wireguard-openbsd - WireGuard implementation for the OpenBSD kernel

	Commit message (Collapse)	Author	Age	Files	Lines
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*	permit sig 0 (existance checking) to setuid parents; ibo@ragnarok.val-axs.net	deraadt	1998-05-30	1	-1/+2
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*	add more signals to setuid part of cansignal()	deraadt	1998-05-18	1	-1/+5
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*	convert CANSIGNAL() macro into a function, and then add significant constraints	deraadt	1998-05-17	1	-13/+51
\| \| \| \| \| \|	regarding setuid/setgid targets (this is permitted by POSIX, and solves a number of security issues). This is due to a conversation months ago with dholland@hcs.harvard.edu.
*	GCC 2.8 caught this type error, thanks	niklas	1998-02-20	1	-2/+4
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*	core dumps disabled for SUID programs is default again.	csapuntz	1998-01-09	1	-2/+2
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*	Get rid of dumping across symlinks. Races can cause this to be problematic	csapuntz	1998-01-09	1	-3/+6
\| \| \| \|	from a security standpoint (i.e. arbitrary files on the FS can be wiped out).
*	add kern.nosuidcoredump to lock things out even more	deraadt	1997-12-08	1	-1/+5
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*	Updates for VFS Lite 2 + soft update.	csapuntz	1997-11-06	1	-2/+2
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*	back out vfs lite2 till after 2.2	deraadt	1997-10-06	1	-2/+2
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*	VFS Lite2 Changes	csapuntz	1997-10-06	1	-2/+2
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*	From FreeBSD (joerg@freebsd.org):	millert	1997-09-15	1	-1/+16
\| \| \| \| \| \| \|	Implement SA_NOCLDWAIT by reparenting kids of processes that have the appropriate bit set to PID 1, and let PID 1 handle the zombie. This assumes that PID 1 will wait for its kids (which is true of init). This also includes some FreeBSD sigaction.2.
*	add copyright for the work i did in csignal()	deraadt	1997-09-12	1	-1/+2
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*	for non-tty TIOCSPGRP/F_SETOWN/FIOSETOWN pgid setting calls, store uid	deraadt	1997-08-31	1	-1/+41
\| \| \| \| \| \| \|	and euid as well, then deliver them using new csignal() interface which ensures that pgid setting process is permitted to signal the pgid process(es). Thanks to newsham@aloha.net for extensive help and discussion.
*	add type & union sigval args to sendsig/trapsignal	deraadt	1997-02-01	1	-7/+28
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*	add another parameter to trapsignal() and sendsig() -- fault addr to be	deraadt	1997-01-27	1	-4/+5
\| \| \| \|	delivered with in the siginfo information
*	initial cut at SA_SIGINFO support	deraadt	1997-01-27	1	-1/+17
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*	Signal handling now fully POSIX.1-1990 compliant	tholo	1996-10-27	1	-3/+4
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*	Allow kill(, 0) on process groups that hold only zombies; per POSIX	tholo	1996-10-27	1	-2/+1
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*	Don't verify that euid has write permission	tholo	1996-10-27	1	-27/+2
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*	Correct last fix	tholo	1996-10-27	1	-2/+2
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*	A process can send a signal to another process if the uid of the signalling	tholo	1996-10-26	1	-1/+2
\| \| \| \|	process is the same as the saved uid of the signalled process
*	Further limit the cases where we write core files	tholo	1996-10-20	1	-6/+34
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*	From Keith Bostic, with some minor changes:	tholo	1996-10-18	1	-19/+34
\| \| \| \| \| \| \| \| \| \| \| \| \| \| \| \|	The problem reported on BUGTRACK was that ftpd could be convinced to drop core after it had discarded its special permissions, but while it still had a copy of the encrypted passwords in its buffers. Change coredump() to: + Don't drop core for any process that was ever setuid/setgid if it's not running as root. + Change errno returns from EFAULT to appropriate values -- this will be useful for when coredump() becomes a system call and gcore goes away. + Create core dump files mode 600, and don't dump to files that are owned by anyone else or readable or writable by anyone other than the owner.
*	another typo....	deraadt	1996-09-03	1	-3/+3
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*	do not coredump for setuid/setgid, unless run by root	deraadt	1996-09-03	1	-3/+7
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*	sync syscalls, no sys/cpu.h	deraadt	1996-05-02	1	-3/+2
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*	From NetBSD: 960217 merge	niklas	1996-03-03	1	-9/+23
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*	ss_sp is correct, ss_base is not. noticed by agc@sde.uts.amdahl.com; netbsd pr#1784	deraadt	1996-01-05	1	-2/+2
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*	initial import of NetBSD tree	deraadt	1995-10-18	1	-0/+1137