struct noise_handshake *handshake,
+ struct noise_static_identity *static_identity,
+ const u8 peer_public_key[NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN],
+ const u8 peer_preshared_key[NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN],
+ struct wg_peer *peer)
{
- memset(handshake, 0, sizeof(struct noise_handshake));
+ memset(handshake, 0, sizeof(*handshake));
init_rwsem(&handshake->lock);
handshake->entry.type = INDEX_HASHTABLE_HANDSHAKE;
handshake->entry.peer = peer;
memcpy(handshake->remote_static, peer_public_key, NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN);
if (peer_preshared_key)
- memcpy(handshake->preshared_key, peer_preshared_key, NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN);
+ memcpy(handshake->preshared_key, peer_preshared_key,
+ NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN);
handshake->static_identity = static_identity;
handshake->state = HANDSHAKE_ZEROED;
- return noise_precompute_static_static(peer);
+ return wg_noise_precompute_static_static(peer);
}
static void handshake_zero(struct noise_handshake *handshake)
@@ -79,18 +90,22 @@ static void handshake_zero(struct noise_handshake *handshake)
handshake->state = HANDSHAKE_ZEROED;
}
-void noise_handshake_clear(struct noise_handshake *handshake)
+void wg_noise_handshake_clear(struct noise_handshake *handshake)
{
- index_hashtable_remove(&handshake->entry.peer->device->index_hashtable, &handshake->entry);
+ wg_index_hashtable_remove(
+ handshake->entry.peer->device->index_hashtable,
+ &handshake->entry);
down_write(&handshake->lock);
handshake_zero(handshake);
up_write(&handshake->lock);
- index_hashtable_remove(&handshake->entry.peer->device->index_hashtable, &handshake->entry);
+ wg_index_hashtable_remove(
+ handshake->entry.peer->device->index_hashtable,
+ &handshake->entry);
}
-static struct noise_keypair *keypair_create(struct wireguard_peer *peer)
+static struct noise_keypair *keypair_create(struct wg_peer *peer)
{
- struct noise_keypair *keypair = kzalloc(sizeof(struct noise_keypair), GFP_KERNEL);
+ struct noise_keypair *keypair = kzalloc(sizeof(*keypair), GFP_KERNEL);
if (unlikely(!keypair))
return NULL;
@@ -103,111 +118,164 @@ static struct noise_keypair *keypair_create(struct wireguard_peer *peer)
static void keypair_free_rcu(struct rcu_head *rcu)
{
- struct noise_keypair *keypair = container_of(rcu, struct noise_keypair, rcu);
-
- net_dbg_ratelimited("%s: Keypair %llu destroyed for peer %llu\n", keypair->entry.peer->device->dev->name, keypair->internal_id, keypair->entry.peer->internal_id);
- kzfree(keypair);
+ kzfree(container_of(rcu, struct noise_keypair, rcu));
}
static void keypair_free_kref(struct kref *kref)
{
- struct noise_keypair *keypair = container_of(kref, struct noise_keypair, refcount);
-
- index_hashtable_remove(&keypair->entry.peer->device->index_hashtable, &keypair->entry);
- call_rcu_bh(&keypair->rcu, keypair_free_rcu);
+ struct noise_keypair *keypair =
+ container_of(kref, struct noise_keypair, refcount);
+
+ net_dbg_ratelimited("%s: Keypair %llu destroyed for peer %llu\n",
+ keypair->entry.peer->device->dev->name,
+ keypair->internal_id,
+ keypair->entry.peer->internal_id);
+ wg_index_hashtable_remove(keypair->entry.peer->device->index_hashtable,
+ &keypair->entry);
+ call_rcu(&keypair->rcu, keypair_free_rcu);
}
-void noise_keypair_put(struct noise_keypair *keypair)
+void wg_noise_keypair_put(struct noise_keypair *keypair, bool unreference_now)
{
if (unlikely(!keypair))
return;
+ if (unlikely(unreference_now))
+ wg_index_hashtable_remove(
+ keypair->entry.peer->device->index_hashtable,
+ &keypair->entry);
kref_put(&keypair->refcount, keypair_free_kref);
}
-struct noise_keypair *noise_keypair_get(struct noise_keypair *keypair)
+struct noise_keypair *wg_noise_keypair_get(struct noise_keypair *keypair)
{
- RCU_LOCKDEP_WARN(!rcu_read_lock_bh_held(), "Taking noise keypair reference without holding the RCU BH read lock");
+ RCU_LOCKDEP_WARN(!rcu_read_lock_bh_held(),
+ "Taking noise keypair reference without holding the RCU BH read lock");
if (unlikely(!keypair || !kref_get_unless_zero(&keypair->refcount)))
return NULL;
return keypair;
}
-void noise_keypairs_clear(struct noise_keypairs *keypairs)
+void wg_noise_keypairs_clear(struct noise_keypairs *keypairs)
{
struct noise_keypair *old;
spin_lock_bh(&keypairs->keypair_update_lock);
- old = rcu_dereference_protected(keypairs->previous_keypair, lockdep_is_held(&keypairs->keypair_update_lock));
- rcu_assign_pointer(keypairs->previous_keypair, NULL);
- noise_keypair_put(old);
- old = rcu_dereference_protected(keypairs->next_keypair, lockdep_is_held(&keypairs->keypair_update_lock));
- rcu_assign_pointer(keypairs->next_keypair, NULL);
- noise_keypair_put(old);
- old = rcu_dereference_protected(keypairs->current_keypair, lockdep_is_held(&keypairs->keypair_update_lock));
- rcu_assign_pointer(keypairs->current_keypair, NULL);
- noise_keypair_put(old);
+
+ /* We zero the next_keypair before zeroing the others, so that
+ * wg_noise_received_with_keypair returns early before subsequent ones
+ * are zeroed.
