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* add some optional indirection to matching of principal names listeddjm2010-05-071-1/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | in certificates. Currently, a certificate must include the a user's name to be accepted for authentication. This change adds the ability to specify a list of certificate principal names that are acceptable. When authenticating using a CA trusted through ~/.ssh/authorized_keys, this adds a new principals="name1[,name2,...]" key option. For CAs listed through sshd_config's TrustedCAKeys option, a new config option "AuthorizedPrincipalsFile" specifies a per-user file containing the list of acceptable names. If either option is absent, the current behaviour of requiring the username to appear in principals continues to apply. These options are useful for role accounts, disjoint account namespaces and "user@realm"-style naming policies in certificates. feedback and ok markus@
* Add a TrustedUserCAKeys option to sshd_config to specify CA keys thatdjm2010-03-041-1/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | are trusted to authenticate users (in addition than doing it per-user in authorized_keys). Add a RevokedKeys option to sshd_config and a @revoked marker to known_hosts to allow keys to me revoked and banned for user or host authentication. feedback and ok markus@
* Add support for certificate key types for users and hosts.djm2010-02-261-1/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | OpenSSH certificate key types are not X.509 certificates, but a much simpler format that encodes a public key, identity information and some validity constraints and signs it with a CA key. CA keys are regular SSH keys. This certificate style avoids the attack surface of X.509 certificates and is very easy to deploy. Certified host keys allow automatic acceptance of new host keys when a CA certificate is marked as trusted in ~/.ssh/known_hosts. see VERIFYING HOST KEYS in ssh(1) for details. Certified user keys allow authentication of users when the signing CA key is marked as trusted in authorized_keys. See "AUTHORIZED_KEYS FILE FORMAT" in sshd(8) for details. Certificates are minted using ssh-keygen(1), documentation is in the "CERTIFICATES" section of that manpage. Documentation on the format of certificates is in the file PROTOCOL.certkeys feedback and ok markus@
* avoid run-time failures when specifying hostkeys via a relativedjm2010-01-131-1/+2
| | | | path by prepending the cwd in these cases; bz#1290; ok dtucker@
* Remove RoutingDomain from ssh since it's now not needed. It can be replaceddtucker2010-01-091-3/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | with "route exec" or "nc -V" as a proxycommand. "route exec" also ensures that trafic such as DNS lookups stays withing the specified routingdomain. For example (from reyk): # route -T 2 exec /usr/sbin/sshd or inherited from the parent process $ route -T 2 exec sh $ ssh 10.1.2.3 ok deraadt@ markus@ stevesk@ reyk@
* Allow to set the rdomain in ssh/sftp/scp/sshd and ssh-keyscan.reyk2009-10-281-1/+3
| | | | ok markus@
* make a2port() return -1 when it encounters an invalid port numberdjm2009-01-221-4/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | rather than 0, which it will now treat as valid (needed for future work) adjust current consumers of a2port() to check its return value is <= 0, which in turn required some things to be converted from u_short => int make use of int vs. u_short consistent in some other places too feedback & ok markus@
* Add support for an experimental zero-knowledge password authenticationdjm2008-11-041-1/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | method using the J-PAKE protocol described in F. Hao, P. Ryan, "Password Authenticated Key Exchange by Juggling", 16th Workshop on Security Protocols, Cambridge, April 2008. This method allows password-based authentication without exposing the password to the server. Instead, the client and server exchange cryptographic proofs to demonstrate of knowledge of the password while revealing nothing useful to an attacker or compromised endpoint. This is experimental, work-in-progress code and is presently compiled-time disabled (turn on -DJPAKE in Makefile.inc). "just commit it. It isn't too intrusive." deraadt@
* Add extended test mode (-T) and connection parameters for test mode (-C).dtucker2008-06-101-1/+2
| | | | | | -T causes sshd to write its effective configuration to stdout and exit. -C causes any relevant Match rules to be applied before output. The combination allows tesing of the parser and config files. ok deraadt djm
* Make the maximum number of sessions run-time controllable viadjm2008-05-081-1/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | a sshd_config MaxSessions knob. This is useful for disabling login/shell/subsystem access while leaving port-forwarding working (MaxSessions 0), disabling connection multiplexing (MaxSessions 1) or simply increasing the number of allows multiplexed sessions. Because some bozos are sure to configure MaxSessions in excess of the number of available file descriptors in sshd (which, at peak, might be as many as 9*MaxSessions), audit sshd to ensure that it doesn't leak fds on error paths, and make it fail gracefully on out-of-fd conditions - sending channel errors instead of than exiting with fatal(). bz#1090; MaxSessions config bits and manpage from junyer AT gmail.com ok markus@
* Enable the AllowAgentForwarding option in sshd_config (global and matchpyr2008-05-071-1/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | context), to specify if agents should be permitted on the server. As the man page states: ``Note that disabling Agent forwarding does not improve security unless users are also denied shell access, as they can always install their own forwarders.'' ok djm@, ok and a mild frown markus@
* rekey arc4random and OpenSSL RNG in postauth childdjm2008-02-131-1/+4
| | | | | closefrom fds > 2 before shell/command execution ok markus@
* add sshd_config ChrootDirectory option to chroot(2) users to a directory anddjm2008-02-081-1/+3
| | | | | tweak internal sftp server to work with it (no special files in chroot required). ok markus@
* Teach Match how handle config directives that are used before authentication.dtucker2007-02-191-2/+2
| | | | | | This allows configurations such as permitting password authentication from the local net only while requiring pubkey from offsite. ok djm@, man page bits ok jmc@
* Add ability to match groups to Match keyword in sshd_config. Feedback djm@,dtucker2006-08-141-1/+2
| | | | stevesk@, ok stevesk@.
