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* bye, bye xfree(); ok markus@djm2013-05-171-77/+68
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* Add an optional second argument to RekeyLimit in the client to allowdtucker2013-05-161-3/+4
| | | | | rekeying based on elapsed time in addition to amount of traffic. with djm@ jmc@, ok djm
* fix bzero(ptr_to_struct, sizeof(ptr_to_struct)); bz#2100 fromdjm2013-05-101-2/+2
| | | | Colin Watson
* hush some {unused, printf type} warningsdjm2013-04-051-6/+5
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* reset pubkey order on partial success; ok djm@markus2013-03-051-2/+6
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* Keep track of which IndentityFile options were manually supplied and whichdtucker2013-02-171-2/+2
| | | | were default options, and don't warn if the latter are missing. ok markus@
* Warn more loudly if an IdentityFile provided by the user cannot be read.dtucker2013-02-151-7/+12
| | | | bz #1981, ok djm@
* Make IdentitiesOnly apply to keys obtained from a PKCS11Provider.djm2012-12-021-3/+26
| | | | | This allows control of which keys are offered from tokens using IdentityFile. ok markus@
* remove dead code following 'for (;;)' loops.dtucker2012-06-221-3/+1
| | | | From Steve.McClellan at radisys com, ok markus@
* Remove undocumented legacy options UserKnownHostsFile2 anddjm2011-05-241-5/+6
| | | | | | GlobalKnownHostsFile2 by making UserKnownHostsFile/GlobalKnownHostsFile accept multiple paths per line and making their defaults include known_hosts2; ok markus
* fix memory leak; bz#1849 ok dtucker@djm2011-05-061-1/+4
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* automatically order the hostkeys requested by the client based ondjm2010-11-291-2/+60
| | | | | | which hostkeys are already recorded in known_hosts. This avoids hostkey warnings when connecting to servers with new ECDSA keys that are preferred by default; with markus@
* add a KexAlgorithms knob to the client and server configuration to allowdjm2010-09-221-1/+3
| | | | | | | selection of which key exchange methods are used by ssh(1) and sshd(8) and their order of preference. ok markus@
* Implement Elliptic Curve Cryptography modes for key exchange (ECDH) anddjm2010-08-311-1/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | host/user keys (ECDSA) as specified by RFC5656. ECDH and ECDSA offer better performance than plain DH and DSA at the same equivalent symmetric key length, as well as much shorter keys. Only the mandatory sections of RFC5656 are implemented, specifically the three REQUIRED curves nistp256, nistp384 and nistp521 and only ECDH and ECDSA. Point compression (optional in RFC5656 is NOT implemented). Certificate host and user keys using the new ECDSA key types are supported. Note that this code has not been tested for interoperability and may be subject to change. feedback and ok markus@
* bz#1502: authctxt.success is declared as an int, but passed bydjm2010-04-261-2/+2
| | | | | reference to function that accepts sig_atomic_t*. Convert it to the latter; ok markus@ dtucker@
* revised certificate format ssh-{dss,rsa}-cert-v01@openssh.com with thedjm2010-04-161-2/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | following changes: move the nonce field to the beginning of the certificate where it can better protect against chosen-prefix attacks on the signature hash Rename "constraints" field to "critical options" Add a new non-critical "extensions" field Add a serial number The older format is still support for authentication and cert generation (use "ssh-keygen -t v00 -s ca_key ..." to generate a v00 certificate) ok markus@
* show the key type that we are offering in debug(), helps distinguishdjm2010-04-101-2/+3
| | | | | between certs and plain keys as the path to the private key is usually the same.
* Add support for certificate key types for users and hosts.djm2010-02-261-1/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | OpenSSH certificate key types are not X.509 certificates, but a much simpler format that encodes a public key, identity information and some validity constraints and signs it with a CA key. CA keys are regular SSH keys. This certificate style avoids the attack surface of X.509 certificates and is very easy to deploy. Certified host keys allow automatic acceptance of new host keys when a CA certificate is marked as trusted in ~/.ssh/known_hosts. see VERIFYING HOST KEYS in ssh(1) for details. Certified user keys allow authentication of users when the signing CA key is marked as trusted in authorized_keys. See "AUTHORIZED_KEYS FILE FORMAT" in sshd(8) for details. Certificates are minted using ssh-keygen(1), documentation is in the "CERTIFICATES" section of that manpage. Documentation on the format of certificates is in the file PROTOCOL.certkeys feedback and ok markus@
* Make HostBased authentication work with a ProxyCommand. bz #1569, patchdtucker2010-01-131-13/+4
| | | | from imorgan at nas nasa gov, ok djm@
* Do not prompt for a passphrase if we fail to open a keyfile, and log thedtucker2010-01-111-2/+2
| | | | | reason the open failed to debug. bz #1693, found by tj AT castaglia org, ok djm@
* Don't escape backslashes in the SSH2 banner. bz#1533, patch fromdtucker2010-01-041-2/+2
| | | | Michal Gorny via Gentoo.