+ */
+ old = rcu_dereference_protected(keypairs->next_keypair,
+ lockdep_is_held(&keypairs->keypair_update_lock));
+ RCU_INIT_POINTER(keypairs->next_keypair, NULL);
+ wg_noise_keypair_put(old, true);
+
+ old = rcu_dereference_protected(keypairs->previous_keypair,
+ lockdep_is_held(&keypairs->keypair_update_lock));
+ RCU_INIT_POINTER(keypairs->previous_keypair, NULL);
+ wg_noise_keypair_put(old, true);
+
+ old = rcu_dereference_protected(keypairs->current_keypair,
+ lockdep_is_held(&keypairs->keypair_update_lock));
+ RCU_INIT_POINTER(keypairs->current_keypair, NULL);
+ wg_noise_keypair_put(old, true);
+
spin_unlock_bh(&keypairs->keypair_update_lock);
}
-static void add_new_keypair(struct noise_keypairs *keypairs, struct noise_keypair *new_keypair)
+void wg_noise_expire_current_peer_keypairs(struct wg_peer *peer)
+{
+ struct noise_keypair *keypair;
+
+ wg_noise_handshake_clear(&peer->handshake);
+ wg_noise_reset_last_sent_handshake(&peer->last_sent_handshake);
+
+ spin_lock_bh(&peer->keypairs.keypair_update_lock);
+ keypair = rcu_dereference_protected(peer->keypairs.next_keypair,
+ lockdep_is_held(&peer->keypairs.keypair_update_lock));
+ if (keypair)
+ keypair->sending.is_valid = false;
+ keypair = rcu_dereference_protected(peer->keypairs.current_keypair,
+ lockdep_is_held(&peer->keypairs.keypair_update_lock));
+ if (keypair)
+ keypair->sending.is_valid = false;
+ spin_unlock_bh(&peer->keypairs.keypair_update_lock);
+}
+
+static void add_new_keypair(struct noise_keypairs *keypairs,
+ struct noise_keypair *new_keypair)
{
struct noise_keypair *previous_keypair, *next_keypair, *current_keypair;
spin_lock_bh(&keypairs->keypair_update_lock);
- previous_keypair = rcu_dereference_protected(keypairs->previous_keypair, lockdep_is_held(&keypairs->keypair_update_lock));
- next_keypair = rcu_dereference_protected(keypairs->next_keypair, lockdep_is_held(&keypairs->keypair_update_lock));
- current_keypair = rcu_dereference_protected(keypairs->current_keypair, lockdep_is_held(&keypairs->keypair_update_lock));
+ previous_keypair = rcu_dereference_protected(keypairs->previous_keypair,
+ lockdep_is_held(&keypairs->keypair_update_lock));
+ next_keypair = rcu_dereference_protected(keypairs->next_keypair,
+ lockdep_is_held(&keypairs->keypair_update_lock));
+ current_keypair = rcu_dereference_protected(keypairs->current_keypair,
+ lockdep_is_held(&keypairs->keypair_update_lock));
if (new_keypair->i_am_the_initiator) {
- /* If we're the initiator, it means we've sent a handshake, and received
- * a confirmation response, which means this new keypair can now be used.
+ /* If we're the initiator, it means we've sent a handshake, and
+ * received a confirmation response, which means this new
+ * keypair can now be used.
*/
if (next_keypair) {
- /* If there already was a next keypair pending, we demote it to be
- * the previous keypair, and free the existing current.
- * TODO: note that this means KCI can result in this transition. It
- * would perhaps be more sound to always just get rid of the unused
- * next keypair instead of putting it in the previous slot, but this
- * might be a bit less robust. Something to think about and decide on.
- */
- rcu_assign_pointer(keypairs->next_keypair, NULL);
- rcu_assign_pointer(keypairs->previous_keypair, next_keypair);
- noise_keypair_put(current_keypair);
- } else /* If there wasn't an existing next keypair, we replace the
- * previous with the current one.
+ /* If there already was a next keypair pending, we
+ * demote it to be the previous keypair, and free the
+ * existing current. Note that this means KCI can result
+ * in this transition. It would perhaps be more sound to
+ * always just get rid of the unused next keypair
+ * instead of putting it in the previous slot, but this
+ * might be a bit less robust. Something to think about
+ * for the future.
*/
- rcu_assign_pointer(keypairs->previous_keypair, current_keypair);
- /* At this point we can get rid of the old previous keypair, and set up
- * the new keypair.
+ RCU_INIT_POINTER(keypairs->next_keypair, NULL);
+ rcu_assign_pointer(keypairs->previous_keypair,
+ next_keypair);
+ wg_noise_keypair_put(current_keypair, true);
+ } else /* If there wasn't an existing next keypair, we replace
+ * the previous with the current one.
+ */
+ rcu_assign_pointer(keypairs->previous_keypair,
+ current_keypair);
+ /* At this point we can get rid of the old previous keypair, and
+ * set up the new keypair.
