| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age | Files | Lines |
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mod_include: Fix potential buffer overflow with escaped characters
in SSI tag string. [Martin Kraemer, Jim Jagielski]
merged by fgsch
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slightly more logical layout of the page;
ok henning@
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ok henning@
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ok henning@
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joint work by Michael Knudsen <e@molioner.dk> and Daniel Ouellet
<daniel@presscom.net> with my input
no change in binaries
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ok henning@
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ok henning@
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adding time and date the binary was built is a really really really
important and worthwile information, rrrrriiiiiiiigggggghhhht.
and for sure a nice way to make the binary changes every time it is built
workaround for now (return "unnown") since this stupid piece of crap
function is part of the API and modules etc might (ab)use it.
king bula sez: what an incredible nonsense
pointed out by John Kerbawy <kerbawy@gmail.com>
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this diff removes a lot of #ifdef'd stuff that is irrelevant for us.
done by Daniel Ouellet after my advice.
tested by many, ok miod@
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Apache's mod_rewrite module can be made to write one zero byte in an
arbitrary memory position outside of a char array, causing DoS or
possibly buffer overflows.
The function lookup_map_dbmfile() in modules/mappers/mod_rewrite.c
copies data from a DBM file to the char array buf in a _secure_ manner,
but it zero-terminates the array afterwards in an _insecure_ manner. If
the key that is looked up has an n bytes long value, a zero byte will be
written in the memory position n bytes from the start of the char array
buf.
exploiting would require enabling dbm for mod_rewrite and getting it to use
a malicious dbm file.
reported by Ulf.Harnhammar.9485@student.uu.se
fix by me
ok otto, deraadt
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the client. Make UseCanonicalName socket port aware.
ok henning@
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when enabled but no explicit CookieName is set.
From: Apache CVS
ok henning@
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Reject responses from a remote server if sent an invalid (negative)
Content-Length. [Mark Cox]
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*) Fix buffer overflow in "SSLOptions +FakeBasicAuth" implementation
if the Subject-DN in the client certificate exceeds 6KB in length.
(CVE CAN-2004-0488).
*) Handle the case of OpenSSL retry requests after interrupted system
calls during the SSL handshake phase.
*) Remove some unused functions.
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by using a AuthNonce secret.
CAN-2003-0987
ok henning@
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could make it easier for attackers to insert those sequences into terminal
emulators containing vulnerabilities related to escape sequences.
CAN-2003-0020
ok henning@
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to produce a double, snprintf()ing that into a buffer and then
converting the string to an int with atoi().
ok millert@ henning@
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ok millert@ henning@
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a etoh diff
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ok henning@
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ok henning@
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(e.g. 192.168.1.1) where parsed incorrectly on sparc64.
It only affected IP addresses with no netmask definition.
The cause of this was:
a) use of the wrong type -- unsigned long instead of a 32bit value
b) implicit casts from int to unsigned long with sign extension
While doing that fix also some other obvious bugs.
from claudio jeker
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ok brad@
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SECURITY: CAN-2003-0542 (cve.mitre.org)
Fix buffer overflows in mod_alias and mod_rewrite which occurred if
one configured a regular expression with more than 9 captures.
[André Malo]
ok markus@
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ok deraadt@
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ok deraadt@
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ok henning@
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Sandor Palfy <netchan@cotse.net>
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secondary groups get initialized as well.
ok beck@ deraadt@
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