| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age | Files | Lines |
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ok djm@
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programs.
ok deraadt@ millert@
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may be forwarded to a local Unix domain socket and vice versa or
both ends may be a Unix domain socket. This is a reimplementation
of the streamlocal patches by William Ahern from:
http://www.25thandclement.com/~william/projects/streamlocal.html
OK djm@ markus@
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existing API is offered as a set of wrappers.
with and ok markus@
Thanks also to Ben Hawkes, David Tomaschik, Ivan Fratric, Matthew
Dempsky and Ron Bowes for a detailed review a few months ago.
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post-auth child. the new buffer code is more strict, and requires
buffer_init() while the old code was happy after a bzero();
originally from djm@
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reduces algorithms to curve25519, aes-ctr, chacha, ed25519;
allows us to explore further options; with and ok djm
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callers that futzing with it will futz with the actual buffer
contents
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feedback and lots help from djm; ok djm@
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that combines Daniel Bernstein's ChaCha20 stream cipher and Poly1305 MAC
to build an authenticated encryption mode.
Inspired by and similar to Adam Langley's proposal for TLS:
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-chacha20poly1305-03
but differs in layout used for the MAC calculation and the use of a
second ChaCha20 instance to separately encrypt packet lengths.
Details are in the PROTOCOL.chacha20poly1305 file.
Feedback markus@, naddy@; manpage bits Loganden Velvindron @ AfriNIC
ok markus@ naddy@
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keepalives and rekeying will work properly over clock steps. Suggested by
markus@, "looks good" djm@.
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based on traffic volume or time. ok djm@, help & ok jmc@ for the man page.
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rekeying based on elapsed time in addition to amount of traffic.
with djm@ jmc@, ok djm
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algorithms to ssh. Includes some refactoring of KEX and key type handling
to be table-driven; ok markus@
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if it is a normal client closure; bz#2057 ok+feedback dtucker@
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since they are abnormal and result in a non-zero ssh exit status; patch
from Iain Morgan in bz#2057; ok dtucker@
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ok and feedback djm@
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this happens if packets are parsed only parially (e.g. ignore
messages sent when su/sudo turn off echo); noted by sthen/millert
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that change the packet format and compute the MAC over the encrypted
message (including the packet size) instead of the plaintext data;
these EtM modes are considered more secure and used by default.
feedback and ok djm@
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ok dtucker@, djm@
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reported Xi Wang, ok markus@
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patch from lionel AT mamane.lu via Colin Watson in bz#1855;
ok markus@
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hardcoding lowdelay/throughput.
bz#1733 patch from philipp AT redfish-solutions.com; ok markus@ deraadt@
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host/user keys (ECDSA) as specified by RFC5656. ECDH and ECDSA offer
better performance than plain DH and DSA at the same equivalent symmetric
key length, as well as much shorter keys.
Only the mandatory sections of RFC5656 are implemented, specifically the
three REQUIRED curves nistp256, nistp384 and nistp521 and only ECDH and
ECDSA. Point compression (optional in RFC5656 is NOT implemented).
Certificate host and user keys using the new ECDSA key types are supported.
Note that this code has not been tested for interoperability and may be
subject to change.
feedback and ok markus@
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string extracted from the buffer contains no embedded \0 characters*
This prevents random (possibly malicious) crap from being appended to
strings where it would not be noticed if the string is used with
a string(3) function.
Use the new API in a few sensitive places.
* actually, we allow a single one at the end of the string for now because
we don't know how many deployed implementations get this wrong, but don't
count on this to remain indefinitely.
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timing information by short-circuiting like memcmp() and use it for
some of the more sensitive comparisons (though nothing high-value was
readily attackable anyway); "looks ok" markus@
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temporarily save the current state ren resuming a suspended connection.
ok markus@
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ok markus@ djm@
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return type to match atomicio's
Diff from djm@, ok markus@
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changes. Most code from Martin Forssen, maf at appgate dot com.
ok markus@
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from Martin Forssen.
ok markus@
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from other files. No functional changes.
ok markus@ djm@
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reading 256K of data on packet size or HMAC errors (in CBC mode only).
Help, feedback and ok djm@
Feedback from Martin Albrecht and Paterson Kenny
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probability for the CPNI-957037 Plaintext Recovery Attack to 2^-18
ok djm@
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key renegotiation (bz #1363). With djm and Matt Day, ok djm@
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~10% speedup for localhost-scp; ok djm@
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keepalive timer (bz #1307). ok markus@
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