*/
- noise_keypair_put(previous_keypair);
+ wg_noise_keypair_put(previous_keypair, true);
rcu_assign_pointer(keypairs->current_keypair, new_keypair);
} else {
- /* If we're the responder, it means we can't use the new keypair until
- * we receive confirmation via the first data packet, so we get rid of
- * the existing previous one, the possibly existing next one, and slide
- * in the new next one.
+ /* If we're the responder, it means we can't use the new keypair
+ * until we receive confirmation via the first data packet, so
+ * we get rid of the existing previous one, the possibly
+ * existing next one, and slide in the new next one.
*/
rcu_assign_pointer(keypairs->next_keypair, new_keypair);
- noise_keypair_put(next_keypair);
- rcu_assign_pointer(keypairs->previous_keypair, NULL);
- noise_keypair_put(previous_keypair);
+ wg_noise_keypair_put(next_keypair, true);
+ RCU_INIT_POINTER(keypairs->previous_keypair, NULL);
+ wg_noise_keypair_put(previous_keypair, true);
}
spin_unlock_bh(&keypairs->keypair_update_lock);
}
-bool noise_received_with_keypair(struct noise_keypairs *keypairs, struct noise_keypair *received_keypair)
+bool wg_noise_received_with_keypair(struct noise_keypairs *keypairs,
+ struct noise_keypair *received_keypair)
{
- bool key_is_new;
struct noise_keypair *old_keypair;
+ bool key_is_new;
/* We first check without taking the spinlock. */
- key_is_new = received_keypair == rcu_access_pointer(keypairs->next_keypair);
+ key_is_new = received_keypair ==
+ rcu_access_pointer(keypairs->next_keypair);
if (likely(!key_is_new))
return false;
spin_lock_bh(&keypairs->keypair_update_lock);
- /* After locking, we double check that things didn't change from beneath us. */
- if (unlikely(received_keypair != rcu_dereference_protected(keypairs->next_keypair, lockdep_is_held(&keypairs->keypair_update_lock)))) {
+ /* After locking, we double check that things didn't change from
+ * beneath us.
+ */
+ if (unlikely(received_keypair !=
+ rcu_dereference_protected(keypairs->next_keypair,
+ lockdep_is_held(&keypairs->keypair_update_lock)))) {
spin_unlock_bh(&keypairs->keypair_update_lock);
return false;
}
@@ -216,92 +284,119 @@ bool noise_received_with_keypair(struct noise_keypairs *keypairs, struct noise_k
* into the current, the current into the previous, and get rid of
* the old previous.
*/
- old_keypair = rcu_dereference_protected(keypairs->previous_keypair, lockdep_is_held(&keypairs->keypair_update_lock));
- rcu_assign_pointer(keypairs->previous_keypair, rcu_dereference_protected(keypairs->current_keypair, lockdep_is_held(&keypairs->keypair_update_lock)));
- noise_keypair_put(old_keypair);
+ old_keypair = rcu_dereference_protected(keypairs->previous_keypair,
+ lockdep_is_held(&keypairs->keypair_update_lock));
+ rcu_assign_pointer(keypairs->previous_keypair,
+ rcu_dereference_protected(keypairs->current_keypair,
+ lockdep_is_held(&keypairs->keypair_update_lock)));
+ wg_noise_keypair_put(old_keypair, true);
rcu_assign_pointer(keypairs->current_keypair, received_keypair);
- rcu_assign_pointer(keypairs->next_keypair, NULL);
+ RCU_INIT_POINTER(keypairs->next_keypair, NULL);
spin_unlock_bh(&keypairs->keypair_update_lock);
return true;
}
/* Must hold static_identity->lock */
-void noise_set_static_identity_private_key(struct noise_static_identity *static_identity, const u8 private_key[NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN])
+void wg_noise_set_static_identity_private_key(
+ struct noise_static_identity *static_identity,
+ const u8 private_key[NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN])
{
- memcpy(static_identity->static_private, private_key, NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN);
- static_identity->has_identity = curve25519_generate_public(static_identity->static_public, private_key);
+ memcpy(static_identity->static_private, private_key,
+ NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN);
+ curve25519_clamp_secret(static_identity->static_private);
+ static_identity->has_identity = curve25519_generate_public(
+ static_identity->static_public, private_key);
}
/* This is Hugo Krawczyk's HKDF:
* - https://eprint.iacr.org/2010/264.pdf
* - https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5869
*/
-static void kdf(u8 *first_dst, u8 *second_dst, u8 *third_dst, const u8 *data, size_t first_len, size_t second_len, size_t third_len, size_t data_len, const u8 chaining_key[NOISE_HASH_LEN])
+static void kdf(u8 *first_dst, u8 *second_dst, u8 *third_dst, const u8 *data,
+ size_t first_len, size_t second_len, size_t third_len,
+ size_t data_len, const u8 chaining_key[NOISE_HASH_LEN])
{
- u8 secret[BLAKE2S_OUTBYTES];
- u8 output[BLAKE2S_OUTBYTES + 1];
+ u8 output[BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE + 1];
+ u8 secret[BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE];
-#ifdef DEBUG
- BUG_ON(first_len > BLAKE2S_OUTBYTES || second_len > BLAKE2S_OUTBYTES || third_len > BLAKE2S_OUTBYTES || ((second_len || second_dst || third_len || third_dst) && (!first_len || !first_dst)) || ((third_len || third_dst) && (!second_len || !second_dst)));
-#endif
+ WARN_ON(IS_ENABLED(DEBUG) &&
