| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age | Files | Lines |
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In ssh, when an agent fails to return a RSA-SHA2 signature when
requested and falls back to RSA-SHA1 instead, retry the signature to
ensure that the public key algorithm sent in the SSH_MSG_USERAUTH
matches the one in the signature itself.
In sshd, strictly enforce that the public key algorithm sent in the
SSH_MSG_USERAUTH message matches what appears in the signature.
Make the sshd_config PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes and
HostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes options control accepted signature algorithms
(previously they selected supported key types). This allows these
options to ban RSA-SHA1 in favour of RSA-SHA2.
Add new signature algorithms "rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com" and
"rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com" to force use of RSA-SHA2 signatures
with certificate keys.
feedback and ok markus@
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what was requested. This might happen when an old/non-OpenSSH agent
is asked to make a rsa-sha2-256/512 signature but only supports
ssh-rsa. bz#2799 feedback and ok markus@
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callers. ok djm@
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ssh.com <=2.* and OpenSSH <= 3.*.
These versions were all released in or before 2001 and predate the
final SSH RFCs. The hacks in question aren't necessary for RFC-
compliant SSH implementations.
ok markus@
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truncated by snprintf. Based on patch from cjwatson at debian.org via
bz#2768, ok djm@
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match. bz#2737 ok dtucker@
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particular when using "stacked" connections where it's not clear which
host is denying. bz#2720, ok djm@ markus@
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ok markus@
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corresponding plain *.pub public key. bz#2617 based on patch from
Adam Eijdenberg; ok dtucker@ markus@
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until rekeying (negative values are rejected at config parse time).
This allows the removal of some casts and a signed vs unsigned
comparison warning.
rekey_time is cast to int64 for the comparison which is a no-op
on OpenBSD, but should also do the right thing in -portable on
anything still using 32bit time_t (until the system time actually
wraps, anyway).
some early guidance deraadt@, ok djm@
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to make assumptions; from Karsten Weiss
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Instead of deleting and re-preparing the entire keys list, just reset
the 'used' flags; the keys list is already in a good order (with already-
tried keys at the back)
Analysis and patch from Vincent Brillault on bz#2642; ok dtucker@
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commit was intended to remove it from the server only.
remove a few server-side pre-auth compression bits that escaped
adjust wording of Compression directive in sshd_config(5)
pointed out by naddy@ ok markus@
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early in the protocol probably seemed reasonable in the 1990s, but
today it's clearly a bad idea in terms of both cryptography (cf.
multiple compression oracle attacks in TLS) and attack surface.
Moreover, to support it across privilege-separation zlib needed
the assistance of a complex shared-memory manager that made the
required attack surface considerably larger.
Prompted by Guido Vranken pointing out a compiler-elided security
check in the shared memory manager found by Stack
(http://css.csail.mit.edu/stack/); ok deraadt@ markus@
NB. pre-auth authentication has been disabled by default in sshd
for >10 years.
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ssh_dispatch_run(DISPATCH_BLOCK, ...) to return without the session
being authenticated. Check for this and exit if necessary. ok djm@
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other similar level. bz#2599, patch from cgallek at gmail.com, ok markus@
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safe fmprintf printer; bz#2058
feedback schwarze@ ok dtucker@
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draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-kex-sha2-03
diffie-hellman-group14-sha256 (2K group)
diffie-hellman-group16-sha512 (4K group)
diffie-hellman-group18-sha512 (8K group)
based on patch from Mark D. Baushke and Darren Tucker
ok markus@
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sshbuf_dup_string() to replace a common idiom of
strdup(sshbuf_ptr()) with better safety checking;
feedback and ok markus@
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when attempting pubkey auth with a certificate, if no separate
private key is found among the keys then try with the certificate
key itself.
bz#2550 reported by Peter Moody
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keys; reported by espie@ ok deraadt@
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ok markus@ djm@
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ok djm@
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ok dtucker@
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ok dtucker@
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based on draft-rsa-dsa-sha2-256-03.txt and draft-ssh-ext-info-04.txt;
with & ok djm@
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make tests consistent
ok markus@
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'ask', or 'confirm', and defaults to 'no'. When enabled, a private
key that is used during authentication will be added to ssh-agent if
it is running (with confirmation enabled if set to 'confirm').
Initial version from Joachim Schipper many years ago.
ok markus@
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keys are noted before pubkey authentication starts. ok dtucker@
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a certificate; patch from Meghana Bhat on bz#2436; ok markus@
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by a '+' to indicate that the specified items be appended to the
default rather than replacing it.
approach suggested by dtucker@, feedback dlg@, ok markus@
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PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes to the client side, so it still can be
tested or turned back on; feedback and ok djm@
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we only ever use it for strlen(pattern).
Prompted by hanno AT hboeck.de pointing an out-of-bound read
error caused by an incorrect pattern length found using AFL
and his own tools.
ok markus@
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