| Age | Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Files | Lines |
|---|
|
CONFIG_PPC_FSL_BOOK3E is redundant with CONFIG_PPC_E500.
Remove it.
And rename five files accordingly.
Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu>
[mpe: Rename include guards to match new file names]
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/795cb93b88c9a0279289712e674f39e3b108a1b4.1663606876.git.christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu
|
|
Convert last users of PPC_INST_BRANCH to PPC_RAW_BRANCH()
And remove PPC_INST_BRANCH.
Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/fa8807108a2ef2287a2c9651d6e1ff7c051923d9.1652074503.git.christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu
|
|
Some functions defined in 'arch/powerpc/lib' are deserving of an `__init`
macro attribute. These functions are only called by other initialization
functions and therefore should inherit the attribute.
Also, change function declarations in header files to include `__init`.
Signed-off-by: Nick Child <nick.child@ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211216220035.605465-3-nick.child@ibm.com
|
|
In order to stop using 'struct ppc_inst' on PPC32,
define a ppc_inst_t typedef.
Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/fe5baa2c66fea9db05a8b300b3e8d2880a42596c.1638208156.git.christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu
|
|
The mitigation-patching.sh script in the powerpc selftests toggles
all mitigations on and off simultaneously, revealing that rfi_flush
and stf_barrier cannot safely operate at the same time due to races
in updating the static key.
On some systems, the static key code throws a warning and the kernel
remains functional. On others, the kernel will hang or crash.
Fix this by slapping on a mutex.
Fixes: 13799748b957 ("powerpc/64: use interrupt restart table to speed up return from interrupt")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.14+
Signed-off-by: Russell Currey <ruscur@russell.cc>
Acked-by: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211027072410.40950-1-ruscur@russell.cc
|
|
Use the restart table facility to return from interrupt or system calls
without disabling MSR[EE] or MSR[RI].
Interrupt return asm is put into the low soft-masked region, to prevent
interrupts being processed here, although they are still taken as masked
interrupts which causes SRRs to be clobbered, and a pending soft-masked
interrupt to require replaying.
The return code uses restart table regions to redirct to a fixup handler
rather than continue with the exit, if such an interrupt happens. In
this case the interrupt return is redirected to a fixup handler which
reloads r1 for the interrupt stack and reloads registers and sets state
up to replay the soft-masked interrupt and try the exit again.
Some types of security exit fallback flushes and barriers are currently
unable to cope with reentrant interrupts, e.g., because they store some
state in the scratch SPR which would be clobbered even by masked
interrupts. For now the interrupts-enabled exits are disabled when these
flushes are used.
Signed-off-by: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>
[mpe: Guard unused exit_must_hard_disable() as reported by lkp]
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210617155116.2167984-13-npiggin@gmail.com
|
|
'struct ppc_inst' is an internal representation of an instruction, but
in-memory instructions are and will remain a table of 'u32' forever.
Replace all 'struct ppc_inst *' used for locating an instruction in
memory by 'u32 *'. This removes a lot of undue casts to 'struct
ppc_inst *'.
It also helps locating ab-use of 'struct ppc_inst' dereference.
Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu>
[mpe: Fix ppc_inst_next(), use u32 instead of unsigned int]
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/7062722b087228e42cbd896e39bfdf526d6a340a.1621516826.git.christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu
|
|
'struct ppc_inst' is an internal structure to represent an instruction,
it is not directly the representation of that instruction in text code.
It is not meant to map and dereference code.
Dereferencing code directly through 'struct ppc_inst' has two main issues:
- On powerpc, structs are expected to be 8 bytes aligned while code is
spread every 4 byte.
- Should a non prefixed instruction lie at the end of the page and the
following page not be mapped, it would generate a page fault.
In-memory code must be accessed with ppc_inst_read().
Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/c9a1201dd0a66b4a0f91f0fb46d9385cbf030feb.1621516826.git.christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu
|
|
Use PPC_RAW_xxx() macros instead of open coding assembly
opcodes.
Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu>
[mpe: Fix bad converison in do_stf_exit_barrier_fixups()]
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/e79cd8e111ca13bf8c61a384bac365aa7e207647.1621506159.git.christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu
|
|
The stf entry barrier fallback is unsafe to execute in a semi-patched
state, which can happen when enabling/disabling the mitigation with
strict kernel RWX enabled and using the hash MMU.