+ (first_len > BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE ||
+ second_len > BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE ||
+ third_len > BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE ||
+ ((second_len || second_dst || third_len || third_dst) &&
+ (!first_len || !first_dst)) ||
+ ((third_len || third_dst) && (!second_len || !second_dst))));
/* Extract entropy from data into secret */
- blake2s_hmac(secret, data, chaining_key, BLAKE2S_OUTBYTES, data_len, NOISE_HASH_LEN);
+ blake2s_hmac(secret, data, chaining_key, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE, data_len,
+ NOISE_HASH_LEN);
if (!first_dst || !first_len)
goto out;
/* Expand first key: key = secret, data = 0x1 */
output[0] = 1;
- blake2s_hmac(output, output, secret, BLAKE2S_OUTBYTES, 1, BLAKE2S_OUTBYTES);
+ blake2s_hmac(output, output, secret, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE, 1,
+ BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE);
memcpy(first_dst, output, first_len);
if (!second_dst || !second_len)
goto out;
/* Expand second key: key = secret, data = first-key || 0x2 */
- output[BLAKE2S_OUTBYTES] = 2;
- blake2s_hmac(output, output, secret, BLAKE2S_OUTBYTES, BLAKE2S_OUTBYTES + 1, BLAKE2S_OUTBYTES);
+ output[BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE] = 2;
+ blake2s_hmac(output, output, secret, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE,
+ BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE + 1, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE);
memcpy(second_dst, output, second_len);
if (!third_dst || !third_len)
goto out;
/* Expand third key: key = secret, data = second-key || 0x3 */
- output[BLAKE2S_OUTBYTES] = 3;
- blake2s_hmac(output, output, secret, BLAKE2S_OUTBYTES, BLAKE2S_OUTBYTES + 1, BLAKE2S_OUTBYTES);
+ output[BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE] = 3;
+ blake2s_hmac(output, output, secret, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE,
+ BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE + 1, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE);
memcpy(third_dst, output, third_len);
out:
/* Clear sensitive data from stack */
- memzero_explicit(secret, BLAKE2S_OUTBYTES);
- memzero_explicit(output, BLAKE2S_OUTBYTES + 1);
+ memzero_explicit(secret, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE);
+ memzero_explicit(output, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE + 1);
}
static void symmetric_key_init(struct noise_symmetric_key *key)
{
spin_lock_init(&key->counter.receive.lock);
atomic64_set(&key->counter.counter, 0);
- memset(key->counter.receive.backtrack, 0, sizeof(key->counter.receive.backtrack));
- key->birthdate = get_jiffies_64();
+ memset(key->counter.receive.backtrack, 0,
+ sizeof(key->counter.receive.backtrack));
+ key->birthdate = ktime_get_coarse_boottime_ns();
key->is_valid = true;
}
-static void derive_keys(struct noise_symmetric_key *first_dst, struct noise_symmetric_key *second_dst, const u8 chaining_key[NOISE_HASH_LEN])
+static void derive_keys(struct noise_symmetric_key *first_dst,
+ struct noise_symmetric_key *second_dst,
+ const u8 chaining_key[NOISE_HASH_LEN])
{
- kdf(first_dst->key, second_dst->key, NULL, NULL, NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN, NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN, 0, 0, chaining_key);
+ kdf(first_dst->key, second_dst->key, NULL, NULL,
+ NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN, NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN, 0, 0,
+ chaining_key);
symmetric_key_init(first_dst);
symmetric_key_init(second_dst);
}
-static bool __must_check mix_dh(u8 chaining_key[NOISE_HASH_LEN], u8 key[NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN], const u8 private[NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN], const u8 public[NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN])
+static bool __must_check mix_dh(u8 chaining_key[NOISE_HASH_LEN],
+ u8 key[NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN],
+ const u8 private[NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN],
+ const u8 public[NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN])
{
u8 dh_calculation[NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN];
if (unlikely(!curve25519(dh_calculation, private, public)))
return false;
- kdf(chaining_key, key, NULL, dh_calculation, NOISE_HASH_LEN, NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN, 0, NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN, chaining_key);
+ kdf(chaining_key, key, NULL, dh_calculation, NOISE_HASH_LEN,
+ NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN, 0, NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN, chaining_key);
memzero_explicit(dh_calculation, NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN);
return true;
}
@@ -313,65 +408,93 @@ static void mix_hash(u8 hash[NOISE_HASH_LEN], const u8 *src, size_t src_len)
blake2s_init(&blake, NOISE_HASH_LEN);
blake2s_update(&blake, hash, NOISE_HASH_LEN);
blake2s_update(&blake, src, src_len);
- blake2s_final(&blake, hash, NOISE_HASH_LEN);
+ blake2s_final(&blake, hash);
}
