diff options
| author |   Thomas Cedeno <thomascedeno@google.com> | 2020-07-16 19:13:57 +0000 |
|---|---|---|
| committer |   Micah Morton <mortonm@chromium.org> | 2020-10-13 09:17:34 -0700 |
| commit | 111767c1d86bd9661f8b72ace50cbcb13507a1bf (patch) | |
| tree | eb61e1cd69c7b43ce363d8cde1c67ae0751eeb37 /kernel/sys.c | |
| parent | Linux 5.9 (diff) | |
| download | linux-111767c1d86bd9661f8b72ace50cbcb13507a1bf.tar.xz linux-111767c1d86bd9661f8b72ace50cbcb13507a1bf.zip | |
LSM: Signal to SafeSetID when setting group IDs
For SafeSetID to properly gate set*gid() calls, it needs to know whether
ns_capable() is being called from within a sys_set*gid() function or is
being called from elsewhere in the kernel. This allows SafeSetID to deny
CAP_SETGID to restricted groups when they are attempting to use the
capability for code paths other than updating GIDs (e.g. setting up
userns GID mappings). This is the identical approach to what is
currently done for CAP_SETUID.
NOTE: We also add signaling to SafeSetID from the setgroups() syscall,
as we have future plans to restrict a process' ability to set
supplementary groups in addition to what is added in this series for
restricting setting of the primary group.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Cedeno <thomascedeno@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Micah Morton <mortonm@chromium.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'kernel/sys.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | kernel/sys.c | 10 |
1 files changed, 5 insertions, 5 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/sys.c b/kernel/sys.c index ab6c409b1159..ad80f9767f27 100644 --- a/kernel/sys.c +++ b/kernel/sys.c @@ -373,7 +373,7 @@ long __sys_setregid(gid_t rgid, gid_t egid) if (rgid != (gid_t) -1) { if (gid_eq(old->gid, krgid) || gid_eq(old->egid, krgid) || - ns_capable(old->user_ns, CAP_SETGID)) + ns_capable_setid(old->user_ns, CAP_SETGID)) new->gid = krgid; else goto error; @@ -382,7 +382,7 @@ long __sys_setregid(gid_t rgid, gid_t egid) if (gid_eq(old->gid, kegid) || gid_eq(old->egid, kegid) || gid_eq(old->sgid, kegid) || - ns_capable(old->user_ns, CAP_SETGID)) + ns_capable_setid(old->user_ns, CAP_SETGID)) new->egid = kegid; else goto error; @@ -432,7 +432,7 @@ long __sys_setgid(gid_t gid) old = current_cred(); retval = -EPERM; - if (ns_capable(old->user_ns, CAP_SETGID)) + if (ns_capable_setid(old->user_ns, CAP_SETGID)) new->gid = new->egid = new->sgid = new->fsgid = kgid; else if (gid_eq(kgid, old->gid) || gid_eq(kgid, old->sgid)) new->egid = new->fsgid = kgid; @@ -744,7 +744,7 @@ long __sys_setresgid(gid_t rgid, gid_t egid, gid_t sgid) old = current_cred(); retval = -EPERM; - if (!ns_capable(old->user_ns, CAP_SETGID)) { + if (!ns_capable_setid(old->user_ns, CAP_SETGID)) { if (rgid != (gid_t) -1 && !gid_eq(krgid, old->gid) && !gid_eq(krgid, old->egid) && !gid_eq(krgid, old->sgid)) goto error; @@ -871,7 +871,7 @@ long __sys_setfsgid(gid_t gid) if (gid_eq(kgid, old->gid) || gid_eq(kgid, old->egid) || gid_eq(kgid, old->sgid) || gid_eq(kgid, old->fsgid) || - ns_capable(old->user_ns, CAP_SETGID)) { + ns_capable_setid(old->user_ns, CAP_SETGID)) { if (!gid_eq(kgid, old->fsgid)) { new->fsgid = kgid; if (security_task_fix_setgid(new,old,LSM_SETID_FS) == 0) |