See the previous commit for more details.
Fix it by changing the order in which we patch the instructions.
Note the stf barrier fallback is only used on Power6 or earlier.
Fixes: bd573a81312f ("powerpc/mm/64s: Allow STRICT_KERNEL_RWX again")
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210513140800.1391706-2-mpe@ellerman.id.au
|
|
The entry flush mitigation can be enabled/disabled at runtime. When this
happens it results in the kernel patching its own instructions to
enable/disable the mitigation sequence.
With strict kernel RWX enabled instruction patching happens via a
secondary mapping of the kernel text, so that we don't have to make the
primary mapping writable. With the hash MMU this leads to a hash fault,
which causes us to execute the exception entry which contains the entry
flush mitigation.
This means we end up executing the entry flush in a semi-patched state,
ie. after we have patched the first instruction but before we patch the
second or third instruction of the sequence.
On machines with updated firmware the entry flush is a series of special
nops, and it's safe to to execute in a semi-patched state.
However when using the fallback flush the sequence is mflr/branch/mtlr,
and so it's not safe to execute if we have patched out the mflr but not
the other two instructions. Doing so leads to us corrputing LR, leading
to an oops, for example:
# echo 0 > /sys/kernel/debug/powerpc/entry_flush
kernel tried to execute exec-protected page (c000000002971000) - exploit attempt? (uid: 0)
BUG: Unable to handle kernel instruction fetch
Faulting instruction address: 0xc000000002971000
Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 11 [#1]
LE PAGE_SIZE=64K MMU=Hash SMP NR_CPUS=2048 NUMA pSeries
CPU: 0 PID: 2215 Comm: bash Not tainted 5.13.0-rc1-00010-gda3bb206c9ce #1
NIP: c000000002971000 LR: c000000002971000 CTR: c000000000120c40
REGS: c000000013243840 TRAP: 0400 Not tainted (5.13.0-rc1-00010-gda3bb206c9ce)
MSR: 8000000010009033 <SF,EE,ME,IR,DR,RI,LE> CR: 48428482 XER: 00000000
...
NIP 0xc000000002971000
LR 0xc000000002971000
Call Trace:
do_patch_instruction+0xc4/0x340 (unreliable)
do_entry_flush_fixups+0x100/0x3b0
entry_flush_set+0x50/0xe0
simple_attr_write+0x160/0x1a0
full_proxy_write+0x8c/0x110
vfs_write+0xf0/0x340
ksys_write+0x84/0x140
system_call_exception+0x164/0x2d0
system_call_common+0xec/0x278
The simplest fix is to change the order in which we patch the
instructions, so that the sequence is always safe to execute. For the
non-fallback flushes it doesn't matter what order we patch in.
Fixes: bd573a81312f ("powerpc/mm/64s: Allow STRICT_KERNEL_RWX again")
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210513140800.1391706-1-mpe@ellerman.id.au
|
|
The entry flush mitigation can be enabled/disabled at runtime via a
debugfs file (entry_flush), which causes the kernel to patch itself to
enable/disable the relevant mitigations.
However depending on which mitigation we're using, it may not be safe to
do that patching while other CPUs are active. For example the following
crash:
sleeper[15639]: segfault (11) at c000000000004c20 nip c000000000004c20 lr c000000000004c20
Shows that we returned to userspace with a corrupted LR that points into
the kernel, due to executing the partially patched call to the fallback
entry flush (ie. we missed the LR restore).
Fix it by doing the patching under stop machine. The CPUs that aren't
doing the patching will be spinning in the core of the stop machine
logic. That is currently sufficient for our purposes, because none of
the patching we do is to that code or anywhere in the vicinity.
Fixes: f79643787e0a ("powerpc/64s: flush L1D on kernel entry")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.10+
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210506044959.1298123-2-mpe@ellerman.id.au
|
|
The STF (store-to-load forwarding) barrier mitigation can be
enabled/disabled at runtime via a debugfs file (stf_barrier), which
causes the kernel to patch itself to enable/disable the relevant
mitigations.
