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| author |   Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> | 2020-11-13 03:10:00 +0100 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> | 2020-11-22 22:00:32 +0100 |
| commit | 1c7606cea18e908cf76201ce1534b0afdc04cc89 (patch) | |
| tree | 56c591b462989278a9bc89fafe927d7347122db5 /version | |
| parent | tunnel: only enable DNS blocking for 0/0 configs (diff) | |
| download | wireguard-windows-1c7606cea18e908cf76201ce1534b0afdc04cc89.tar.xz wireguard-windows-1c7606cea18e908cf76201ce1534b0afdc04cc89.zip | |
manager: allow S-1-5-32-556 users to launch a limited UI
I still have serious security reservations about this, both conceptually
-- should users be allowed to do this stuff? -- and pratically -- there
are issues with this implementation that need some examination.
TODO:
- Is that registry key a secure path? Should we double check it?
- Are we leaking handles to the unpriv'd process from the manager? Audit
this too.
- IPC notifications are blocking. Should we move this to a go routine to
mitigate DoS potential?
- Is GOB deserialization secure? Can an NCO user crash or RCE the
manager?
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'version')
0 files changed, 0 insertions, 0 deletions