Reimplement uvm/uvm_map.

vmmap is designed to perform address space randomized allocations,
without letting fragmentation of the address space go through the roof.

Some highlights:
- kernel address space randomization
- proper implementation of guardpages
- roughly 10% system time reduction during kernel build

Tested by alot of people on tech@ and developers.
Theo's machines are still happy.

1 files changed, 3 insertions, 7 deletions

diff --git a/sys/uvm/uvm_unix.c b/sys/uvm/uvm_unix.c
index ec7922cd9f3..2b8eee79057 100644
--- a/sys/uvm/uvm_unix.c
+++ b/sys/uvm/uvm_unix.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/*	$OpenBSD: uvm_unix.c,v 1.40 2009/11/24 10:35:56 otto Exp $	*/
+/*	$OpenBSD: uvm_unix.c,v 1.41 2011/05/24 15:27:36 ariane Exp $	*/
 /*	$NetBSD: uvm_unix.c,v 1.18 2000/09/13 15:00:25 thorpej Exp $	*/
 
 /*
@@ -167,9 +167,7 @@ uvm_coredump(struct proc *p, struct vnode *vp, struct ucred *cred,
 
 	offset = chdr->c_hdrsize + chdr->c_seghdrsize + chdr->c_cpusize;
 
-	for (entry = map->header.next; entry != &map->header;
-	    entry = entry->next) {
-
+	RB_FOREACH(entry, uvm_map_addr, &map->addr) {
 		/* should never happen for a user process */
 		if (UVM_ET_ISSUBMAP(entry)) {
 			panic("uvm_coredump: user process with submap?");
@@ -261,9 +259,7 @@ uvm_coredump_walkmap(struct proc *p, void *iocookie,
 	vaddr_t top;
 	int error;
 
-	for (entry = map->header.next; entry != &map->header;
-	    entry = entry->next) {
-
+	RB_FOREACH(entry, uvm_map_addr, &map->addr) {
 		state.cookie = cookie;
 		state.prot = entry->protection;
 		state.flags = 0;