However depending on which mitigation we're using, it may not be safe to
do that patching while other CPUs are active. For example the following
crash:
User access of kernel address (c00000003fff5af0) - exploit attempt? (uid: 0)
segfault (11) at c00000003fff5af0 nip 7fff8ad12198 lr 7fff8ad121f8 code 1
code: 40820128 e93c00d0 e9290058 7c292840 40810058 38600000 4bfd9a81 e8410018
code: 2c030006 41810154 3860ffb6 e9210098 <e94d8ff0> 7d295279 39400000 40820a3c
Shows that we returned to userspace without restoring the user r13
value, due to executing the partially patched STF exit code.
Fix it by doing the patching under stop machine. The CPUs that aren't
doing the patching will be spinning in the core of the stop machine
logic. That is currently sufficient for our purposes, because none of
the patching we do is to that code or anywhere in the vicinity.
Fixes: a048a07d7f45 ("powerpc/64s: Add support for a store forwarding barrier at kernel entry/exit")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.17+
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210506044959.1298123-1-mpe@ellerman.id.au
|
|
The L1D flush fallback functions are not recoverable vs interrupts,
yet the scv entry flush runs with MSR[EE]=1. This can result in a
timer (soft-NMI) or MCE or SRESET interrupt hitting here and overwriting
the EXRFI save area, which ends up corrupting userspace registers for
scv return.
Fix this by disabling RI and EE for the scv entry fallback flush.
Fixes: f79643787e0a0 ("powerpc/64s: flush L1D on kernel entry")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.9+ which also have flush L1D patch backport
Reported-by: Tulio Magno Quites Machado Filho <tuliom@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210111062408.287092-1-npiggin@gmail.com
|
|
In a bunch of our security flushes, we use a comma rather than
a semicolon to 'terminate' an assignment. Nothing breaks, but
checkpatch picks it up if you copy it into another flush.
Switch to semicolons for ending statements.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201201144344.1228421-1-dja@axtens.net
|
|
IBM Power9 processors can speculatively operate on data in the L1 cache
before it has been completely validated, via a way-prediction mechanism. It
is not possible for an attacker to determine the contents of impermissible
memory using this method, since these systems implement a combination of
hardware and software security measures to prevent scenarios where
protected data could be leaked.
However these measures don't address the scenario where an attacker induces
the operating system to speculatively execute instructions using data that
the attacker controls. This can be used for example to speculatively bypass
"kernel user access prevention" techniques, as discovered by Anthony
Steinhauser of Google's Safeside Project. This is not an attack by itself,
but there is a possibility it could be used in conjunction with
side-channels or other weaknesses in the privileged code to construct an
attack.
This issue can be mitigated by flushing the L1 cache between privilege
boundaries of concern. This patch flushes the L1 cache after user accesses.
This is part of the fix for CVE-2020-4788.
Signed-off-by: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
|
|
IBM Power9 processors can speculatively operate on data in the L1 cache
before it has been completely validated, via a way-prediction mechanism. It
is not possible for an attacker to determine the contents of impermissible
memory using this method, since these systems implement a combination of
hardware and software security measures to prevent scenarios where
protected data could be leaked.
However these measures don't address the scenario where an attacker induces
the operating system to speculatively execute instructions using data that
the attacker controls. This can be used for example to speculatively bypass
"kernel user access prevention" techniques, as discovered by Anthony
Steinhauser of Google's Safeside Project. This is not an attack by itself,
but there is a possibility it could be used in conjunction with
side-channels or other weaknesses in the privileged code to construct an
attack.
This issue can be mitigated by flushing the L1 cache between privilege
boundaries of concern. This patch flushes the L1 cache on kernel entry.
This is part of the fix for CVE-2020-4788.
Signed-off-by: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
|
|
In a few places we want to calculate the address of the next
instruction. Previously that was simple, we just added 4 bytes, or if
using a u32 * we incremented that pointer by 1.
But prefixed instructions make it more complicated, we need to advance
by either 4 or 8 bytes depending on the actual instruction. We also
can't do pointer arithmetic using struct ppc_inst, because it is
always 8 bytes in size on 64-bit, even though we might only need to
advance by 4 bytes.
