| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age | Files | Lines |
|
|
|
| |
with & ok markus@
|
|
|
|
| |
with & ok markus@
|
|
|
|
| |
with & ok markus@
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
legacy one.
Includes a fairly big refactor of auth2-pubkey.c to retain less state
between key file lines.
feedback and ok markus@
|
|
|
|
|
| |
check that the negotiated algorithm matches the type in the
signature (only matters for RSA SHA1/SHA2 sigs). ok markus@
|
| |
|
| |
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
early in the protocol probably seemed reasonable in the 1990s, but
today it's clearly a bad idea in terms of both cryptography (cf.
multiple compression oracle attacks in TLS) and attack surface.
Moreover, to support it across privilege-separation zlib needed
the assistance of a complex shared-memory manager that made the
required attack surface considerably larger.
Prompted by Guido Vranken pointing out a compiler-elided security
check in the shared memory manager found by Stack
(http://css.csail.mit.edu/stack/); ok deraadt@ markus@
NB. pre-auth authentication has been disabled by default in sshd
for >10 years.
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
places that use them (authn and session code). After this, no state is
cached in canohost.c
feedback and ok markus@
|
|
|
|
|
| |
based on draft-rsa-dsa-sha2-256-03.txt and draft-ssh-ext-info-04.txt;
with & ok djm@
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
| |
a corresponding private key authentication being applied to other
authentication methods. Reported by halex@, ok markus@
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
The client will not ask the server to prove ownership of the private
halves of any hitherto-unseen hostkeys it offers to the client.
Allow UpdateHostKeys option to take an 'ask' argument to let the
user manually review keys offered.
ok markus@
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
a) switch packet.c to buffer api and isolate per-connection info into struct ssh
b) (de)serialization of the state is moved from monitor to packet.c
c) the old packet.c API is implemented in opacket.[ch]
d) compress.c/h is removed and integrated into packet.c
with and ok djm@
|
| |
|
|
|
|
| |
monitor rather than /var/empty/dev/log; ok dtucker@ deraadt@ markus@
|
|
|
|
| |
generally useful
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
method using the J-PAKE protocol described in F. Hao, P. Ryan,
"Password Authenticated Key Exchange by Juggling", 16th Workshop on
Security Protocols, Cambridge, April 2008.
This method allows password-based authentication without exposing
the password to the server. Instead, the client and server exchange
cryptographic proofs to demonstrate of knowledge of the password while
revealing nothing useful to an attacker or compromised endpoint.
This is experimental, work-in-progress code and is presently
compiled-time disabled (turn on -DJPAKE in Makefile.inc).
"just commit it. It isn't too intrusive." deraadt@
|
|
|
|
|
| |
ok djm, sort of ok stevesk
makes the pain stop in one easy step
|
|
|
|
| |
#include <pwd.h>; ok markus@
|
| |
|
| |
|
| |
|
| |
|
|
|
|
| |
markus@ ok
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
cleanup_exit() function. re-refine cleanup_exit() where appropriate,
allocate sshd's authctxt eary to allow simpler cleanup in sshd.
tested by many, ok deraadt@
|
|
|
|
| |
but keep kerberos passwd auth for ssh1 and 2; ok djm, hin, henning, ...
|
|
|
|
| |
stripped down and tested by Jakob and myself.
|
|
|
|
| |
test+ok henning@
|
| |
|
|
|
|
| |
patch from markus
|
| |
|
| |
|
| |
|
| |
|
| |
|
|
for ssh-privsep
|