* zap unused variable and strlen; from Steve McClellan, ok djmdtucker2009-12-061-3/+2
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* Use the HostKeyAlias when prompting for passwords. bz#1039, ok djm@dtucker2009-11-201-5/+9
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* Set close-on-exec on various descriptors so they don't get leaked todtucker2009-11-101-1/+4
| | | | child processes. bz #1643, patch from jchadima at redhat, ok deraadt.
* Let the client detect if the server supports roaming by lookingandreas2009-10-241-1/+6
| | | | | for the resume@appgate.com kex algorithm. ok markus@
* disallow a hostile server from checking jpake auth by sending andjm2009-10-231-1/+20
| | | | out-of-sequence success message. (doesn't affect code enabled by default)
* refactor the (disabled) Schnorr proof code to make it a little moredjm2009-03-051-1/+2
| | | | generally useful
* Add support for an experimental zero-knowledge password authenticationdjm2008-11-041-2/+301
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | method using the J-PAKE protocol described in F. Hao, P. Ryan, "Password Authenticated Key Exchange by Juggling", 16th Workshop on Security Protocols, Cambridge, April 2008. This method allows password-based authentication without exposing the password to the server. Instead, the client and server exchange cryptographic proofs to demonstrate of knowledge of the password while revealing nothing useful to an attacker or compromised endpoint. This is experimental, work-in-progress code and is presently compiled-time disabled (turn on -DJPAKE in Makefile.inc). "just commit it. It isn't too intrusive." deraadt@
* sprinkle ARGSUSED on dispatch handlersdjm2008-11-011-2/+13
| | | | nuke stale unusued prototype
* Repair strnvis() buffersize of 4*n+1, with termination gauranteed by thederaadt2008-10-031-3/+3
| | | | | | | | function. spotted by des@freebsd, who commited an incorrect fix to the freebsd tree and (as is fairly typical) did not report the problem to us. But this fix is correct. ok djm
* don't allocate space for empty banners; report t8m at centrum.cz; ok deraadtmarkus2008-07-311-2/+2
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* strnvis preauth banner; pointed out by mpf@ ok markus@djm2008-07-171-5/+13
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* promote rekeylimit to a int64 so it can hold the maximum useful limitdjm2008-01-191-2/+2
| | | | of 2^32; report and patch from Jan.Pechanec AT Sun.COM, ok dtucker@
* djm owes me a vb and a tism cd for breaking ssh compilationjolan2007-05-171-1/+2
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* fall back to gethostname() when the outgoing connection is notdjm2007-05-171-3/+12
| | | | | | on a socket, such as is the case when ProxyCommand is used. Gives hostbased auth an opportunity to work; bz#616, report and feedback stuart AT kaloram.com; ok markus@
* Fix regression where SSH2 banner is printed at loglevels ERROR and FATALdtucker2006-08-301-2/+2
| | | | where previously it weren't. bz #1221, found by Dean Kopesky, ok djm@
* bz #1218 - disable SPNEGO as per RFC4462; diff from simon AT sxw.org.ukdjm2006-08-181-11/+4
| | | | ok markus@
* almost entirely get rid of the culture of ".h files that include .h files"deraadt2006-08-031-5/+6
| | | | | ok djm, sort of ok stevesk makes the pain stop in one easy step
* move #include <stdio.h> out of includes.hstevesk2006-08-011-1/+2
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* move #include <string.h> out of includes.hstevesk2006-07-221-1/+2
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* missed some needed #include <unistd.h> when KERBEROS5=no; issue fromstevesk2006-07-201-1/+2
| | | | massimo@cedoc.mo.it
* move #include <errno.h> out of includes.h; ok markus@stevesk2006-07-111-1/+3
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* do not set the gid, noted by solar; ok djmmarkus2006-06-081-2/+2
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* replace remaining setuid() calls with permanently_set_uid() andmarkus2006-06-061-3/+3
| | | | check seteuid() return values; report Marcus Meissner; ok dtucker djm
* uint32_t -> u_int32_t (which we use everywhere else)djm2006-05-081-2/+2
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* Prevent ssh from trying to open private keys with bad permissions more thandtucker2006-04-251-5/+7
| | | | | once or prompting for their passphrases (which it subsequently ignores anyway), similar to a previous change in ssh-add. bz #1186, ok djm@
* Put $OpenBSD$ tags back (as comments) to replace the RCSID()s thatdjm2006-03-251-0/+1
| | | | Theo nuked - our scripts to sync -portable need them in the files
* introduce xcalloc() and xasprintf() failure-checked allocations functionsdjm2006-03-251-7/+3
| | | | | | | | | | and use them throughout openssh xcalloc is particularly important because malloc(nmemb * size) is a dangerous idiom (subject to integer overflow) and it is time for it to die feedback and ok deraadt@
* RCSID() can diederaadt2006-03-191-1/+0
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* memory leaks detected by Coverity via elad AT netbsd.org;djm2006-03-191-2/+7
| | | | deraadt@ ok