So add a ppc_inst_next() helper which calculates the location of the
next instruction, if the given instruction was located at the given
address. Note the instruction doesn't need to actually be at the
address in memory.
Although it would seem natural for the value to be passed by value,
that makes it too easy to write a loop that will read off the end of a
page, eg:
for (; src < end; src = ppc_inst_next(src, *src),
dest = ppc_inst_next(dest, *dest))
As noticed by Christophe and Jordan, if end is the exact end of a
page, and the next page is not mapped, this will fault, because *dest
will read 8 bytes, 4 bytes into the next page.
So value is passed by reference, so the helper can be careful to use
ppc_inst_read() on it.
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Reviewed-by: Jordan Niethe <jniethe5@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200522133318.1681406-1-mpe@ellerman.id.au
|
|
Expand the feature-fixups self-tests to includes tests for prefixed
instructions.
Signed-off-by: Jordan Niethe <jniethe5@gmail.com>
[mpe: Use CONFIG_PPC64 not __powerpc64__, add empty inlines]
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200506034050.24806-26-jniethe5@gmail.com
|
|
For powerpc64, redefine the ppc_inst type so both word and prefixed
instructions can be represented. On powerpc32 the type will remain the
same. Update places which had assumed instructions to be 4 bytes long.
Signed-off-by: Jordan Niethe <jniethe5@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Alistair Popple <alistair@popple.id.au>
[mpe: Rework the get_user_inst() macros to be parameterised, and don't
assign to the dest if an error occurred. Use CONFIG_PPC64 not
__powerpc64__ in a few places. Address other comments from
Christophe. Fix some sparse complaints.]
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200506034050.24806-24-jniethe5@gmail.com
|
|
Currently all instructions have the same length, but in preparation for
prefixed instructions introduce a function for returning instruction
length.
Signed-off-by: Jordan Niethe <jniethe5@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Reviewed-by: Alistair Popple <alistair@popple.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200506034050.24806-18-jniethe5@gmail.com
|
|
Prefixed instructions will mean there are instructions of different
length. As a result dereferencing a pointer to an instruction will not
necessarily give the desired result. Introduce a function for reading
instructions from memory into the instruction data type.
Signed-off-by: Jordan Niethe <jniethe5@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Reviewed-by: Alistair Popple <alistair@popple.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200506034050.24806-13-jniethe5@gmail.com
|
|
Currently unsigned ints are used to represent instructions on powerpc.
This has worked well as instructions have always been 4 byte words.
However, ISA v3.1 introduces some changes to instructions that mean
this scheme will no longer work as well. This change is Prefixed
Instructions. A prefixed instruction is made up of a word prefix
followed by a word suffix to make an 8 byte double word instruction.
No matter the endianness of the system the prefix always comes first.
Prefixed instructions are only planned for powerpc64.
Introduce a ppc_inst type to represent both prefixed and word
instructions on powerpc64 while keeping it possible to exclusively
have word instructions on powerpc32.
Signed-off-by: Jordan Niethe <jniethe5@gmail.com>
[mpe: Fix compile error in emulate_spe()]
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200506034050.24806-12-jniethe5@gmail.com
|
|
In preparation for instructions having a more complex data type start
using a macro, ppc_inst(), for making an instruction out of a u32. A
macro is used so that instructions can be used as initializer elements.
Currently this does nothing, but it will allow for creating a data type
that can represent prefixed instructions.
Signed-off-by: Jordan Niethe <jniethe5@gmail.com>
[mpe: Change include guard to _ASM_POWERPC_INST_H]
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Reviewed-by: Alistair Popple <alistair@popple.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200506034050.24806-7-jniethe5@gmail.com
|
|
create_branch(), create_cond_branch() and translate_branch() return the
instruction that they create, or return 0 to signal an error. Separate
these concerns in preparation for an instruction type that is not just
an unsigned int. Fill the created instruction to a pointer passed as
the first parameter to the function and use a non-zero return value to
signify an error.
