| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age | Files | Lines |
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from Christian Hesse bz#2686
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ok krw millert
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message to be consistent with other cases. Part of bz#1993, ok deraadt.
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always obvious what it will be. bz#2368, ok djm@
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check sshkey_fingerprint return values;
ok markus
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host keys. Fixes connection-killing host key mismatches when
a server offers multiple ECDSA keys with different curve type
(an extremely unlikely configuration).
ok markus, "looks mechanical" deraadt@
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Add a hostkeys@openssh.com protocol extension (global request) for
a server to inform a client of all its available host key after
authentication has completed. The client may record the keys in
known_hosts, allowing it to upgrade to better host key algorithms
and a server to gracefully rotate its keys.
The client side of this is controlled by a UpdateHostkeys config
option (default on).
ok markus@
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ok djm markus
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fingerprints. Default changes from MD5 to SHA256 and format
from hex to base64.
Feedback and ok naddy@ markus@
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from portable
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Allow textfile or KRL-based revocation of hostkeys.
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may be forwarded to a local Unix domain socket and vice versa or
both ends may be a Unix domain socket. This is a reimplementation
of the streamlocal patches by William Ahern from:
http://www.25thandclement.com/~william/projects/streamlocal.html
OK djm@ markus@
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during initial key exchange. bz#2154 patch from Iain Morgan; ok markus@
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existing API is offered as a set of wrappers.
with and ok markus@
Thanks also to Ben Hawkes, David Tomaschik, Ivan Fratric, Matthew
Dempsky and Ron Bowes for a detailed review a few months ago.
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reduces algorithms to curve25519, aes-ctr, chacha, ed25519;
allows us to explore further options; with and ok djm
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certificate keys to plain keys and attempt SSHFP resolution.
Prevents a server from skipping SSHFP lookup and forcing a new-hostkey
dialog by offering only certificate keys.
Reported by mcv21 AT cam.ac.uk
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BindAddress is actually specified. Fixes regression in 6.5 for
UsePrivilegedPort=yes; patch from Corinna Vinschen
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deranged and might make some attacks on KEX easier; ok markus@
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obsolete RSA+MD5 signature scheme. it will still be possible to connect
with these clients/servers but only DSA keys will be accepted, and we'll
deprecate them entirely in a future release. ok markus@
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search path of domain suffixes to use to convert unqualified host names
to fully-qualified ones for host key matching.
This is particularly useful for host certificates, which would otherwise
need to list unqualified names alongside fully-qualified ones (and this
causes a number of problems).
"looks fine" markus@
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swp AT swp.pp.ru; ok dtucker@
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ProxyCommands that establish a connection and then pass a connected
file descriptor back to ssh(1). This allows the ProxyCommand to exit
rather than have to shuffle data back and forth and enables ssh to use
getpeername, etc. to obtain address information just like it does with
regular directly-connected sockets. ok markus@
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move first for SSH protocol 2 connections (the default). Patch based on
one in bz#1999 by tls AT panix.com, feedback dtucker@ ok markus@
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GlobalKnownHostsFile2 by making UserKnownHostsFile/GlobalKnownHostsFile
accept multiple paths per line and making their defaults include
known_hosts2; ok markus
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ok dtucker@
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ok markus@
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this warning if a new key type appears. ok djm@
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which hostkeys are already recorded in known_hosts. This avoids
hostkey warnings when connecting to servers with new ECDSA keys
that are preferred by default; with markus@
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ok markus@
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host/user keys (ECDSA) as specified by RFC5656. ECDH and ECDSA offer
better performance than plain DH and DSA at the same equivalent symmetric
key length, as well as much shorter keys.
Only the mandatory sections of RFC5656 are implemented, specifically the
three REQUIRED curves nistp256, nistp384 and nistp521 and only ECDH and
ECDSA. Point compression (optional in RFC5656 is NOT implemented).
Certificate host and user keys using the new ECDSA key types are supported.
Note that this code has not been tested for interoperability and may be
subject to change.
feedback and ok markus@
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following changes:
move the nonce field to the beginning of the certificate where it can
better protect against chosen-prefix attacks on the signature hash
Rename "constraints" field to "critical options"
Add a new non-critical "extensions" field
Add a serial number
The older format is still support for authentication and cert generation
(use "ssh-keygen -t v00 -s ca_key ..." to generate a v00 certificate)
ok markus@
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ok deraadt markus
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a CA key
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are trusted to authenticate users (in addition than doing it per-user
in authorized_keys).
Add a RevokedKeys option to sshd_config and a @revoked marker to
known_hosts to allow keys to me revoked and banned for user or host
authentication.
feedback and ok markus@
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OpenSSH certificate key types are not X.509 certificates, but a much
simpler format that encodes a public key, identity information and
some validity constraints and signs it with a CA key. CA keys are
regular SSH keys. This certificate style avoids the attack surface
of X.509 certificates and is very easy to deploy.
Certified host keys allow automatic acceptance of new host keys
when a CA certificate is marked as trusted in ~/.ssh/known_hosts.
see VERIFYING HOST KEYS in ssh(1) for details.
Certified user keys allow authentication of users when the signing
CA key is marked as trusted in authorized_keys. See "AUTHORIZED_KEYS
FILE FORMAT" in sshd(8) for details.
Certificates are minted using ssh-keygen(1), documentation is in
the "CERTIFICATES" section of that manpage.
Documentation on the format of certificates is in the file
PROTOCOL.certkeys
feedback and ok markus@
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with "route exec" or "nc -V" as a proxycommand. "route exec" also ensures
that trafic such as DNS lookups stays withing the specified routingdomain.
For example (from reyk):
# route -T 2 exec /usr/sbin/sshd
or inherited from the parent process
$ route -T 2 exec sh
$ ssh 10.1.2.3
ok deraadt@ markus@ stevesk@ reyk@
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child processes. bz #1643, patch from jchadima at redhat, ok deraadt.
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