| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age | Files | Lines |
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from FreeBSD; fixes pr/1878
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output hardware checksumming. Not tested yet, but should be done
tonight.
Remain to be solved: interactions with bridge, TCP/UDP output
checksumming, interactions of TCP/UDP checksumming with routing
changes.
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- ok angelos@
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by crh@ubiqx.mn.org, fix from NetBSD; okay angelos@
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are not taken into consideration in anything just yet.
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licence in a way that makes ipf not free according to the rules we
established over 5 years ago, at www.openbsd.org/goals.html (and those
same basic rules govern the other *BSD projects too). Specifically,
Darren says that modified versions are not permitted. But software
which OpenBSD uses and redistributes must be free to all (be they
people or companies), for any purpose they wish to use it, including
modification, use, peeing on, or even integration into baby mulching
machines or atomic bombs to be dropped on Australia. Furthermore, we
know of a number of companies using ipf with modification like us, who
are now in the same situation, and we hope that some of them will work
with us to fill this gap that now exists in OpenBSD (temporarily, we
hope).
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(because of routing changes etc.)
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information will be stored in the TDB. ok ho@ provos@
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security properties of the packets to be pushed up to the application
(not done yet). Eventually, this will be turned into a packet
attributes framework.
Make sure tdbi's are free'd/cleared properly whenever drivers (or NFS)
does weird things with mbufs.
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andrews@crt.se for testing.
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the enc* interface, usually enc0; cedric@wireless-networks.com
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flag delayed to ip_output(). That halves the code and reduces most of
the route lookups. okay deraadt@
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fix -- the logic has to be reworked to allow for
multicast-over-IPsec. Patch from gene@lucky.net.
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angelos, be more careful :)
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form@openbsd.ru
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in some place sizeof(u_char), and in some place sizeof(int) were used.
previous code can cause problem in big endian machines.
now it always uses "int" (isakmpd uses int, so it should be okay)
set m_len properly on mcdonald-simple-ipsec-api getsockopt.
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- if the source IP address if unset (INADDR_ANY)
- if higher level protocol has cached the SA to use, and the SA specifies
the source address, use that
- otherwise, do a routing lookup to determine our outgoing interface
and fix the source address
- do an SPD lookup (which is why we needed the source address)
- if no IPsec is needed, proceed to multicast processing (if necessary),
IPF, etc. -- transmit the packet as usual; use the routing information
from before (if routing lookup was performed), or do a routing lookup
at this point.
- if IPsec is needed, do multicast processing (if needed), then do
IPsec processing, then call ip_output() recursively. Currently,
the second invocation does not do another SPD lookup (it will be
changed to do so in the near future, to support independent nested
tunnels without infinite loops).
Note that if the inner packet (the one that will have IPsec applied to) is
multicast or broadcast, the interface flags are not checked (since it's not
clear what their meaning is in this case). If the IPsec destination address
is multicast/broadcast, the interface flags are checked of course.
It is no longer necessary to have routing entries for private networks on
IPsec gateways (or default routing entries if they're not needed, for that
matter).
Finally, this patch solves a problem with ever-increasing reference counts
on routing entries when doing IPsec processing.
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steps (including option type/length field - there were no checks, seems to
me 4.4BSD bug)
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filter.
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the link layer can choose the right address.
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idea is to support various cryptographic hardware accelerators (which
may be (detachable) cards, secondary/tertiary/etc processors,
software crypto, etc). Supports session migration between crypto
devices. What it doesn't (yet) support:
- multiple instances of the same algorithm used in the same session
- use of multiple crypto drivers in the same session
- asymmetric crypto
No support for a userland device yet.
IPsec code path modified to allow for asynchronous cryptography
(callbacks used in both input and output processing). Some unrelated
code simplification done in the process (especially for AH).
Development of this code kindly supported by Network Security
Technologies (NSTI). The code was writen mostly in Greece, and is
being committed from Montreal.
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reuse it in ip6_output and the bridge. The policy-lookup code will
probably follow suit in a separate routine sometime soon.
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one provided by pavlin@catarina.usc.edu)
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packets from 10.0.0.1 going to 11.0.0.1 should be ESP encrypted to
host 1:2:3:4:5:6:7:8).
ip6_output() needs to be modified to honor IP_RAWOUTPUT (or some such)
and IP_ENCAPSULATED, to not prepend an IPv6 header to the packet, and
to not do IPsec processing respectively.
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