| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age | Files | Lines |
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represent lists of revoked keys and certificates, taking as little as
a single bit of incremental cost to revoke a certificate by serial number.
KRLs are loaded via the existing RevokedKeys sshd_config option.
feedback and ok markus@
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Previously, we recorded "Failed xxx" since we reset authenticated before
calling auth_log() in auth2.c. This adds an explcit "Partial" state.
Add a "submethod" to auth_log() to report which submethod is used
for keyboard-interactive.
Fix multiple authentication when one of the methods is
keyboard-interactive.
ok markus@
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authorized_keys from a command in addition to (or instead of) from
the filesystem. The command is run as the target server user unless
another specified via a new AuthorizedKeysCommandUser option.
patch originally by jchadima AT redhat.com, reworked by me; feedback
and ok markus@
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to match. Feedback and ok djm@ markus@.
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no file should be read.
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Bring back authorized_keys2 as a default search path (to avoid breaking
existing users of this file), but override this in sshd_config so it will
be no longer used on fresh installs. Maybe in 2015 we can remove it
entierly :)
feedback and ok markus@ dtucker@
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of protocol v.2 support and has been undocumented for many years;
ok markus@
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which hostkeys are already recorded in known_hosts. This avoids
hostkey warnings when connecting to servers with new ECDSA keys
that are preferred by default; with markus@
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global options.strict_modes
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"looks ok" markus@
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keyfiles. These messages will be sent after the user has successfully
authenticated (where our client will display them with LogLevel=debug).
bz#1554; ok dtucker@
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in certificates. Currently, a certificate must include the a user's name
to be accepted for authentication. This change adds the ability to
specify a list of certificate principal names that are acceptable.
When authenticating using a CA trusted through ~/.ssh/authorized_keys,
this adds a new principals="name1[,name2,...]" key option.
For CAs listed through sshd_config's TrustedCAKeys option, a new config
option "AuthorizedPrincipalsFile" specifies a per-user file containing
the list of acceptable names.
If either option is absent, the current behaviour of requiring the
username to appear in principals continues to apply.
These options are useful for role accounts, disjoint account namespaces
and "user@realm"-style naming policies in certificates.
feedback and ok markus@
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are trusted to authenticate users (in addition than doing it per-user
in authorized_keys).
Add a RevokedKeys option to sshd_config and a @revoked marker to
known_hosts to allow keys to me revoked and banned for user or host
authentication.
feedback and ok markus@
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when chrooting; reported by danh AT wzrd.com; ok dtucker@
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user's shell inside the chroot; bz #1679, patch from alex AT rtfs.hu;
ok dtucker
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Holland via bz #1348 . Also checks for non-regular files during protocol
1 RSA auth. ok djm@
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unifdef -USKEY
These options have been in use for some years;
ok markus@ "no objection" millert@
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ok djm, sort of ok stevesk
makes the pain stop in one easy step
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which works similarly to the "Host" directive in ssh_config.
Lines after a Match line override the default set in the main section
if the condition on the Match line is true, eg
AllowTcpForwarding yes
Match User anoncvs
AllowTcpForwarding no
will allow port forwarding by all users except "anoncvs".
Currently only a very small subset of directives are supported.
ok djm@
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Theo nuked - our scripts to sync -portable need them in the files
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and use them throughout openssh
xcalloc is particularly important because malloc(nmemb * size) is a
dangerous idiom (subject to integer overflow) and it is time for it to
die
feedback and ok deraadt@
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add expansion to ControlPath; ok markus@
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(bz #999); ok markus@
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DenyGroups. bz #909, ok djm@
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