Signed-off-by: Jordan Niethe <jniethe5@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Reviewed-by: Alistair Popple <alistair@popple.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200506034050.24806-6-jniethe5@gmail.com
|
|
Based on 1 normalized pattern(s):
this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify
it under the terms of the gnu general public license as published by
the free software foundation either version 2 of the license or at
your option any later version
extracted by the scancode license scanner the SPDX license identifier
GPL-2.0-or-later
has been chosen to replace the boilerplate/reference in 3029 file(s).
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Allison Randal <allison@lohutok.net>
Cc: linux-spdx@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190527070032.746973796@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
In order to protect against speculation attacks (Spectre
variant 2) on NXP PowerPC platforms, the branch predictor
should be flushed when the privillege level is changed.
This patch is adding the infrastructure to fixup at runtime
the code sections that are performing the branch predictor flush
depending on a boot arg parameter which is added later in a
separate patch.
Signed-off-by: Diana Craciun <diana.craciun@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
|
|
Functions do_stf_{entry,exit}_barrier_fixups are static but not declared as
such. This was detected by `sparse` tool with the following warning:
arch/powerpc/lib/feature-fixups.c:121:6: warning: symbol 'do_stf_entry_barrier_fixups' was not declared. Should it be static?
arch/powerpc/lib/feature-fixups.c:171:6: warning: symbol 'do_stf_exit_barrier_fixups' was not declared. Should it be static?
This patch declares both functions as static, as they are only called by
do_stf_barrier_fixups(), which is in the same source code file.
Signed-off-by: Breno Leitao <leitao@debian.org>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
|
|
Implement the barrier_nospec as a isync;sync instruction sequence.
The implementation uses the infrastructure built for BOOK3S 64.
Signed-off-by: Diana Craciun <diana.craciun@nxp.com>
[mpe: Split out of larger patch]
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
|
|
Add a config symbol to encode which platforms support the
barrier_nospec speculation barrier. Currently this is just Book3S 64
but we will add Book3E in a future patch.
Signed-off-by: Diana Craciun <diana.craciun@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
|
|
Pull powerpc updates from Michael Ellerman:
"Notable changes:
- Support for split PMD page table lock on 64-bit Book3S (Power8/9).
- Add support for HAVE_RELIABLE_STACKTRACE, so we properly support
live patching again.
- Add support for patching barrier_nospec in copy_from_user() and
syscall entry.
- A couple of fixes for our data breakpoints on Book3S.
- A series from Nick optimising TLB/mm handling with the Radix MMU.
- Numerous small cleanups to squash sparse/gcc warnings from Mathieu
Malaterre.
- Several series optimising various parts of the 32-bit code from
Christophe Leroy.
- Removal of support for two old machines, "SBC834xE" and "C2K"
("GEFanuc,C2K"), which is why the diffstat has so many deletions.
And many other small improvements & fixes.
There's a few out-of-area changes. Some minor ftrace changes OK'ed by
Steve, and a fix to our powernv cpuidle driver. Then there's a series
touching mm, x86 and fs/proc/task_mmu.c, which cleans up some details
around pkey support. It was ack'ed/reviewed by Ingo & Dave and has
been in next for several weeks.