-static void mix_psk(u8 chaining_key[NOISE_HASH_LEN], u8 hash[NOISE_HASH_LEN], u8 key[NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN], const u8 psk[NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN])
+static void mix_psk(u8 chaining_key[NOISE_HASH_LEN], u8 hash[NOISE_HASH_LEN],
+ u8 key[NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN],
+ const u8 psk[NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN])
{
u8 temp_hash[NOISE_HASH_LEN];
- kdf(chaining_key, temp_hash, key, psk, NOISE_HASH_LEN, NOISE_HASH_LEN, NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN, NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN, chaining_key);
+ kdf(chaining_key, temp_hash, key, psk, NOISE_HASH_LEN, NOISE_HASH_LEN,
+ NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN, NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN, chaining_key);
mix_hash(hash, temp_hash, NOISE_HASH_LEN);
memzero_explicit(temp_hash, NOISE_HASH_LEN);
}
-static void handshake_init(u8 chaining_key[NOISE_HASH_LEN], u8 hash[NOISE_HASH_LEN], const u8 remote_static[NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN])
+static void handshake_init(u8 chaining_key[NOISE_HASH_LEN],
+ u8 hash[NOISE_HASH_LEN],
+ const u8 remote_static[NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN])
{
memcpy(hash, handshake_init_hash, NOISE_HASH_LEN);
memcpy(chaining_key, handshake_init_chaining_key, NOISE_HASH_LEN);
mix_hash(hash, remote_static, NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN);
}
-static void message_encrypt(u8 *dst_ciphertext, const u8 *src_plaintext, size_t src_len, u8 key[NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN], u8 hash[NOISE_HASH_LEN])
+static void message_encrypt(u8 *dst_ciphertext, const u8 *src_plaintext,
+ size_t src_len, u8 key[NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN],
+ u8 hash[NOISE_HASH_LEN])
{
- chacha20poly1305_encrypt(dst_ciphertext, src_plaintext, src_len, hash, NOISE_HASH_LEN, 0 /* Always zero for Noise_IK */, key);
+ chacha20poly1305_encrypt(dst_ciphertext, src_plaintext, src_len, hash,
+ NOISE_HASH_LEN,
+ 0 /* Always zero for Noise_IK */, key);
mix_hash(hash, dst_ciphertext, noise_encrypted_len(src_len));
}
-static bool message_decrypt(u8 *dst_plaintext, const u8 *src_ciphertext, size_t src_len, u8 key[NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN], u8 hash[NOISE_HASH_LEN])
+static bool message_decrypt(u8 *dst_plaintext, const u8 *src_ciphertext,
+ size_t src_len, u8 key[NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN],
+ u8 hash[NOISE_HASH_LEN])
{
- if (!chacha20poly1305_decrypt(dst_plaintext, src_ciphertext, src_len, hash, NOISE_HASH_LEN, 0 /* Always zero for Noise_IK */, key))
+ if (!chacha20poly1305_decrypt(dst_plaintext, src_ciphertext, src_len,
+ hash, NOISE_HASH_LEN,
+ 0 /* Always zero for Noise_IK */, key))
return false;
mix_hash(hash, src_ciphertext, src_len);
return true;
}
-static void message_ephemeral(u8 ephemeral_dst[NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN], const u8 ephemeral_src[NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN], u8 chaining_key[NOISE_HASH_LEN], u8 hash[NOISE_HASH_LEN])
+static void message_ephemeral(u8 ephemeral_dst[NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN],
+ const u8 ephemeral_src[NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN],
+ u8 chaining_key[NOISE_HASH_LEN],
+ u8 hash[NOISE_HASH_LEN])
{
if (ephemeral_dst != ephemeral_src)
memcpy(ephemeral_dst, ephemeral_src, NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN);
mix_hash(hash, ephemeral_src, NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN);
- kdf(chaining_key, NULL, NULL, ephemeral_src, NOISE_HASH_LEN, 0, 0, NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN, chaining_key);
+ kdf(chaining_key, NULL, NULL, ephemeral_src, NOISE_HASH_LEN, 0, 0,
+ NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN, chaining_key);
}
static void tai64n_now(u8 output[NOISE_TIMESTAMP_LEN])
{
struct timespec64 now;
- getnstimeofday64(&now);
+ ktime_get_real_ts64(&now);
+
+ /* In order to prevent some sort of infoleak from precise timers, we
+ * round down the nanoseconds part to the closest rounded-down power of
+ * two to the maximum initiations per second allowed anyway by the
+ * implementation.
+ */
+ now.tv_nsec = ALIGN_DOWN(now.tv_nsec,
+ rounddown_pow_of_two(NSEC_PER_SEC / INITIATIONS_PER_SECOND));
+
/* https://cr.yp.to/libtai/tai64.html */
- *(__be64 *)output = cpu_to_be64(4611686018427387914ULL + now.tv_sec);
+ *(__be64 *)output = cpu_to_be64(0x400000000000000aULL + now.tv_sec);
*(__be32 *)(output + sizeof(__be64)) = cpu_to_be32(now.tv_nsec);
}
-bool noise_handshake_create_initiation(struct message_handshake_initiation *dst, struct noise_handshake *handshake)
+bool
+wg_noise_handshake_create_initiation(struct message_handshake_initiation *dst,
+ struct noise_handshake *handshake)
{
u8 timestamp[NOISE_TIMESTAMP_LEN];
u8 key[NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN];
bool ret = false;
- /* We need to wait for crng _before_ taking any locks, since curve25519_generate_secret
- * uses get_random_bytes_wait.
+ /* We need to wait for crng _before_ taking any locks, since
+ * curve25519_generate_secret uses get_random_bytes_wait.
