| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age | Files | Lines |
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Bring back authorized_keys2 as a default search path (to avoid breaking
existing users of this file), but override this in sshd_config so it will
be no longer used on fresh installs. Maybe in 2015 we can remove it
entierly :)
feedback and ok markus@ dtucker@
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for Match. This avoids problems caused by forgetting to keep three
code locations in perfect sync and ordering
"this is at once beautiful and horrible" + ok dtucker@
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host/user keys (ECDSA) as specified by RFC5656. ECDH and ECDSA offer
better performance than plain DH and DSA at the same equivalent symmetric
key length, as well as much shorter keys.
Only the mandatory sections of RFC5656 are implemented, specifically the
three REQUIRED curves nistp256, nistp384 and nistp521 and only ECDH and
ECDSA. Point compression (optional in RFC5656 is NOT implemented).
Certificate host and user keys using the new ECDSA key types are supported.
Note that this code has not been tested for interoperability and may be
subject to change.
feedback and ok markus@
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Fixes an info leak of environment variables specified in authorized_keys,
reported by Jacob Appelbaum. ok djm@
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changes. Most code from Martin Forssen, maf at appgate dot com.
ok markus@
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from other files. No functional changes.
ok markus@ djm@
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generally useful
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method using the J-PAKE protocol described in F. Hao, P. Ryan,
"Password Authenticated Key Exchange by Juggling", 16th Workshop on
Security Protocols, Cambridge, April 2008.
This method allows password-based authentication without exposing
the password to the server. Instead, the client and server exchange
cryptographic proofs to demonstrate of knowledge of the password while
revealing nothing useful to an attacker or compromised endpoint.
This is experimental, work-in-progress code and is presently
compiled-time disabled (turn on -DJPAKE in Makefile.inc).
"just commit it. It isn't too intrusive." deraadt@
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a sshd_config MaxSessions knob. This is useful for disabling
login/shell/subsystem access while leaving port-forwarding working
(MaxSessions 0), disabling connection multiplexing (MaxSessions 1) or
simply increasing the number of allows multiplexed sessions.
Because some bozos are sure to configure MaxSessions in excess of the
number of available file descriptors in sshd (which, at peak, might be
as many as 9*MaxSessions), audit sshd to ensure that it doesn't leak fds
on error paths, and make it fail gracefully on out-of-fd conditions -
sending channel errors instead of than exiting with fatal().
bz#1090; MaxSessions config bits and manpage from junyer AT gmail.com
ok markus@
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mechanism. Each channel maintains a queue of callbacks, which will
be drained in order (RFC4253 guarantees confirm messages are not
reordered within an channel).
Also includes a abandonment callback to clean up if a channel is
closed without sending confirmation messages. This probably
shouldn't happen in compliant implementations, but it could be
abused to leak memory.
ok markus@ (as part of a larger diff)
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set by a Match block (eg Banner) behave the same for non-existent
users. Found by and ok djm@
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unifdef -USKEY
These options have been in use for some years;
ok markus@ "no objection" millert@
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when it encounters problems, and use this to make session multiplexing
masters survive slaves failing to pass all stdio FDs; ok markus@
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specify umac-64@openssh.com). Provides about 20% end-to-end speedup
compared to hmac-md5. Represents a different approach to message
authentication to that of HMAC that may be beneficial if HMAC based on one
of its underlying hash algorithms is found to be vulnerable to a new attack.
http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4418.txt
in conjunction with and OK djm@
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Yields around a 12-16% end-to-end speedup for arcfour256/hmac-md5
patch from markus@ tested dtucker@ and myself, ok markus@ and me (I'm
committing at his request)
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This allows configurations such as permitting password authentication from
the local net only while requiring pubkey from offsite. ok djm@, man page
bits ok jmc@
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(or until openssl include files are cleaned of parameter names in function
prototypes)
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ok djm, sort of ok stevesk
makes the pain stop in one easy step
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silencing a heap of lint warnings. also allows them to use
__bounded__ checking which can't be applied to macros; requested
by and feedback from deraadt@
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Theo nuked - our scripts to sync -portable need them in the files
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and use them throughout openssh
xcalloc is particularly important because malloc(nmemb * size) is a
dangerous idiom (subject to integer overflow) and it is time for it to
die
feedback and ok deraadt@
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(containing number of bytes read/written), and indicates error by
returning 0. EOF is signalled by errno==EPIPE.
Typical use now becomes:
if (atomicio(read, ..., len) != len)
err(1,"read");
ok deraadt@, cloder@, djm@
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before recording the new login. Fixes missing lastlog message when
/var/log/lastlog is not world-readable and incorrect datestamp when
multiple sessions are used (bz #463); much assistance & ok markus@
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from des@freebsd via bz #330, ok markus@
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markus@ ok
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cleanup_exit() function. re-refine cleanup_exit() where appropriate,
allocate sshd's authctxt eary to allow simpler cleanup in sshd.
tested by many, ok deraadt@
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but keep kerberos passwd auth for ssh1 and 2; ok djm, hin, henning, ...
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stripped down and tested by Jakob and myself.
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test+ok henning@
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* both client and server rekey _automatically_
(a) after 2^31 packets, because after 2^32 packets
the sequence number for packets wraps
(b) after 2^(blocksize_in_bits/4) blocks
(see: http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-secsh-newmodes-00.txt)
(a) and (b) are _enabled_ by default, and only disabled for known
openssh versions, that don't support rekeying properly.
* client option 'RekeyLimit'
* do not reply to requests during rekeying
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