Thanks to: Akshay Adiga, Alastair D'Silva, Alexey Kardashevskiy, Al
Viro, Andrew Donnellan, Aneesh Kumar K.V, Anju T Sudhakar, Arnd
Bergmann, Balbir Singh, Cédric Le Goater, Christophe Leroy, Christophe
Lombard, Colin Ian King, Dave Hansen, Fabio Estevam, Finn Thain,
Frederic Barrat, Gautham R. Shenoy, Haren Myneni, Hari Bathini, Ingo
Molnar, Jonathan Neuschäfer, Josh Poimboeuf, Kamalesh Babulal,
Madhavan Srinivasan, Mahesh Salgaonkar, Mark Greer, Mathieu Malaterre,
Matthew Wilcox, Michael Neuling, Michal Suchanek, Naveen N. Rao,
Nicholas Piggin, Nicolai Stange, Olof Johansson, Paul Gortmaker, Paul
Mackerras, Peter Rosin, Pridhiviraj Paidipeddi, Ram Pai, Rashmica
Gupta, Ravi Bangoria, Russell Currey, Sam Bobroff, Samuel
Mendoza-Jonas, Segher Boessenkool, Shilpasri G Bhat, Simon Guo,
Souptick Joarder, Stewart Smith, Thiago Jung Bauermann, Torsten Duwe,
Vaibhav Jain, Wei Yongjun, Wolfram Sang, Yisheng Xie, YueHaibing"
* tag 'powerpc-4.18-1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/powerpc/linux: (251 commits)
powerpc/64s/radix: Fix missing ptesync in flush_cache_vmap
cpuidle: powernv: Fix promotion from snooze if next state disabled
powerpc: fix build failure by disabling attribute-alias warning in pci_32
ocxl: Fix missing unlock on error in afu_ioctl_enable_p9_wait()
powerpc-opal: fix spelling mistake "Uniterrupted" -> "Uninterrupted"
powerpc: fix spelling mistake: "Usupported" -> "Unsupported"
powerpc/pkeys: Detach execute_only key on !PROT_EXEC
powerpc/powernv: copy/paste - Mask SO bit in CR
powerpc: Remove core support for Marvell mv64x60 hostbridges
powerpc/boot: Remove core support for Marvell mv64x60 hostbridges
powerpc/boot: Remove support for Marvell mv64x60 i2c controller
powerpc/boot: Remove support for Marvell MPSC serial controller
powerpc/embedded6xx: Remove C2K board support
powerpc/lib: optimise PPC32 memcmp
powerpc/lib: optimise 32 bits __clear_user()
powerpc/time: inline arch_vtime_task_switch()
powerpc/Makefile: set -mcpu=860 flag for the 8xx
powerpc: Implement csum_ipv6_magic in assembly
powerpc/32: Optimise __csum_partial()
powerpc/lib: Adjust .balign inside string functions for PPC32
...
|
|
Note that unlike RFI which is patched only in kernel the nospec state
reflects settings at the time the module was loaded.
Iterating all modules and re-patching every time the settings change
is not implemented.
Based on lwsync patching.
Signed-off-by: Michal Suchanek <msuchanek@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
|
|
Based on the RFI patching. This is required to be able to disable the
speculation barrier.
Only one barrier type is supported and it does nothing when the
firmware does not enable it. Also re-patching modules is not supported
So the only meaningful thing that can be done is patching out the
speculation barrier at boot when the user says it is not wanted.
Signed-off-by: Michal Suchanek <msuchanek@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
|
|
On some CPUs we can prevent a vulnerability related to store-to-load
forwarding by preventing store forwarding between privilege domains,
by inserting a barrier in kernel entry and exit paths.
This is known to be the case on at least Power7, Power8 and Power9
powerpc CPUs.
Barriers must be inserted generally before the first load after moving
to a higher privilege, and after the last store before moving to a
lower privilege, HV and PR privilege transitions must be protected.
Barriers are added as patch sections, with all kernel/hypervisor entry
points patched, and the exit points to lower privilge levels patched
similarly to the RFI flush patching.
Firmware advertisement is not implemented yet, so CPU flush types
are hard coded.
Thanks to Michal Suchánek for bug fixes and review.
Signed-off-by: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Mauricio Faria de Oliveira <mauricfo@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Neuling <mikey@neuling.org>
Signed-off-by: Michal Suchánek <msuchanek@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
Add a test of the relative branch patching logic in the alternate
section feature fixup code. This tests that if we branch past the last
instruction of the alternate section, the branch is not patched.
That's because the assembler will have created a branch that already
points to the first instruction after the patched section, which is
correct and needs no further patching.
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
|
|
The code patching code has always been a bit confused about whether
it's best to use void *, unsigned int *, char *, etc. to point to
instructions. In fact in the feature fixups tests we use both unsigned
int[] and u8[] in different places.
Unfortunately the tests that use unsigned int[] calculate the size of
the code blocks using subtraction of those unsigned int pointers, and
then pass the result to memcmp(). This means we're only comparing 1/4
of the bytes we need to, because we need to multiply by
sizeof(unsigned int) to get the number of *bytes*.
The result is that the tests do all the patching and then only compare
some of the resulting code, so patching bugs that only effect that
last 3/4 of the code could slip through undetected. It turns out that
hasn't been happening, although one test had a bad expected case (see
previous commit).
