| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age | Files | Lines |
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rekeying based on elapsed time in addition to amount of traffic.
with djm@ jmc@, ok djm
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Colin Watson
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were default options, and don't warn if the latter are missing. ok markus@
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bz #1981, ok djm@
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This allows control of which keys are offered from tokens using
IdentityFile. ok markus@
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From Steve.McClellan at radisys com, ok markus@
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GlobalKnownHostsFile2 by making UserKnownHostsFile/GlobalKnownHostsFile
accept multiple paths per line and making their defaults include
known_hosts2; ok markus
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which hostkeys are already recorded in known_hosts. This avoids
hostkey warnings when connecting to servers with new ECDSA keys
that are preferred by default; with markus@
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selection of which key exchange methods are used by ssh(1) and sshd(8)
and their order of preference.
ok markus@
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host/user keys (ECDSA) as specified by RFC5656. ECDH and ECDSA offer
better performance than plain DH and DSA at the same equivalent symmetric
key length, as well as much shorter keys.
Only the mandatory sections of RFC5656 are implemented, specifically the
three REQUIRED curves nistp256, nistp384 and nistp521 and only ECDH and
ECDSA. Point compression (optional in RFC5656 is NOT implemented).
Certificate host and user keys using the new ECDSA key types are supported.
Note that this code has not been tested for interoperability and may be
subject to change.
feedback and ok markus@
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reference to function that accepts sig_atomic_t*. Convert it to
the latter; ok markus@ dtucker@
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following changes:
move the nonce field to the beginning of the certificate where it can
better protect against chosen-prefix attacks on the signature hash
Rename "constraints" field to "critical options"
Add a new non-critical "extensions" field
Add a serial number
The older format is still support for authentication and cert generation
(use "ssh-keygen -t v00 -s ca_key ..." to generate a v00 certificate)
ok markus@
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between certs and plain keys as the path to the private key is usually
the same.
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OpenSSH certificate key types are not X.509 certificates, but a much
simpler format that encodes a public key, identity information and
some validity constraints and signs it with a CA key. CA keys are
regular SSH keys. This certificate style avoids the attack surface
of X.509 certificates and is very easy to deploy.
Certified host keys allow automatic acceptance of new host keys
when a CA certificate is marked as trusted in ~/.ssh/known_hosts.
see VERIFYING HOST KEYS in ssh(1) for details.
Certified user keys allow authentication of users when the signing
CA key is marked as trusted in authorized_keys. See "AUTHORIZED_KEYS
FILE FORMAT" in sshd(8) for details.
Certificates are minted using ssh-keygen(1), documentation is in
the "CERTIFICATES" section of that manpage.
Documentation on the format of certificates is in the file
PROTOCOL.certkeys
feedback and ok markus@
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from imorgan at nas nasa gov, ok djm@
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reason the open failed to debug.
bz #1693, found by tj AT castaglia org, ok djm@
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Michal Gorny via Gentoo.
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child processes. bz #1643, patch from jchadima at redhat, ok deraadt.
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for the resume@appgate.com kex algorithm.
ok markus@
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out-of-sequence success message. (doesn't affect code enabled by default)
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generally useful
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method using the J-PAKE protocol described in F. Hao, P. Ryan,
"Password Authenticated Key Exchange by Juggling", 16th Workshop on
Security Protocols, Cambridge, April 2008.
This method allows password-based authentication without exposing
the password to the server. Instead, the client and server exchange
cryptographic proofs to demonstrate of knowledge of the password while
revealing nothing useful to an attacker or compromised endpoint.
This is experimental, work-in-progress code and is presently
compiled-time disabled (turn on -DJPAKE in Makefile.inc).
"just commit it. It isn't too intrusive." deraadt@
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nuke stale unusued prototype
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function.
spotted by des@freebsd, who commited an incorrect fix to the freebsd tree
and (as is fairly typical) did not report the problem to us. But this fix
is correct.
ok djm
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of 2^32; report and patch from Jan.Pechanec AT Sun.COM, ok dtucker@
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on a socket, such as is the case when ProxyCommand is used.
Gives hostbased auth an opportunity to work; bz#616, report
and feedback stuart AT kaloram.com; ok markus@
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where previously it weren't. bz #1221, found by Dean Kopesky, ok djm@
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ok markus@
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ok djm, sort of ok stevesk
makes the pain stop in one easy step
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massimo@cedoc.mo.it
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check seteuid() return values; report Marcus Meissner; ok dtucker djm
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once or prompting for their passphrases (which it subsequently ignores
anyway), similar to a previous change in ssh-add. bz #1186, ok djm@
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Theo nuked - our scripts to sync -portable need them in the files
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and use them throughout openssh
xcalloc is particularly important because malloc(nmemb * size) is a
dangerous idiom (subject to integer overflow) and it is time for it to
die
feedback and ok deraadt@
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deraadt@ ok
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