| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age | Files | Lines |
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uses a macro with multiple-evaluations of arguments (different amount
than the previous version..), but doug/bcook's inline version makes
BIGNUM not opaque [problem spotted by naddy]
ok doug
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inspired by guido vranken https://guidovranken.wordpress.com/2016/03/01/public-disclosure-malformed-private-keys-lead-to-heap-corruption-in-b2i_pvk_bio/
ok doug@
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Need to make sure i * 4 won't overflow. Based on OpenSSL:
commit 99ba9fd02fd481eb971023a3a0a251a37eb87e4c
input + ok bcook@
ok beck@
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ok deraadt@
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Based on a few OpenSSL commits:
Remove ancient DSA workarounds
commit ab4a81f69ec88d06c9d8de15326b9296d7f498ed
Remove workaround for broken DSA implementations using negative integers
commit dfb10af92e9663ce4eefaa1d6b678817fa85344d
Typo in error name (EVP_R_DECODE_ERROR -> DSA_R_DECODE_ERROR)
commit f6fb7f1856d443185c23f1a5968c08b4269dd37d
ok beck@
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ok doug@
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from ray@, ok jmc@
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ok jsing@
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ok guenther@
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ok guenther@
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ok guenther@
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ok bcook@
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ok bcook@
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ok bcook@
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The recently-added EVP_aead_chacha20_poly1305_ietf() function, which implements
informational RFC 7539, "ChaCha20 and Poly1305 for IETF Protocols", needs a
64-bit counter to avoid truncation on 32-bit platforms.
The existing TLS ChaCha20-Poly1305 ciphersuite is not impacted by this, but
making this change requires an ABI bump.
ok jsing@, "Looks sane" beck@
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This enables ENGINE_get_digest to work again with SHA1.
noted by NARUSE, Yui, @nurse from github
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ok djm@ jsing@
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ok krw@
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bn_internal(3) and lhash(3)
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give them names that really exist.
This also helps jmc@'s ongoing work on improving NAME sections.
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entry for them;
feedback/ok schwarze
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I found drafts of these in my tree, probably originally from
Max Fillinger, that just needed minor polishing.
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Already some time ago, bcook@ said these can be installed.
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reported by Ruslan Babayev.
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24 bits; if we don't, Td4[] gets cast to signed int, and according to C>=99
6.5.7, signed int shifted by enough bits to cause a the sign bit to be set
is an UB.
Reported by Pascal Cuoq on behalf of the trust-in-soft.com mafia I am
{partial,slightly related} to.
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CAST_KEY is constructed. This is expected to reduce blood pressure in
auditors.
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Suggested by WubTheCaptain so the same comparison code can be used with
LibreSSL.
https://www.openssl.org/docs/manmaster/crypto/OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER.html
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"ChaCha20 and Poly1305 for IETF Protocols", introduced a modified AEAD
construction that is incompatible with the common style that has been
already used in TLS with EVP_aead_chacha20_poly1305(). The IETF
version also adds a constant (salt) that is prepended to the nonce.
OK mikeb@ jsing@
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relying upon previously included headers to do this, to enhance portability;
from Pascal Cuoq, libressl github pull request #52
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For backward compatibility, the flags are redefined as 0.
ok jsing@
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No part of LibreSSL checks for this flag any longer.
ok jsing@
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ssl23_get_client_hello sets type=1 on error and continues processing.
It should return an error immediately to simplify things. This also
allows us to start removing the last of SSL_OP_NO_SSL*.
Added extra paranoia for s->version to make sure it is set properly.
ok jsing@
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ASN1_{GENERALIZED,UTC}TIME_set_string(), which allows it to be called
with a NULL pointer.
ok beck@
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ASN1_{GENERALIZED,UTC,}TIME_set_string() to be called with a NULL pointer.
Found the hard way by @kinichiro on github.
ok beck@
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becoming negative in probable_prime_dh_safe(). Reported by Franck Denis who
noticed `openssl gendh 0' would segfault.
Fix adapted from OpenSSL RT#2701.
ok beck@ jsing@
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will end up doing a read and write of up to 7 bytes beyond the specified
length. This is effectively a non-issue since we read and write back the
same data and due to alignment it is within a page boundary.
Regardless, avoid this by removing the "special" handling for the remaining
length and allow the standard (non-chunk) code to process the remaining
bytes, which does not result in overrun.
Reported by Pascal Cuoq <cuoq at trust-in-soft.com> - thanks!
ok beck@ miod@
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