| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age | Files | Lines |
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ok markus
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Do not link uidwap.c into ssh any more. Neuters UsePrivilegedPort,
which will be marked as deprecated shortly. ok markus@ djm@
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ok djm@
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only scp/sftp use progressmeter.o; ok djm@
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regular digest code. This speeds up compilation considerably.
ok markus@
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the name of the entry points for UMAC-128 before including umac.c.
Idea from FreeBSD.
ok dtucker@
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perhaps it is too verbose? Change each */Makefile to specifying exactly
what sources that program requires, compiling it seperate. Maybe we'll
iterate by sorting those into seperatable chunks, splitting up files
which contain common code + server/client specific code, or whatnot. But
this isn't one step, or we'd have done it a long time ago..
ok dtucker markus djm
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early in the protocol probably seemed reasonable in the 1990s, but
today it's clearly a bad idea in terms of both cryptography (cf.
multiple compression oracle attacks in TLS) and attack surface.
Moreover, to support it across privilege-separation zlib needed
the assistance of a complex shared-memory manager that made the
required attack surface considerably larger.
Prompted by Guido Vranken pointing out a compiler-elided security
check in the shared memory manager found by Stack
(http://css.csail.mit.edu/stack/); ok deraadt@ markus@
NB. pre-auth authentication has been disabled by default in sshd
for >10 years.
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discussed it at length with djm -- i think it is time to give this a
trial in snapshots.
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ok markus@
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reduces algorithms to curve25519, aes-ctr, chacha, ed25519;
allows us to explore further options; with and ok djm
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initial patch from Aris Adamantiadis; ok djm@
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the code bloat makes that no longer trustworthy functionality
ok guenther
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This introduces a new "UsePrivilegeSeparation=sandbox" option for
sshd_config that applies mandatory restrictions on the syscalls the
privsep child can perform. This prevents a compromised privsep child
from being used to attack other hosts (by opening sockets and proxying)
or probing local kernel attack surface.
The sandbox is implemented using systrace(4) in unsupervised "fast-path"
mode, where a list of permitted syscalls is supplied. Any syscall not
on the list results in SIGKILL being sent to the privsep child. Note
that this requires a kernel with the new SYSTR_POLICY_KILL option.
UsePrivilegeSeparation=sandbox will become the default in the future
so please start testing it now.
feedback dtucker@; ok markus@
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was imported over four years ago, so we don't need to link libdes
for kerberos anymore.
ok mikeb@ deraadt@
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host/user keys (ECDSA) as specified by RFC5656. ECDH and ECDSA offer
better performance than plain DH and DSA at the same equivalent symmetric
key length, as well as much shorter keys.
Only the mandatory sections of RFC5656 are implemented, specifically the
three REQUIRED curves nistp256, nistp384 and nistp521 and only ECDH and
ECDSA. Point compression (optional in RFC5656 is NOT implemented).
Certificate host and user keys using the new ECDSA key types are supported.
Note that this code has not been tested for interoperability and may be
subject to change.
feedback and ok markus@
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It doesn't do anything yet but is needed for upcoming changes in
roaming_common.c
ok markus@
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changes. Most code from Martin Forssen, maf at appgate dot com.
ok markus@
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method using the J-PAKE protocol described in F. Hao, P. Ryan,
"Password Authenticated Key Exchange by Juggling", 16th Workshop on
Security Protocols, Cambridge, April 2008.
This method allows password-based authentication without exposing
the password to the server. Instead, the client and server exchange
cryptographic proofs to demonstrate of knowledge of the password while
revealing nothing useful to an attacker or compromised endpoint.
This is experimental, work-in-progress code and is presently
compiled-time disabled (turn on -DJPAKE in Makefile.inc).
"just commit it. It isn't too intrusive." deraadt@
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unifdef -USKEY
These options have been in use for some years;
ok markus@ "no objection" millert@
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change in Portable; ok markus@
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since 2.0); ok markus@
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stripped down and tested by Jakob and myself.
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server interops with commercial client; ok jakob@ djm@
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ok markus@
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ssh_config.5/sshd_config.5; ok deraadt@ millert@
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run less code with euid==0 if ssh is installed setuid root
just switch the euid, don't switch the complete set of groups
(this is only needed by sshd). ok provos@
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