| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age | Files | Lines |
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name (though we don't actually enforce this at present). Move one up
that was out of sequence
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for which host keys do not exist, generate the host keys with the
default key file path, an empty passphrase, default bits for the key
type, and default comment. This will be used by /etc/rc to generate
new host keys. Idea from deraadt.
ok deraadt
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portable without resorting to dropping PRIu64 formats everywhere
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store ECDH group information in private keys files as "named groups"
rather than as a set of explicit group parameters (by setting
the OPENSSL_EC_NAMED_CURVE flag). This makes for shorter key files and
retrieves the group's OpenSSL NID that we need for various things.
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should still be better than our current RSA-2048 default.
ok djm@, markus@
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OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms is the name of the function we have a man page
for, so use that. ok djm
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host/user keys (ECDSA) as specified by RFC5656. ECDH and ECDSA offer
better performance than plain DH and DSA at the same equivalent symmetric
key length, as well as much shorter keys.
Only the mandatory sections of RFC5656 are implemented, specifically the
three REQUIRED curves nistp256, nistp384 and nistp521 and only ECDH and
ECDSA. Point compression (optional in RFC5656 is NOT implemented).
Certificate host and user keys using the new ECDSA key types are supported.
Note that this code has not been tested for interoperability and may be
subject to change.
feedback and ok markus@
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for, so use that. ok djm
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appear in lexical order and make our ssh-keygen comply. ok markus@
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bz#1749; ok markus@
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files to include "progname: filename: error reason"
bz#1783; ok dtucker@
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certificates. The logic is that if another implementation fails to
implement them then the connection just loses features rather than fails
outright.
ok markus@
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since we would refuse to use them anyway. bz#1516; ok dtucker@
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inaccessible while trying to create .ssh directory. Based on patch
from jchadima AT redhat.com; ok dtucker@
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following changes:
move the nonce field to the beginning of the certificate where it can
better protect against chosen-prefix attacks on the signature hash
Rename "constraints" field to "critical options"
Add a new non-critical "extensions" field
Add a serial number
The older format is still support for authentication and cert generation
(use "ssh-keygen -t v00 -s ca_key ..." to generate a v00 certificate)
ok markus@
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ok djm kettenis
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suggested by vinschen AT redhat.com and markus@
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imorgan AT nas.nasa.gov
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are trusted to authenticate users (in addition than doing it per-user
in authorized_keys).
Add a RevokedKeys option to sshd_config and a @revoked marker to
known_hosts to allow keys to me revoked and banned for user or host
authentication.
feedback and ok markus@
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appease it.
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OpenSSH certificate key types are not X.509 certificates, but a much
simpler format that encodes a public key, identity information and
some validity constraints and signs it with a CA key. CA keys are
regular SSH keys. This certificate style avoids the attack surface
of X.509 certificates and is very easy to deploy.
Certified host keys allow automatic acceptance of new host keys
when a CA certificate is marked as trusted in ~/.ssh/known_hosts.
see VERIFYING HOST KEYS in ssh(1) for details.
Certified user keys allow authentication of users when the signing
CA key is marked as trusted in authorized_keys. See "AUTHORIZED_KEYS
FILE FORMAT" in sshd(8) for details.
Certificates are minted using ssh-keygen(1), documentation is in
the "CERTIFICATES" section of that manpage.
Documentation on the format of certificates is in the file
PROTOCOL.certkeys
feedback and ok markus@
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ftp://ftp.rsasecurity.com/pub/pkcs/pkcs-11/v2-20/pkcs-11v2-20.pdf
ssh(1) and ssh-keygen(1) use dlopen(3) directly to talk to a PKCS#11
provider (shared library) while ssh-agent(1) delegates PKCS#11 to
a forked a ssh-pkcs11-helper process.
PKCS#11 is currently a compile time option.
feedback and ok djm@; inspired by patches from Alon Bar-Lev
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bz#1630 reported by tj AT castaglia.org; ok markus@
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as it was inheriting the wrong one when bubblebabble signatures were
activated; bz#1611 report and patch from fwojcik+openssh AT besh.com;
ok markus@
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ok dtucker
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-v is also specified, making it consistent with the manual and other
uses of -l.
ok grunk@
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ok djm@ markus@
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that is not how it was envisioned.
Also correct manpage saying that -v is needed along with -l for it to work.
spotted by naddy@
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would not display you the random art as intended, spotted by canacar@
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graphical hash visualization schemes known as "random art", and by
Dan Kaminsky's musings on the subject during a BlackOp talk at the
23C3 in Berlin.
Scientific publication (original paper):
"Hash Visualization: a New Technique to improve Real-World Security",
Perrig A. and Song D., 1999, International Workshop on Cryptographic
Techniques and E-Commerce (CrypTEC '99)
http://sparrow.ece.cmu.edu/~adrian/projects/validation/validation.pdf
The algorithm used here is a worm crawling over a discrete plane,
leaving a trace (augmenting the field) everywhere it goes.
Movement is taken from dgst_raw 2bit-wise. Bumping into walls
makes the respective movement vector be ignored for this turn,
thus switching to the other color of the chessboard.
Graphs are not unambiguous for now, because circles in graphs can be
walked in either direction.
discussions with several people,
help, corrections and ok markus@ djm@
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search for a host in ~/.ssh/known_hosts and display its fingerprint;
ok markus@
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hash just the specified hostname and not the entire hostspec from the
keyfile. It may be of the form "hostname,ipaddr", which would lead to
a hash that never matches. report and fix from jp AT devnull.cz
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properly removes trailing newline
removes an unused variable
correctly counts line number
"looks ok" ray@ markus@
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ok pyr@, ray@, millert@, moritz@, chl@
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