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authorJason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>2020-11-13 03:10:00 +0100
committerJason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>2020-11-22 22:00:32 +0100
commit1c7606cea18e908cf76201ce1534b0afdc04cc89 (patch)
tree56c591b462989278a9bc89fafe927d7347122db5 /updater
parenttunnel: only enable DNS blocking for 0/0 configs (diff)
downloadwireguard-windows-1c7606cea18e908cf76201ce1534b0afdc04cc89.tar.xz
wireguard-windows-1c7606cea18e908cf76201ce1534b0afdc04cc89.zip
manager: allow S-1-5-32-556 users to launch a limited UI
I still have serious security reservations about this, both conceptually -- should users be allowed to do this stuff? -- and pratically -- there are issues with this implementation that need some examination. TODO: - Is that registry key a secure path? Should we double check it? - Are we leaking handles to the unpriv'd process from the manager? Audit this too. - IPC notifications are blocking. Should we move this to a go routine to mitigate DoS potential? - Is GOB deserialization secure? Can an NCO user crash or RCE the manager? Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'updater')
-rw-r--r--updater/msirunner_windows.go1
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/updater/msirunner_windows.go b/updater/msirunner_windows.go
index 2f5ce5a4..d901274c 100644
--- a/updater/msirunner_windows.go
+++ b/updater/msirunner_windows.go
@@ -32,7 +32,6 @@ func (t *tempFile) ExclusivePath() string {
return t.Name()
}
-
func (t *tempFile) Delete() error {
if t.originalHandle == 0 {
name16, err := windows.UTF16PtrFromString(t.Name())