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authortb <tb@openbsd.org>2020-12-15 16:04:49 +0000
committertb <tb@openbsd.org>2020-12-15 16:04:49 +0000
commit07c79ec5956a98bd7797869b5f56b6ed90fb294b (patch)
tree9b775390e1c2e74e1a89d04a3cd50cbd2c18756d
parentmissing NET_LOCK()/NET_UNLOCK() in pf_osfp_flush() (diff)
downloadwireguard-openbsd-07c79ec5956a98bd7797869b5f56b6ed90fb294b.tar.xz
wireguard-openbsd-07c79ec5956a98bd7797869b5f56b6ed90fb294b.zip
Use natural sizes for S3I(s)->tmp's *_md arrays
It is a historical artifact that cert_verify_md[], finish_md[] and peer_finish_md[] are twice as large as they need to be. This is confusing, especially for finish_md[] and peer_finish_md[] which are copied to to previous_client_finished[] and previous_server_finished[] which are only half as large. It is easy to check that they will never get more than EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE data written to them. In 1998, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE was 20 bytes long (for SHA-1). This got bumped to 16+20 for the SSLv3-specific md5+sha1. Apparently under the impression that EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE was still 20 bytes, someone else doubled finish_md[]'s size to EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE*2 and added /* actually only needs to be 16+20 */. A bit later finish_md[] was split up, and still a bit later the comment was amended for TLSv1. Shortly thereafter SHA-512 required a bump of EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE to 64 by a third person and we have been carrying 192 bytes of untouched memory in each of our SSLs ever since. ok inoguchi jsing (jsing had the same diff)
-rw-r--r--lib/libssl/ssl_locl.h10
1 files changed, 4 insertions, 6 deletions
diff --git a/lib/libssl/ssl_locl.h b/lib/libssl/ssl_locl.h
index 80a7d95be58..312c18f7ca2 100644
--- a/lib/libssl/ssl_locl.h
+++ b/lib/libssl/ssl_locl.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: ssl_locl.h,v 1.309 2020/12/14 15:20:31 tb Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: ssl_locl.h,v 1.310 2020/12/15 16:04:49 tb Exp $ */
/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
* All rights reserved.
*
@@ -892,13 +892,11 @@ typedef struct ssl3_state_internal_st {
struct {
int new_mac_secret_size;
- /* actually only needs to be 16+20 */
- unsigned char cert_verify_md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE*2];
+ unsigned char cert_verify_md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
- /* actually only need to be 16+20 for SSLv3 and 12 for TLS */
- unsigned char finish_md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE*2];
+ unsigned char finish_md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
size_t finish_md_len;
- unsigned char peer_finish_md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE*2];
+ unsigned char peer_finish_md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
size_t peer_finish_md_len;
unsigned long message_size;