| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age | Files | Lines |
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ok markus@
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reported by henning@ also bz#1765; ok markus@ dtucker@
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in certificates. Currently, a certificate must include the a user's name
to be accepted for authentication. This change adds the ability to
specify a list of certificate principal names that are acceptable.
When authenticating using a CA trusted through ~/.ssh/authorized_keys,
this adds a new principals="name1[,name2,...]" key option.
For CAs listed through sshd_config's TrustedCAKeys option, a new config
option "AuthorizedPrincipalsFile" specifies a per-user file containing
the list of acceptable names.
If either option is absent, the current behaviour of requiring the
username to appear in principals continues to apply.
These options are useful for role accounts, disjoint account namespaces
and "user@realm"-style naming policies in certificates.
feedback and ok markus@
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following changes:
move the nonce field to the beginning of the certificate where it can
better protect against chosen-prefix attacks on the signature hash
Rename "constraints" field to "critical options"
Add a new non-critical "extensions" field
Add a serial number
The older format is still support for authentication and cert generation
(use "ssh-keygen -t v00 -s ca_key ..." to generate a v00 certificate)
ok markus@
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authorized_keys and TrustedCAKeys; ok markus@
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are trusted to authenticate users (in addition than doing it per-user
in authorized_keys).
Add a RevokedKeys option to sshd_config and a @revoked marker to
known_hosts to allow keys to me revoked and banned for user or host
authentication.
feedback and ok markus@
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OpenSSH certificate key types are not X.509 certificates, but a much
simpler format that encodes a public key, identity information and
some validity constraints and signs it with a CA key. CA keys are
regular SSH keys. This certificate style avoids the attack surface
of X.509 certificates and is very easy to deploy.
Certified host keys allow automatic acceptance of new host keys
when a CA certificate is marked as trusted in ~/.ssh/known_hosts.
see VERIFYING HOST KEYS in ssh(1) for details.
Certified user keys allow authentication of users when the signing
CA key is marked as trusted in authorized_keys. See "AUTHORIZED_KEYS
FILE FORMAT" in sshd(8) for details.
Certificates are minted using ssh-keygen(1), documentation is in
the "CERTIFICATES" section of that manpage.
Documentation on the format of certificates is in the file
PROTOCOL.certkeys
feedback and ok markus@
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Holland via bz #1348 . Also checks for non-regular files during protocol
1 RSA auth. ok djm@
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regular files; report from Solar Designer via Colin Watson in bz#1471
ok dtucker@ deraadt@
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ok djm, sort of ok stevesk
makes the pain stop in one easy step
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Theo nuked - our scripts to sync -portable need them in the files
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warnings; ok djm@
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they don't decode. bz #884, with & ok djm@
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markus@ ok
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check authctxt->valid rather then pw != NULL; ok markus@
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