Fix it for now by multiplying the size by 4 in the affected functions.
Fixes: 362e7701fd18 ("powerpc: Add self-tests of the feature fixup code")
Epic-brown-paper-bag-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
|
|
When we patch an alternate feature section, we have to adjust any
relative branches that branch out of the alternate section.
But currently we have a bug if we have a branch that points to past
the last instruction of the alternate section, eg:
FTR_SECTION_ELSE
1: b 2f
or 6,6,6
2:
ALT_FTR_SECTION_END(...)
nop
This will result in a relative branch at 1 with a target that equals
the end of the alternate section.
That branch does not need adjusting when it's moved to the non-else
location. Currently we do adjust it, resulting in a branch that goes
off into the link-time location of the else section, which is junk.
The fix is to not patch branches that have a target == end of the
alternate section.
Fixes: d20fe50a7b3c ("KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Branch inside feature section")
Fixes: 9b1a735de64c ("powerpc: Add logic to patch alternative feature sections")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v2.6.27+
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
|
|
Currently the rfi-flush messages print 'Using <type> flush' for all
enabled_flush_types, but that is not necessarily true -- as now the
fallback flush is always enabled on pseries, but the fixup function
overwrites its nop/branch slot with other flush types, if available.
So, replace the 'Using <type> flush' messages with '<type> flush is
available'.
Also, print the patched flush types in the fixup function, so users
can know what is (not) being used (e.g., the slower, fallback flush,
or no flush type at all if flush is disabled via the debugfs switch).
Suggested-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Mauricio Faria de Oliveira <mauricfo@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
|
|
Merge our fixes branch from the 4.15 cycle.
Unusually the fixes branch saw some significant features merged,
notably the RFI flush patches, so we want the code in next to be
tested against that, to avoid any surprises when the two are merged.
There's also some other work on the panic handling that was reverted
in fixes and we now want to do properly in next, which would conflict.
And we also fix a few other minor merge conflicts.
|
|
feature fixups need to use patch_instruction() early in the boot,
even before the code is relocated to its final address, requiring
patch_instruction() to use PTRRELOC() in order to address data.
But feature fixups applies on code before it is set to read only,
even for modules. Therefore, feature fixups can use
raw_patch_instruction() instead.
Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@c-s.fr>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
|
|
On some CPUs we can prevent the Meltdown vulnerability by flushing the
L1-D cache on exit from kernel to user mode, and from hypervisor to
guest.
This is known to be the case on at least Power7, Power8 and Power9. At
this time we do not know the status of the vulnerability on other CPUs
such as the 970 (Apple G5), pasemi CPUs (AmigaOne X1000) or Freescale
CPUs. As more information comes to light we can enable this, or other
mechanisms on those CPUs.
The vulnerability occurs when the load of an architecturally
inaccessible memory region (eg. userspace load of kernel memory) is
speculatively executed to the point where its result can influence the
address of a subsequent speculatively executed load.
In order for that to happen, the first load must hit in the L1,
because before the load is sent to the L2 the permission check is
performed. Therefore if no kernel addresses hit in the L1 the
vulnerability can not occur. We can ensure that is the case by
flushing the L1 whenever we return to userspace. Similarly for
hypervisor vs guest.
In order to flush the L1-D cache on exit, we add a section of nops at
each (h)rfi location that returns to a lower privileged context, and
patch that with some sequence. Newer firmwares are able to advertise
to us that there is a special nop instruction that flushes the L1-D.
If we do not see that advertised, we fall back to doing a displacement
flush in software.
For guest kernels we support migration between some CPU versions, and
different CPUs may use different flush instructions. So that we are
prepared to migrate to a machine with a different flush instruction
activated, we may have to patch more than one flush instruction at
boot if the hypervisor tells us to.
In the end this patch is mostly the work of Nicholas Piggin and
Michael Ellerman. However a cast of thousands contributed to analysis
of the issue, earlier versions of the patch, back ports testing etc.
Many thanks to all of them.
Tested-by: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
|
|
Testing the fortified string functions[1] would cause a kernel panic on
boot in test_feature_fixups() due to a buffer overflow in memcmp.