*/
wait_for_random_bytes();
@@ -383,29 +506,42 @@ bool noise_handshake_create_initiation(struct message_handshake_initiation *dst,
dst->header.type = cpu_to_le32(MESSAGE_HANDSHAKE_INITIATION);
- handshake_init(handshake->chaining_key, handshake->hash, handshake->remote_static);
+ handshake_init(handshake->chaining_key, handshake->hash,
+ handshake->remote_static);
/* e */
curve25519_generate_secret(handshake->ephemeral_private);
- if (!curve25519_generate_public(dst->unencrypted_ephemeral, handshake->ephemeral_private))
+ if (!curve25519_generate_public(dst->unencrypted_ephemeral,
+ handshake->ephemeral_private))
goto out;
- message_ephemeral(dst->unencrypted_ephemeral, dst->unencrypted_ephemeral, handshake->chaining_key, handshake->hash);
+ message_ephemeral(dst->unencrypted_ephemeral,
+ dst->unencrypted_ephemeral, handshake->chaining_key,
+ handshake->hash);
/* es */
- if (!mix_dh(handshake->chaining_key, key, handshake->ephemeral_private, handshake->remote_static))
+ if (!mix_dh(handshake->chaining_key, key, handshake->ephemeral_private,
+ handshake->remote_static))
goto out;
/* s */
- message_encrypt(dst->encrypted_static, handshake->static_identity->static_public, NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN, key, handshake->hash);
+ message_encrypt(dst->encrypted_static,
+ handshake->static_identity->static_public,
+ NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN, key, handshake->hash);
/* ss */
- kdf(handshake->chaining_key, key, NULL, handshake->precomputed_static_static, NOISE_HASH_LEN, NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN, 0, NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN, handshake->chaining_key);
+ kdf(handshake->chaining_key, key, NULL,
+ handshake->precomputed_static_static, NOISE_HASH_LEN,
+ NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN, 0, NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN,
+ handshake->chaining_key);
/* {t} */
tai64n_now(timestamp);
- message_encrypt(dst->encrypted_timestamp, timestamp, NOISE_TIMESTAMP_LEN, key, handshake->hash);
+ message_encrypt(dst->encrypted_timestamp, timestamp,
+ NOISE_TIMESTAMP_LEN, key, handshake->hash);
- dst->sender_index = index_hashtable_insert(&handshake->entry.peer->device->index_hashtable, &handshake->entry);
+ dst->sender_index = wg_index_hashtable_insert(
+ handshake->entry.peer->device->index_hashtable,
+ &handshake->entry);
handshake->state = HANDSHAKE_CREATED_INITIATION;
ret = true;
@@ -417,17 +553,20 @@ out:
return ret;
}
-struct wireguard_peer *noise_handshake_consume_initiation(struct message_handshake_initiation *src, struct wireguard_device *wg)
+struct wg_peer *
+wg_noise_handshake_consume_initiation(struct message_handshake_initiation *src,
+ struct wg_device *wg)
{
+ struct wg_peer *peer = NULL, *ret_peer = NULL;
+ struct noise_handshake *handshake;
bool replay_attack, flood_attack;
+ u8 key[NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN];
+ u8 chaining_key[NOISE_HASH_LEN];
+ u8 hash[NOISE_HASH_LEN];
u8 s[NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN];
u8 e[NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN];
u8 t[NOISE_TIMESTAMP_LEN];
- struct noise_handshake *handshake;
- struct wireguard_peer *wg_peer = NULL;
- u8 key[NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN];
- u8 hash[NOISE_HASH_LEN];
- u8 chaining_key[NOISE_HASH_LEN];
+ u64 initiation_consumption;
down_read(&wg->static_identity.lock);
if (unlikely(!wg->static_identity.has_identity))
@@ -443,58 +582,69 @@ struct wireguard_peer *noise_handshake_consume_initiation(struct message_handsha
goto out;
/* s */
- if (!message_decrypt(s, src->encrypted_static, sizeof(src->encrypted_static), key, hash))
+ if (!message_decrypt(s, src->encrypted_static,
+ sizeof(src->encrypted_static), key, hash))
goto out;
/* Lookup which peer we're actually talking to */
- wg_peer = pubkey_hashtable_lookup(&wg->peer_hashtable, s);
- if (!wg_peer)
+ peer = wg_pubkey_hashtable_lookup(wg->peer_hashtable, s);
+ if (!peer)
goto out;
- handshake = &wg_peer->handshake;
+ handshake = &peer->handshake;
/* ss */
- kdf(chaining_key, key, NULL, handshake->precomputed_static_static, NOISE_HASH_LEN, NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN, 0, NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN, chaining_key);
+ kdf(chaining_key, key, NULL, handshake->precomputed_static_static,
+ NOISE_HASH_LEN, NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN, 0, NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN,
+ chaining_key);
/* {t} */
- if (!message_decrypt(t, src->encrypted_timestamp, sizeof(src->encrypted_timestamp), key, hash))
+ if (!message_decrypt(t, src->encrypted_timestamp,
+ sizeof(src->encrypted_timestamp), key, hash))
goto out;
down_read(&handshake->lock);
