| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age | Files | Lines |
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the ANSI way.
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by wayne@stallion.oz.au; also whack register.
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tcp connections during tcp_slowtimo. apdapted from thorpej@netbsd.org
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from netbsd; also fix a bug where setting TF_ACKNOW didn't actually
result in an ack.
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adapated from netbsd. okay angelos@
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Ok millert@
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UDP PCB's if the socket is connected.
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checksum errors as hardware checksum packets as well.
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output hardware checksumming. Not tested yet, but should be done
tonight.
Remain to be solved: interactions with bridge, TCP/UDP output
checksumming, interactions of TCP/UDP checksumming with routing
changes.
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are not taken into consideration in anything just yet.
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PCB; store information from the TDB to the PCB, if it's not
initialized, so processed can eventually retrieve it.
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with IPv6 TCP PMTUD is mandatory, compute mss size accordingly.
sync with kame
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security properties of the packets to be pushed up to the application
(not done yet). Eventually, this will be turned into a packet
attributes framework.
Make sure tdbi's are free'd/cleared properly whenever drivers (or NFS)
does weird things with mbufs.
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makes upgrades/code sharing much easier.
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validate ICMPv6 too big messages (pmtud) based on pcb. we accept
certain amount of non-validated ones, as IPv6 mandates ICMPv6 (so even for
traffic from unconnected pcb, we need pmtud).
sync with kame
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to less than N per 1 second.
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we don't support IPv4 mapped address,
and there are inconsistent bit manipulation code so it's safer to nuke them.
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flag delayed to ip_output(). That halves the code and reduces most of
the route lookups. okay deraadt@
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osuga@mml.yrp.nttdocomo.co.jp
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unspecified address (::) to mean "unbounded" or "unconnected",
and can be confused by packets from outside.
use of :: as source is not documented well in IPv6 specification.
not sure if it presents a real threat. the worst case scenario is a DoS
against TCP listening socket:
- outsider transmit TCP SYN with :: as IPv6 source
- receiving side creates TCP control block with:
local address = my addres
remote address = :: (meaning "unconnected")
state = SYN_RCVD
note that SYN ACK will not be sent due to ip6_output() filter.
this stays until it timeouts.
- the TCP control block prevents listening TCP control block from
being contacted (DoS).
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on diff from "Pete Kazmier" <pete@kazmier.com>
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not sure if there is a real threat or not, but it seems that there's
possibility for overrun/underrun (like non-NOP option with optlen > cnt).
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Remove netinet.h within ifdef INET6; this is already included.
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- protect IPv6 ND from being hosed (due to neighbor unreachability detection
hint) by wrong tcp traffic. still not sure if there's real attack, but
it is good to be cautious.
- avoid bitfield for router renumbering header decl.
- implement packet-per-sec limitation for icmp6 errors, turn interval
limit off (it is not very useful due to unix timer resolution).
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cleanup (indentation, v4-or-v6 conditions)
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inconsistency in corner cases (from NRL I believe).
todd (fries) and I have seen panic, with the following call chain:
ip6_input -> tcp_input -> tcp_respond -> ip_input -> bang!
more cleanups should be done, to decrease complexity.
for example, INP_IPV6_MAPPED should be nuked.
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as per TCP-imply IETF WG draft(s). The correct approach is to just use
the relevant interface's MTU.
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touch tcp header before m_adj, than the other way around.
(no behavior change with the current m_adj code, new code is safer against
any future m_adj changes)
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