This boils down to things like this:
extern unsigned int ftr_fixup_test1;
extern unsigned int ftr_fixup_test1_orig;
check(memcmp(&ftr_fixup_test1, &ftr_fixup_test1_orig, size) == 0);
We know that these are asm labels so it is safe to read up to 'size'
bytes at those addresses.
However, because we have passed the address of a single unsigned int to
memcmp, the compiler believes the underlying object is in fact a single
unsigned int. So if size > sizeof(unsigned int), there will be a panic
at runtime.
We can fix this by changing the types: instead of calling the asm labels
unsigned ints, call them unsigned int[]s. Therefore the size isn't
incorrectly determined at compile time and we get a regular unsafe
memcmp and no panic.
[1] http://openwall.com/lists/kernel-hardening/2017/05/09/2
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1497903987-21002-7-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Suggested-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Tested-by: Andrew Donnellan <andrew.donnellan@au1.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Donnellan <andrew.donnellan@au1.ibm.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
Update code that relied on sched.h including various MM types for them.
This will allow us to remove the <linux/mm_types.h> include from <linux/sched.h>.
Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
|
|
We cannot do those initializations from apply_feature_fixups() as
this function runs in a very restricted environment on 32-bit where
the kernel isn't running at its linked address and the PTRRELOC()
macro must be used for any global accesss.
Instead, split them into a separtate steup_feature_keys() function
which is called in a more suitable spot on ppc32.
Fixes: 309b315b6ec6 ("powerpc: Call jump_label_init() in apply_feature_fixups()")
Reported-and-tested-by: Christian Kujau <lists@nerdbynature.de>
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
|
|
Commit 9402c6846131 ("powerpc: Factor do_feature_fixup calls")
introduced a subtle bug on 32-bit. When reading the cpu spec from the
global, we not only need to do a pointer relocation on the global
address but also on the pointer we read from it.
This fixes crashes reported on MPC5200 based machines.
Fixes: 9402c6846131 ("powerpc: Factor do_feature_fixup calls")
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
|
|
As we just did for CPU features.
Signed-off-by: Kevin Hao <haokexin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Aneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
|
|
We do binary patching of asm code using CPU features, which is a
one-time operation, done during early boot. However checks of CPU
features in C code are currently done at run time, even though the set
of CPU features can never change after boot.
We can optimise this by using jump labels to implement cpu_has_feature(),
meaning checks in C code are binary patched into a single nop or branch.
For a C sequence along the lines of:
if (cpu_has_feature(FOO))
return 2;
The generated code before is roughly:
ld r9,-27640(r2)
ld r9,0(r9)
lwz r9,32(r9)
cmpwi cr7,r9,0
bge cr7, 1f
li r3,2
blr
1: ...
After (true):
nop
li r3,2
blr
After (false):
b 1f
li r3,2
blr
1: ...
mpe: Rename MAX_CPU_FEATURES as we already have a #define with that
name, and define it simply as a constant, rather than doing tricks with
sizeof and NULL pointers. Rename the array to cpu_feature_keys. Use the
kconfig we added to guard it. Add BUILD_BUG_ON() if the feature is not a
compile time constant. Rewrite the change log.
Signed-off-by: Kevin Hao <haokexin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Aneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
|
|
Call jump_label_init() early so that we can use static keys for CPU and
MMU feature checks.
Signed-off-by: Aneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
|
|
Early in boot we binary patch some sections of code based on the CPU and
MMU feature bits. But it is a one-time patching, there is no facility
for repatching the code later if the set of features change.
It is a major bug if the set of features changes after we've done the
code patching - so add a check for it.
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
|
|
32 and 64-bit do a similar set of calls early on, we move it all to
a single common function to make the boot code more readable.
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
|
Christophe Leroy
Nick Child
Russell Currey
Nicholas Piggin
Michael Ellerman
Daniel Axtens
Jordan Niethe
Thomas Gleixner
Diana Craciun
Breno Leitao
Linus Torvalds
Michal Suchanek
Mauricio Faria de Oliveira
Christophe Leroy
Ingo Molnar
Benjamin Herrenschmidt
Kevin Hao
Aneesh Kumar K.V