- replay_attack = memcmp(t, handshake->latest_timestamp, NOISE_TIMESTAMP_LEN) <= 0;
- flood_attack = !time_is_before_jiffies64(handshake->last_initiation_consumption + INITIATIONS_PER_SECOND);
+ replay_attack = memcmp(t, handshake->latest_timestamp,
+ NOISE_TIMESTAMP_LEN) <= 0;
+ flood_attack = (s64)handshake->last_initiation_consumption +
+ NSEC_PER_SEC / INITIATIONS_PER_SECOND >
+ (s64)ktime_get_coarse_boottime_ns();
up_read(&handshake->lock);
- if (replay_attack || flood_attack) {
- peer_put(wg_peer);
- wg_peer = NULL;
+ if (replay_attack || flood_attack)
goto out;
- }
/* Success! Copy everything to peer */
down_write(&handshake->lock);
memcpy(handshake->remote_ephemeral, e, NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN);
- memcpy(handshake->latest_timestamp, t, NOISE_TIMESTAMP_LEN);
+ if (memcmp(t, handshake->latest_timestamp, NOISE_TIMESTAMP_LEN) > 0)
+ memcpy(handshake->latest_timestamp, t, NOISE_TIMESTAMP_LEN);
memcpy(handshake->hash, hash, NOISE_HASH_LEN);
memcpy(handshake->chaining_key, chaining_key, NOISE_HASH_LEN);
handshake->remote_index = src->sender_index;
- handshake->last_initiation_consumption = get_jiffies_64();
+ if ((s64)(handshake->last_initiation_consumption -
+ (initiation_consumption = ktime_get_coarse_boottime_ns())) < 0)
+ handshake->last_initiation_consumption = initiation_consumption;
handshake->state = HANDSHAKE_CONSUMED_INITIATION;
up_write(&handshake->lock);
+ ret_peer = peer;
out:
memzero_explicit(key, NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN);
memzero_explicit(hash, NOISE_HASH_LEN);
memzero_explicit(chaining_key, NOISE_HASH_LEN);
up_read(&wg->static_identity.lock);
- return wg_peer;
+ if (!ret_peer)
+ wg_peer_put(peer);
+ return ret_peer;
}
-bool noise_handshake_create_response(struct message_handshake_response *dst, struct noise_handshake *handshake)
+bool wg_noise_handshake_create_response(struct message_handshake_response *dst,
+ struct noise_handshake *handshake)
{
- bool ret = false;
u8 key[NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN];
+ bool ret = false;
- /* We need to wait for crng _before_ taking any locks, since curve25519_generate_secret
- * uses get_random_bytes_wait.
+ /* We need to wait for crng _before_ taking any locks, since
+ * curve25519_generate_secret uses get_random_bytes_wait.
*/
wait_for_random_bytes();
@@ -509,25 +659,33 @@ bool noise_handshake_create_response(struct message_handshake_response *dst, str
/* e */
curve25519_generate_secret(handshake->ephemeral_private);
- if (!curve25519_generate_public(dst->unencrypted_ephemeral, handshake->ephemeral_private))
+ if (!curve25519_generate_public(dst->unencrypted_ephemeral,
+ handshake->ephemeral_private))
goto out;
- message_ephemeral(dst->unencrypted_ephemeral, dst->unencrypted_ephemeral, handshake->chaining_key, handshake->hash);
+ message_ephemeral(dst->unencrypted_ephemeral,
+ dst->unencrypted_ephemeral, handshake->chaining_key,
+ handshake->hash);
/* ee */
- if (!mix_dh(handshake->chaining_key, NULL, handshake->ephemeral_private, handshake->remote_ephemeral))
+ if (!mix_dh(handshake->chaining_key, NULL, handshake->ephemeral_private,
+ handshake->remote_ephemeral))
goto out;
/* se */
- if (!mix_dh(handshake->chaining_key, NULL, handshake->ephemeral_private, handshake->remote_static))
+ if (!mix_dh(handshake->chaining_key, NULL, handshake->ephemeral_private,
+ handshake->remote_static))
goto out;
/* psk */
- mix_psk(handshake->chaining_key, handshake->hash, key, handshake->preshared_key);
+ mix_psk(handshake->chaining_key, handshake->hash, key,
+ handshake->preshared_key);
/* {} */
message_encrypt(dst->encrypted_nothing, NULL, 0, key, handshake->hash);
- dst->sender_index = index_hashtable_insert(&handshake->entry.peer->device->index_hashtable, &handshake->entry);
+ dst->sender_index = wg_index_hashtable_insert(
+ handshake->entry.peer->device->index_hashtable,
+ &handshake->entry);
handshake->state = HANDSHAKE_CREATED_RESPONSE;
ret = true;
@@ -539,24 +697,28 @@ out:
return ret;
}
-struct wireguard_peer *noise_handshake_consume_response(struct message_handshake_response *src, struct wireguard_device *wg)
+struct wg_peer *
+wg_noise_handshake_consume_response(struct message_handshake_response *src,
+ struct wg_device *wg)
{
+ enum noise_handshake_state state = HANDSHAKE_ZEROED;
+ struct wg_peer *peer = NULL, *ret_peer = NULL;
struct noise_handshake *handshake;
- struct wireguard_peer *ret_peer = NULL;
u8 key[NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN];
u8 hash[NOISE_HASH_LEN];
u8 chaining_key[NOISE_HASH_LEN];
u8 e[NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN];
u8 ephemeral_private[NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN];
u8 static_private[NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN];