* almost entirely get rid of the culture of ".h files that include .h files"deraadt2006-08-031-3/+1
| | | | | ok djm, sort of ok stevesk makes the pain stop in one easy step
* Make PermitOpen take a list of permitted ports and act more like most otherdtucker2006-07-211-1/+3
| | | | | keywords (ie the first match is the effective setting). This also makes it easier to override a previously set PermitOpen. ok djm@
* Add ForceCommand keyword to sshd_config, equivalent to the "command="dtucker2006-07-191-1/+3
| | | | | key option, man page entry and example in sshd_config. Feedback & ok djm@, man page corrections & ok jmc@
* Add support for conditional directives to sshd_config via a "Match" keyword,dtucker2006-07-121-3/+8
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | which works similarly to the "Host" directive in ssh_config. Lines after a Match line override the default set in the main section if the condition on the Match line is true, eg AllowTcpForwarding yes Match User anoncvs AllowTcpForwarding no will allow port forwarding by all users except "anoncvs". Currently only a very small subset of directives are supported. ok djm@
* support arguments to Subsystem commands; ok markus@djm2006-07-061-1/+2
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* standardise spacing in $OpenBSD$ tags; requested by deraadt@djm2006-03-251-1/+1
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* Add support for tun(4) forwarding over OpenSSH, based on an idea andreyk2005-12-061-1/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | initial channel code bits by markus@. This is a simple and easy way to use OpenSSH for ad hoc virtual private network connections, e.g. administrative tunnels or secure wireless access. It's based on a new ssh channel and works similar to the existing TCP forwarding support, except that it depends on the tun(4) network interface on both ends of the connection for layer 2 or layer 3 tunneling. This diff also adds support for LocalCommand in the ssh(1) client. ok djm@, markus@, jmc@ (manpages), tested and discussed with others
* bz #898: support AddressFamily in sshd_config. from peak@argo.troja.mff.cuni.czdjm2004-12-231-1/+2
| | | | ok deraadt@
* re-exec sshd on accept(); initial work, final debugging and ok markus@djm2004-06-241-3/+5
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* Add MaxAuthTries sshd config option; ok markus@dtucker2004-05-231-1/+3
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* bz #815: implement ability to pass specified environment variables from thedjm2004-04-271-1/+5
| | | | client to the server; ok markus@
* implement KerberosGetAFSToken server option. ok markus@, beck@jakob2003-12-231-1/+3
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* rename keepalive to tcpkeepalive; the old name causes too muchmarkus2003-12-091-2/+2
| | | | confusion; ok djm, dtucker; with help from jmc@
* remove unused kerberos code; ok henning@markus2003-09-011-3/+1
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* support GSS API user authentication; patches from Simon Wilkinson,markus2003-08-221-1/+3
| | | | stripped down and tested by Jakob and myself.
* remove RhostsAuthentication; suggested by djm@ before; ok djm@, deraadt@,markus2003-08-131-3/+1
| | | | fgsch@, miod@, henning@, jakob@ and others
* remove (already disabled) KRB4/AFS support, re-enable -k in ssh(1);markus2003-07-221-2/+1
| | | | test+ok henning@
* deprecate VerifyReverseMapping since it's dangerous if combinedmarkus2003-06-021-2/+2
| | | | | | | with IP based access control as noted by Mike Harding; replace with a UseDNS option, UseDNS is on by default and includes the VerifyReverseMapping check; with itojun@, provos@, jakob@ and deraadt@ ok deraadt@, djm@
* always parse kerberos options. ok djm@ markus@jakob2003-05-151-7/+1
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* add PermitUserEnvironment (off by default!); from dot@dotat.at; ok provos, deraadtmarkus2002-07-301-1/+2
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* allow Compression=yes/no in sshd_configmarkus2002-06-201-1/+2
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* for unprivileged user, group do:stevesk2002-03-201-4/+1
| | | | pw=getpwnam(SSH_PRIVSEP_USER); do_setusercontext(pw). ok provos@
* _PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR; ok provos@stevesk2002-03-191-2/+1
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* integrate privilege separated openssh; its turned off by default for now.provos2002-03-181-1/+4
| | | | work done by me and markus@
* $OpenBSD$ and RCSID() cleanup: don't use RCSID() in .h files; addstevesk2002-03-041-2/+2
| | | | | missing RCSID() to .c files and remove dup /*$OpenBSD$*/ from .c files. ok markus@
* s/ReverseMappingCheck/VerifyReverseMapping/ and avoid confusion; ok stevesk@markus2002-01-291-2/+2
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* add X11UseLocalhost; ok markus@stevesk2002-01-271-1/+2
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* basic KNF done while i was looking for something elsederaadt2001-12-191-4/+4
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* add -o to sshd, too. ok deraadt@markus2001-12-061-1/+3
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* typo in commentstevesk2001-08-171-4/+4
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* deprecate CheckMail. ok markus@jakob2001-08-161-2/+1
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* remove comments from .h, since they are cut&paste from the .c filesmarkus2001-06-261-14/+4
| | | | and out of sync
* Kerberos v5 support for SSH1, mostly from Assar Westerlund <assar@freebsd.org> and Bjorn Gronvall <bg@sics.se>. markus@ okdugsong2001-06-261-4/+6
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* prototype pedant. not very creative...itojun2001-06-261-4/+4
| | | | | - () -> (void) - no variable names
* get rid of known_hosts2, use it for hostkey lookup, but do not modify.markus2001-06-231-3/+3
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