| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age | Files | Lines |
... | |
| |
|
| |
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
security properties of the packets to be pushed up to the application
(not done yet). Eventually, this will be turned into a packet
attributes framework.
Make sure tdbi's are free'd/cleared properly whenever drivers (or NFS)
does weird things with mbufs.
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
the function. Previously it was possible for us to get stuck in splsoftnet()
under certain situations. Bug reported by hunter@dg.net.ua, fix by me ok'd
by deraadt@, provos@, angelos@.
|
| |
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
validate ICMPv6 too big messages (pmtud) based on pcb. we accept
certain amount of non-validated ones, as IPv6 mandates ICMPv6 (so even for
traffic from unconnected pcb, we need pmtud).
sync with kame
|
|
|
|
| |
transmit a truncated icmp6 packet and panic the system. sync with kame.
|
|
|
|
|
| |
we don't support IPv4 mapped address,
and there are inconsistent bit manipulation code so it's safer to nuke them.
|
| |
|
| |
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
unspecified address (::) to mean "unbounded" or "unconnected",
and can be confused by packets from outside.
use of :: as source is not documented well in IPv6 specification.
not sure if it presents a real threat. the worst case scenario is a DoS
against TCP listening socket:
- outsider transmit TCP SYN with :: as IPv6 source
- receiving side creates TCP control block with:
local address = my addres
remote address = :: (meaning "unconnected")
state = SYN_RCVD
note that SYN ACK will not be sent due to ip6_output() filter.
this stays until it timeouts.
- the TCP control block prevents listening TCP control block from
being contacted (DoS).
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
IPv4/v6 so the separation should make more sense.
TODO: remove IPv6 case from udp_output()
TODO: remove/comment out/#if 0 IPv4 mapped address cases
|
| |
|
| |
|
| |
|
| |
|
|
|
|
| |
should fix the crash problems with isic, reported last week.
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
only ipv6 tools (which touches ancillary data) are affected.
From: =?iso-8859-1?Q?G=F6ran_Bengtson?= <goeran@cdg.chalmers.se>
|
| |
|
| |
|
| |
|
| |
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
malicious party may try to use v4 mapped addr as source/dest to
confuse tcp/udp layer, or to bypass security checks,
for example, naive stack can mistakingly think a packet with
src = ::ffff:127.0.0.1 is from local node.
(sync with kame)
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
| |
bad for access controls.
(quickhack fix, need sysctl/setsockopt knob to enable this functionality)
|
|
|
|
| |
TODO: ditto for raw and tcp socket
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
replaces NRL IPv6 layer. reuses NRL pcb layer. no IPsec-on-v6 support.
see sys/netinet6/{TODO,IMPLEMENTATION} for more details.
GENERIC configuration should work fine as before. GENERIC.v6 works fine
as well, but you'll need KAME userland tools to play with IPv6 (will be
bringed into soon).
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
james@oaktree.co.uk by re-working icmp embedded-packet code so that
ip_forward() m_copy()-aliased packet can be forwarded to ip_output and
icmp_error() safely, because no packet tweaking is needed before
calling icmp_error()
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
SA to be used, use this SA in ip_output if available. allow mobile road
warriors for bind SAs with wildcard dst and src addresses. check IPSEC
AUTH and ESP level when receiving packets, drop them if protection is
insufficient. add stats to show dropped packets because of insufficient
IPSEC protection. -- phew. this was all done in canada. dugsong and linh
provided the ride and company.
|
|
|
|
|
| |
packets out. Also had the nice side effect of fewer blocks now move around by
ifdefs, which makes it more readable.
|
| |
|
| |
|
| |
|
| |
|
| |
|
| |
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
| |
ip_off, ip_id. for udp, also correct uh_sum. ip_sum is still set to 0;
(all this debugged using nmap)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
draft-mcdonald-simple-ipsec-api, kernel notifies (EMT_REQUESTSA) signal
userland key management applications when security services are requested.
this is only for outgoing connections at the moment, incoming packets
are not yet checked against the selected socket policy.
|
| |
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
a bitmask configurable via sysctl([38]). The default values
have not changed. If one wants to change the list it should
be done early on in /etc/rc.
|
| |
|
| |
|