- enum noise_handshake_state state = HANDSHAKE_ZEROED;
down_read(&wg->static_identity.lock);
if (unlikely(!wg->static_identity.has_identity))
goto out;
- handshake = (struct noise_handshake *)index_hashtable_lookup(&wg->index_hashtable, INDEX_HASHTABLE_HANDSHAKE, src->receiver_index);
+ handshake = (struct noise_handshake *)wg_index_hashtable_lookup(
+ wg->index_hashtable, INDEX_HASHTABLE_HANDSHAKE,
+ src->receiver_index, &peer);
if (unlikely(!handshake))
goto out;
@@ -564,7 +726,8 @@ struct wireguard_peer *noise_handshake_consume_response(struct message_handshake
state = handshake->state;
memcpy(hash, handshake->hash, NOISE_HASH_LEN);
memcpy(chaining_key, handshake->chaining_key, NOISE_HASH_LEN);
- memcpy(ephemeral_private, handshake->ephemeral_private, NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN);
+ memcpy(ephemeral_private, handshake->ephemeral_private,
+ NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN);
up_read(&handshake->lock);
if (state != HANDSHAKE_CREATED_INITIATION)
@@ -575,22 +738,25 @@ struct wireguard_peer *noise_handshake_consume_response(struct message_handshake
/* ee */
if (!mix_dh(chaining_key, NULL, ephemeral_private, e))
- goto out;
+ goto fail;
/* se */
if (!mix_dh(chaining_key, NULL, wg->static_identity.static_private, e))
- goto out;
+ goto fail;
/* psk */
mix_psk(chaining_key, hash, key, handshake->preshared_key);
/* {} */
- if (!message_decrypt(NULL, src->encrypted_nothing, sizeof(src->encrypted_nothing), key, hash))
+ if (!message_decrypt(NULL, src->encrypted_nothing,
+ sizeof(src->encrypted_nothing), key, hash))
goto fail;
/* Success! Copy everything to peer */
down_write(&handshake->lock);
- /* It's important to check that the state is still the same, while we have an exclusive lock */
+ /* It's important to check that the state is still the same, while we
+ * have an exclusive lock.
+ */
if (handshake->state != state) {
up_write(&handshake->lock);
goto fail;
@@ -601,11 +767,11 @@ struct wireguard_peer *noise_handshake_consume_response(struct message_handshake
handshake->remote_index = src->sender_index;
handshake->state = HANDSHAKE_CONSUMED_RESPONSE;
up_write(&handshake->lock);
- ret_peer = handshake->entry.peer;
+ ret_peer = peer;
goto out;
fail:
- peer_put(handshake->entry.peer);
+ wg_peer_put(peer);
out:
memzero_explicit(key, NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN);
memzero_explicit(hash, NOISE_HASH_LEN);
@@ -616,34 +782,49 @@ out:
return ret_peer;
}
-bool noise_handshake_begin_session(struct noise_handshake *handshake, struct noise_keypairs *keypairs)
+bool wg_noise_handshake_begin_session(struct noise_handshake *handshake,
+ struct noise_keypairs *keypairs)
{
struct noise_keypair *new_keypair;
+ bool ret = false;
down_write(&handshake->lock);
- if (handshake->state != HANDSHAKE_CREATED_RESPONSE && handshake->state != HANDSHAKE_CONSUMED_RESPONSE)
- goto fail;
+ if (handshake->state != HANDSHAKE_CREATED_RESPONSE &&
+ handshake->state != HANDSHAKE_CONSUMED_RESPONSE)
+ goto out;
new_keypair = keypair_create(handshake->entry.peer);
if (!new_keypair)
- goto fail;
- new_keypair->i_am_the_initiator = handshake->state == HANDSHAKE_CONSUMED_RESPONSE;
+ goto out;
+ new_keypair->i_am_the_initiator = handshake->state ==
+ HANDSHAKE_CONSUMED_RESPONSE;
new_keypair->remote_index = handshake->remote_index;
if (new_keypair->i_am_the_initiator)
- derive_keys(&new_keypair->sending, &new_keypair->receiving, handshake->chaining_key);
+ derive_keys(&new_keypair->sending, &new_keypair->receiving,
+ handshake->chaining_key);
else
- derive_keys(&new_keypair->receiving, &new_keypair->sending, handshake->chaining_key);
+ derive_keys(&new_keypair->receiving, &new_keypair->sending,
+ handshake->chaining_key);
handshake_zero(handshake);
- add_new_keypair(keypairs, new_keypair);
- net_dbg_ratelimited("%s: Keypair %llu created for peer %llu\n", new_keypair->entry.peer->device->dev->name, new_keypair->internal_id, new_keypair->entry.peer->internal_id);
- WARN_ON(!index_hashtable_replace(&handshake->entry.peer->device->index_hashtable, &handshake->entry, &new_keypair->entry));
- up_write(&handshake->lock);
-
- return true;
+ rcu_read_lock_bh();
+ if (likely(!READ_ONCE(container_of(handshake, struct wg_peer,
+ handshake)->is_dead))) {
+ add_new_keypair(keypairs, new_keypair);
+ net_dbg_ratelimited("%s: Keypair %llu created for peer %llu\n",
+ handshake->entry.peer->device->dev->name,
+ new_keypair->internal_id,
+ handshake->entry.peer->internal_id);
+ ret = wg_index_hashtable_replace(
+ handshake->entry.peer->device->index_hashtable,
+ &handshake->entry, &new_keypair->entry);
+ } else {
+ kzfree(new_keypair);
+ }
+ rcu_read_unlock_bh();
-fail:
+out:
up_write(&handshake->lock);
- return false;
+ return ret;
}